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Over the last few decades, international organisations and bilateral donors have 
progressively promoted externally-led state building and Security Sector Reform (SSR) 
as two of the principal policy approaches to enhance state legitimacy and promote 
stability and security in countries emerging from conflicts. At the same time, the state 
building and SSR research agendas have grown exponentially and the quest for 
evidence-based policies has increasingly become an important aspect for international 
and British decision-makers working in fragile, conflict-affected countries. Nonetheless, 
the use and uptake of state building and SSR-oriented research findings by those 
involved in policy-making has remained a largely under-studied field of research, and 
enquiry into the research-policy nexus has rarely approached the issues of state building 
and SSR.  
This PhD research seeks to compensate for this gap in the literature by 
investigating the extent to which research has influenced and interacted with SSR 
policies, programmes and activities implemented by the United Kingdom (UK) in 
conflict-affected Sierra Leone. The thesis uses concepts and notions from the literature 
on the policy process and research utilisation to explore the ways in which research has 
influenced UK-led SSR policy. It analyses the evolution of the network of policy-
makers, street-level bureaucrats, and researchers working on SSR in Sierra Leone, and 
argues that two main variables – an increased stability in the country and a progressive 
evolution of SSR in policy and research – contributed to the expansion of the policy 
network over time and to a better use of research by street-level bureaucrats on the 
ground. The thesis tests the applicability of the literature on the research-policy nexus to 
the challenge of state building and SSR in conflict-affected environments, deriving from 
the Sierra Leone case study a series of recommendations to improve the use of research 
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1.1 Empirical context and argument 
Over of the last 15 years, scholars and donors working on Security Sector Reform (SSR) 
have extensively analysed the policy interventions designed and implemented by the 
United Kingdom (UK) during and after the Sierra Leone civil conflict (Albrecht, 2009, 
2010; Albrecht & Jackson, 2009; Albrecht & Malan, 2006; Baker, 2006; Ball, 1998; 
Denney, 2011; Department for International Development (DFID), 1998, 2000a; Ebo, 
2006; Ero, 2000; Fitz-Gerald, 2004; Gbla, 2007; Horn, Olonisakin & Peake, 2006; 
Jackson & Albrecht, 2010, 2011; Kondeh, 2008a; Malan et al., 2003; Short, 1999). 
British-led SSR policy in Sierra Leone consisted of a series of programmes, projects, and 
activities that started in the late 1990s and targeted the police, military, justice, 
intelligence, and governance structures of the country. These externally-led initiatives 
represented for the British government the first attempt to reform and overhaul the 
entire security architecture of a conflict-affected state. The novelty of this type of 
intervention, as well as the achievements of the country in the field of security over the 
course of the last two decades, demonstrated the importance of the Sierra Leone case 
study in the whole body of SSR literature. As a result, British-led SSR policy in conflict-
affected Sierra Leone is still studied and referred by scholars and practitioners working 
on SSR.  
Most of the narratives of the Sierra Leone case study have described and 
analysed the policies implemented in the West African state (Albrecht, 2010; Albrecht & 
Jackson, 2009; Albrecht & Malan, 2006; Denney, 2011; Gbla, 2007; Horn, Olonisakin & 
Peake, 2006; Jackson & Albrecht, 2010, 2011; Kondeh, 2008a; Malan et al., 2003), 
focusing on the lessons learned from the SSR intervention (Ebo, 2006; Ero, 2000; Fitz-
Gerald, 2004) and providing possible recommendations for future British and 
international SSR engagements in other fragile, conflict-affected environments 
(Albrecht, 2009; Ball, 1998; DFID, 1998, 2000a; Short, 1999). Only a few studies have 
actually described the policy process that brought British policy-makers in London and 
street-level bureaucrats in the country1 to take and implement such allegedly successful 
                                                          
1 The thesis uses the term ‘policy-makers’ to refer to those people responsible for or involved in 
formulating SSR policies, mostly based in London headquarters. It uses the term ‘street-level bureaucrats’ 
(Part 1.4 of the thesis defines the term according to Lipsky’s definition) to generally refer to those people 
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policy decisions (Albrecht & Jackson, 2009; Horn, Olonisakin & Peake, 2006; Jackson 
& Albrecht, 2010, 2011). Furthermore, no previous study has tried to investigate 
whether and how research played a role in designing and shaping these policies. 
Nonetheless, the international SSR policy and research agenda has grown exponentially 
over the last decade (Ball & Hendrickson, 2006; Bryden & Keane, 2010; DFID, 2002a, 
2002b; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 2005, 2007a; Sugden, 2006), and the quest 
for evidence-based policy has increasingly become an important aspect for British and 
international decision-makers working in fragile, conflict-affected countries (DFID, 
2004, 2008, 2009a, p. 1, 2010a). An analysis of the role played by research in the design 
and implementation of British-led SSR policy in Sierra Leone would therefore shed light 
on the dynamics characterising the policy process in such contexts, potentially 
improving the uptake and utilisation of research in current and future SSR interventions 
worldwide. 
This PhD seeks to understand the extent to which research has influenced and 
interacted with British-led SSR policy in conflict-affected Sierra Leone. The thesis 
explores the problems, the dynamics, and the narratives of research utilisation 
characterising the Sierra Leone case study, investigating the ways in which research and 
researchers have interacted with the SSR policy process in the country and, by 
extension, with British policies in the West African state. This PhD thesis thus 
represents an empirically-driven study on the role and utilisation of research in a 
specific, internationally-led policy such as SSR and in a dynamic and insecure context 
such as conflict-affected Sierra Leone. Through an extensive analysis of the use of 
research and knowledge in this particular and allegedly successful case study, the thesis 
aims to better understand the complexities of the SSR policy process in fragile, conflict-
affected environments, deriving from the Sierra Leone example useful 
recommendations on how to improve the utilisation of research into policy.  
With that goal at its centre, this PhD addresses this main question:  
To what extent has research influenced and interacted with British 
governmental SSR policy in conflict-affected Sierra Leone?  
                                                                                                                                                                    
(advisers, programme managers, implementers, officers) tasked with implementing Her Majesty’s 
Government (HMG) SSR policy and managing SSR assistance programmes on the ground, specifying 
their exact roles when possible.  
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To assist with answering this question, a series of inter-connected sub-questions are also 
addressed throughout the text:2 
1. How has the network of researchers and policy actors working on 
SSR in conflict-affected Sierra Leone evolved during the conflict 
and post-conflict years?  
2. What were the main contextual factors and exigencies that hindered 
or promoted the uptake of research into British-led SSR policy in 
Sierra Leone? 
3. What is the applicability of the literature on the research-policy 
nexus to the fast-paced, cross-governmental, institution-oriented, 
and internationalised challenge of state building and SSR in fragile, 
conflict-affected environments? 
4. What measures could favour and increase the influence of research 
upon state building and SSR policies in fragile, conflict-affected 
environments?    
In line with the ESRC’s definition, this PhD thesis defines research as “any form of 
disciplined inquiry that aims to contribute to a body of knowledge or theory” (ESRC, 
2005, p. 7). Research involves gathering and analysing information in a structured, 
methodical, and scientific way, and can be divided in at least two categories that are 
relevant to this study. Academic research is more likely to involve a broader (often 
comparative) focus, to be deeper in nature, and to have a strong empirical basis as a 
result. Because academic studies take longer to conduct, this kind of research tends not 
to be commissioned as much by donors working on SSR who require quick solutions to 
the challenges they face. Policy-driven research, on the other hand, is often 
commissioned by donors in response to a particular problem they want to address 
(quite urgently) and is hence more likely to be narrowly focused (on a specific country 
or theme), shorter-term in nature, and therefore have a weaker empirical basis. 
                                                          
2 Some of these questions are similar to those of the Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC)/DFID Research Project: ‘The Influence of DFID-Sponsored State Building-Oriented Research 
on British Policy in Fragile, Post-Conflict Environments’ (Grant Reference: RES-167-25-0596), to which 
this PhD is linked. For more information on the differences between this PhD and its overarching 
project, please see the Appendix. 
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Knowledge simply refers to what people know, or what is already known about a 
particular subject. The thesis adopts a wide definition of research, encompassing 
different studies and research outputs, from academic books to analyses and 
evaluations. It looks at the influence of different types of research on the decisions of 
policy-makers working in the headquarters of UK governmental departments and on 
the activities of street-level bureaucrats implementing policy-decisions in conflict-
affected Sierra Leone. It examines the extent to which British street-level bureaucrats 
sought to harness relevant ‘local’ knowledge of the context in which they were working 
or to draw upon research produced by outside experts to assist them in implementing 
the UK’s SSR programme.  
The thesis accepts the Oxford Dictionary’s definition of influence as “the 
capacity to have an effect on the character, development, or behaviour of someone or 
something” (Stevenson, 2010).3 In line with the literature on research utilisation 
(Hanney et al., 2003; Weiss, 1979), this study recognises that research can influence and 
interact with the policy process in different ways. Research can have a direct, 
straightforward, instrumental impact on policy-making and implementation, or it can 
have a more articulated interaction with policy, influencing the activities, choices, and 
thoughts of policy-makers and street-level bureaucrats in an indirect and conceptual 
fashion (Coleman, 1991; Garret & Islam, 1998; Mulgan, 2005; Neilson, 2001; Nutley, 
Davies & Walter, 2002). The thesis therefore understands ‘influence’ as a dynamic and 
multifaceted process through which the concepts, notions, and ideas that emerge from 
research directly or indirectly shape and model the activities, thoughts, choices, 
strategies, and policy approaches of policy-makers and street-level bureaucrats. Research 
utilisation in policy can thus follow knowledge-driven, problem-solving, interactive, 
political, tactical, and enlightenment models, and research can be seen as part of the 
intellectual enterprise of a society eventually interacting with policy and with the larger 
fashion of social thought (Weiss, 1979). 
The principal argument of the thesis is that research has increasingly influenced 
and interacted with policy decisions and activities of British SSR personnel working in 
conflict-affected Sierra Leone. In particular, two main variables contributed to this 
incremental interaction and influence of research. These two variables are an increasing 
                                                          
3 A sub-definition of influence also defines the terms as “the power to shape policy or ensure favourable 
treatment from someone, especially through status, contacts, or wealth” (Stevenson, 2010).  
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stability of the country context of Sierra Leone, and the progressive evolution of SSR as 
HMG policy and a related research agenda.  
With reference to the stability of the country context, the first UK SSR activities 
in Sierra Leone started in a period of open conflict and represented a series of so-called 
‘fire-fighting’ solutions aimed at re-establishing and bolstering the security apparatus of 
the state in an emergency situation. Early British-led security assistance activities in 
Sierra Leone started in the late 1990s in the middle of a civil war and evolved over the 
years in a more integrated set of reforms that continued until the current peaceful 
period. The end of the conflict in 2002 and an increased security on the ground assured 
researchers and street-level bureaucrats more access and capacity to gather information 
from the different provinces of the war-torn country. Similarly, this progressive stability 
gave British street-level bureaucrats more time to reflect on their policies and to read 
and analyse various studies and reports conducted in the country. As a result, the urgent 
and compelling policy and programme decisions taken in a dynamic situation of open 
conflict were progressively replaced by more articulated and structured policies during 
the post-conflict years. These policies were increasingly shaped and modelled by ad hoc, 
policy-driven research, studies, and surveys of international and local researchers 
working on the ground, as the improved security in the country allowed a more 
systematic gathering of information.  
At the same time, the SSR policy agenda developed in the late 1990s in the UK 
and was increasingly adopted at an international level by the donors member of the 
OECD DAC and by other multilateral organisations such as the European Union (EU) 
and the United Nations (UN) (Albrecht, Stepputat & Andersen, 2010; Ball, 2010; Ball & 
Hendrickson, 2006; DFID, 1997, 1998, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2000d, 2002b; DFID, 
Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) & Ministry of Defence (MOD), 2003a, 2003b, 
2004; Ebo & Powell, 2010; OECD DAC, 2004, 2005, 2007a; Short, 1998, 1999; UN, 
2008; United States Agency for International Development (USAID), United States 
Department of Defense (USDOD) & United States Department of State (USDOS), 
2009). As part of this evolution, Sierra Leone constituted the first engagement with SSR 
for the British government, an important learning experience for several UK 
departments as well as a test of their increasingly joined-up activities. Indeed, the first 
British-led security assistance activities in Sierra Leone started well before the launching 
of the first SSR policy statement by DFID Secretary of State Clare Short in March 1999 
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(Short, 1999). These narrowly oriented, ‘fire-fighting’ activities cannot be considered 
‘SSR’, since they were not always in line with the holistic, integrated, governance-
oriented principles of SSR. DFID thus developed and launched the SSR policy agenda 
because the first solutions in Sierra Leone were not working, and the Department 
believed that HMG required a longer-term, more integrated approach to reforming the 
security sector. DFID itself believed that it had a role to play in this process, but 
required a policy framework to enable this, hence the development of the SSR policy 
agenda.  
Thus, the British SSR policy agenda was launched in March 1999 and evolved 
progressively in the successive years. Lessons emerging from Sierra Leone and from 
other HMG engagements in countries such as Ethiopia, Uganda, Indonesia, and Sri 
Lanka informed this growing agenda and contributed to the refinement of the early SSR 
concept at headquarters level and HMG programmes and policy approaches on the 
ground. Research constituted an integral part of this evolution and since the launch of 
the SSR policy agenda DFID funded several security-related studies (Ball, 1998; Ball & 
Holmes, 2002; Ball et al., 2007; Hutchful, 2009; Nathan, 2007), as well as research 
centres such as the Conflict Security & Development Group (CSDG) at King’s College, 
London and the Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR) to 
inform the emerging SSR policy agenda. The progressive evolution of SSR as British 
and international policy and a related research agenda thus was a second main factor 
that contributed to an increased use of research by British street-level bureacurats in 
Sierra Leone. Lessons emerging from other conflict-affected countries progressively 
informed SSR policy at HMG level, and shaped street-level bureaucrats’ activities on the 
ground. Furthermore, the increased reflection on SSR-related issues and availability of 
research on security and governance-related issues constituted an important repository 
of knowledge for SSR street-level bureaucrats working in Sierra Leone.  
The improved stability in the country, as well as the progressive evolution of 
SSR as HMG policy and a related research agenda thus represent the two main variables 
impacting on the utilisation of research in British-led SSR policy in conflict-affected 
Sierra Leone. Positive changes in these two variables resulted in an increased influence 
and interaction between research and policy at headquarters level and in an improved 
use of research in SSR programmes and activities on the ground. As a consequence, the 
British-led SSR policy process in Sierra Leone evolved from a first period of ‘fire-
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fighting’ solutions to the more stable post-conflict decade. Policy-makers in London, 
street-level bureaucrats implementing SSR policy on the ground, and researchers 
informing HMG policy at headquarters and country level established over the years a 
growing and consolidated network stretching from the UK to Sierra Leone. The 
improved stability in the country and the progressive evolution of the SSR policy and 
research agenda contributed to the expansion of this policy network and to the increase 
of the number of policy and research actors participating in British-led SSR 
programmes and activities both in the UK and on the ground.  
The network of policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and researchers involved 
in British-led SSR in Sierra Leone evolved over the years, shaped and modelled by the 
two main variables that influenced the use of research in SSR policy in the country. 
These variables can be thus considered as the main external (the stability and security of 
the country) and internal (the evolution of the SSR policy and research agenda) factors 
that determined the shape and extension of the network of policy-makers, street-level 
bureaucrats, and researchers working on SSR in conflict-affected Sierra Leone. 
Developments outside and within the research-policy network thus interacted with one 
another, eventually contributing to a more structured and articulated network of policy 
and research actors, and, by extension, to an increased use, influence, and interaction of 
research with British-led SSR policy in Sierra Leone.  
The utilisation of research in British-led SSR policy in Sierra Leone also 
improved over the years, shaped by external contexts dynamics and by a progressive 
evolution of SSR as international and British policy and a related research agenda. 
During the first period of open conflict, British street-level bureaucrats in the country 
were compelled to take urgent and delicate policy decisions. The instability of the 
environment, together with the novelty of the SSR concept in British and international 
policy and in the related research agenda, severely limited the influence of research on 
these early decisions. Widespread insecurity in some provinces, lack of available 
materials, and HMG organisational structures shaped the British-led SSR policy process 
in the country, limiting the number of policy and research actors and the use of research 
on the ground. As a consequence, research played a marginal yet important role in the 
first ‘fire-fighting’ solutions of British street-level bureaucrats in Sierra Leone. It directly 
influenced some of the early policy decisions and the little information gathered from 
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the field constituted an invaluable source of knowledge for British street-level 
bureaucrats implementing security reforms in the country. 
Conversely, the post-conflict years were characterised by incremental stability, 
an increased availability of research, and a more structured and institutionalised policy 
process. They also saw an increase in the mechanisms at HMG level to use research in 
SSR policy at headquarters and country level. These different factors contributed to a 
better interaction between research and policy, eventually leading to an improved 
utilisation of research in SSR decisions and programme implementation in post-conflict 
Sierra Leone. The network of SSR policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and 
researchers working on British-led SSR grew and was further consolidated in the post-
conflict years. Lessons from other HMG engagements progressively shaped British 
governmental policy at headquarters level. Likewise, the improved security in the 
provinces allowed more information to be gathered and increased the street-level 
bureaucrats’ contextual knowledge of the country. As a result, SSR programmes in post-
conflict Sierra Leone could benefit from a vast array of reflections on SSR, as well as 
from an improved research capacity of international and local researchers working on 
the ground. The network of policy and research actors and the SSR policy process in 
Sierra Leone therefore evolved over the years. Likewise, the role, influence, and 
utilisation of research in British-led SSR became more important the further the country 
moved away from the conflict period. 
In spite of the great strides made in research utilisation in SSR policy and the 
expansion of the network of state building and SSR researchers at the international 
level, a significant gap remains in the literature on the research-policy nexus. The 
following sections of this chapter introduce this gap, as well as the context, the 
theoretical approach, and the structure of the thesis. Part 1.2 analyses how over the last 
two decades the quest for evidence-based approaches to policy has become an 
increasingly relevant requirement for British and international donors and decision-
makers working in the field of post-war reconstruction and development. Nonetheless, 
and despite a burgeoning production of research on state building and SSR, only a few 
studies have thus far investigated the use and uptake of these research findings by 
policy-makers and street-level bureaucrats on the ground. Part 1.3 sets the scene of the 
whole thesis by providing an historical account of the civil conflict in Sierra Leone and 
of the different British-led SSR policies implemented in the country. Part 1.4 focuses on 
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the theoretical approach used by the study to bring order and explore the main 
empirical question of the PhD. Finally, Part 1.5 presents the structure of the entire PhD 
and of the remaining chapters of the thesis. 
1.2 The gap: the quest for evidence-based policy4 
This PhD, its principal question, and related sub-questions identify and seek to 
compensate for a gap in the literature on research utilisation and post-conflict recovery, 
vis-à-vis an increasing contemporary emphasis and attention of bilateral and 
international donors on the promotion of more evidence-grounded policies. In recent 
years, state building has risen to the forefront of donors’ post-war reconstruction and 
development policy agenda (DFID, 2009b, 2010b; OECD, 2008, 2010; OECD DAC, 
2007b, 2008, 2011; Whaites, 2008). State building can include a range of different policy 
interventions designed to enhance state legitimacy through increased capability, 
accountability, and responsiveness to the needs of citizens. Among these interventions 
is SSR, which has become one of donors’ principal policy prescriptions to promote 
stability and security by rebuilding or reforming the security institutions of countries 
emerging from conflict. Indeed, the SSR policy agenda has expanded progressively over 
the last decade (OECD DAC, 2004, 2005, 2007a; UN, 2008; USAID, USDOD & 
USDOS, 2009), and the UK has become one of the major players promoting and 
implementing this growing agenda at bilateral and multilateral levels (DFID, 1997, 1998, 
2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2000d, 2002b; DFID, FCO & MOD, 2003a, 2003b, 2004; Short, 
1998, 1999). 
Over the last two decades, externally-led state building and SSR have thus 
emerged on the international agenda as two principal policies of intervention in fragile, 
post-conflict environments. State building, at least in its post-Cold War manifestation, 
has become a relatively new and burgeoning field, regularly challenging policy-makers 
with new and multifaceted problems. This rapid emergence of state building in the 
international policy agenda has “confronted policy-makers with novel problems” 
(Barakat, Waldman & Varisco, 2011a, p. 2) for which there were few ready answers, 
leading to “a situation in which practice often ran ahead of knowledge and evidence” 
(Waldman, Barakat & Varisco, 2014, p. 3). Similarly, SSR practices require an array of 
different and timely activities. Whilst the intent of these SSR efforts is political, their 
                                                          
4 Part of the analysis in this section has been used in Barakat, Waldman & Varisco (2011a). 
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nature is usually technical, operational, and targeted at military, police, justice, and 
intelligence actors, or relevant groups in the civilian policy sectors. Because of their 
nature and urgency, “there is seemingly little or no room for research to influence the 
implementation of these activities” (Varisco, 2014, p. 90). Rushing to tackle the several 
problems emerging in the aftermath of a war, policy-makers and street-level bureaucrats 
working on state building and SSR have often recurred to “atavistic, haphazard, 
fragmented, and short term responses” (Ghani & Lockart, 2008, p. 5) that sometimes 
exacerbated the collection of problems they were trying to fix.  
At the same time, research has sometimes struggled to keep up with this 
burgeoning policy agenda and provide state builders with solutions as new issues arose 
(Collier, 2006). However, the body of research on state building and on its “armed 
wing” (Jackson, 2010) SSR has grown significantly since the end of the Cold War, with 
an increasing volume of research on the topic (Collier, 2009, p. 3). Over the last decade, 
scholars and researchers have produced an increasing number of academic studies and 
research on post-conflict state building and SSR (Call & Wyeth, 2008; Chanaa, 2002; 
Chandler, 2010; Chesterman, 2004; Cooper & Pugh, 2002; Egnell & Haldén, 2009; 
Fukuyama, 2004; Jackson, 2011; McCartney, Fischer & Wils, 2004; Paris & Sisk, 2009; 
Sedra, 2010; Wulf, 2004). Furthermore, they “now have a larger pool of country case 
studies from which to extrapolate more reliable findings” (Barakat, Waldman & Varisco, 
2011a, p. 2), evidence, and lessons learned. 
Yet this increased number of lessons has “not necessarily resolved the apparent 
disconnect between research and policy” (Barakat, Waldman & Varisco, 2011a, p. 2). If 
it is true that “the inadequacy of postwar interventions does not necessarily result from 
a lack of expertise” (Jennings, 2003, p. 5), it seems nonetheless that academic studies on 
the topic have not yet sufficiently filled the alleged gap and disconnect between 
researchers and practitioners (Egnell & Haldén, 2010; Englebert & Tull, 2008, p. 109). 
The use and uptake of state building and SSR-oriented research findings by policy-
makers and street-level bureaucrats working in conflict-affected countries has remained 
indeed a largely under-studied field of research. Enquiry into the research-policy nexus 
has rarely approached the issue of state building and SSR in the aftermath of the ‘new 
wars’ (Kaldor, 1999) that erupted since the end of the Cold War, rather it has thus far 
focused primarily upon either commercial or scientific questions. Furthermore, when 
this enquiry approached the field of international development, its focus has seldom 
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revolved around state building or post-recovery issues, instead investigating 
scientifically-oriented issues such as natural resource management, health, and 
agronomy (Behrman, 2007; Buenavista, 2003; Buxton & Hanney, 1996; Court, Hovland 
& Young, 2005; Gilson & McIntyre, 2008; Hennink & Stephenson, 2005).  
Thus, the literature on research utilisation has rarely explored the problems 
associated with the use of research in post-conflict state building and SSR. As a result, 
if, on the one hand, the number of academic studies, country case analyses, lessons 
learned, and recommendations for policy-makers working on state building and SSR has 
flourished in recent years, on the other hand, the scholarship investigating the 
interactions between policy and research in state building and SSR has remained 
nonetheless limited (Ball & Hendrickson, 2006; Barakat, Waldman & Varisco, 2011a; 
CSDG, 2008; Sugden, 2006). 
The limited number of analyses and studies on research use in state building and 
SSR therefore constitutes a notable gap in the literature on post-war recovery and 
research utilisation. This gap has several consequences for international policy-makers 
and practitioners working on the ground. The apparent disarticulation between research 
and policy has often led to situations in which state builders repeatedly make the same 
mistakes and follow misguided short-term approaches (Barakat, 2010, p. 249) or 
blueprint model interventions in different contexts, difficultly learning from previous 
post-conflict engagements. This represents a major challenge for international donors 
and British departments working in the field of post-war reconstruction and 
development. 
In Britain, DFID has been the leading department within the UK government 
to increasingly promote evidence-based policy for development since its establishment 
as a separate ministry in 1997. From a practical point of view, this has been manifested 
in: explicit commitments to research in policy documents (DFID, 2001, p. 30, 2004, 
2007, 2009c, p. 1, 2010a; Surr et al., 2002); the adoption of comprehensive research 
strategies (DFID, 2008); improved funding for research (DFID, 2008, p. 6; National 
Audit Office (NAO), 2011, p. 56); the creation of several and new funding mechanisms 
such as the Research Programme Consortia (DFID, 2009a; Hovland et al., 2008); and 
the progressive evaluation of the impact of DFID-funded research (DFID, 2013). An 
analysis of the DFID WPs shows, for example, an increasing commitment of the 
ministry toward research and evidence, up to the 2009 promise of £1 billion investment 
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in development research over 5 years (Burnell, 1998, p. 794; DFID, 1997, 2000c, 2006a, 
2009d, p. 128). At the same time, DFID’s Research Strategy 2008-13 (2008) underlines the 
Department’s seriousness about supporting relevant and usable research, and “commits 
DFID to developing innovative means of measuring the impact of research” (Waldman, 
Barakat & Varisco, 2014, p. 47).  
The bulk of DFID’s research has “traditionally focused on scientific and 
technical fields of enquiry, with subjects in social science, governance and politics only 
seriously gaining attention from the late 1990s” (Waldman, Barakat & Varisco, 2014, p. 
50). Similarly, DFID understanding of the impact and uptake of research on policy and 
practice remained confined to particular domains. Despite the Department’s high 
interest on the topic,5 DFID-commissioned studies have only examined so far the 
impact and ‘return’ of research in fields such as health,6 water sanitation,7 sustainable 
agriculture,8 natural resources,9 education, and economics, without focusing to date on 
impact in relation to state building or SSR in fragile, conflict-affected environments. 
Nevertheless, as state building and SSR have recently become two of the main 
approaches of DFID and other international development actors, the Department has 
progressively augmented its investment in research into such issues over the last decade. 
For example, if in 2006-07 DFID spent over £10 million on social and political research 
(DFID, 2007), and in 2014-15 the Department’s Research and Evidence Division 
(RED) has pledged to spend just under 10% of its budget on governance, conflict and 
social development research, for a projected amount of approximately £29 million 
(NAO, 2011, p. 57). 
                                                          
5 See for example the websites of the following projects from the website Research for Development (R4D) of 
DFID: Learning Lessons on Research Uptake and Use: A Review of DFID’s Research Communication 
Programmes; Communicating Research for Utilisation: Scoping Study; Improving the Impact of 
Development Research through Better Communication and Uptake. 
6 See for example the websites of the following projects from DFID R4D: Future Health Systems: 
Making Health Systems Work for the Poor RPC; Consortium for Research on Equitable Health Systems; 
Research and Capacity Building in Reproductive and Sexual Health and HIV/AIDS in Developing 
Countries. 
7 See for example the websites of the following projects from DFID R4D: European Water Initiative 
Coordination of Member State Research Programmes in Water Science and Technology for the 
Developing World; Institutionalised Scaling-up and Uptake Promotion of Outputs from Soil and Water 
Management Research in East and Central Africa. 
8 See for example the websites of the following projects: IFPRI/SPIA: Impact of Agricultural Research 
on Poverty Reduction: An Integrated Economic and Social Analysis – Phase 2; The Research Into Use 
Programme; Bridging Knowledge Gaps Between Soils Research and Dissemination in Ghana. 
9 See for example the websites of the following projects from DFID R4D: Policies Processes and 
Institutions in NRM – Lessons from NRSP Research; Developing a Framework to Assess the Poverty 
Impact of NR Research; Guidelines for an Assessment Method for the Optimum Uptake of Research. 
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Over the years, DFID has funded several studies and research in the field of 
state building and SSR (Albrecht & Jackson, 2009; Ball, 1998; Ball & Holmes, 2002; Ball 
et al., 2007; CSDG, 2008; Fritz & Rocha Menocal, 2007; Hendrickson, 1999; Hutchful, 
2009; Nathan, 2007).10 In particular, DFID’s funding for state building-oriented 
research has been focused on four main large research programmes,11 which together 
have received around £22 million over ten years. According to DFID’s 2011 Governance 
Portfolio Review, between 2004 and 2009 the same programmes of research have 
generated some 130 peer-reviewed journal articles, 19 books or edited volumes, and 138 
book chapters (DFID, 2011a, p. 12). DFID thus “spends millions every year funding 
research on state building-oriented topics and yet, to date, no study into the research-
policy nexus has addressed this topic” (Barakat, Waldman & Varisco, 2011a, p. 6). 
Alongside the Department’s burgeoning agenda, British and international state building 
and SSR-oriented research has grown exponentially over the last decades. In the field of 
SSR, international organisations such as the OECD, donor governments, academic 
institutions such as Birmingham University or the CSDG at King’s College London, 
research institutes and think tanks like the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control 
of Armed Forces (DCAF) and Clingendael, as well as non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) such as Saferworld, are working and conducting research on SSR. 
Today, several books, studies, and reports describe the different and 
multifaceted challenges faced by international organisations and bilateral donors 
working on state building and reforming security institutions in countries emerging 
from conflict. Academic studies on state building and SSR topics flourish, and 
quantitative and statistically-based analyses, case studies, lessons learned, and policy 
recommendations now enrich this burgeoning literature. Nonetheless, the literature on 
state building and SSR has rarely analysed the different dynamics and key factors which 
underpin the relationship between such research and policy. Many scholars and 
practitioners raised the problem. Likewise, governments need to know whether their 
investments in research are providing them with solid evidence that could support 
                                                          
10 Most of DFID-sponsored, state building-oriented research has been carried out by large Research 
Programme Consortia such as the Centre for the Future State at the Institute of Development Studies 
(IDS), Sussex; the Centre on Citizenship, Participation and Accountability also at IDS; the Centre for 
Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE) at the University of Oxford; the Crisis 
States Research Centre at the London School of Economic and Political Science (LSE), and the recently 
funded Justice and Security Research Programme also at LSE. 
11 These are the Centre for the Future State and the Centre on Citizenship, Participation and 
Accountability; CRISE; and the Crisis States Research Centre. 
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difficult policy decisions with systematic analysis and information. Furthermore, 
research funders such as the ESRC and DFID are under increasing pressure to 
demonstrate the ‘value for money’ arising from their expenditure in research. The 
literature on research utilisation has so far investigated several policy areas such as 
health, agriculture, or development. As state building and SSR have become increasingly 
important for post-war recovery and development, the same careful analysis of the 
problems entailed in using research in fragile, conflict-affected environments is required.  
This PhD seeks to compensate for this gap in the literature. Focusing on the 
particular case study of Sierra Leone, it investigates the extent to which research has 
influenced and interacted with British policies to reform the security sector of that 
conflict-affected country. The choice to focus on SSR derives from an academic as well 
as a personal and professional interest. As stated earlier, in the last few decades SSR has 
become one of the main policies promoted in the framework of British approach to 
state building in conflict-affected countries. From an academic point of view, this 
emergence of SSR in the post-war recovery agenda has spurred the publication of 
numerous studies and a growing body of literature on the topic at British and 
international levels. Analysing how this burgeoning research influenced and interacted 
with UK-led SSR post-war recovery practices could therefore have important 
implications on British policies in fragile, conflict-affected environments, as it could 
derive useful lessons to improve the current uptake of research into externally-led state 
building and SSR policy. Likewise, from a personal and professional point of view, I 
decided to focus on SSR because my academic and professional background on security 
and disarmament studies enabled me to better evaluate such policies, compared to other 
state building activities promoted and implemented by the UK in fragile, conflict-
affected countries. 
The choice of Sierra Leone as a case study came almost as a natural 
consequence of the decision to focus on SSR. Although the UK undertook extensive 
efforts to reform the security sectors of other post-conflict countries, Sierra Leone 
constituted the first engagement with SSR for the British government. At the time of 
the first UK reforms in the country, no other international donor had tried to reform 
the security structures of a country emerging from war. British-led SSR in Sierra Leone 
thus represented the first attempt to reform and overhaul the entire security architecture 
of a conflict-affected country. It encompassed a wide range of programmes, projects, 
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and activities ultimately targeting the police, military, justice, intelligence, and 
governance structures of the West African state. As already underlined, the particularly 
unstable situation in which these reforms started and the achievements of the country in 
the field of security brought donors and researchers to analyse extensively the Sierra 
Leone case study, to derive from it important lessons learned and future best practices, 
and to refer to British-led SSR in Sierra Leone as one of the most important examples 
of externally-led SSR. For this reason, some scholars have viewed British-led SSR in 
Sierra Leone as a notable case of success among the numerous, internationally-driven, 
SSR interventions in conflict-affected countries (Malan, 2003).  
Yet, at the time of the first British reforms in the country in the late 1990s, the 
outcome and direction of British efforts were still unclear for the different 
governmental departments, policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and researchers 
working in the UK and on the ground. Thus, as British street-level bureaucrats in Sierra 
Leone and policy-makers in London were learning how to make SSR by doing it, 
research was, at the same time, struggling to keep the pace with practice, responding 
and interacting with policy needs as they arose. The choice of Sierra Leone as a case 
study for this PhD thesis was therefore dictated by the need to understand the extent to 
which research and knowledge influenced and interacted with this early and alleged case 
of success. By focusing on a case study which is still studied and referred to by scholars 
and practitioners in the field, the thesis sheds light on the role research and knowledge 
can play in SSR policies designed and implemented in hectic and rapidly-evolving 
conflict-affected environments. 
The next part of this introduction sets the scene for the whole thesis. It 
provides an historical account of the civil conflict in Sierra Leone and briefly introduces 
the different policies and activities promoted by UK in the West African country. 
1.3 Setting the scene: the Sierra Leone Civil War and British-led SSR policy 
1.3.1 The seeds of the conflict  
The war in Sierra Leone was a brutal civil conflict which lasted 11 years from 1991 to 
2002. The war ravaged a country with a population of roughly 5 million people, 
claiming the lives of approximately 50,000 people, maiming and injuring thousands 
others, and creating 500,000 refugees and over two million internally displaced persons 
(Solomon & Ginifer, 2008, p. 5). Most of the literature on the Sierra Leone conflict 
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agrees in identifying key causes of the 1991-2002 Civil War, including: political injustice, 
mismanagement of resources, economic corruption, social exclusion, over-centralisation 
of state powers and resources, wide-spread poverty, and mass illiteracy (Adebajo, 2002, 
pp. 79-109; Alie, 2000, pp. 34-35; Chege, 2002; Hanlon, 2005; Keen, 2003; Peters, 2004; 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), 2004; Waldman, 2005; Zack-Williams, 
1999). Some of the seeds of these causes can be traced back to the historical period in 
which the state was formed and to its colonial years, when the Freetown peninsula (the 
Colony) and the territory outside the coastal Colony (the Protectorate) developed 
separately and unequally over the whole nineteenth century (Kurz, 2010; TRC, 2004).  
However, the majority of the political, social, and economic problems that 
eventually led to the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) attack on the 23 March 1991 
were increasingly exacerbated after the country gained independence in 1961, 
particularly during Siaka Stevens’ rule. At the political level, Siaka Stevens ruled through 
cronyism and patronage since his election in 1967, when he assumed presidential power 
and subsequently undermined his political opposition by making his All People’s 
Congress (APC) the only legal political party in the country. With increasing 
polarisation, over-centralisation, and division between the capital and the provinces, 
local governance was progressively neglected, and chieftains replicated the power and 
patronage practices of the APC at the local level. As Sierra Leone is home of a multi-
ethnic society composed by several different ethnic groups,12 Siaka Stevens reinforced 
the progressive polarisation along ethnic lines that had been initiated in the early post-
colonial years, with the APC following the practice that its predecessor, the Sierra 
Leone People’s Party (SLPP), had adopted: appointing people from their respective 
ethnic groups in the Army, the judiciary, and the public sector. Whilst ethnicity and 
ethnic factionalism did not play a significant and decisive role in causing and fuelling the 
war (Conibere et al., 2004 cited in Bellows & Miguel, 2009, p. 1146; Glennerster, Miguel 
& Rothenberg, 2012), the intense rivalry between the Mende and Temne for political 
power had “serious implications for national unity and cohesion” (Alie, 2000, p. 26).  
On an economic level, Stevens relied on informal networks based on clientelism 
and patronage to control the state and its resources, a de facto shadow state (Reno, 1995, 
                                                          
12 The main ethic cleavages are the historical dichotomy between Creoles in Freetown and natives in the 
country, and the division between groups such as the Mende in the South-East and the Temne and Limba 
in the North. The support to the main political parties is polarised along these lines, with the SLPP 




1998, 2000), which allowed him to draw authority from his ability “to control markets 
and their material rewards” (Reno, 1995, p. 3) and enabled him to exert “government 
control over import/export licenses and over the allocation of foreign exchange to 
favour his own clients” (Keen, 2003, p. 75). On a social level, the practices of bad 
governance, corruption, and favouritism were in stark contrast with a reality of poverty 
for the majority of the population, accompanied by a progressive decline of education 
and health services. In particular, a large cohort of disgruntled radical students and a 
mass of ‘lumpen’, illiterate, unemployed, and marginalised youths (Abdullah, 1998; 
Abdullah & Muana, 1998; Kandeh, 1999, pp. 356-362; Keen, 2003, pp. 77-80; Rashid, 
2004), were increasingly denied opportunities to improve their social status. Finally, on a 
military level, Siaka Stevens’ mistrust of the Army – the military had already toppled him 
with a coup in 1967 – induced him to maintain it purposely weak, relegating it to a 
mainly ceremonial role. He created and relied instead on the Internal Security Unit 
(lately renamed Special Security Division (SSD),13 a well-trained and armed paramilitary 
force which essentially acted as his private security force used to intimidate political 
opponents and suppress demonstrations against the government. 
Major-General Joseph Momoh succeeded to Siaka Stevens in 1985, inheriting a 
country on the brink of collapse, characterised by inflation and devaluation out of 
control, a 10 per cent fall of revenue collections in 10 years (Keen, 2005, p. 27), an 
increasing inequality between a few privileged people and the majority of the 
population, widespread unemployment, corruption, and worsening services, education, 
and health. During the same time period, a former corporal of the Sierra Leone Army 
(SLA) named Foday Sankoh met with the leader of the National Patriotic Front of 
Liberia (NPFL), Charles Taylor, during some military and ideological training in 
Benghazi, Libya (TRC, 2004, p. 97). Taylor understood the importance of sustaining the 
RUF advance in south-eastern Sierra Leone, as it would have provided access to the 
diamantiferous areas of the country and could, in this way, finance his own movement 
in Liberia. On 23 March 1991, the RUF entered into Sierra Leone from Liberia, 
attacking the border town village of Bomaru, in Kailahun District and opening a second 
flank at the Mano River Bridge, in Pujehun District (TRC, 2004). In its Manifesto 
Footpaths to Democracy (RUF, 1995), the Movement denounced the misuse of natural 
                                                          
13 Given the acronym of the Unit (ISU), and its propensity to use its weapons, the Unit was nicknamed in 
popular parlance “I shoot you”. When the name of the Unit changed in SSD, the new acronym was 
dubbed as “Siaka Stevens’ Dogs”. 
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resources by “crooked politicians and military adventurists” and pointed its finger at a 
“decadent, backward and oppressive regime” that moved the country toward a “pattern 
of exploitation, degradation and denial” after “years of autocratic rule and militarism”. 
Asking at the same time “freedom, justice and equal opportunity for all”, the RUF 
clearly identified the main grievances of the Sierra Leonean society. Its real willingness 
to fight for these ideals was subsequently tested by 11 years of civil war. 
1.3.2 The Civil War (1991-2002)     
As shown in Figure 1, the conflict in Sierra Leone was a long civil war between the 
rebels of the RUF and government forces. However, several different actors also 
participated in the war, and the lines and roles of the different fighting forces blurred 
throughout the 11 years of conflict. Military coups, alliances between some factions of 
the Army and the rebels, the support of civil armed forces to the government, as well as 
the direct involvement of regional and international actors contributed to enrich the 
narrative and the complex chronology of the Civil War. 
Figure 1   Chronology of the Sierra Leone Civil War (1991-2002) 
 
At the moment of their first attack in 1991, the rebels of the RUF were supported by 
Liberian and Burkinabe fighters from the NPFL. Sub-regional dynamics – and 
particularly the war in neighbouring Liberia – sustained the first offensives of the RUF 
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in the country (Sawyer, 2004). In this early phase of the conflict, the rebels carried out 
targeted attacks to conscript young people, sometimes receiving support from the 
population. More often, the RUF exerted violence against senior members of the 
villages, and its Liberian and Burkinabe factions were frequently involved in disruptive 
lootings. On the government side, the soldiers of the Republic of Sierra Leone Military 
Forces (RSLMF) proved unable to effectively respond to the ‘target’ warfare tactics 
used by the RUF and were always at risk of ambushes organised by the rebels. Being 
afraid of confronting the RUF openly, or simply not finding the rebels in the midst of 
the jungle, they sometimes arbitrarily accused civilians of collaboration with the rebels, 
widening the gap between them and the local population.  
The terrible condition and limited capacity of the SLA was the result of years of 
mismanagement by the APC regime and of Siaka Stevens’ choice to rely on the 
paramilitary SSD force rather than on the RSLMF. According to the TRC, at the 
moment of the attack in 1991: 
“The Army didn’t have moveable vehicles, communication facilities 
were non existent, and most of the soldiers were not combat ready. 
They had not attended refresher courses or gone to the practice range 
for years. The senior officers had indulged in the good life and were 
therefore unwilling to go to the warfront. The Army was simply a 
mess” (TRC, 2004, p. 145). 
Being, in the words of one of its generals, “caught with our pants down” (Keen, 2005, 
p. 83), the Army was quickly expanded to 7,000. However, this expansion was poorly 
funded and Sierra Leonean soldiers were also reinforced by the Liberian militia group 
United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy and by the help of Guinean and 
Nigerian Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring 
Group (ECOMOG) troops that were in those days fighting against Taylor in Liberia.  
 Facing several difficulties on the battlefield and lacking a sufficient political 
support from Freetown, a group of junior officers of the SLA led by Captain Valentine 
Strasser organised a successful military coup against Momoh’s government. From April 
1992, the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) was in power in the country. 
The NPRC denounced the previous APC corruption, and declared a commitment to 
“end the war, revamp the economy, and restore a multi-party democracy” (Abdullah & 
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Muana, 1998, p. 181). In reality, it suspended the constitution, executed some political 
detainees, and soon returned to the old practices of corruption that had characterised 
the APC regime. Early negotiations with the RUF rapidly failed, and the NPRC 
“maintained Momoh’s policy of rapidly expanding the Army” (Keen, 2005, p. 97) to 13-
14,000 soldiers by mid-1992. Recruited after minimal vetting procedures, these new 
soldiers were usually badly trained for a period of approximately three weeks in 
Freetown then quickly sent to resources-rich areas to counter the rebels.  
 Following some losses in 1993, the RUF changed its tactics and opted for a 
more elusive guerrilla warfare, establishing small bases in the jungle for its fighters and 
conducting ambushes and ‘hit and run’ attacks on near-by villages to ensure its survival. 
On the other side, government soldiers’ wages continued to decrease, and soldiers grew 
resentful towards the NPRC leadership. It is in this period that some groups of 
undisciplined soldiers started acting as ‘sobels’ – soldiers by day and rebels by night – 
looting and carrying out attacks on civilians, arming the rebels and collaborating with 
them to avoid direct confrontations in order to prolong the war and its related 
opportunities for enrichment (Abraham, 2004; Keen, 2003, 2005; Richards P., 1996; 
TRC, 2004). Illegal diamond smuggling also contributed to prolong the war, as the 
control of the diamantiferous areas of the country allowed the RUF to support and 
finance their struggle and to sell diamonds in exchange of weapons (Cater C., 2003, p. 
38-39; Keen, 2003, 2005; Pugh, Cooper & Goodhand, 2004, pp. 91-141; Smillie, Gberie 
& Hazleton, 2000; UN, 2000; USAID Office of Transition Initiatives, 2001). 
 With the RUF advancing in the south-east, the rebels attacking villages in ‘hit 
and run’ raids, and the NPRC government being unable to control large sections of its 
Army, civilians started looking to core groups of traditional hunters for their own 
protection. These local militias, or Civil Defence Forces (CDF), were scattered across 
the country and had different names according to their region of origin. The most 
famous and effective among them were the Kamajors, a group of Mende traditional 
hunters based in the south and led by Commander Sam Hinga Norman. The Kamajors 
intervention had indeed a decisive impact on the war, as they had a better knowledge of 
the fighting terrain and enjoyed the support of the local population. The NPRC 
government also called the South African private security company Executive 
Outcomes, an army of mercenaries that arrived in the country in May 1995 to fight 
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alongside the Kamajors. The advancing RUF was thus defeated firstly outside the 
capital Freetown, then in the diamantiferous areas surrounding the city of Kono.  
1996 was a year of hope in Sierra Leone. Following an internal military coup, 
Brigadier Julis Bio replaced Strasser as NPRC leader in January. Under increasing 
pressure from the international community, the country held a democratic presidential 
election on the 17 March, which saw the victory of the SLPP party led by Ahmad Tejan 
Kabbah (Bellows & Miguel, 2009, p. 1146). Shortly after the election, a peace process 
was promoted which led to the signature of the Abidjan Peace Agreement by Kabbah 
and Sankoh on the 30 November 1996 (Anon., 1996). Among its different provisions, 
the Agreement ensured amnesty to the RUF combatants, called for a National 
Commission on Human Rights and for the beginning of the Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process, gave a political status to the RUF, 
and required Executive Outcomes to leave the country and to be replaced by a Neutral 
Monitoring Group. 
The Abidjan Peace Agreement lasted only few months. The planned downsizing 
of the Army, together with the increasing importance of the Kamajors element within 
the RSLMF, were two main underlying causes of the military coup carried out by the 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) on the 25 May 1997. The AFRC were a 
group of disgruntled soldiers led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma. They were joined by 
the rebel forces of the RUF, bringing the rebel/soldiers collaboration to Freetown. 
With President Kabbah exiled to Conakry in Guinea, a group of Nigerian and Guinean 
ECOMOG troops flew to the country during a night operation to try to re-establish 
control.  
After months of failed negotiations between the AFRC/RUF junta and 
ECOWAS, as well as a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) embargo on the 
country, ECOMOG regained the control of Freetown in February 1998. As a result of 
the fighting, which also involved the Kamajor militias and the private military company 
Sandline, the majority of the AFRC/RUF junta escaped from Freetown to the north of 
the country and Kabbah was reinstated in power in March. Outside the capital, the 
security situation remained extremely unstable, with the AFRC/RUF killing and 
maiming civilians and looting the villages of the provinces. With the ECOMOG troops 
trying to secure the internal provinces of the country, Foday Sankoh was put on trial 
and the UN approved the deployment of the United Nations Observer Mission in 
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Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), a group of 70 military observers to oversee the DDR 
process agreed at Abidjan.  
The apparent safety of the capital and the majority of the 1998 peace efforts 
were nonetheless thwarted on 6 January 1999 when the AFRC/RUF troops re-entered 
in Freetown. The attack of the capital in 1999 was probably the bloodiest and most 
brutal page of the Sierra Leone civil conflict. Operation No Living Thing – the name given 
to the attack by the AFRC and RUF rebels – brought massive destruction to the capital, 
with major loss of life, executions, rapes, and mutilation of civilians. RSLMF, 
ECOMOG, and CDF troops hardly defended the capital, losing both their morale and 
their credibility in the eyes of the population. Civilians and the whole international 
community turned toward Kabbah to open a dialogue with the rebels. The President 
realised the necessity of a political settlement with the RUF, and peace negotiations 
were held in the Togolese capital Lomé.  
On the 7 July 1999, the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) and the RUF 
signed the Lomé Peace Agreement (Anon., 1999). Seen by some scholars as an external 
imposition (Francis, 2000; Kargbo, 2000, p. 48; Williams, 2001, pp. 147-148), the 
Agreement provided a framework upon which the future peace of the country could be 
built. It declared a cessation of hostilities, granting Sankoh and the RUF soldiers 
“absolute and free pardon” (Anon., 1999) and transforming the rebel group into a 
political party. The Agreement gave a freed Foday Sankoh the Chairmanship of the 
Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and 
Development; it called for the replacement of ECOMOG with the new United Nations 
peacekeeping Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), revived the DDR process and the 
restructuring of the Sierra Leone Armed Forces, and proposed the establishment of a 
TRC to investigate human rights violations committed during the war.  
The implementation of the Peace Agreement proceeded in the following 
months. The Sierra Leone Parliament enacted the “Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission Act”. Furthermore, UNSC Resolution 1270 authorised the deployment of 
a peacekeeping force of up to 6,000 troops in Sierra Leone (Malan, Rakate & Mcintyre, 
2002; Olonisakin, 2008). An increment in the UNAMSIL contingent to 11,000 troops 
and the complete withdrawal of ECOMOG forces in May 2000 ensured the complete 
passage of peacekeeping responsibilities to the UN forces. In spite of this progress, 
some destabilising factors such as “the continuing, destabilising influence of Liberia; 
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obstructionism by the RUF leadership; the exclusion of the AFRC/SLA from the 
agreement; the weakness of international support for DDR; and the weak international 
peacekeeping effort” (Keen, 2005, p. 253) remained and undermined the complete 
implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement.  
These underlying weaknesses emerged at the beginning of May 2000, when the 
RUF took more than 550 UN peacekeepers hostage and started moving toward 
Freetown. A ‘Peace Task Force’ with elements of the Army, the SSD and the West Side 
Boys – a splinter armed group which operated in the outskirts of Freetown (Utas & 
Jörgel, 2008) – was formed to defend the city from the RUF advance. The Task Force 
joined the Kamajors and the UNAMSIL troops to oppose the advancement of 
approximately 1,000 RUF rebels to the capital. British forces were also sent to Sierra 
Leone to conduct a rescue operation, Operation Palliser, to evacuate British citizens in the 
country. Led by General David Richards, the British troops joined the anti-rebels side, 
fighting against the RUF and training some SLA troops. Their intervention, together 
with the successful UNAMSIL-led Operation Khukri in the south-east of the country, 
boosted the morale of the international troops and resulted decisive for the final defeat 
of the RUF. 
Surrounded by a growing and more organised international force and further 
defeated by Guinean troops in the north of the country, the RUF was near to its final 
decline. Sankoh was arrested and the leadership of the movement was assumed by the 
Commander General Issa Sesay. Meanwhile, the UN hostages were released. On 10 
November 2000, the government and the RUF signed the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement 
(Anon., 2000), which reaffirmed their firm commitment to implement the precedent 
Lomé Peace Agreement. Further talks were held in the same city in May 2001. These 
‘Abuja II’ negotiations reinvigorated the DDR process and ensured the government 
control in most of the country, in view of a new presidential election. President Kabbah 
lifted the state of emergency in Spring 2002, de facto ending the Civil War. The election 
was held in May 2002 under the supervision of approximately 17,500 UNAMSIL 
troops, the largest UN peacekeeping operation in West Africa. Kabbah and the SLPP 
won the election. With the disarmament of more than 72,000 ex-combatants, and the 
death of Foday Sankoh in 2003, the country could finally enter into the post-war 
recovery phase. Nonetheless, the final burden of the civil conflict was extremely heavy, 
with a tragic legacy of approximately 50,000 deaths, several thousand injured and 
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maimed people, over two million displaced, and widespread human rights abuses 
perpetrated by rebel and governmental forces (Human Rights Watch, 1999; Leboeuf, 
2008).  
1.3.3 British-led SSR activities in Sierra Leone 
British-led programmes and activities to reform the security sector of Sierra Leone 
started well before the UK military intervention in the country in May 2000. As shown 
by Figures 2 and 3 and further analysed in Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis, British-led 
SSR policies in Sierra Leone began in 1996 after an initial request of President Kabbah 
for a total reform of the police. These reforms evolved over time – some of them 
continuing to date – and were bolstered by the UK military intervention in May 2000, 
ultimately encompassing a wide range of programmes, projects, and activities targeting 
the police, military, justice, intelligence, and governance structures of the state. 
Furthermore, they developed in conjunction with other activities promoted by the 
international community, such as the DDR programme or the UN peacekeeping 
presence in the country (Malan et al., 2003).  





Figure 3   British-led SSR programmes in Sierra Leone 
 
The first security reforms began during the conflict years, and constituted a series of 
‘fire-fighting’ solutions to re-establish and bolster the security apparatus of the state. 
Activities in this phase involved two successive programmes to reform the police: the 
Commonwealth Police Development Task Force (CPDTF), from 1998 to 2000 – a 
retired British police officer, Keith Biddle, was also appointed as Sierra Leone 
Inspector-General of Police (IGP) from 1999 to 2003 – and the Commonwealth 
Community Safety and Security Project (CCSSP), from 2000 to 2005. Other SSR 
programmes during this period include: a programme to reform and restructure the 
security, intelligence, and military apparatus of the country, the Sierra Leone Security 
Sector Reform Programme (SILSEP), from 1999 to 2008; the presence of an 
International Military Advisory Training Team (IMATT), from 2000 to 2013, to support 
the planning and restructuring of the Armed Forces and the MOD; and a Law 
Development Programme (LDP), from 2001 to 2005, which addressed the most urgent 
problems in the justice sector. These programmes were developed in conjunction with 
other activities promoted by the international community, such as the DDR programme 
or the UNAMSIL peacekeeping operation.   
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With the end of the civil conflict and increased stability on the ground, the 
Sierra Leonean institutions progressively took ownership of the country’s security 
elements, and some of the early UK-led SSR programmes closed or were restructured. 
The LPD and the CCSSP were replaced by the Justice Sector Development Programme 
(JSDP), a programme that ran from 2005 to 2011 and targeted broader elements of the 
justice sector previously neglected such as prisons, probation, legal reform, legal advice, 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA), and non-state and traditional justice (Howlett-
Bolton, 2008). The police element of SSR was split, with JSDP overseeing broader 
justice aspects of police reform, and SILSEP absorbing the security aspects of police 
such as the paramilitary Operational Support Division (OSD). SILSEP, JSDP, and 
IMATT remained for a number of years as the main UK-sponsored programmes 
targeting SSR in Sierra Leone. The first of these programmes ended in 2008. JSDP 
ended in 2011 and was replaced by the four-year Access to Security and Justice 
Programme (ASJP), a new programme focusing on improving local ownership of the 
security and justice reform process and strengthening security and justice provision at 
community level. IMATT was progressively downsized and eventually ended its mission 
in March 2013. It was replaced by the International Security Advisory Team (ISAT), a 
multilateral advisory team with a broader remit across the whole security sector and a 
growing role within the sub-region. Today, ISAT continues to advise and support the 
Sierra Leone Armed Forces, providing at the same time advice and support to other 
elements of the security sector such as the police force, the Office of National Security 
(ONS), the National Fire Force, the Prisons Department, the Immigration Office, and 
the Joint Maritime Committee, as well as working alongside DFID and the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on operations dedicated to the justice 
sector. 
1.4 Theoretical approach 
Part 1.1 of this chapter has presented the empirical context and the main question and 
sub-questions underpinning this PhD thesis, specifying that the principal aim of this 
study is to examine the extent to which research has influenced and interacted with 
British governmental SSR policy in conflict-affected Sierra Leone. In practical terms, 
this implies a thorough analysis of the role played (or not played) by research and local 
knowledge in designing, shaping, modelling, and implementing the numerous British-
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led SSR policy decisions, programmes, and activities introduced in Part 1.3.3 of this 
chapter. This PhD study thus examines the different dynamics, narratives, and patterns 
of research utilisation in policy, as well as the numerous events, situations, and 
interactions that modelled the policy process and the decisions taken by British street-
level bureaucrats on the ground. However, a careful understanding of the main question 
and sub-questions of the thesis necessitates, first and foremost, a solid theoretical 
approach upon which building the empirical analysis of this research. This theoretical 
approach not only brings order to the thesis as a whole, but also connects this PhD 
research to more general theories of the policy process and research utilisation into 
policy, increasing the value of the single case study for the whole literature on the 
research-policy nexus.  
In order to examine the influence and role of research in British-led SSR policy 
in conflict-affected Sierra Leone, this thesis uses, analyses, and re-elaborates theoretical 
frameworks, concepts, notions, and understandings pertaining to the academic literature 
on the policy process and research utilisation into policy. Most of the early depictions of 
the policy process portrayed a linear, highly rational model divided into several 
sequential stages (Dorey, 2005; Easton, 1965). According to this model, policy decisions 
are taken following a series of stages. After an initial identification of the problem, 
policy-makers set the policy agenda, consider the possible alternatives, select the best 
options in the policy formulation phase, and implement and evaluate the policies 
adopted.  
Over the years, the majority of the literature has heavily modified this early 
linear conception and scholars have provided different descriptions and understandings 
of the policy process. Scholars criticised the linear model and argued instead that the 
policy process is far from being rational and exhaustive, but it is better “typified more 
by muddling through and incrementalism: small steps taken from a small number of 
alternatives involving few radical changes” (Waldman, Barakat & Varisco, 2014, p. 13). 
The aim of the process is to find consensus, rather than achieve an optimal possible 
solution: policy-makers thus consider in depth only those policy options that are 
deemed possible or acceptable. As a consequence, scholars have developed alternative 
understandings of the policy process that focus on the various influences shaping 
policy-makers’ decisions. Such more articulated models are usually “centred around the 
inclusion and exclusion of certain views in the policy process, as well as the domination 
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of certain alternative approaches” (Waldman, Barakat & Varisco, 2014, p. 13). They 
look and analyse the role of networks, narratives, and policy/epistemic communities in 
the policy process (Sutton, 1999). 
This thesis explores the extent to which external actors such as researchers and 
academics, as well as their research and knowledge outputs, have influenced and 
interacted with the formulation of SSR policy by British decision-makers at 
headquarters level and with its implementation by street-level bureaucrats in Sierra 
Leone. The theoretical approach of this PhD thesis looks at the alternative 
conceptualisations of the policy process to understand the way groups of actors external 
to the policy process can shape policy through their studies, narrative, and discourses. 
In this regard, the policy network approach contends that “different types of 
relationships between group representatives, bureaucrats, politicians, and other 
participants in decision-making account for the various ways in which political systems 
process policy” (John, 1998, p 78). Policy networks are sets of formal institutional and 
informal linkages between governmental and external actors which contribute to policy-
making and implementation. The different types of relationships and interactions 
between governmental and external actors create a policy network; this policy network 
eventually assumes a major role in shaping the policy process and the decisions taken by 
policy-makers. Researchers constitute one of these external actors that are able to 
influence the policy process, an epistemic community of “professionals with recognised 
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-
relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (Haas, 1992, p. 3). In conditions 
of uncertainty, transnational epistemic communities can “influence policymakers 
through communicative action” (Adler & Haas, 1992, p. 389), and help them 
“formulate policies” (Hass, 1992, p. 15).   
The literature on policy networks, with its understanding of the policy process 
as an outcome of negotiating interests and relationships between governmental and 
external groups and actors, has been then used as the principal theoretical model to 
understand and explain the policy process in the context of this PhD thesis. Researchers 
are one of the multiple, frequently competing, and intertwined sets of actors eventually 
impacting on the policy process. Likewise, research has been understood as one of the 
many variables that can influence policy decisions. However, research has rarely a direct 
uptake into policy and the literature on research utilisation has explored, analysed, and 
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theoretically explained the different dynamic modes in which research influences and 
interacts with the policy process. Scholars working on research utilisation have studied 
the ways in which policy-makers account for knowledge and research when designing 
their policy decisions (Hanney et al., 2003; Janowitz, 1972; Lord Rothschild, 1971; 
Weiss, 1979), as well as the different factors influencing the use and uptake of research 
into policy (Majone, 1989; Mulgan, 2005; Porter & Prysor-Jones, 1997; Stone, 2002). 
Furthermore, they developed conceptual frameworks and models (Hanney et al., 2003; 
Court & Young, 2004) explaining and illustrating how research dynamically interplays 
with the policy-making process and with the activities of street level bureaucrats 
(Lipsky, 1980, 1997; Sutton, 1999, pp. 22-23) working on the ground. 
Street-level bureaucrats have been defined by Lipsky as “public service workers 
who interact directly with citizens in the course of their job, and who have substantial 
discretion in the execution of their work” (1980, p. 3). Normally charged with 
implementing policy on the ground, these individuals often maintain a high degree of 
autonomy and agency from their organisational authority, at the point to be considered 
by Lipsky as proper policy-makers (1980, pp. 13-25). This vision is in line with an 
understanding of the policy process in which state power is progressively decentred and 
dispersed. Street-level bureaucrats are “not merely cogs in an automatic transfer of 
policy-making to outcome in practice” (Sutton, 1999, p. 22). They maintain autonomy 
and discretion, they can exercise considerable flexibility in implementing instructions, 
and they can make and remake policy “with respect to significant aspects of their 
interactions with citizens” (Lipsky, 1980, p. 13) according to the different circumstances 
on the ground. As a result, Lipsky argues that “the decisions of street-level bureaucrats, 
the routines they establish, and the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and 
work pressures, effectively become the public policies they carry out” (1997, p. 389, 
emphasis in original). In the context of this thesis, street-level bureaucrats are those 
British advisers, programme managers, and officers who were tasked with implementing 
and managing HMG SSR policy and assistance programmes in Sierra Leone. As it will 
be shown in Chapters 5 and 6 of the thesis, these individuals maintained a high degree 
of autonomy and agency from their respective headquarters, in line with Lipsky’s 
definition of the term. 
This PhD starts from the theoretical literature on policy networks and the 
different frameworks and models of research utilisation to elaborate a sketch of the 
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policy network of researchers, policy-makers, and street-level bureaucrats who worked 
on British-led SSR in Sierra Leone, following its evolution over time. By visually 
illustrating the expansion of this policy network from the conflict to the post-conflict 
years, the analysis shows how, in line with the main argument of the thesis, changes in 
two main variables – namely an increasing stability of the country context and a 
progressive evolution of SSR as a policy and research agenda – contributed to an 
incremental rise in the use of research by street-level bureaucrats on the ground. These 
two variables will be considered as the two main external and internal factors that 
modelled the policy network of SSR policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and 
researchers over the years. Developments outside (a shift in context from a period of 
‘fire-fighting’ solutions to the post-conflict years) and inside (a progressive evolution of 
SSR policy and research) the policy network thus contributed to its expansion and 
consolidation. As already mentioned in Part 1.1, an incremental stability gave street-level 
bureaucrats more time to reflect on their policy decisions and more security to access 
the different provinces of the country. Similarly, a progressive evolution of the SSR 
policy and research agenda ensured not only a major availability of research, but also a 
better exchange between street-level bureaucrats and researchers on the ground. 
Fostered by these internal and external developments, the interaction between policy 
and research increased throughout the years. As it will be visually demonstrated by the 
thesis, the policy network of SSR researchers, policy-makers, and street-level 
bureaucrats in Sierra Leone expanded and consolidated consequently. It progressively 
grew as the role, use, influence, and uptake of research in British-led SSR policy in the 
country improved over the years. 
1.5 The structure of the thesis  
This thesis is structured in three main parts and composed of eight chapters, including 
this introduction.  
The first part of the thesis is comprised of three chapters and presents the main 
theoretical concepts and ideas underpinning the investigation of the principal question 
and sub-questions of this study. The main question of this PhD research positions this 
thesis at the intersection of two different theoretical disciplines: (i) the literature on the 
policy-making process and research utilisation into policy and (ii) the literature on state 
building and SSR in fragile, conflict-affected environments. Stemming from an 
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empirical research question and the analysis of a particular case study, the thesis 
investigates the interconnections and exchanges between these two different fields of 
research, exploring the relationships and the possible synergies between the study of 
public policy and the post-war reconstruction and development discipline.  
Chapter 2 explores how policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and researchers 
exist in policy networks that define and characterise the policy-making process. The 
chapter briefly introduces the literature on policy networks to show how, over the last 
few decades, the theoretical inquiry on policy-making has progressively considered the 
importance of informal links between governmental and other actors in the policy 
process. In seeing researchers as one of these competing actors, the chapter particularly 
examines the theoretical concept of epistemic communities – peculiar groups of 
professionals who base their influence on policy upon their recognised knowledge and 
expertise. It then introduces the literature on research utilisation to further comprehend 
the narratives and dynamics characterising the use of research in policy.  
Chapter 3 analyses how HMG policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and SSR 
researchers exist in a state building policy network which stretches from donor 
countries such as the UK to conflict-affected states like Sierra Leone. The chapter first 
canvasses the evolution of the literature and policy in post-war recovery to see how the 
practice of (re)building states in the aftermath of a conflict waxed and waned over the 
years to become today the main international policy of intervention in fragile, conflict-
affected environments. It examines how the state building academic literature and the 
international and British policy agendas proceeded at the same pace and how the 
network of state builders and researchers working in donor and fragile states has 
expanded exponentially over the last two decades. Likewise, the chapter illustrates how 
SSR has recently become the main internationally-led policy prescription to reform the 
security architectures of countries emerging from conflict. It shows how the network of 
SSR policy and research actors developed, expanded, and consolidated. The chapter 
further conceptualises the theoretical ideas presented in Chapter 2 within the context of 
this thesis, and presents a visual representation of a hypothetical policy network of SSR 
policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and researchers, an ideal model that will be 
indirectly compared to the policy network of policy actors and researchers working on 
British-led SSR in Sierra Leone over the years.  
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Chapter 4 presents the methodology of the PhD, a mainly qualitative study that 
starts from the activities and the interviews with British street-level bureaucrats who 
worked in the country to evaluate the influence of research on such policies. In 
presenting the methodology of the thesis, the chapter also underlines its limits and 
ethical considerations.  
The second part of the thesis is divided into two chapters and moves the 
discussion from theory to practice, presenting the main findings of the data collected by 
the study. The chapters analyse in depth the role played by research in the British-led 
SSR policy in Sierra Leone. They explore and describe the narratives and interactions 
between policy and research and the evolution of the policy network of SSR policy-
makers, street-level bureaucrats, and researchers working on rebuilding and reforming 
the security institutions of conflict-affected Sierra Leone. The second part of the thesis 
visually shows how this network and the role of researchers within it evolved over the 
years, developing and growing from the first phase of ‘fire-fighting’ solutions to the 
second, post-conflict phase. The chapters examine how the two main variables, namely 
the increasing stability of the Sierra Leone context and the progressive evolution of SSR 
as policy at HMG and international levels and a related research agenda, contributed to 
the evolution of the policy network, and, by extension, to an increased influence of 
research in British-led SSR policy in the country.  
In this way, Chapters 5 and 6 provide an account of the role played by research 
in British-led SSR policy in Sierra Leone, as well as a visual understanding of the 
evolution of the network of policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and research actors 
working on such policies over the years. Focusing respectively on the war and on the 
post-war periods, the two chapters have a parallel structure that analyses the historical 
context, the evolution of SSR policy and research, and the role of research in the SSR 
policy process. This parallel structure facilitates the comparison between the two 
historical periods and shows how a more stable country context and a progressive 
evolution of SSR policy and research at British and international level contributed to an 
incremental rise in the use of research by street-level bureaucrats working on the 
ground.  
The third part of the thesis is divided in two chapters that analyse, assess, and 
synthesise the main findings of the thesis and link them to the theory introduced in the 
first part of the study. Chapter 7 derives from the data presented in Chapters 5 and 6 
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some indications about when, why, and how different types of research have different 
kinds of policy impacts – or not. The chapter builds a typology of types of research and 
types of impact to explain the different policy influence of various kinds of research 
during the conflict and post-conflict years. It looks at the reasons why research has or 
does not have high influence on policy, presenting the main ingredients and indicators 
of high impact research. It then explores the various direct and indirect ways in which 
research has been used by HMG policy-makers and street-level bureaucrats working on 
SSR programmes and activities in Sierra Leone.  
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by presenting the main findings of the research, 
providing some practical recommendations to increase the influence of research on SSR 
policy, and setting the thesis within the current and future literature on research 
utilisation and post-war recovery. The recommendations section of the chapter 
abandons the descriptive, explanatory approach of the thesis for a more normative and 
prescriptive tone, suggesting some practical measures to promote and improve the use 
of research in internationally-led SSR policy. These recommendations reinforce the 
methodological, theoretical, and empirical contribution of the study to the literature and 
discipline. They are aimed to impact the theoretical research-policy debate and help 
researchers, practitioners, and policy-makers maximise the influence of research on 
policy. While these recommendations mainly target HMG departments, such as DFID 
or the Stabilisation Unit (SU), similar organisations such as bilateral aid-financing 
agencies like USAID and the Canadian International Development Agency, 
governments or intergovernmental bodies like the UN or the European Commission 
(EC), international financial institutions such as the World Bank, non-governmental or 
philanthropic entities such as Oxfam or the Gates Foundation, research sponsors like 
the ESRC or the Leverhulme Trust, and the private sector could equally benefit from 
some of the findings of this PhD to improve the commissioning, management, 
dissemination, and utilisation of research in their programmes and policy. Finally, the 
final section of the thesis focuses on the importance of this PhD research vis-à-vis the 
general literature on research utilisation and post-war recovery and points to future 




PART I –THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
The main question of the thesis addresses the extent to which research has influenced 
and interacted with British-led SSR policy in conflict-affected Sierra Leone. An 
empirical enquiry lies at the foundation of this research. Nonetheless, the introduction 
(specifically Part 1.4) emphasised how a careful examination of this subject also requires 
a solid theoretical approach upon which to build the empirical analysis of the thesis. 
Such a theoretical approach would structure the thesis by grounding the main empirical 
enquiry of the research in both the theoretical literature on the policy process and 
research utilisation in policy. Situating the empirical question of this PhD research 
within such a theoretical framework would emphasise the value of the Sierra Leone case 
study for the literature on the research-policy nexus, eventually deriving from the thesis 
important theoretical insights on the use of research in externally-led SSR policy in 
fragile, conflict-affected countries.  
Figure 4 shows how this multidisciplinary, empirical PhD study lies at the 
intersection of two different theoretical disciplines: (i) the literature on the policy-
making process and research utilisation in policy and (ii) the literature on state building 
and SSR in fragile, conflict-affected contexts.  





State building and 





Through the analysis of the ways in which research has influenced and interacted with 
British-led SSR policy in conflict-affected Sierra Leone, this PhD thesis looks at the 
intersections between the policy analysis and the state building/SSR disciplines. It 
investigates the interconnections between the literatures on the policy-making process 
and on post-war reconstruction and development, exploring the relationships and the 
possible synergies between these two different fields of research. These 
multidisciplinary theoretical foundations are in line with sub-question 3 of the thesis. As 
this sub-question aims to understand the applicability of the literature on the research-
policy nexus to the fast-paced, cross-governmental, institution-oriented, and 
internationalised challenge of state building and SSR in fragile, conflict-affected 
environments, the introduction of such a multidisciplinary approach would not only set 
the theoretical background of the study, but it would also facilitate a better investigation 
of such sub-question.  
 The first part of the thesis explores the theoretical literature on the policy-
making process, as well as post-conflict state building and SSR, in order to identify 
concepts and ideas that shed light on the empirical question and sub-questions of the 
research. It also shows how the network of policy and research actors working on 
externally-led state building and SSR engagements in fragile and conflict-affected 
contexts has exponentially grown over the last two decades. In the case of Sierra Leone, 
this policy network increased in extension and reach, finally stretching from the UK to 
the West African country, comprising British decision-makers and street-level 
bureaucrats, as well as international and local state building and SSR researchers. This 
first, theoretical part of the thesis introduces concepts and frameworks that will be used 
to analyse the extent to which research influenced and interacted with British-led SSR 
policy in conflict-affected Sierra Leone. It is divided in three different chapters, which 
present key concepts from the literature on the policy process and research utilisation, 
analyse the evolution of the state building and SSR policy and research agenda, and 
illustrate the methodology used in this PhD study, respectively.  
Chapter 2 explains how policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and researchers 
exist within policy networks – sets of formal and informal interactions between 
governmental and external actors that eventually shape the policy process. In order to 
reach this aim, the chapter introduces and analyses notions, understandings, and 
theoretical frameworks pertaining to the academic literature on the policy-making 
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process and research utilisation in policy. It firstly looks at the evolution of policy 
network analysis to explain how researchers can be considered one of the numerous 
external groups informally and formally interacting with governmental actors 
throughout the policy-making process. In particular, the chapter underlines how 
researchers can contribute to policy-making and implementation as part of transnational 
epistemic communities of professionals with expertise, competence, authoritative claim, 
and policy relevant knowledge in a determined area. Furthermore, the chapter canvasses 
the literature on research utilisation to understand the different ways in which policy-
makers account for research in the policy-making process. It presents the work of 
different authors who investigated the complex and dynamic interaction between policy 
and research, analysing the principal factors that hinder or facilitate the uptake of 
research in policy.  
Chapter 3 shows how policy-makers at headquarters level, street-level 
bureaucrats on the ground, as well as state building and SSR international and local 
researchers can be considered part of a growing network that stretches from donors to 
fragile countries – in this instance, from the UK to Sierra Leone. The chapter analyses 
the recent expansion of these state building and SSR networks, devoting particular 
attention to the British case and to the evolution of SSR in policy and research. The 
analysis firstly shows how the practice of (re)building states in the aftermath of a war 
has become, in recent years, the principal policy of intervention in countries emerging 
from conflict. Subsequently, the chapter focuses on SSR – the “armed wing” of liberal 
state building (Jackson, 2010) – to show how this policy practice and related research 
agenda emerged in the late 1990s and developed over the last decade as one of the 
major policy prescriptions to rebuild and reform the security architecture of states 
emerging from war. The chapter thus interprets and re-elaborates the ideas and 
concepts from the literature on research utilisation introduced in Chapter 2 in light of 
the particular policy process and policy network that characterise state building and SSR 
in fragile countries. It introduces some studies that analysed the specific factors 
impacting on the use of research in development policy and concludes by presenting an 
outline of an ideal typical policy network of policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and 
researchers working on post-conflict state building and SSR. This framework will be 
used as a model for the empirical part of the thesis, as it will be indirectly compared to 
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the growing policy network of policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and researchers 
working on British-led SSR in Sierra Leone over the years.  
Finally, Chapter 4 constitutes a methodological chapter that presents the 
methods employed by the research to investigate the use and influence of research on 
British-led SSR policy in conflict-affected Sierra Leone and highlights the challenges and 
limitations of this PhD research. Chapter 4 concludes the theoretical part of the thesis. 
It explains how the concepts and ideas introduced in Chapters 2 and 3 have been 
operationalised in the research. It then moves the discussion from theory to practice, 
transitioning to the empirical portion of the dissertation which analyses in depth the 
extent to which research has influenced and interacted with British-led SSR policy in 
Sierra Leone.   
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2. Policy networks and research utilisation into policy 
2.1 Introduction 
The central question of this research aims to understand the extent to which research 
has influenced and interacted with British SSR policy in conflict-affected Sierra Leone. 
The thesis therefore represents an empirical exploration on the use of research in 
British-led SSR policy in Sierra Leone, providing an analysis of the role played by 
research in the design and implementation of a series of internationally-led programmes, 
projects, and activities in a fragile, conflict-affected country. Through careful analysis of 
the utilisation of research in British SSR policy in Sierra Leone, this PhD thesis aims to 
understand the extent to which research and researchers can influence policy. It also 
explores new measures that could favour and improve the influence of research upon 
state building and SSR policy decisions and programmes.  
The first step in the exploration of the empirical question of the thesis is 
interrogating the academic literature on the policy process to understand whether 
research and researchers could have the capacity and the ability to interact with the 
activities of the decision-makers who design and implement policies and to examine the 
different ways in which research could potentially be utilised as part of the policy 
process. Chapter 2 addresses this first conundrum by investigating the role that research 
and researchers can play in policy. It introduces notions, understandings, and theoretical 
frameworks pertaining to the academic literature on the policy-making process to 
explain how policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and researchers interact with each 
other as part of policy networks. It further analyses the literature on research utilisation 
to understand the different ways and processes through which research can be 
incorporated into policy by decision-makers and street-level bureaucrats on the ground.  
Figure 4 illustrated how, from a theoretical point of view, this PhD research is 
positioned at the intersection of two main fields of enquiry: the literature on the policy-
making process and research utilisation into policy, as well as the literature on state 
building and SSR in fragile, conflict-affected environments. This chapter explores the 
first of these two fields of research to find in the policy process and research utilisation 
literatures the main tools, ideas, and concepts that will help unravel the use of research 
in Sierra Leone and the role researchers played in the British-led SSR policy process in 
the country.  
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The chapter is composed of three different parts and is structured as follows.  
Part 2.2 explores the policy network literature to explain how researchers are 
one of several external groups that can interact with governmental actors in the policy-
making process. The analysis shows how policy networks are defined as sets of formal 
and informal interactions between government and groups, which eventually shape the 
policy process. Policy networks can differ for different dimensions such as their number 
of participants, the type of interest, their frequency of interaction with governmental 
actors, their resources and power (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992, p. 251). These dimensions 
eventually determine the tightness of a network, and its role and importance in the 
policy-making process. Part 2.2.1 thus introduces the dialectic approach to policy 
networks, a particular view of policy networks that considers the variability within and 
across networks. 
Part 2.3 starts from the previous discussion on policy networks to focus on 
particular approaches that stress the cognitive dimension of policy networks and the 
role of knowledge and expertise in policy-making. In particular, the analysis shows how 
the role of research and researchers in policy could be explained by the notion of 
epistemic communities. Epistemic communities are networks of “professionals with 
recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim 
to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (Haas, 1992, p. 3). 
Researchers thus form a transnational epistemic community that can be consulted by 
policy-makers and street-level bureaucrats as part of the policy process.  
The next section, Part 2.4, looks at theories and paradigms of research utilisation 
to explore in depth the research-policy nexus and the ways in which research influences 
and interacts with the policy-making process. The analysis firstly introduces the 
different models of research utilisation to examine the ways in which policy-makers 
account for research in their policy decisions. It then investigates some main factors and 
barriers that can hinder the uptake of research into policy and limit the extent, 
frequency, and quality of the interactions between policy and research actors within 
policy networks. Finally, it presents a readapted version of the payback model, a 
conceptual framework of research utilisation into policy that explores the different ways 




2.2 Policy network analysis 
As the introduction of the chapter underlined, the first step to understand whether 
research and researchers can be accounted as part of the factors and actors influencing 
and interacting with policy is to interrogate the literature on the policy process to look 
for models, notions, and theories that emphasise the role of external actors in policy. In 
this regard, the study of public policy and the research on “how the machinery of the 
state and political actors interacts to produce public actions” (John, 1998, p. 1) evolved 
throughout the years as the role, responsibilities, and policy domains of the state 
expanded. The extensive literature investigating the policy process followed this 
expansion of the state, bridging and incorporating new approaches to explain the 
increasing “variety and complexity of the decision-making process” (John, 1998, p. 1) 
vis-à-vis the expansion of the state and its policy domains. Traditional ‘stagist’ models 
of the policy process (Easton, 1965) which assume “a clear sequence of stages through 
which public policies proceed” (Dorey, 2005, p. 4) have been discarded and replaced by 
different approaches that provide a more realistic explanatory account of the increasing 
complexity of the process. More articulated models of the policy process have thus 
been developed in the last 50 years. Some of these models focus on the role of the 
institutions in shaping policy decisions and outcomes or on the importance of groups 
and networks in the policy process. Others emphasise the influence of socio-economic 
factors on policy outcomes, as well as rational choice, institutional and socio-economic 
constraints to policy-making. Still more highlight the role of ideas in the agenda setting, 
giving rise to different policy-making models such as the rational, the incrementalist, or 
the ‘garbage-can’ model, to mention few (Hanney et al., 2003; John, 1998; Sabatier, 
1999). 
 Among these different models, the policy network approach14 contends that 
“different types of relationships between group representatives, bureaucrats, politicians, 
and other participants in decision-making account for the various ways in which 
political systems process policy” (John, 1998, p. 78). According to this view of the 
policy-making process, policy decisions thus emerge from the interdependence and 
links between a government and other state and societal actors – the policy networks. 
Policy networks were defined by Rhodes (2006, p. 426) as “sets of formal institutional 
                                                          
14 This PhD uses the term policy network approach and policy network analysis interchangeably. 
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and informal linkages between governmental and other actors structured around a 
shared if endlessly negotiated beliefs and interests in public policy making and 
implementation”.15 In the context of this thesis, researchers and their research can be 
considered part of these external actors that potentially influenced and interacted with 
British-led SSR policy in conflict-affected Sierra Leone. The policy network approach, 
with its emphasis on the relationship between government and other external societal 
actors, thus emerges as the most pertinent way of understanding and explaining the 
policy process in the context of this research. Consequently, this chapter begins with a 
short presentation of the literature on policy networks, as introducing this literature 
would help understand the role that external groups – and researchers among them – 
can have in the policy-making process  
The idea that a government has to consider the interests of different groups in 
its policy-making process is not new and some authors have traced it back to Greek 
philosophy (Jung, 2010,  p. 351; Kimber & Richardson, 1974, p. 4; Parry, 1969). One of 
the first modern reference to the influence of groups on government can be found in 
the work of Charles Alexis de Tocqueville in the early nineteenth century, when he 
describes how a tariff question generated association and lobbying activities at the 
national level (Tocqueville, 2003, pp. 222-224). However, it is only at the beginning of 
the twentieth century – particularly with the end of World War II – that the activities of 
groups started to be considered as an integral part of the policy-making process. 
The analysis of government/group relations developed and expanded in the 
twentieth century in the United States (US) literature and is embedded in the pluralist 
tradition (John, 1998, pp. 67-68; Richards D. & Smith M. J., 2002; Smith M. J., 1993, pp. 
15-28). For pluralists, “power is dispersed throughout society rather than concentrated 
within the state” (Smith M. J., 1993, p. 3), and different groups reflecting the various, 
competing and sometimes divergent interests of the society are formed to put pressure 
on government. Groups are therefore central to the political process and neither the 
state nor single groups have the ability to control the policy process. The role of the 
state is therefore to reflect the public desires and adjudicate between the competing 
                                                          
15 Policy network is a generic term used to identify these actors. The literature on policy networks also 
identifies similar general concepts such as pressure or identity groups. Beside these general terms, more 
specific notions such as policy communities, issue networks, iron triangles, sub-governments, or sub-
systems have developed through the years to better identify, describe, and understand the linkages 
between a government and other groups. These notions will be considered as varieties and more specific 
subsets of the general notion of policy networks and will be explored in the course of the chapter. 
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interests of the society. In line with this pluralist view, the pioneering work of Arthur F. 
Bentley in 1908 describes for the first time government as the “process of the 
adjustment of a set of interest groups” (p. 260) and as a “network of activity” (p. 261). 
Bentley concludes that “all phenomena of government are phenomena of groups 
pressing one another, forming one another and pushing out new groups and 
representatives (the organs or agencies of governments) to mediate the adjustments” (p. 
269).  
In the following years, other scholars and political scientists began to give 
particular attention to the role of groups in the policy process. For example, Griffith 
argues in 1939 (p. 182):  
“One cannot live in Washington for long without being conscious that it 
has whirlpools or centers of activity focusing on particular problems. ...It 
is my opinion that ordinarily the relationship among these men – 
legislators, administrators, lobbyists, scholars – who are interested in a 
common problem is a much more real relationship than the relationship 
between congressmen generally or between administrators generally. In 
other words, he who would understand the prevailing pattern of our 
present governmental behavior, instead of studying the formal 
institutions or even generalizations of organs, important though all these 
things are, may possibly obtain a better picture of the way things really 
happen if he would study these “whirlpools” of special social interests 
and problems”. 
Following World War II, an “increasing complexity in the organisation of government 
and the government of society” (Jung, 2010, p. 351) moves scholars and political 
scientists toward a more attentive study of government/group relations. In 1951, 
Truman states that “the behaviours that constitute the process of government cannot 
be understood apart from the groups, especially the organized and potential interest 
groups, which are operative at any point in time” (p. 502). Likewise, in 1952 Latham 
recognised the importance of groups in the political process in his book The Group Basis 
of Politics.  
The idea of policy networks developed from these early studies and replaced the 
group perspective. Different from the pluralist tradition, the policy network approach 
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sees the state as having its own interests, goals and resources that it seeks to manage 
through networks. The concept of policy networks is therefore used to explain the 
relationships between government and groups. These relationships can be different, 
informal, and vary by policy sector. The relationships between group representatives 
and decision-makers matter and influence the policy process, rather than the mere 
presence of a group. 
The term ‘policy network’ appears for the first time after World War II in the US 
literature. Starting from the 1950s, the scholarship investigating the policy process 
became increasingly aware of the role of groups, networks, associations, and informal 
relationships both inside and outside political institutions in shaping the policy process. 
As part of this increasing consideration of the role of networks in policy-making, 
political science scholars began to concentrate their attention on a “few privileged 
groups with close relations with governments” (Rhodes, 2006, p. 427) and on “the links 
between actors involved in both policy formulation and implementation” (Jung, 2010, 
p. 351). This focus entailed a distinction between outsiders and insiders (Dorey, 2005, 
pp. 125-132; Grant, 1978, 1995), with the latter defined as legitimate groups “acceptable 
to government, responsible in their expectations, and willing to work with and through 
government” (Rhodes, 2006, p. 427).  
In this way, the process of policy formation and implementation began to be 
understood through the analysis of sub-governmental levels and by the linkages within a 
policy sector between public and private organisations, government, and external 
groups. These sub-government levels constitute “clusters of individuals that effectively 
make most of the routine decisions in a given substantive area and policy” (Ripley & 
Franklin, 1981, pp. 8-9). Scholars described their understanding of the 
government/group relations by developing new metaphors such as ‘sub-systems’ 
(Freeman, 1965; Freeman & Stevens, 1987), ‘subgovernments’ (Cater D., 1964), ‘sloppy 
large hexagons’ (Jones C. O., 1979), and ‘iron triangles’ (Ethridge & Handelman, 2010; 
Ripley & Franklin, 1981). These new concepts represent the first attempts to better 
understand the evolution of policy-making in the US and to further investigate aspects 
of the government/group relationship rarely addressed by the precedent literature.  
Originating from these studies, the work of Heclo and Wildavsky (1974) and, 
particularly, Heclo (1978), further refined the analysis of government/group relations 
within the policy process. Heclo argued that for many policy initiatives “is all but 
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impossible to identify clearly who the dominant actors are” (Heclo, 1978, p. 102) or who 
is controlling these actions. By looking as a consequence at the wider “open networks of 
people that increasingly impinge upon government” (Heclo, 1978, p. 88) and at the webs 
of influence that provoke and guide the exercise of power, the author introduces the 
concept of issue networks. Issue networks are defined as webs of influence that 
“comprise a large number of participants with quite variable degrees of mutual 
commitment or of dependence on others” (Heclo, 1978, p. 102). In an issue network, no 
one is “in control of the policies and issues” (Heclo, 1978, p. 102), as “participants move 
in and out of the networks constantly” (Heclo, 1978, p. 102). Within an issue network, 
intellectual and emotional commitment are more important than direct material interest: 
individuals with “a reputation for being knowledgeable” (Heclo, 1978, p. 103), issue-
skilled people, “policy activists who know each other through the issues” (Heclo, 1978, 
p. 103), and “people with recognised reputations in particular areas of public policy” 
(Heclo, 1978, p. 107) can all be part of an issue network. The introduction of the 
concept of issue networks was an important step forward in the literature about 
government/group relations. It underlines for the first time the dynamic nature of the 
interaction between government and external groups. Furthermore, it does not confine 
the nature of the relationship between government and groups to material interests only.  
The early US studies on policy networks were rapidly broadened and expanded 
by British, Western European, and Canadian scholars and political scientists (Berger, 
1981; Pross, 1986; Richardson, 1982). In particular, the literature on policy networks 
flourished in Britain, where groups acquired increasing importance in the domestic 
policy-making to become over the decades “a central aspect of the British political 
process” (Kimber & Richardson, 1974, p. iii). Over the years, British scholars devoted 
increasing attention to the importance and influence of policy networks in the domestic 
policy process: if in 1958 Finer underlined the existence of “faceless, voiceless, and 
unidentifiable; in brief, anonymous” (p. 145) groups, Alderman argued in 1984 that “the 
influence of pressure groups is to be found at all levels in the organs and decision-
making machinery of British government. This is inevitable” (p. 126). Likewise, a survey 
of more than 250 groups in 1986 found that “almost 75 per cent – maintained ‘regular 
or frequent’ contact with one or more MPs” (Rush, 1990, pp. 280-296 cited in Norton, 
1995, p. 94) and Kavanagh affirmed in 1996 that “the role of pressure groups and the 
development of the ‘group politics’ style of decision-making are crucial to an 
55 
 
understanding of the development of British politics” (p. 202). Government/group 
relationships therefore increased their importance in British policy-making through this 
period to become “part of the democratic process” (Alderman, 1984, p. 132), with the 
British literature drawing from the post-World War II American insights to develop its 
own independent perspectives over the years. 
Richardson and Jordan were among the first scholars to study the role of 
pressure groups in the British policy-making process. The two authors consider groups 
as “essential to the process of government” (John, 1998, p. 71) and they argued that 
“policy-making is characterised as a process by which an equilibrium is reached between 
the competing groups in society” (Richardson & Jordan, 1979, pp. 3-4). They thus 
introduced for the first time the concept of policy communities, groups “distinguished 
by commonality of interests” (Dowding, 1995, p. 138) and by a “common culture and 
understandings about the nature of the problems and decision-making processes within 
a given policy domain” (Dowding, 1995, p. 138). Policy communities are therefore “a 
special type of stable network” (Jordan, 1990, p. 327, emphasis in original) with shared 
views on a problem. The two authors focused their attention on the role of policy 
communities on the British policy-making process. By seeing the policy process as 
based on co-operation and consensus, they asserted that “co-ordination takes place at a 
number of levels within the relevant policy community until a common policy emerges” 
(Jordan & Richardson, 1982, p. 83). In their analysis of the British policy process, they 
stated that “the incorporation of some types of groups into the process by which 
policies are formulated and implemented has become routinized in a complex web of 
informal and formal arrangements” (Jordan & Richardson, 1987, p. 277) and considered 
the influence of groups in the political system as “both inevitable and generally 
positive” (Jordan & Richardson, 1987, p. 290).  
Working in the same decades of Richardson and Jordan, Rhodes developed new 
models and understandings of the policy networks. In particular, Rhodes’ numerous 
analyses of the policy networks (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; Rhodes, 1981, 1986, 1997) 
became influential and predominant in the literature because the author aligned policy 
networks along a continuum according to their diverse degrees of integration, stability, 
and exclusiveness, thus differentiating for the first time policy networks according to 




Figure 5   The characteristics of the policy networks 
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  Source: Marsh & Rhodes (1992), p. 251 
In Marsh and Rhodes’ model, policy networks differ from their levels of membership, 
integration, resources, and power. Furthermore, “the character of the network explains 
policy outcomes and policy change” (John, 1998, p. 84). In other words, the different 
characteristics of a policy network determine its position along a hypothetical 
continuum, as well as its influence on policy, power, and access to policy-makers. 
Located at the two ends of the continuum, policy communities and issue networks are 
two ideal types with different and antithetic characteristics. Any other network “can be 
located at some point along it” (Rhodes, 1997, p. 45), as “no policy area will conform 
exactly to either list of characteristics” (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992, p. 250).  
The levels of membership, integration, resources, and power are thus important 
to locate a policy network along Marsh and Rhodes’ continuum and understand a 
network’s influence on policy. Policy communities are tight and stable networks 
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characterised by a limited number of participants and “frequent and high quality 
interaction between all members of the community on all matters related to the policy 
issues” (Rhodes, 1997, p. 43). On the other hand, issue networks are unstable and loose 
networks, characterised by a large number of participants and fluctuating interaction 
and access for the various members (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992, p. 14; Rhodes, 1997, p. 
45). The stability and balance of a policy community allow frequent and continuous 
interactions with policy-makers and the construction of a reciprocal relationship which 
could eventually influence the policy process. Conversely, the large, loose, and 
fluctuating nature of an issue network hinders its regular access to policy-makers, 
resulting in a less powerful government/group relationship and a limited influence on 
policy. 
During the same period, Wilks and Wright developed a new typology to study 
the different policy actors within the industrial policy sector (Wilks & Wright, 1987; 
Wright, 1988). They also assigned policy actors to differently aggregated sub-systems of 
policy universes, policy communities, and policy networks. However, Wilks and 
Wright’s re-utilisation and re-definition of terms that already had an accepted currency 
in the policy networks literature – such as policy communities and policy networks – 
undermined the success of this new typology (Jordan, 1990, p. 335).  
The policy network continuum, with its division between policy communities 
and issue networks and the different dimensions of the Marsh and Rhodes typology, 
influenced the successive literature on policy networks to become in the course of the 
decades “the most widely referenced schema” (Skogstad, 2005, p. 4). Most of the 
scholars who studied the policy networks in the last two decades start their analysis 
from the Marsh and Rhodes typology, aligning policy networks along a policy 
community-issue network continuum according to their different characteristics. Some 
authors, such as Van Waarden (1992), tried to develop new classificatory schemas to 
catalogue policy networks; others, like Dorey (2005, pp. 124-161), readapted Marsh and 
Rhodes’ model to specify the different characteristics and dimensions of policy 
networks and their role in the policy process. The result of this second group of 
classifications is thus not dissimilar to the Marsh and Rhodes’ model, with policy 
communities intended as close and organised networks with significant impact and 
influence on public policy, and issue networks understood as loose and wide networks 
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which “usually enjoy only limited or sporadic consultation with policy makers” (Dorey, 
2005, p. 156) and have a minimal role in the implementation of public policies.  
2.2.1 The dialectic approach to policy networks 
The characteristics and nature of policy networks have been identified as important 
factors explaining the influence of a network on policy and, in the case of this thesis, 
the differential impact and uptake of research. For instance, Evans M. and Davies 
(1999) introduced the notion of policy transfer network, “ad hoc phenomenon set up 
with the specific intention of engineering policy change” (Evans M. & Barakat, 2012, p. 
545) and characterised by defined levels of membership, integration, resources, and 
power. The dialectical approach to policy networks originated from the precedent 
literature on policy networks and was introduced in 2000 by Marsh and Smith. This new 
approach attempted to “provide an explanation of policy continuity and change within 
policy networks” (Evans M., 2001, p. 543) and examine policy networks effects on 
policy outcomes.  
The starting point of Marsh and Smith’s reflection is “the claim that policy 
networks cannot be distinguished from the actors who are participating in them” 
(Evans M., 2001, p. 543). As a consequence, the two authors produced a multi-level, 
interactive theory of policy networks that integrates micro-anthropological levels of 
analysis with macro-level of analysis and looks at the ways in which both micro-level 
and macro-level factors shape and affect policy. According to Marsh and Smith, “there 
are three interactive or dialectical relationships involved between: the structure of the 
network and the agents operating within them; the network and the context within 
which it operates; and the network and the policy outcome” (Marsh & Smith, 2000, p. 
20). Policy outcomes are defined, shaped, interpreted, and reinterpreted by the 
interactive relationship between networks and actors. Likewise, “the network is 
interpreted, reinterpreted, and constrained by its participating actors” (Evans M., 2001, 
p. 543), in a complex interaction between structure – the network – and agency – its 
participating actors. According to Marsh and Smith, a dialectic, interactive, and more 
complex relationship exists between actors and networks. Macro-level variables are part 
of this relationship, as they are interpreted by both actors and network relationships 




The dialectic approach to policy networks advocated an alternative pathway 
within policy network analysis. It tried to surpass precedent accounts and approaches to 
the study of policy network and integrate them into a coherent analytical whole. It 
underlined the limits of the explanatory claims of meso-level approaches and argued 
that these can be enriched and integrated with macro and micro level perspectives. It 
enriched the debates on policy networks, engaging and focusing on the interactive 
relationship between structure and agency. Lastly, the dialectic approach assumed a 
conceptual, environmental, contextual, political, ideological, institutional, cultural, and 
ethical variability within, and across, networks, an important aspect of policy networks 
which will explain the differential influence and uptake of research in British-led SSR 
policy in conflict-affected Sierra Leone. 
This brief account of the literature on the policy process presented the modern 
evolution of the concept of policy network, and its particular uptake and re-definition in 
the British literature. Not only did British scholars further explore the concept of policy 
networks aligning them in a continuum according to their degrees of integration, but 
they also investigated their different characteristics and the implications on policy 
influence, power, and access to policy-makers. This evolution of the British literature 
proceeded together with a change in the British policy process, “a shift from 
government by a unitary state to governance by and through networks” (Bevir & 
Rhodes, 2003, p. 6), an increasing hollowing out of the state (Dorey, 2005; Rhodes, 
1997, 2007; Richards D. & Smith M. J., 2002), and a progressive loss of control of the 
British core executive over the policy-making arena (Dunleavy & Rhodes, 1990; 
Kavanagh et al., 2006, pp. 42-63; Rhodes & Dunleavy, 1995, pp. 1-60; Smith M. J., 
1999).  
The current policy-making process in Britain is therefore shaped by “a whole 
range of pressures” (Richards D. & Smith M. J., 2002, p. 3). The role of interest groups 
and policy networks has become crucial in contemporary discussions of governance. 
Considering the influence of external groups on policy-makers has assumed paramount 
importance in the understanding of the modern British policy process. Researchers can 
be considered as one of these many competing groups – a particular external group of 
actors that derives its authority from knowledge and expertise in a determined field with 
the potential of interacting with and exerting influence on the activities of decision-
makers and on the policy-making process. Nevertheless, the literature on policy 
60 
 
networks presented in this subsection has adopted a descriptive and principally rational 
approach to outline a decision-making process mainly based on power relations. The 
next section of this chapter looks at the work of those scholars who explored the 
cognitive dimension of policy networks and the role of knowledge and expertise in 
policy-making. Among the different and alternative approaches to the study of the 
policy process presented in Part 2.3 of the chapter, the analysis particularly focuses on 
the theoretical concept that better understands and explains the role of researchers in 
influencing the policy-making process: the notion of epistemic communities. 
2.3 The role of epistemic communities in the policy process 
The bulk of the literature on policy networks employs a descriptive approach to policy 
networks and sees the policy process as “a bargaining game between different types of 
actors” (Dowding, 1995, p. 147) with loose or tight interactions between themselves. It 
mainly focuses on “normative questions around policy formation” (Dowding, 1995, p. 
147), principally rational decision-making, power structures, and technical issues over 
policy formulation and implementation. It rarely devotes a similar level of attention to 
the processes through which interests are generated. Starting from the 1990s, this 
rational, power-dependent approach and the possibility of rational policy-formation 
have been questioned by studies investigating the generation of interests and “the 
socially constructed nature of knowledge” (Dowding, 1995, p. 147). This shift of 
attention compelled international policy and decision-makers to face and consider an 
ever-widening range of issues of “increasingly complex and technical nature” (Haas, 
1992, p. 12). The descriptive literature on policy networks was therefore no longer seen 
as a sufficient tool to encapsulate and explain the role of groups in the policy process. 
Some scholars developed new and alternative approaches that looked at the role of 
beliefs, meanings, and traditions in policy-making; others started to investigate “the 
generation of policy ideas from technical experts and professionals” (Dowding, 1995, p. 
147).  
Starting from the early 1990s, scholars and political scientists studying the policy 
process moved away from the rational and power-dependent models that had 
characterised the literature up to that point, instead exploring the role of beliefs in the 
policy-making process and developing alternative approaches to the study of policy 
networks. These new approaches enriched the policy network literature and have been 
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conceptualised by some scholars as specific types of policy network analysis (Rhodes, 
2006). For example, the pioneering work of Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith introduced the 
advocacy coalition framework, a new view of the policy process that conceptualised 
public policies “in the same manner as belief systems, that is, as sets of value priorities 
and casual assumptions about how to realise them” (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993, p. 
16). According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’ view of the policy process, advocacy 
coalitions “seek to translate their beliefs into public policies or programs” (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith, p. 28). Belief systems therefore “determine the direction in which an 
advocacy coalition [...] will seek to move governmental programs” (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith, p. 29, emphasis in original). Stable advocacy coalitions have a consensus 
upon a set of core, shared beliefs that is resistant to change. They also have some 
secondary beliefs that can change over time and bring a “re-evaluation of the belief 
system about public policy” (Dowding, 1995, p.147) and a reformulation of the interests 
of a coalition over a policy solution. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’ advocacy coalition 
framework surpassed the understanding of public policy as a mere battle between 
groups, reintroducing “the concept of ideas and their origins in the study of policy 
change” (Dowding, 1995, p. 150), and considering knowledge as a source of power. 
However, in arguing that knowledge is used in open rationale debate, the authors did 
not aim to demonstrate that “public policy is a result of open rational debate, and would 
not want to try” (Dowding, 1995, p. 150). 
Following the work of Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, more recent scholars such as 
Rhodes (2007) and Bevir and Richards D. (2009a; 2009b) promote a new and decentred 
approach to policy networks that “highlights the importance of beliefs, meanings, 
traditions and discourses” (Bevir & Richards D., 2009a, p. 7) in the policy process. This 
decentred approach argues that beliefs and actions, “informed by traditions and 
expressed in stories” (Rhodes, 2007, p. 1259), can influence the everyday practices of 
policy-makers. Government advisers therefore “define and redefine problems in new 
ways by telling policy-makers distinctive stories about their world and how it is 
governed” (Bevir & Richards D., 2009a, p. 13) This approach thus calls for a richer 
understanding of networks which involves “methodologies, such as textual analysis and 
ethnography, as a way of recovering meanings embedded in traditions” (Bevir & 
Richards D., 2009a, p. 13) and attention to the way other people construct the world. It 
moves away from earlier rational, power-dependent approaches to the study of policy 
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networks to adopt a more nuanced and articulated view of policy networks and the 
policy-making process.   
A second group of scholars investigated the cognitive dimension of policy 
networks and the role of knowledge and research in the policy-making process. The 
early literature on policy networks had already identified researchers and experts as two 
of the groups of actors potentially interacting with the policy process. For example, 
Laffin (1986) saw the “possession of expert knowledge; occupancy of a senior position 
in a relevant organisation” (p. 7) as two qualities to be part of a policy community. 
Similarly, Creighton Campbell et al. (1989) considered “’experts’, inside government, in 
universities or other institutions, who research and think about policy” (p. 86) among 
the main possible members of a policy community. However, it is only with the 
introduction of the concept of epistemic communities in the early 1990s that a new 
approach to account for the role of knowledge and information into policy is 
developed. 
The literature on epistemic communities focused its attention on “the various 
ways in which new ideas and information are diffused and taken into account by 
decision makers” (Haas, 1992, p. 4). As already stated in the introduction of the chapter, 
epistemic communities are defined as networks of “professionals with recognized 
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-
relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (Haas, 1992, p. 3). These 
networks, usually transnational in their nature, “can consist of social scientists or 
individuals from any discipline or profession who have a sufficiently strong claim to a 
body of knowledge that is valued by society” (Haas, 1992, p. 16). They share knowledge, 
beliefs, values, professional judgement, skills, methods, and techniques, and “can 
influence state interests either by directly identifying them for decision makers or by 
illuminating the salient dimensions of an issue from which the decision makers may 
then deduce their interests” (Haas, 1992, p. 4). Decision-makers can consult epistemic 
communities under conditions of uncertainty. Furthermore, epistemic communities can 
also influence the international debate and contribute to the creation of institutions that 
guide international behaviour, increasing “the likelihood of convergent state behavior 
and international policy coordination” (Haas, 1992, p. 4).  
The notion of epistemic community is the closest to the idea of research 
influencing policy, as researchers could be seen as an epistemic community with 
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expertise, competence, authoritative claim, and policy relevant knowledge in a particular 
subject. Policy-makers tend to rely on the expertise and knowledge of epistemic 
communities to justify a particular policy pursued by a state and legitimate “the power 
that the state exercises in moving toward that policy” (Adler & Haas, 1992, p. 389). As 
underlined by Haas, epistemic communities can influence the decisions of policy-
makers in different ways: they can “provide advice about the likely results of various 
courses of action” (Haas, 1992, p. 15); they can “help decision makers gain a sense of 
who the winners and losers would be as the result of a particular action or event” (Haas, 
1992, p. 15); they can also “shed light on the nature of the complex interlinkages 
between issues and on the chain of events that might proceed either from failure to take 
action or from instituting a particular policy” (Haas, 1992, p. 15). Additionally, epistemic 
communities can influence and “help formulate policies” (Haas, 1992, p. 15), providing, 
for example, information about a proposed policy and its alternatives, selecting an 
appropriate policy and working out its details, anticipating possible conflicts of interest, 
or building national and international coalitions supporting it. Lastly, epistemic 
communities “influence policymakers through communicative action” (Adler & Haas, 
1992, p. 389) and can exert influence on policy innovation by “framing the range of 
political controversy surrounding an issue, defining state interests, and setting 
standards” (Adler & Haas, 1992, p. 375). 
The concept of epistemic communities is thus the best way to understand the 
policy process and the influence of knowledge and research on policy in the framework 
of this thesis. In particular, the fact that epistemic communities can influence 
international debates accrues the value of this concept for this PhD research. In line 
with the notion of epistemic communities, state building and SSR researchers were 
consulted by international and national policy-makers, eventually shaping bilateral SSR 
policies and contributing to the convergence of SSR policy at international level. In this 
way, epistemic communities of researchers can influence and interact with the SSR 
policy process. Yet, the influence, use, and uptake of ideas and research in policy are 
rarely a straightforward, immediate, linear process, but are instead impeded, hindered, 
inhibited, mediated, or postponed by several theoretical and practical problems. In 
order to address these problems, the next part of this chapter moves away from the 
policy network literature to present the principal theoretical models that explore the 
research-policy nexus and the utilisation of research into policy. It introduces the 
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literature on research utilisation and underlines some of the main practical aspects that 
characterise and sometimes hinder the utilisation of research in policy. 
2.4 Theories and paradigms of research utilisation16 
The principal research question of this thesis aims to understand the extent to which 
research has influenced and interacted with British-led SSR policy in conflict-affected 
Sierra Leone. The chapter so far has deepened the analysis of this question by showing 
how researchers can be seen as one of the many groups that are able to interact with the 
policy process and to influence the activities of international and national policy-makers. 
In particular, the notion of epistemic communities – groups of professionals with 
competence, expertise, and policy-relevant knowledge in a determined area – has been 
introduced as the best way to understand the role and influence researchers might exert 
on policy. The chapter has also illustrated how the loose or tight nature of the network 
of policy-makers and different groups eventually determine the extent, frequency, and 
quality of interactions between governmental actors and external groups. With reference 
to the main question of this thesis, the extent to which research influences and interacts 
with policy is thus linked to the nature and extension of the network of policy-makers, 
street-level bureaucrats, and researchers working on state building and SSR. Yet, the 
extent, quality, and frequency of interactions between researchers and policy actors 
within a policy network are dependent on several circumstances and the use of research 
in policy might be hindered or postponed by numerous barriers. These factors and 
barriers that ultimately facilitate or oppose the use of research in policy have been 
extensively examined by the literature on research utilisation. The following part of this 
chapter provides a review of this literature, as most of these general factors and barriers 
presented also characterise the research-policy nexus in the case of British-led SSR in 
Sierra Leone.  
Some of the analyses that explored the role of research (and researchers) into 
policy-making assume, as a general belief, a cultural divide and lack of dialogue between 
researchers and policy-makers, who seem to live in parallel universes and belong to two 
distinct communities with different values, language, time-frames, interests, reward 
systems, and professional affiliations (Buse, Mays & Walt, 2005, p. 163; Caplan, 1979; 
Green A. & Bennett, 2007, p. 26). Researchers cannot understand why there is 
                                                          
16 Part of the analysis in this section has been used in Waldman, Barakat, and Varisco (2014). 
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resistance to policy change despite clear scientific evidence; conversely policy-makers 
bemoan the inability of researchers to produce accessible and digestible findings. On 
the other hand, the presumption that social science ought to be useful in the 
formulation of policies has been accepted by policy-makers over the years, as the UK 
government’s commitment toward “better use of evidence and research in policy 
making” (Cabinet Office, 1999, p. 16) and the increasing amount of money allocated by 
DFID to research demonstrate.  
The relationship between researchers and policy-makers therefore appears 
founded upon a difficult dilemma: on one hand decision-makers accept the importance 
of research into policy-making – at least for a mere ‘value for money’ approach that can 
justify the high amount of governmental investments on research – while on the other 
hand the differences in agendas and forma mentis between researchers and decision-
makers seem hardly reconcilable. Facing this dilemma, also known as the ‘two-
communities’ theory (Caplan, 1979), several authors tried to explain the difficult 
relationship between research and policy and the way research can feed into policy. 
Different models of research utilisation, theoretical paradigms, and understandings of 
the research-policy nexus have been developed over the years, with some scholars 
deriving from practical case studies some lessons for a better uptake of research into 
policy. Likewise, some authors took into account all the factors and issues facilitating or 
inhibiting the research-policy nexus to create conceptual frameworks that explain the 
interplay between research and policy in the policy-making process.  
The diffuse and contingent nature of policy-making and the exercise of power in 
policy network analysis portray a fragmented and densely populated policy terrain, 
where policy-makers take their decisions amidst a variety of different, divergent, and 
sometimes competing interests. Researchers can be considered as one of these 
competing groups and actors which can influence the policy-making process, and 
research is only one of the many variables and factors that can influence policy-making. 
However, “the model of policy-making as a rational process that gather evidence and 
provides guidance for appropriate actions is highly questionable” (Clarke & 
Ramalingam, 2008, p. 32) and multiple, frequently competing and intertwined sets of 
influences and factors also concur to the policy process (Jones N. & Walsh, 2008, p. 2). 
Furthermore, the availability of quality research products does not necessarily imply 
their uptake into policy, as decision-makers can always decide whether to use evidence 
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in their work or not and how such evidence should be incorporated. Thus, the 
interaction between research and policy in the policy-making process can be hardly 
encapsulated by linear or top-down explanations of the research-policy nexus. Over the 
decades, new and more articulated paradigms have developed alongside the traditional 
linear approach to explain the role, influence, and uptake of research into policy.  
The literature on the policy networks shows how the policy-making process is 
often characterised by a series of various dynamic interactions between governmental 
and external actors. Likewise, the use and uptake of research into policy is rarely a linear 
and straightforward process, as decision-makers can become acquainted with research 
in a variety of ways. Over the last three decades, several scholars have investigated and 
theoretically explained the diverse, dynamic modes in which research influences and 
interacts with the policy process. As a consequence, the literature on research utilisation 
has grown widely to encompass numerous models, paradigms, and theories on the 
research-policy nexus. First presented by Weiss in 1979, these models of research 
utilisation constitute general understandings of the ways in which research is used and 
taken into account by decision-makers as part of the policy process. The models capture 
common approaches of policy-makers to research. These models also characterise the 
use of SSR and state building-oriented research by British policy-makers and street-level 
bureaucrats working on SSR in Sierra Leone, which is the focus of this thesis. Described 
in detail by Waldman, Barakat, and Varisco (2014), the main models of research 
utilisation into policy are: the classic/purist/knowledge-driven model; the problem-
solving/engineering/policy-driven model; the interactive/social interaction model; the 
political model; the tactical model; the enlightenment/percolation/limestone model; 
and the intellectual enterprise view of research utilisation. 
The knowledge-driven model assumes a linear sequence of stages through which 
research generates knowledge which presses toward its use in policy (Lord Rothschild, 
1971). The problem-solving model also sees research feeding into policy through a 
linear sequence; however, this process begins with a policy-maker identifying a problem 
and requesting a researcher to provide the missing knowledge. The interactive model 
sees the research-policy process as a set of interactions. Policy makers seek information 
from several competing sources, and social science research is only one of these. The 
political model occurs when policy-makers use congenial and supportive research 
findings as “ammunition in an adversarial system of policy making” (Hanney et al., 
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2003, p. 8) to support (pre)determined positions over a policy issue. The tactical model 
argues that policy-makers invoke research “irrespective of its conclusions” (Weiss, 1979, 
p. 429) for purposes such as gaining time and delaying a decision on a pressing issue. 
The enlightenment model is a less direct form of research uptake and assumes that the 
gradual ‘sedimentation’ of insights, theories, concepts and perspectives generated by 
social science research eventually permeates the policy-making process (Janowitz, 1972). 
Policy-makers therefore are rarely able to quote specific studies that influenced their 
decisions, but their policies are shaped anyways by ideas emerged in social research. 
Finally, another model of research utilisation sees research as one of the many 
intellectual pursuits of a society, which influences and is influenced by the larger fashion 
of social thought. 
The extensive literature on research utilisation does not only focus on 
theoretical models of the research-policy nexus, but it also includes several studies 
which investigated, often through practical case studies, the several factors that can 
impede, hinder, inhibit, or postpone the uptake of research into policy (Carden, 2004; 
Coleman, 1991; Davies, Nutley & Smith P. C., 2000; Edwards, 2005; Garret & Islam, 
1998; Nutley, Davies & Walter, 2002; Perri 6, 2002; Sen, 2010; Shaxson, 2005; Walt, 
1994). These factors also characterise the research-policy nexus in the framework of this 
thesis and the use of research in British-led SSR in Sierra Leone, as they can be 
considered as general features, practical problems, and issues limiting the ideal model of 
a governmental decision-making based on evidence and objective knowledge. They 
derive from inner characteristics of the research utilisation process, as well as from the 
nature of both social knowledge and policy. For example, one of the main problems 
emerging from the research utilisation literature is attribution, understood as the 
difficulty to identify the extent to which a specific piece of research has influenced a 
particular policy (Carden, 2004; Sen, 2010). Research indeed can be contributory in 
nature and built on others’ work; it can be indirect and not targeted to a particular 
policy, or it can be hard to identify, quantify, and measure its potential impact on policy. 
Likewise, timeliness and communication are two other and equally fundamental aspects 
influencing the uptake of research into policy, as decision-makers usually need readily 
available, clear, and accessible research findings upon which to make immediate policy 
choices (Walt, 1994). Policy-makers have limited time and they rarely rely only on 
research when taking their policy-decisions; they often overuse, misuse, or interpret 
68 
 
research partially, and are seldom able to predict their future information, knowledge, 
and research needs. 
Stone (2002) is one of the several scholars who studied the factors in the 
research supply and demand side, as well as in the contingent political models (or ‘policy 
currents’), that can influence the use or uptake of evidence by policy-making institutions 
and other research users. These factors are also likely to characterise dynamics and 
international policy processes such as externally-led state building and SSR interventions 
in conflict-affected environments. On the supply-side, an inadequate supply of policy 
relevant research, lack of access to research for policy-makers, poor policy 
comprehension of researchers about the policy process, and ineffective communication 
might limit the number of studies available to policy-makers. Similarly, on the demand 
side politicians may ignore the existence of policy-relevant research, have a tendency for 
anti-intellectualism, be incapable of absorbing and using research, or tend to use it in a 
politicised way. Other factors, such as a societal disconnection of both researchers and 
decision-makers from each other, broader patterns of socio-political, economic and 
cultural influence, the contested validity of knowledge, and different epistemological 
questions about what is knowable and the different ways of knowing further 
characterise and distinguish Stone’s account of the research-policy nexus.  
Mulgan underlined some practical limits inherent to the nature of government 
and social knowledge that hinder the influence and interaction of research with policy 
and are present in a high degree in fast-paced policy processes such as SSR in conflict-
affected countries. Democracy, ambiguity, and time are the limits deriving from the 
nature of government. In a democracy, the people and the politicians “have every right 
to ignore evidence” (Mulgan, 2005, p. 224); ambiguity is essential to hold together a 
society, as “the assertion of rationality and evidence may have little impact” (Mulgan, 
2005, p. 224) when different groups have diametrically opposing views and interests. 
Additionally, research time is different from high-pressured decision-making time, as 
politicians and officials do not have time for tests and evaluations, but take quick 
decisions upon their internalised understanding of how the world works. Similarly, the 
nature of social knowledge is limited by contingency, reflexivity, and disciplinary 
organisation. Social knowledge is historically contingent: knowledge bases need to be 
constantly replenished, research users are normally sceptic about the validity of research 
evidence, and theories and practices change as people and systems change. Reflexivity 
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implies that “actors act in the light of available knowledge which transforms the 
accuracy of the available knowledge” (Mulgan, 2005, p. 225) and has implications for a 
government’s capacity to influence the behaviours of others. Furthermore, the 
disciplinary organisation of the social sciences has left major gaps and weaknesses in 
knowledge and areas that may be of most interest to policy-makers.  
Effective and adequate communication of research findings to policy-makers is 
another fundamental aspect influencing the extent to which research is used in policy. 
Several scholars focused on the role of communication in the policy process, presenting 
models and practical suggestions to improve the impact of research into policy. Majone 
(1989), for example, starts from the assumption that “public policy is made of language” 
(p. 1) to analyse the role of evidence, argument, and persuasion in the policy process. 
He underlines the importance of rhetorical skills for policy scientists and analysts to 
improve the methods and conditions of public discourse at all levels and stages of 
policy-making. Likewise, Porter and Prysor-Jones understand the research-policy nexus 
as a three-pronged “process of communication linking researchers, decision makers, 
and those most affected by whatever issues are under consideration” (Porter & Prysor-
Jones, 1997, p. vii). Starting from this model, they list the four basic stages in the 
research process (defining the research question; developing the proposal; conducting 
the study; communicating research results), and present a series of recommendations 
researchers should follow in each of the four stages to improve the influence and 
uptake of their work into policy.  
The different theoretical paradigms presented, as well as lessons learned from 
practical studies, demonstrate how the uptake of research into policy is rarely linear and 
straightforward, but it follows conversely a more articulated process impeded, inhibited, 
postponed, or facilitated by several converging issues, factors, and external 
circumstances. Starting from these findings, some authors developed a series of 
conceptual frameworks that take into account the literature on research utilisation while 
trying to explain and illustrate the interplay between research and policy in the policy-
making process. Among the different conceptual understandings that captured the 
inter-relations between research and policy, Figure 6 presents a synthesised and 
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readapted version of the payback model initially developed by the Health Economics 
Research Group at Brunel University in 2003.17  
 
Figure 6   Revised payback model of the research and policy process 
 
Source:  Research Project Proposal (Anon., 2010), adapted from Hanney et al., 2003 and Hanney, Packwood 
& Buxton, 2000. 
Based upon the various theories of research utilisation, the model consists in a series of 
stages and interfaces underlining the process through which research is accounted into 
policy. It incorporates the different interactions of this process with the stock of 
existing knowledge and with the wider political, professional, industrial/economic, and 
social environment. The need for research is identified in Stage 0, which occurs before a 
project or a research is commissioned. Stage 1 encompasses the first inputs to research: 
“the financial inputs but also the experience of the researchers, the knowledge-base on 
which they build and the opportunity costs of their involvement” (Hanney, Packwood 
& Buxton, 2000, p. 144). Inputs from already existing knowledge, evidence, and analysis 
therefore come also into play at this stage of the model. Research is then conducted in 
Stage 2 and produces outputs and findings in Stage 3. Such outputs do not only 
improve the stock of existing knowledge, evidence, and analysis, but they are also 
disseminated and communicated, eventually reaching the policy arena. Research outputs 
such as publications and articles produced at Stage 3 can thus influence policy at a 
rhetoric and conceptual level, or influence policy outcomes at a primary and secondary 
level. Primary policy outcomes in Stage 4 are formal, governmental policy documents, 
                                                          
17 This model has been employed as a conceptual framework to support and direct the qualitative 
elements of this research and its related ESRC-funded project. 
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white papers, and cross-governmental policies. Secondary policy outcomes in Stage 5 
are key research themes or findings in specialised and programme-oriented policy 
documents, such as DFID country plans or sectoral strategies. Both primary and 
secondary policy outcomes can thus be influenced by ideas, concepts, and notions 
elaborated in research and academia.   
Despite its linearity, the model leaves room for feedback loops and forward 
leaps and “recognises that the actual steps involved in utilisation and achieving final 
outcomes are often multidirectional and convoluted” (Hanney et al., 2003, p. 3). As a 
consequence, the influence of research on policy-making is best understood as part of a 
wider analysis of the utilisation of research in the policy process. Research can directly 
influence policy-makers as part of the linear flow, it can enter the stock of existing 
knowledge and be grabbed by policy-makers at a different time, or it can be received by 
other actors such industry, professionals, and the broader public who can, in turn, 
influence the policy-making process.  
2.5 Conclusion 
The chapter explored the academic literature on the policy process and research 
utilisation to identify concepts and ideas that shed light on the main research question 
and related sub-questions of this PhD research. The analysis has shown how 
researchers, policy-makers, and street-level bureaucrats can be seen as part of a policy 
network that interacts with and eventually influences policy decisions. In particular, the 
role of researchers in the policy-making process has been explained with Hass’ notion 
of epistemic communities. The chapter then canvassed the literature on research 
utilisation to show how research rarely has a direct uptake on policy, but often interacts 
with the policy process in a dynamic and sometimes indirect way. By introducing some 
of the factors that can hinder, inhibit, or conversely facilitate the utilisation of research 
in policy, the chapter concluded by presenting a readapted version of the payback 
model developed by the Health Economics Research Group at Brunel University 
(Hanney et al., 2003), a conceptual framework to understand the interplay between 
research and policy in the policy-making process. 
The theories, analyses, approaches, and frameworks introduced in this chapter 
have mainly considered the role of research in domestic policy; however, these same 
frameworks are also applicable to the use and uptake of research in international policy. 
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They are directly relevant to the main research question and sub-questions posed by this 
PhD, which aim to understand the applicability of the literature on the research-policy 
nexus to particular international policy of SSR in conflict-affected countries. In 
determining the extent to which policy-makers at headquarters level and street-level 
bureaucrats in Sierra Leone have used research and knowledge as part of their activities, 
the thesis therefore also aims to explore the particular challenges, difficulties, and 
dynamics of research utilisation in foreign policy implemented in fragile, conflict-
affected environments. The next chapter re-elaborates the literature presented in this 
chapter with reference to the context of state building and SSR in post-war societies. In 
presenting the recent evolution of externally-led state building and SSR in international 
policy and research, it shows how the network of policy-makers, street-level 
bureaucrats, and researchers working on these topics has grown progressively in recent 
years, stretching from donor states, such as the UK, to fragile, conflict-affected 




3. State building and SSR in fragile, conflict-affected environments 
3.1 Introduction 
The extensive analysis of the literature on the policy process and research utilisation in 
Chapter 2 has presented some concepts and ideas that shed light on the principal 
question and sub-questions of this PhD research. However, most of the concepts and 
theories on the uptake of research in policy examined in the previous chapter have been 
so far applied to the analysis of domestic policy processes, rarely addressing the 
influence of knowledge and research on international processes such as state building 
and SSR in conflict-affected environments. Chapter 3 problematises and readapts the 
literature on policy networks and research utilisation within the context of externally-led 
state building and SSR policies in fragile, conflict-affected countries. It sets the 
theoretical background for the next empirical part of the thesis, investigating the ways in 
which the literature on the research-policy nexus can be applied to internationally-led 
state building and SSR policies.  
Chapter 3 thus explores the field of post-war recovery studies to present an 
account of the literature on state building and SSR, the second main theoretical 
foundation of the thesis identified in Figure 4. Post-war recovery is a new and 
multifaceted field of research that has its foundations in recently developed subjects 
such as peace and conflict studies and development, and overlaps consistently with 
more traditional disciplines such as political science, international relations, history, 
economics, anthropology, architecture, sociology, and psychology (Barakat & Zyck, 
2009). As a confluence of manifold subjects, post-war recovery studies received inputs 
and enjoyed a lively debate among scholars from different backgrounds. The 
multifaceted interventions and practices of post-war recovery – from disarmament to 
infrastructure rehabilitation, from education to health to mention only few – further 
widened the number of actors involved in the reconstruction of a society after war, 
introducing new and disparate disciplines such as medicine, education, or gender studies 
in the debate. Likewise, the blurred boundaries between relief, recovery, and 
development in a post-conflict environment entailed a sometimes difficult encounter 
and interaction between short-term oriented humanitarian relief and longer-term 
oriented development actors, agencies, and practitioners, de facto spurring the debate on 
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the possible strategies of post-war recovery and long-term development (Bailey S. et al., 
2009; Barakat & Zyck, 2009).  
Whilst bearing in mind the breadth and the main debates characterising the 
discipline, Chapter 3 specifically analyses the policy and research evolution of two 
particular post-war practices, (re)building a fragile, conflict-affected state and reforming 
its security sector. The chapter sees state building as “the process through which states 
enhance their ability to function” (Whaites, 2008, p. 4), thus not limiting the practice of 
state building to fragile and conflict-affected states (Tilly, 1992). However, this chapter, 
and by extension the whole PhD thesis, mainly focuses on the policies through which 
international actors aim at (re)building a country in the aftermath of a war, consequently 
accepting Call & Wyeth’s definition of externally-led state building: “actions undertaken 
by international or national actors to establish, reform, or strengthen the institutions of 
the state and their relation to society” (2008, p. 5).  
Likewise, the thesis defines SSR18 as:  
“The transformation of the security system – which includes all the 
actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to 
manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent 
with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and 
thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework” (OECD 
DAC, 2005, p. 20). 
This definition includes in the security system core security actors such as armed forces, 
police, gendarmeries, paramilitary forces, intelligence and security services; security 
management and oversight bodies such as the Executive, the MOD, internal affairs, 
foreign affairs, customary and traditional authorities; justice and law enforcement 
                                                          
18 In the last decades, different donors, governments, and researchers have used a variety of terms such as 
‘Security Sector Reform’, ‘Security System Reform’, and ‘Security System Transformation’ to refer to the 
policies to reform the security institutions of a country. This thesis refers to these policies as ‘Security 
Sector Reform’, as this is the main way in which the principal policy papers of the British government 
refer to these policies. The thesis considers under this term also practices and policies of reform targeting 
police actors and the civil justice system (which in the UK case fell for many years under the term ‘Safety, 
Security and Access to Justice’) and reforms to the security apparatus of fragile countries that have been 
called in different ways by various donors or practitioners. For example, the chapter defines SSR 
according to the OECD DAC definition of ‘Security System Reform’, as the OECD has supported over 
the years donor efforts to develop a joint approach to SSR and this definition has been widely accepted 
by the international community. For a discussion of the different ways to refer to SSR practices and on 




institutions such as judiciary, justice ministries, prisons, criminal investigation and 
prosecution services; and non-statutory security forces such as liberation or guerrilla 
armies, private body-guard units, or private security companies (OECD DAC, 2005, pp. 
20-21).19 Lastly, this chapter and this PhD thesis use DFID’s definition of fragile states: 
countries “where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the 
majority of its people, including the poor” (2005, p. 7). Since the definition of a state as 
fragile is a highly politicised issue, donors and scholars have developed and used 
different definitions of fragility over the years (Country Indicators for Foreign Policy, 
2006; OECD, 2008; Stepputat & Engberg-Pedersen, 2008; Stewart & Brown, 2010; 
USAID, 2005; World Bank, 2005) and there is not a definitive and internationally-
agreed list of fragile countries.20 The reasons for using DFID’s definition of fragility in 
this work are twofold. Firstly, since this PhD is part of an overarching research project 
funded by DFID and the ESRC, accepting DFID’s definition of fragility ensures the 
consistency of this work with the funders’ definition and terminology. Secondly, 
DFID’s definition of fragility underlines how two different and equally important 
elements concur to the fragility of a state: its ability or capacity to deliver, and its (or at 
least its rulers’) actual willingness to do it. In this regard, fragile states might derive from 
a lack of capacity, from a lack of willingness to emerge from fragility, or from a 
combination of these two elements. 
In this way, Chapter 3 sheds light on the recent evolution of state building and 
SSR, understanding and explaining the ways in which concepts and notions associated 
with fragility, state building, and SSR have modelled the recent policy and research 
agenda of the post-war recovery discipline. The chapter takes an historical perspective 
to illustrate how externally-led state building has become the principal international and 
British policy approach to enhance state legitimacy through increased capabilities, 
accountability, and responsiveness to the needs of citizens – particularly in the wake of 
9/11. At the same time, it analyses how the literature on state building has flourished 
over the last decades and how research has evolved alongside this growing policy 
agenda. Likewise, the chapter shows how SSR has emerged as one of the major policy 
                                                          
19 These SSR actors have been also accepted by DFID (2002b). 
20 In general, most development agencies understand state fragility as the inability to ensure basic security, 
maintain rule of law and justice, or provide basic services and economic opportunities for the citizens, 
including in this definition different poor and conflict affected countries. Post-conflict and conflict-
affected countries are therefore a particular category of fragile states which are recovering from conflict. 
A high proportion of post-conflict and conflict-affected countries fall into the definition of fragile states. 
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prescriptions whereby international actors aim specifically to promote stability and 
security by rebuilding or reforming the security institutions of fragile and conflict-
affected countries. In presenting such evolution, the chapter re-elaborates the literature, 
concepts, and ideas introduced by the previous Chapter 2 to demonstrate how the 
network of state building and SSR policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and 
researchers has grown progressively up to stretch from donor states to conflict-affected 
countries.  
The chapter is composed of three main parts, aimed to show how the state 
building and SSR network of researchers and policy practitioners has extensively 
expanded over the last two decades. Part 3.2 analyses how the practice of (re)building 
states in the aftermath of a conflict has waxed and waned in recent years to eventually 
become the main externally-led policy of intervention in countries emerging from war. 
In particular, the chapter argues that the recent reconsideration of state building in post-
war recovery followed a three-phase evolution since the end of the Cold War. It also 
examines how contemporary historical events fostered and accompanied these 
progressive developments of state building in the international and British policy and 
research agenda. Part 3.3 illustrates how, among the different policies designed to 
buttress the state and enhance stability, security, and development in the wake of a 
conflict, SSR has emerged as one of the major policy prescriptions to reform the 
security institutions of conflict-affected states. In presenting the progressive growth of 
importance of SSR in policy and research, the analysis focuses on the prominent role 
played by the UK in promoting this expanding agenda. Finally, Part 3.4 reconnects 
more explicitly Chapter 3 with the theories of the policy process and research utilisation 
introduced in the previous Chapter 2. It presents the Research and Policy in 
Development (RAPID) framework elaborated by the Overseas Development Institute 
(ODI) to examine the particular challenges entailed in using research in international 
developmental policies. It then draws a sketch of an ideal policy network of state 
building and SSR policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and researchers working in a 
conflict-affected country. This network is an important tool to understand the evolution 
of the network of policy and research actors designing and implementing British-led 
SSR programmes and activities in Sierra Leone, as Chapters 5 and 6 will draw similar 
sketches of the SSR policy network in the country, indirectly comparing these to this 
ideal typical model.  
77 
 
3.2 (Re)building fragile, conflict-affected states: a three-phase evolution in policy 
and research 
The network of state building and SSR policy and research actors has grown 
exponentially over the last two decades, stretching internationally from donor countries 
like the UK to fragile and conflict-affected states like Sierra Leone. In particular, the 
evolution of the state building policy network in the post-Cold War years followed three 
principal phases which eventually resulted in the promotion of externally-led state 
building as a major policy of intervention in countries emerging from conflict. Likewise, 
it fostered the production of a burgeoning literature to support this expanding policy 
agenda. The following sections of the chapter present this post-Cold War evolution of 
state building in policy and research. The analysis starts from post-World War II 
approaches to post-conflict recovery to illustrate how the policy network of state 
builders and related researchers has grown in importance and dimensions over the last 
two decades and concludes underlining three different main trends that characterised 
this evolution.  
3.2.1 Cold War approaches: from the Marshall Plan to the Washington Consensus 
State-led reconstruction and development efforts are far from being a new policy in the 
field of post-war recovery. Whilst rebuilding states in post-war contexts has a long 
history, the international thinking and practices regarding the role of the state in fragile, 
conflict-affected environments waxed and waned over the last 50 years. 
 Following the mandates system and the transitional administrations of the 
League of Nations in the aftermath of World War I (Chesterman, 2004, pp. 11-47), 
state-led reconstruction and development efforts became the main post-conflict 
recovery policies promoted in the wake of World War II. Such policies were often 
supported by funding from the US or the Soviet Union, as the emblematic examples of 
the reconstruction of war-torn West Germany and Europe through the Marshall Plan 
(Barakat, 2010; Diefendorf, 1993; Ellwood, 1992) or the post-war recovery of Japan 
demonstrate. This state-led approach to post-war recovery was in line with a state-led 
model of development in vogue in the same years. Emerging from the birth of new 
independent states in Africa and Asia, this model of development was encouraged and 
supported by the international community through the creation of regional member 
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states-based organisations such as the UN Economic Commission for Latin America in 
1948 and the UN Economic Commission for Africa in 1958. 
This state-led approach to post-war recovery and development changed in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. In light of state capture phenomena, growing debt, 
macroeconomic instability, and strategic Cold War interests, Western capitalist nations 
started embracing a set of neo-liberal policies to promote reconstruction and 
development in the aftermath of a conflict. The premise for this new market-oriented 
model was the liberal assumption that “the surest foundation of peace […] is market-
democracy, that is, a liberal democratic polity and a market-oriented economy” (Paris, 
1997, p. 56). As a consequence, economic liberalisation policies were promoted in the 
reconstruction, recovery, and development processes of Sudan, Egypt, Mozambique, 
and several Latin American countries. In this regard, the support from the international 
community – particularly the Bretton Woods institutions such as the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – to post-conflict and developing countries 
started being based on aid conditionalities – structural adjustment loans to develop 
infrastructures and adjust the local economies for export. Economic liberalisation 
programmes were thus based on the promotion of macroeconomic stability through the 
control of the inflation, the reduction of fiscal deficit, the liberalisation of trade and 
capital, and the privatisation and deregulation of the domestic markets (Gore, 2000).  
This new neo-liberal approach, also known as Washington Consensus, 
presupposed structural adjustments designed to reduce the size, reach, and control of 
the state upon its economy. Deregulation and a minimal role of the government were 
also envisaged in the 1991 World Bank’s World Development Report, a key text affirming 
that governments need to “let domestic and international competition flourish” (World 
Bank, 1991, p. 9), doing “less in those areas where markets work, or can be made to 
work, reasonably well” (World Bank, 1991, p. 9) while at the same time doing “more in 
those areas where markets alone cannot be relied upon” (World Bank, 1991, p. 9). 
These structural adjustments, often considered a sign of loyalty to the liberal democratic 
model, had sometimes detrimental consequences on state capacity, de facto heightening 
the risk of conflict reversion in several countries in Latin America (El Salvador, 
Nicaragua, and Guatemala to mention few of them), and West and North Africa (Sudan 
and Zambia).  
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Furthermore, these structural adjustments could not ensure the provision and 
delivery of basic social services to the most vulnerable. As a consequence, more flexible 
international non-governmental actors stepped in trying to fill this vacuum and provide 
previously state-controlled services. A new and more people-centred paradigm emerged 
in these years and “envisioned a consensual partnership between international 
organisations, donor agencies, recipient governments and ‘grassroots’ civil society” (ul 
Haq, 1995 cited in Barakat & Zyck, 2009, p. 1074). As part of this paradigm, new social 
funds were distributed by quasi-public agencies and involved donor contributions to 
community groups or NGOs for community-improvement projects. The neo-liberal 
and the people-centred approach, though apparently complementary, proposed indeed 
completely different and sometimes incompatible solutions to the development 
challenges faced by post-conflict environments. The end of the Cold War and the 
subsequent increment of conflicts in the early 1990s showed the limits of both the 
private sector and the NGOs paradigms and paved the way for a more unified approach 
to post-war reconstruction and development. 
3.2.2 Post-Cold War evolution 
The end of the Cold War resulted in the emergence of at least four different trends: an 
increase in the number of intrastate conflicts; a shorter length of some of these 
conflicts; a growth in the number of states; and an increase of international activism in 
post-war recovery. 
The first trend was an increase in the number of intrastate armed conflicts 
across the globe. As shown by Lotta and Wallensteen (2013) and by the data of the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) in Figure 7, this was particularly marked in the 
first years of the 1990s and spurred by the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, the 
weakening of state power in several countries, and by increasing calls for autonomy and 
self-determination. At the same time, Lotta and Wallensteen (2013) and the UCDP data 
also underline a major second trend in post-Cold War armed conflicts, namely their 
shorter length. Some of the conflicts erupted at the end of the Cold War lasted indeed 
for only few years, and, as the number of conflicts peaked in the early 1990s, the 1989-
2000 period also witnessed the end of 56 conflicts (Wallensteen & Sollenberg, 2001 




Figure 7   Armed conflict by type, 1946-2012 
 
The third trend characterising the early post-Cold War period was a growth in the 
number of states in the world. Numerous and smaller countries replaced the former 
Soviet and Yugoslavian blocs, the quest for statehood remained a strong ideal for 
people in conflict, and the number of states rapidly increased, as evidenced by the 
access to the UN of 26 new countries in a period of only three years from 1991 to 
1994.21 Fourthly, the early 1990s saw a progressive increase of international activism in 
post-war recovery. The vanishing of the bipolar order also allowed the dissolution of 
the mutual vetoes which paralysed the UN during the Cold War. As a result, the UN 
not only multiplied its Security Council Resolutions,22 but it also increased exponentially 
the number of its peacekeeping operations (Gleditsch, 2008, p. 695). 
As a consequence of the growing number of intrastate conflicts and an altered 
international order which ensured more resources and possibilities for peace operations, 
peacebuilding activities and post-war reconstruction and development interventions 
                                                          
21 See the webpage, Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945-present, available at: 
http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml.   
22 From 1946 to the end of 1989, the UN voted 646 Security Council Resolutions. On 5 March 2014, the 
UN voted its Security Council Resolution number 2142, therefore approving approximately 1,500 
resolutions in less than 25 years, almost two times and a half the number of resolutions approved during 
its first 43 years of existence. For more information, see the list and text of the Resolutions adopted by the 
Security Council since 1946: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/index.shtml. 
81 
 
became more sophisticated and expanded in number and scope. In a short time span of 
only four years between 1989 and 1993, the UN launched eight different peacebuilding 
operations in countries emerging from civil conflicts (Namibia, Nicaragua, Angola, 
Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Liberia, and Rwanda). The tasks and 
responsibilities of these peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions multiplied over the 
years, and post-conflict efforts became broader and more varied, encompassing new 
activities such as DDR of ex-combatants. Furthermore, these security-related policies 
were gradually seen as a part of a more multifaceted approach which also included 
humanitarian, political, and economic reforms and was eventually aimed to (re)build the 
structures and capacities of a conflict-affected country. Resettlement of refugees, 
monitoring and administration of elections, human rights investigations, and economic 
reforms became part of these new and more comprehensive efforts toward post-war 
recovery (Bush, 1995, pp. 55-56). While initially maintaining limited mandates and 
“quick and dirty” approaches (Paris & Sisk, 2007, p. 2), these first post-Cold War 
interventions have been retrospectively seen “as early statebuilding operations” 
(Roberts, 2008, p. 537). This specific approach characterised the whole post-Cold War 
period and started in Namibia in 1989, where the activities of the UN Transition 
Assistance Group involved police training, disarmament, elections preparation, and 
constitution assistance tasks. It then evolved in Cambodia, where the UN operation 
involved polling, disarmament, demobilisation, demining, and limited political 
trusteeship with suspended sovereignty, and “an early manifestation of contemporary 
statebuilding became clearer” (Roberts, 2008, p. 539).  
Following these trends and this mutated international scenario, the international 
and British policy agenda and the scholarship in the field started to progressively 
reconsider the role of the state in post-war recovery and development. While it is 
debatable and always difficult to draw artificial boundaries to explain a dynamic, on-
going evolution shaped by events and the interactions between policy and research, 
nevertheless three main phases characterised the process of reconsideration of the role 
of the state during the post-Cold War years:  
- A first phase of early reflection, from the early 1990s to 2001;  
- A second phase of post-shock recovery, from 2001 to approximately 2004;  
- A third phase of proactive engagement with fragility and internationally-led 
state building, from approximately the end of 2004 to the current time. 
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The following parts of the chapter discuss the ways in which contemporary historical 
events, changes in the academic discourse, and policy developments at international and 
British level contributed to this three-phase evolution. They also explore how the 
network of policy actors and researchers working on post-conflict state building has 
developed and grown over the three phases.  
3.2.2.1 Phase 1: early reflection (1990s-2001) 
The tensions between a market-oriented approach to post-conflict and a more people-
centred paradigm persisted in the early 1990s. If on the one hand the “end of history” 
(Fukuyama, 1992) seemed to indicate to the world that market economy, liberalisation, 
privatisation, and democracy were the best developmental models to follow, on the 
other the NGOs maintained the control of several of the new post-conflict activities, 
multiplying their number and tasks. Nevertheless, an increasing debate on the role of 
the state in post-war recovery and development started emerging in the early 1990s 
among practitioners in academia and policy-makers at international level. Early in 1992, 
the UN Secretary General Report An Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali, 1992) analysed 
the wide array of activities entailed in a post-conflict peacebuilding intervention. These 
ranged from disarmament to the repatriation of refugees, from the support and training 
of security personnel to the monitoring of elections, from the protection of human 
rights to the reform and strengthening of governmental institutions and the promotion 
of formal and informal processes of political participation. Without directly identifying 
these activities with the practices of (re)building a state, the report called nonetheless for 
comprehensive efforts to “identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen 
and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). 
  At the same time, successful state-led development experiences of the four 
East ‘Asian Tigers’ and the increasing economic growth of the Indian subcontinent, 
China and Vietnam moved to a re-evaluation of the role of the state in supporting rapid 
economic growth and radical socioeconomic transformation. By the end of the 1990s, 
the neo-liberal model and the informal activities of the NGOs were no longer seen as 
sufficient approaches for the recovery and development of post-war societies, and 
scholars and practitioners started questioning the political, economic, and 
developmental orthodoxy of that time. At the academic level, the ‘good governance’ 
agenda with its emphasis on transparency, accountability, and the need to control the 
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state rose in prominence and overlapped to some degree with the ‘developmental state’ 
agenda and its focus on the effectiveness of the state (Fritz & Rocha Menocal, 2006). 
Likewise, the presumed link between democracy and economic growth was challenged. 
Leftwich (1993) argued that “non-consensual and non-democratic measures may often 
be essential in the early stages of developmental sequences” (p. 616), whereas Brohman 
(1995), Green R. and Ahmed (1999) promoted traditional models of development and 
rehabilitation over imported Western blueprints.  
 Ideas developed in academia progressively permeated the policy discourse: by 
the end of the 1990s, the international policy agenda changed its approach to 
development and started reconsidering the role of the state. The 1997 World Bank’s 
World Development Report is an emblematic publication testifying to this change. In 
evaluating the role and effectiveness of the state in development, the Report affirmed 
that “state-dominated development has failed. But so has stateless development” 
(World Bank, 1997, p. iii). Furthermore, the Report envisaged a rethinking of the state, 
recognising its centrality “to economic and social development” (World Bank, 1997, p. 
1). Likewise, other international organisations such as the IMF played an important role 
in the promotion and imposition of the good governance agenda. In 1996 for example, 
the Interim Committee of the IMF stressed the particular importance of “promoting 
good governance in all its aspects, including by ensuring the rule of law, improving the 
efficiency and accountability of the public sector, and tackling corruption” (IMF, 1996). 
One year after, the IMF’s Executive Board adopted the Good Governance – The IMF’s Role 
guidance note to foster good governance, public sector transparency and accountability 
(IMF, 1997). 
 From the late 1990s, the international community started reconsidering the 
role of the state and the importance of governance, state capacity, and institutional 
quality for effective post-war recovery and development. The conventional wisdom of 
the end of the century re-evaluated the significance of the state for development, and 
expressions like ‘institutions matter’ or ‘getting to Denmark’ – a model of a developed 
country with functioning public sector and state institutions – became common 
recommendations in the development world. The research and policy world moved 
alongside this policy evolution: as the academic literature emphasising the importance of 
institutions and good governance flourished (Grindle, 1997, 2000; Klitgaard, 1995; 
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Tendler, 1997), donors and international organisations began to reconsider the role of 
the state in post-war recovery and development (World Bank, 1997, 2000).  
 The mixed results of the international efforts in the early 1990s, with relative 
successful missions such as El Salvador accompanied by failures such as Rwanda, 
imposed an additional reflection about the complexity of post-conflict transitions. In 
particular, the international community started “bringing the state back” (Evans P. B., 
Rueshemeyer & Skocpol, 1985) into the post-war recovery agenda. The trend toward 
intensified efforts in post-war recovery and development continued at the international 
level in the following years, as more expensive mandates for UN operations and the 
introduction in 1999 of the country-focused IMF/World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSP) demonstrate. A new wave of international interventions in Burundi, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone adopted a new and 
longer-term approach to post-war recovery, aimed to (re)build effective formal 
institutions and performing states. These efforts to promote state effectiveness were 
also echoed within the humanitarian world, as the international community claimed in 
the wake of Kosovo its right of military intervention in a sovereign state whenever a 
state does not fulfil its ‘responsibility to protect’ its own citizens from serious harm 
(International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001).   
 This first phase of evolution in the academic and policy discourse was also 
reflected in British policy agenda. Whilst UK’s role in assistance can be dated at least to 
the first activities of the Ministry of Overseas Development in the 1960s (Barder, 2007), 
the Labour Government’s establishment of DFID as a separate ministry in 1997 
marked the recent engagement of Britain with state building interventions in fragile, 
post-conflict environments. Since then, DFID has led British efforts in the field of 
post-war recovery and development. Its activities and programmes have been 
increasingly developed in collaboration with other British ministries and with 
international donors, in line with a ‘whole of government’ (OECD DAC, 2006a; Patrick 
& Brown, 2007, pp. 9-30) and multilateral approach which characterised the UK post-
war recovery efforts in the new century.  
 The first activities of DFID saw a convergence between the Department’s and 
the international policy agenda of other donors and international institutions. DFID 
promoted themes, concepts, and principles in line with the research agenda and the 
general donors’ approach to post-war recovery and development of that time. For 
85 
 
example, DFID WPs in 1997 and 2000 denoted an initial and growing commitment of 
the Department toward states weakness and ineffectiveness. DFID underlined the 
problems linked to state weakness and corruption and increasingly recognised the 
importance of good governance, political stability, and accountability in development 
(DFID, 1997). The WPs explore the linkages between conflict and poverty, considering 
“weak and ineffective states” (DFID, 2000c, p. 23) as a barrier to globalisation, and 
focusing on the need to promote effective governments, efficient markets, and inclusive 
political institutions. Likewise, the words of then DFID Secretary of State Clare Short 
re-echoed previous World Bank reports in acknowledging the failure of “the old models 
– both statism and laissez faire” (Short, 1998). Short stressed the importance of the 
state and its institutions for security and committed the Department to “provide more 
support to countries coming out of conflict to rebuild and move forward” (Short, 
2000). Researchers were part of the early DFID’s policy agenda: for example, the 
Department started sponsoring in 2001 the Governance Resource Centre in 
Birmingham to support evidence-based policy and practice in international 
development. 
 Alongside DFID, other British governmental departments and agencies 
devoted increasing attention to weak states and progressively became integral part of 
the growing network of policy actors working on state building. The MOD Strategic 
Defence Review considered “the break-up of states” (1998, p. 14) as a security problem 
and identified “the failure of state structures” (MOD, 1998, p. 95) as one of the new 
challenges for Britain outside Europe. Furthermore, British ‘whole of government’ 
approach to post-war recovery was reinforced by the creation of the conflict prevention 
pools – joint funding mechanisms managed by DFID, FCO, and MOD and used to 
reduce conflict and promote joint analysis, long-term strategies, and an improved co-
ordination with international partners. An Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) and 
a Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) became operational in 2001.  
 British policy network of actors, HMG departments, and agencies working on 
state building and fragility emerged, developed, and started consolidating across 
government in the late 1990s. In particular, some key components of this network, such 
as the emergence of DFID and its agenda, the increasing cross-governmental 
relationship between DFID, FCO, and MOD, or a progressive policy attention toward 
research emerged in this first phase of evolution to be further consolidated over the 
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successive years. This early British approach to post-war recovery and development 
moved alongside the international policy agenda and contained most of the concepts 
and principles appearing in the subsequent academic literature on state building. 
However, these early policy papers did not articulate yet a clear policy response to weak 
states, and DFID assistance seemed to be designed to strengthen already functioning 
states rather than to build them from failure or fragility. 
3.2.2.2 Phase 2: post-shock recovery (2001-2004) 
This early evolution of thinking ushered in a second, post-shock recovery phase, a 
direct consequence of some contemporary events such as the terrorist attacks in the US 
in September 2001 and the problematic process of post-conflict reconstruction in war-
torn Afghanistan. In particular, the 9/11 attacks served as a catalyst for a thorough 
academic and policy investigation on the role of the state in security and development. 
In the wake of 9/11, the international community started seeing unstable and non-
performing countries (addressed over the years as ‘weak’, ‘rogue’, ‘failed’, or ‘fragile’ 
states) as a potential threat to global security (Barakat, 2009, pp. 107-108; Fukuyama, 
2004). Scholars and practitioners (re)considered the impact of state fragility on security 
and stability; at the same time, addressing state fragility became one of the top priorities 
of the international community to promote development and prevent conflict, 
terrorism, human and drug trafficking, and organised violence both at domestic and 
international level.  
 From a scholarly point of view, the literature on state reconstruction started 
flourishing in the first few years of the new century, as academics further investigated 
the role of the state in post-war reconstruction and development. The ‘good enough 
governance’ agenda (Grindle, 2004) reformulated the concept of good governance to 
focus on those areas that matter the most for a state’s development process. 
Scholarship in the field of post-war recovery started an attentive reflection on how to 
effectively and comprehensively address state fragility, and the academic literature saw 
the burgeoning outgrowth of studies and books on post-conflict state building, 
particularly in 2004 (Chesterman, 2004; Chesterman, Ignatieff & Thakur, 2004; Fearon 
& Laitin, 2004; Fukuyama, 2004; Krasner, 2004; Paris, 2004).  
 As scholars reflected on the role of the state in security and development, so 
the policy agenda at the international level evolved to reconsider and incorporate states 
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in their post-war reconstruction and development practices and strategies. Western 
donors stressed the importance of legitimate states and effective institutions in fragile, 
conflict-affected environments, considering states as “the front-line responders to 
today’s threats” (UN, 2004, p. 18). Also, from a development perspective, the fragility 
of a country started to be seen as the major barrier to the achievement of the 
Millennium Development Goals, with one third of the people living in extreme poverty 
found in fragile and failing states (DFID, 2005).  
 This increasing reflection and reconsideration of the role of the state elicited 
the first policy answers to state fragility and state weakness found its way in the 
international policy agenda. In 2002, the World Bank set up a Task Force to address the 
special needs of Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS), a particular group of 
countries with unstable government and institutions and weak economic structures 
(World Bank, 2002). State weakness became thus prominent in the international policy 
agenda and started to be considered part – when not the actual cause – of several 
security and development problems. At the same time, donors promoted programmes 
and studies to improve their understanding of state weakness, analysing the ways in 
which international and external actors can prevent or redress conflict by tackling state 
problems effectively. The state thus (re)gained an important role into the policy 
discourse, and comprehending state instability and engaging with it became the main 
international policy answer to the challenges of post-war reconstruction and 
development.  
 In Britain, the policy discourse was characterised by a progressive convergence 
with the international policy agenda and an increasing reflection on the role of the state. 
DFID reinforced its engagement with post-war recovery: it launched the Drivers of 
Change approach (DFID, 2003) and published the first evaluation of the conflict 
prevention pools mechanism (Austin et al., 2004). At the same time, then DFID 
Secretary of State Hilary Benn incorporated the terminology on state building and state 
fragility into some of his official speeches. He asserted that weak, failing, broken-down, 
collapsed, or crisis states represented a challenge for development and security (Benn, 
2004a, 2004b) and reiterated the need to prevent state crisis and “do something to 
promote more effective states” (Benn, 2004a, 2004b). Benn described these weak states 
as “unable or unwilling to carry out their basic functions” (Benn, 2004b), de facto 
anticipating of one year DFID’s official definition of fragile states. DFID’s rhetorical 
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and policy commitments were matched by increasing efforts at HMG level. In 2004, the 
government set up the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU, renamed in 2007 
SU), a joint DFID-FCO-MOD unit to provide through a civil-military partnership 
targeted assistance in countries emerging from violent conflict.  
 Researchers were integral part of these increased commitments toward state 
weakness. DFID published in September 2002 the Surr Report (Surr et al., 2002), a 
policy paper that constituted an important step in enhancing DFID’s approach to 
research and led to the establishment of the Central Research Department. Building on 
the findings of Surr, DFID published in May 2004 the Research Funding Framework 2005-
07 (DFID, 2004), a publication outlining the long-term use of DFID funds for research 
to “contribute to a global pool of new knowledge and technologies for development, 
improving access of users in developing countries to this global pool, and raising the 
impact of DFID-funded research” (Waldman, Barakat & Varisco, 2014, p. 46). The 
network of state building researchers therefore grew and expanded alongside the 
evolution of the policy agenda, supporting these early HMG commitments toward state 
weakness.  
3.2.2.3 Phase 3: proactive engagement (2005-today) 
The third and current phase represents the natural evolution of the precedent increasing 
reflection on the role of the state in post-conflict recovery and sees the concepts of 
state building and fragility permeating the contemporary literature and policy agenda. 
This growing engagement with state building and state fragility was actually fostered by 
recent historical events: the complexity of the current post-war reconstruction process 
in Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, forced scholars and policy-makers to further 
study, evaluate, and understand the most effective ways to engage with fragile, conflict-
affected countries. The network of research and policy actors working on state building 
has thus consolidated and reached international dimensions during this third phase. At 
the same time, the academic reflection on state building and fragility has become more 
nuanced and articulated. Likewise, international organisations and bilateral donors have 
progressively refined their policy responses to post-conflict state fragility.  
 From a scholarly point of view, the academic literature broadened its reflection 
on the role of the state in post-war recovery. Scholars underlined the relevance of 
institutions for economic growth (Fritz & Rocha Menocal, 2006), while the reflection 
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on good governance was enriched by the more inclusive approach of ‘collaborative 
governance’ (Evans M., 2010). Some authors stressed the need for inclusive, “internally-
led and externally-supported” (Interpeace, 2010, p. 6) state building processes. Others 
analysed the different forms of legitimacy characterising fragile states (Bellina et al., 
2009; Clements, 2008). They focused on the different ways through which a state can 
improve its legitimacy, arguing that political commitment, a state’s control over a 
territory, and its capacity to deliver policies need to be matched by an institutional, long-
term perspective (Ghani, Lockhart & Carnahan, 2005). Likewise, academics looked at 
the work of Cliffe, Guggenheim, and Kostner (2003) to emphasise the importance of 
locally-owned, community-driven models of recovery and development, and warned 
against the risk of exporting and imposing external frameworks of governance on other 
countries (Chandler, 2010; Heathershaw & Lambach, 2008). 
  As researchers reflected on the different roles and functions of a state (Ghani 
& Lockhart, 2008, pp. 124-166; Ghani, Lockhart & Carnahan, 2005), they published 
new and more articulated studies on the practices and dilemmas of post-war state 
building that analysed the complexities, difficulties, problems, and theoretical and 
practical consequences entailed in (re)building a fragile, conflict-affected country 
(Barbara, 2008; Paris & Sisk, 2007, 2009). For example, scholars studied the different 
aims and priorities of state building, peacebuilding, nation building, and institution 
building (Belloni, 2007; Call & Cousens, 2008; Call & Wyeth, 2008; Lun, 2009; Paris & 
Sisk, 2007, 2009; Rocha Menocal, 2010). Noting how post-conflict state building has 
become crucial in the promotion of sustainable peace and long-term development, they 
investigated the implications of the progressive merging of the peacebuilding and the 
state building agendas (Call & Wyeth, 2008; Rocha Menocal, 2010). They underlined 
how the priorities of the two agendas, while overlapping and somehow complementary, 
also pursue different goals: if the aim of state building is to create legitimate and 
effective states, the main goal of peacebuilding is a self-sustaining peace (Call & Wyeth, 
2008). At the same time, they contended that (re)building states in the aftermath of 
conflict entails a difficult mediation between the immediate and short-term objectives of 
peacebuilding and the longer-term goals of state building (Call & Cousens, 2008). This 
apparently minimal difference could actually result in tensions when post-war 
programmes are designed around the different goals and time frames of the two 
agendas, as donors might tend to bypass state institutions or appease some leaders in 
90 
 
the interest of peace, undermining in this way long-term state building efforts (Brynen, 
2008; Call & Wyeth, 2008; Rocha Menocal, 2010).  
 Likewise, some academics pointed out how early recovery and post-war 
reconstruction policies consist most of the time of different, overlapping approaches 
and activities promoted by numerous international, governmental, and non-
governmental actors in a conflict-affected environment (Bailey S. et al., 2009). State 
building priorities and policies thus interact with other humanitarian, stabilisation, 
counterinsurgency, early recovery, peacebuilding, and development policies, at times 
competing and clashing with the agendas of the different actors on the ground. Others 
scholars reflected on contemporary state building and post-war recovery practices and 
derived recommendations for policy practitioners working in fragile states (Barakat, 
2010; Call & Wyeth, 2008; Rocha Menocal, 2010).  
 On the policy side, international organisations and donors closely followed – 
and sometimes anticipated – this academic evolution, progressively polishing their 
policy answers to state weakness. Multilateral organisations and bilateral donors 
embraced the notion of state fragility, and started to consider fragile states as a threat to 
security and an obstacle to development. At the same time, the international community 
began to promote externally-led state building as the main policy answer to post-conflict 
fragility, recognising that establishing a minimally functioning state is “essential to 
undertake political and economic reforms and maintain the peace, especially in the long 
term” (Rocha Menocal, 2010, p. 3; Call & Cousens, 2008; Paris & Sisk, 2009). The 
notions of state fragility and post-conflict state building have thus become prominent in 
the international policy agenda (OECD DAC, 2007b, 2011; World Bank, 2011, pp. 97-
117). For example, the OECD DAC published its Principles for Good International 
Engagement in Fragile States & Situations (2007b), as well as several studies and practical 
policy guidance on how to (re)build fragile and conflict-affected countries (OECD, 
2008, 2010; OECD DAC, 2008, 2011). Similarly, the World Bank reinforced its work in 
fragile states (Zoellick, 2008) and stressed in its 2011 World Development Report the 
importance of transforming institutions to deliver security, justice, and jobs. In this way, 
the concept of state building has become “more and more accepted within the 
international community” (Brahimi, 2007, p. 5) as a main policy of external 
interventions in post-conflict countries.  
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 This progressive engagement with state fragility not only resulted in the 
increase in the number of studies and policy papers on fragility, but also entailed a 
substantial growth in the amount of aid spent in fragile states by post-war 
reconstruction and development donors, as demonstrated in the following figure 
published by the OECD DAC:  
Figure 8   Official Development Assistance (ODA) to fragile and non-fragile states, 
1995-2007 
 
       Source: OECD DAC, 2010a, p. 36. 
The figure is particularly significant because it shows how from 2001 – the starting date 
of the second phase of post-war recovery evolution – the yearly amount of ODA to 
fragile states has always been higher than in the precedent years. This escalation 
continued progressively in the most recent years. Starting in 2004 – the end date of the 
second phase of evolution and the starting date of the third phase – the amount of 
ODA channelled to fragile states has regularly surpassed the 30% of the total ODA 
expenditure.  
 Increasing engagement with post-conflict fragility is not the only policy trend 
characterising the third phase of evolution of the role of the state in post-war 
reconstruction and development. As international donors have proactively promoted 
externally-led policies to create effective states and institutions, as well as ensure peace, 
recovery, and development in the aftermath of a war, they also fine-tuned their 
approaches toward state fragility, incorporating in some of their policy papers 
reflections, concepts, and debates that emerged in the academic literature over the years. 
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Exchanges and interconnections between policy and research actors therefore 
characterised this third phase of evolution and constituted an integral part of the 
growing network of practitioners and academics working on state building and post-
conflict fragility. 
 For example, the OECD (2010, pp. 53-57) integrated in its recommendations 
for donors working on fragile states some of the notions and suggestions stressed by 
the literature on the subject (Rocha Menocal, 2010). Furthermore, international actors 
became more cautious in imposing external and radical modernisation agendas and 
emphasised the importance of non-state actors and bottom-up approaches for building 
sustainable peace and legitimacy (OECD, 2010). In line with academic studies on the 
importance of national ownership for successful recovery and long-term development, 
international and bilateral donors have devoted increasing attention to the leadership 
and ownership of national governments over the post-war reconstruction and 
development processes. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness emphasised the 
importance for partner countries to “exercise effective leadership over their 
development policies and strategies and co-ordinate development actions” (Anon., 
2005). Similarly, the launching in 2008 of the Accra Agenda for Action (Anon., 2008), the 
recent establishment of the g7+, a group of self-defined fragile states which tries to 
influence the burgeoning international agenda on fragility, and the signature by more 
than 40 countries and organisations of the 2011 New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States 
(International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, 2011), are examples of the 
increasing international efforts toward more articulated and refined models of post-war 
recovery and development.  
 The UK was integral part of this growing state building network, as the HMG 
policy evolution has proceeded together with, and sometimes anticipated, the general 
policy trend in post-war recovery at international level. Early signs of a more proactive 
engagement toward fragility could be already found in late 2004, when the British 
government established the Poverty Reduction in Difficult Environments (PRDE) 
team, then renamed fragile states team. In particular, the PRDE published seven 
Working Papers between 2004 and 2005 which introduced for the first time the concept 
of fragility in the British policy discourse (Anderson et al., 2005; Leader & Colenso, 
2005; Moreno-Torres & Anderson, 2004; Vallings & Moreno-Torres, 2005), paving the 
way to a new phase of proactive engagement toward fragility and post-conflict state 
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building. The following year, the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit produced a Background 
Paper on Countries at Risk of Instability (Yiu & Mabey, 2005), while DFID expressed its 
proactive engagement with fragility in its Policy Paper Why We Need to Work More 
Effectively in Fragile States (DFID, 2005). This paper represented a change of policy for 
the UK, as DFID made for the first time explicit its policy commitment toward fragile 
states by defining them “one of the biggest challenges for the UK and for the 
international community” (DFID, 2005, p. 3). The document set out DFID objectives 
and commitments about its work in fragile environments and provided a first proxy list 
of fragile states. The Department’s response to fragility appeared in line with the 
growing state building agenda at international level: the Policy Paper promoted 
multilateral efforts in closely cooperation with the UN, the EU, and the G8 countries. 
Likewise, DFID identified the World Bank and the OECD DAC as the main partners 
“to build on the research base for better policy” (DFID, 2005, p. 25).  
 Policy documents at HMG level (Cabinet Office, 2008; DFID, 2006a, 2006b; 
FCO, 2006) and the official speeches of the then Secretary of State Hilary Benn (Benn, 
2006a, 2006b) supported British commitment to state building and fragility. In 
particular, DFID 2006 WP suggested for the first time a move toward more explicit 
state building objectives and programmes (DFID, 2006a, pp. 17-42). This engagement 
with post-conflict state building was further articulated in DFID’s publication States in 
Development: Understanding State-building (Whaites, 2008), a working paper that did not 
represent UK policy but proved to be extremely influential on DFID policy approach 
to fragility and post-conflict state building. Whaites elaborated a model of responsive 
state building that involved three necessary areas of progress: (i) the development of 
political settlements; (ii) the presence of the three survival or core functions of security, 
revenue, and law; and (iii) the delivery of expected functions to fulfil public expectations 
in the field of infrastructure, social provision, policing, and others. This state building 
model influenced the rhetoric of the then Secretary of State Douglas Alexander 
(Alexander, 2008, 2009a, 2009b). Furthermore, Whaites’ concepts and analysis were 
incorporated and re-elaborated in successive British policy papers (DFID, 2009b, 
2009d; SU, 2008). For example, DFID 2009 WP explicitly recognised the importance of 
building peaceful states and societies in countries emerging from conflict (DFID, 
2009d, pp. 69-89) and used concepts derived from Whaites’ state building model such 
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as inclusive political settlements and core functions of a state to highlight the 
Department’s approach to post-conflict fragility.  
 The hypothetical point of arrival of HMG’s recent reflection on the role of the 
state in post-war reconstruction and development was the publication in 2010 of 
DFID’s Practice Paper Building Peaceful States and Societies (DFID, 2010b). The paper re-
elaborated the analysis of Whaites (2008) and of the precedent DFID Policy Paper 
Building the State and Securing the Peace (2009b) and developed a new approach aimed at 
building peaceful states and societies through the promotion of strong and positive 
state-society relations. This new approach integrated and combined DFID’s 
understanding of state building and peacebuilding, thus incorporating in a practical 
policy paper the theoretical convergence of the state building and peacebuilding agenda. 
In line with the academic literature on the subject, the paper also recognised the 
possible tensions between the short-term goal of peace and the longer-term state 
building process (DFID, 2010b, p. 18). Nonetheless, the paper aimed at guiding the 
work of DFID practitioners by listing some operational implications and practical tools 
for officers working in fragile or conflict-affected countries, as well as a list of examples 
on how to apply the integrated approach to different sectors of intervention such as 
justice, education, job creation, political institutions and processes. Building Peaceful States 
and Societies is therefore the UK’s last and most advanced framework for understanding 
peacebuilding and state building in the context of post-conflict recovery. It represents 
an attempt to incorporate the developments of research and international policy in 
fragile, conflict-affected countries into a single policy paper. As an ideal ending point of 
the current British reflection on conflict and fragility, the paper has informed “analysis, 
DFID country plans and the development of UK strategies” (DFID 2010b, p. 38), as 
well as the work of several DFID officers in conflict-affected countries. 
 Britain’s growing policy activities and engagement in post-conflict state 
building have been progressively supported by a growing network of researchers and 
HMG-funded studies. In 2005, the Governance Resource Centre was further expanded 
to become the Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC), a 
centre providing DFID and other international clients such as the EC with applied 
knowledge services on broader state-building-related issues such as governance, social 
development, humanitarian response, and conflict. Recently, Coffey International 
Development and a large group of consultancy partners have started working alongside 
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the GSDRC to provide expanded and integrated governance, social development, 
conflict, and humanitarian Professional Evidence and Applied Knowledge Services 
(PEAKS) for DFID. Likewise, DFID-sponsored research has grown exponentially over 
the years: in 2006-07, the Department spent over £10 million on social and political 
research (DFID, 2007), while DFID’s 2008 Research Strategy (DFID, 2008) pledged to 
invest £1 billion in research from 2008 to 2013. This increased funding was 
overwhelmingly devoted to establish and oversee large Development Research Centres 
such as the Research Programme Consortia. Typically funded for a period of five years, 
these Consortia are “centres of specialisation around a particular research and policy 
theme” (DFID, 2009a, p. 2), led by a UK university or research institute and comprised 
of a number of Southern research partner institutions such as academic, civil society, 
and commercial organisations. 
 HMG’s in-house capacity to commission, appraise, and use research has also 
improved progressively over the years. RED, a division in DFID “specifically tasked to 
identify and generate evidence, knowledge, technology, and ideas” (Waldman, Barakat 
& Varisco, 2014, p. 48) and to convey these with the view to inform and influence 
policy, programmes, and practice, accounted for 90% of the Department’s expenditure 
in research in 2010-2011 (NAO, 2011, p. 55). Its research budget is expected to increase 
from £125 million in 2008-09 to £320 million in 2014-15, and just under 10% of this 
total research expenditure – a projected amount of approximately £29 million for 
2014/15 – is spent on governance, conflict, and social development (NAO, 2011, pp. 
55-57). Other funds have been made available for ad hoc research on specific issues. 
DFID Policy Division can now directly commission its own research on pressing issues 
through the Policy Research Fund; likewise, DFID country teams have funds available 
to commission their own research, and in 2010-2011 they commissioned research for a 
total amount of £26 million (NAO, 2011, p. 55).  
 DFID is also using reference groups and expert panels of leading academics to 
inform its policy-making process. The Department has also recruited a number of 
Senior Research Fellows, academics working part-time in DFID and helping draft 
policy on certain issues. Furthermore, regional resource hubs have been established in a 
number of locations. For instance, in 2010 RED established the South Asia Research 
Hub to support the use of evidence by DFID South Asia country programmes; capacity 
building in the research institutions in the region; and the development of DFID 
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research programmes that address key regional priorities. Today, RED Evidence into 
Action Team promotes and supports the use of quality research evidence in decision-
making both within DFID and more widely. DFID also requires its staff to set out the 
rationale for choosing a project and programme in business cases based on evidence of 
what works and knowledge and experience from fragile states. Finally, intermediary 
figures such as FCO analysts or DFID’s evidence brokers – DFID staff that assist 
advisers and programme managers by providing evidence products and building internal 
capacity to search, appraise, and apply evidence in programmes and policy – facilitate 
the use of research in government departments.  
3.2.3 Main trends in British state building policy network 
The network of policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and researchers working and 
writing on post-conflict state building and fragility has grown exponentially over the last 
two decades. In line with the recent expansion of the international policy agenda on 
post-conflict recovery, Britain’s efforts in post-war reconstruction and development 
followed a three-phase evolution which found its zenith in the current proactive 
engagement with state building in fragile, conflict-affected countries and in the 
publication of DFID Practice Paper, Building Peaceful States and Societies (DFID, 2010b). 
Three main and distinct trends have emerged over the past few decades and have 
characterised the progressive expansion of the British network of policy and research 
actors working on state building and post-recovery. 
 The first trend is an expansion and consolidation of this network at the 
international level, as part of a growing HMG and international policy engagement with 
fragility and post-conflict state building. State weakness and fragility have received an 
increasing attention in the wake of 9/11. Particularly after 2004, policy initiatives on 
fragility and post-conflict state building have flourished among international 
organisations and bilateral donors, in line with a burgeoning academic literature on the 
topic. A proactive engagement with internationally-led state building has progressively 
become the most supported policy answer to conflict and fragility. This engagement has 
resulted in an intensified rhetoric and proactive attention to fragile states and post-
conflict environments (Mitchell, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2011), as well as an increasing 
allocation of funds to programmes in fragile states. The UK has become a global leader 
in the field of development (OECD DAC, 2006b, 2010b), and DFID has piloted some 
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OECD DAC programmes23 and started to be considered the “key driver of the DAC 
work on fragile states” (OECD DAC, 2010b, p. 31). 
 The second trend is a progressive consolidation of this network across HMG. 
As DFID emerged as a global player in the field of development, its work has been 
progressively conducted in a framework of cooperation with other ministries and 
bodies, consolidated, reinvigorated, and supported by whole of government and joint 
DFID-FCO-MOD policies. Examples of these joined-up approaches were the creation 
of the SU and of the Conflict Pool mechanism,24 or the publication of tri-departmental 
strategies such as the recent Building Stability Overseas Strategy (DFID, FCO & MOD, 
2011). Indeed, these efforts for a better coordination among departments have become 
in the last decade a common feature in donors’ response to fragility and conflict (Patrick 
& Brown, 2007). Like the UK, the US created in 2004 the Office of the Coordinator for 
Reconstruction and Stabilisation, an office responsible for coordinating federal 
government efforts in countries at risk of or in conflict. This office has been integrated 
since 2011 with the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilisation Operations. Likewise, Canada 
created in 2005 the joint Department of Foreign Affairs-International Trade’s 
Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force, while the Australian Department of 
Foreign Affairs and the Australian Agency for International Development created in 
2009 the Crisis Prevention, Stabilisation and Recovery Group. This recent creation and 
promotion of joint and cross-governmental mechanisms at British and international 
levels denotes how bilateral donors progressively began to see that the problems 
associated with conflict necessitated a more comprehensive response. This type of 
policy response is the increasing promotion of state building in countries emerging from 
conflict. This new approach would no longer necessitate separate and disjointed efforts 
in the fields of security, development, foreign policy, or economy, but would 
progressively require an overarching and cross-government effort, the joined-up work 
                                                          
23 DFID for example chaired and co-chaired some of the OECD DAC’s networks and groups, piloted 
the DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States in Nepal, Yemen, and Somalia, and 
published in 2010 the Briefing Paper series Working Effectively in Conflict-affected and Fragile Situations (DFID, 
2010c), based on the OECD DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations.  
24 The Conflict Pool was created in 2009 as a new DFID-FCO-MOD joint mechanism of funding which 
merged the funds of the Africa and Global Conflict Prevention Pools with the Stabilisation Aid Fund. 
This new mechanism is aimed at reducing global and regional conflict, and requires collaboration among 
DFID, FCO, and MOD to conduct joint analysis, establish shared priorities, and design and implement 
joint conflict prevention and management programmes on the ground. 
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of every department to (re)build the structures, the institutions, and the functions of an 
effective state.  
 The third and final trend characterising the British network of actors working 
on state building is the increasing role played by researchers as part of this growing 
network and policy agenda. The amount of HMG funding allocated to in-house and 
commissioned research has grown exponentially over the last two decades. 
Furthermore, the different governmental departments, and DFID in particular, have 
promoted an increased number of new mechanisms, roles, teams, and divisions to 
facilitate the appraisal and use of research at HMG level. These developments, as well as 
organisational restructuring, have underpinned an increasing synergy between policy 
practices and the academic literature and research. As the scholarship on state building, 
conflict, and fragility has mushroomed over the last decade, British policy documents, 
practice papers, and strategies on post-war state building and fragility have progressively 
incorporated the main themes emerging in the academic literature. Several scholarly 
themes have thus shaped the UK’s growing state building policy agenda and have been 
incorporated into the different WPs and policy papers delineating British policy 
practices in the field of post-conflict development. The concept of political settlements 
has found for example its way into several HMG doctrines and policy documents 
(DFID, 2010b; House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 2011; MOD, 2009; 
SU, 2008). Likewise, academic studies on the convergence between the peacebuilding 
and state building agenda have been translated into DFID recent promotion of an 
integrated approach to state building and peacebuilding. 
3.3 SSR: the armed wing of state building 
The precedent part of the chapter has analysed the modern evolution of state building 
as a policy practice and field of research at international and British level, showing how 
different policy and academic institutions and actors working on state building were 
part of a network that has grown exponentially over recent years. Externally-led state-
building has thus become the principal policy approach to enhance state legitimacy 
through increased capabilities, accountability, and responsiveness to the needs of 
citizens (DFID, 2009b, 2010b; OECD, 2008, 2010; OECD DAC, 2007b, 2008, 2011; 
Whaites, 2008). Among the different state building policy activities, SSR has emerged in 
the last decade as one of the major policy prescriptions whereby international actors aim 
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specifically to promote stability and security by rebuilding or reforming security 
institutions of fragile, conflict-affected countries. As a result, SSR has today become the 
principal policy approach to reform the security apparatus of a state in the aftermath of 
a war. As part of this evolutionary process, the UK has emerged as one of the main 
global actors in the field of SSR, pioneering some SSR interventions, and promoting the 
international policy agenda, as well as a range of academic studies on SSR. The next part 
of the chapter therefore looks at this evolution of SSR as a concept, policy practice, and 
field of study. 
 State building and SSR practices are closely interlinked within the modern 
liberal policy agenda of post-war recovery promoted by international and western 
donors working in fragile, conflict-affected environments. According to the OECD 
DAC Handbook on Security System Reform, international countries promoting SSR policies 
support recipient states in achieving four overarching objectives: establishing effective 
governance, oversight, and accountability in the security system; improving delivery of 
security and justice services; developing local partnership and ownership of the reform 
process; and promoting the sustainability of justice and security service delivery (OECD 
DAC, 2007a, p. 21). The definition of SSR reported in the introduction of this chapter 
and these SSR objectives therefore stress how the practices to reform a security sector 
in a conflict-affected country are underpinned by core values such as democracy, 
transparency, accountability, and good governance. These values bring the SSR agenda 
within the framework of internationally-led, liberal state building policies. SSR has been 
thus considered “the armed wing” (Jackson, 2010) and “an integral element of state 
building” (Jackson, 2011, p. 1810). Reforms in the field of security have become an 
essential “part of the international community’s approach to conflict management” 
(Jackson, 2010, p. 123), a central aspect of international interventions in fragile states to 
bring peace and security in the aftermath of a war. Over the last two decades, SSR 
policies and practices have therefore developed alongside the three-phase evolution of 
the state building policy and research agenda, constituting major policy prescriptions to 
reform the security institutions of a country emerging from war.  
 SSR gained prominence in the international policy agenda since the early 1990s 
and over the successive post-Cold War decades. During the Cold War, the main 
activities promoted by bilateral and international donors in the field of security were 
limited to the provision of technical, financial, and material assistance to allied or 
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friendly countries, with the aim to support Western (or Eastern) foreign and security 
strategic objectives overseas. Indeed, no attention was given to ensure that donors’ 
security support resulted in the creation of efficient, effective, or democratically 
accountable security sectors in the country assisted. Similarly, the research community 
was not interested in investigating the linkages between support in the field of security 
and the broader development agenda. Few academic studies focused on the military 
involvement in politics in the 1960s and 1970s and only in the 1980s did researchers 
start to devote increasing attention to issues such as the military’s role in governance in 
transition countries, the impact of the broader security sector on development, and the 
prevention of violent inter-group conflict or state violence against populations (Ball & 
Hendrickson, 2006). 
 The end of the Cold War resulted in consequent shifts in donors’ geopolitical 
priorities and in a changed political and strategic scenario. Several new approaches to 
security and development began to emerge in the early 1990s and they eventually 
shaped the development discourse and constituted the building blocks of the current 
SSR agenda (Smith C., 2001). In particular, some of the main developments influencing 
the emergence of SSR were an increasing consideration of the linkages between military 
expenditure and economic development and growth with a consequent attention from 
donors on the reduction of military expenditure for development purposes; a necessity 
to match the growing number of peacekeeping and post-war recovery missions with a 
better security assistance and conflict prevention; and a progressive emphasis on 
governance and public sector reform (Brzoska, 2003). These developments interacted 
with old and new debates and concepts that were shaping the international research and 
policy agenda, such as the academic enquiry on civil-military relations and the 
emergence of the concept of human security in the early 1990s (Brzoska, 2003; Law, 
2005). At the same time, the emerging SSR agenda received further inputs from some 
security reforms in Eastern and Central Europe as well as African countries. For 
example, the transition of Eastern Europe under the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation and the EU sphere of influence required an increased emphasis on 
democratic civil-military relations and accountable armed forces. Likewise, the advocacy 
efforts of civil society actors in post-apartheid South Africa influenced the country’s 
reforms of defence, intelligence, and police while research initiatives in the field security 
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emerged in other African states such as Ghana and Nigeria (Ball, 2010; Ball & 
Hendrikson, 2006).  
 It is thus upon these foundations and premises that the SSR agenda emerged 
in the late 1990s and developed over the successive years. DFID and the British 
government were the first bilateral actors to champion SSR and HMG engagement with 
SSR started soon after the 1997 election of the New Labour Government. The early 
seeds of British interest in SSR can be found in the DFID 1997 WP, when the 
Department stated its commitment to “help other countries to develop democratically 
accountable armed forces” (DFID, 1997, pp. 69-70), while at the same time 
discouraging “excessive military expenditure in developing countries” (DFID, 1997, p. 
70). DFID’s reiterated its role in conflict and security in the following years. The 
Department published some policy papers and statements on the importance of 
security, justice, and SSR for development (DFID, 1998, 2000b, 2000d) and its 2000 
WP reaffirmed its support to “effective security sector reform, to ensure that security 
sectors are appropriately structured and managed and subject to proper civilian control” 
(DFID, 2000c, p. 33). During the same period, then Secretary of State Clare Short 
released a series of influential speeches promoting “the need for a real partnership 
between the development community and the military” (Short, 1998) and explicitly 
announced DFID’s emerging SSR policy agenda in March 1999 at King’s College, 
London (Short, 1999). These early HMG initiatives occurred alongside British security 
assistance activities in Sierra Leone. British-led security activities in the West African 
state constituted the first engagement with SSR for the British government, an 
important step in the evolution of SSR as a concept and related policy at HMG level.    
Following these initial engagements of DFID in the late 1990s, SSR developed 
as an increasingly cross-governmental agenda in the early 2000s. In 2001, HMG 
launched the conflict prevention pools and created a tri-departmental Defence Advisory 
Team (DAT) of 10-15 people – later renamed Security Sector DAT (SSDAT) given its 
main involvement with SSR – to support SSR initiatives and “provide a mobile team of 
civilian and military advisers to undertake short-term training and advisory work” 
(DFID, 2002b, p. 11). Efforts toward a more joined-up approach were progressively 
reinforced: in June 2002, ministers from DFID, FCO, and the MOD approved a tri-
departmental SSR strategy (DFID, FCO & MOD, 2003b) and in November 2003 the 
three departments published an SSR Policy Brief that set out the UK government’s 
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policy approach to SSR (DFID, FCO & MOD, 2003a). During the same years, DFID 
produced some guidelines for SSR and police and justice reforms (DFID, 2002a, 
2002b), while DFID, FCO, and the MOD published a new SSR Strategy in 2004 and 
received support from the DAT team to implement it in “over 25 different country 
programmes” (DFID, FCO & MOD, 2004, p. 6).  
As happened in the case of state building, researchers constituted an integral 
part of the emerging policy agenda and of the related network of SSR academics and 
policy practitioners. The SSR research thus moved alongside this policy evolution. In 
1998, DFID funded through Saferworld a seminar and a pioneer study symbolically 
entitled Spreading Good Practices in Security Sector Reform: Policy Options for the British 
Government (Ball, 1998). Furthermore, the Department started in 1999 a three-year 
collaboration with King’s College London (which established the dedicated CSDG unit 
to support DFID’s work on SSR) to receive “analysis and advice, as well as training and 
the planning and implementation of programmes in the field” (Short, 1999). At the end 
of the three years, the contract was passed to Bradford University.  
Likewise, in the summer of 2000 a DFID-sponsored three-day symposium tried 
to maintain the momentum of the emerging policy and research agenda by bringing 
together and consolidating the emerging network of international and HMG policy-
makers and street-level bureaucrats working in post-conflict environments, along with 
British and international SSR researchers and academics (DFID, 2000a). The network 
expanded in the following years to reach progressively more practitioners and 
researchers based in conflict-affected countries. In 2002, DFID set up the GFN-SSR, a 
hub for SSR resources and practitioners to provide “the intellectual engine to support 
forward thinking, and networking and capacity building” (DFID, FCO & MOD, 2004, 
p. 7). The GFN-SSR was based in Cranfield University until 2006, and moved to the 
University of Birmingham for the following five years, where it also started organise 
quarterly Security and Justice training courses for HMG and international SSR officers 
and practitioners. The courses aim to give a practical, case study-orientated introduction 
to security and justice by mimicking the real-life experience of designing, implementing, 
and reviewing a security and justice intervention in a developing country. Mechanisms 
to include local researchers in  the process have been also envisaged: for instance, in 
2003, through the GFN-SSR, DFID began to sponsor the African Security Sector 
Network (ASSN), which became a hub for African researchers, policy analysts, 
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practitioners, and current and former members of the security forces working on SSR. 
Besides these DFID-funded initiatives and studies, the Defence Academy, Cranfield 
University, the Central Police Training and Development Authority, and Her Majesty’s 
Ship Dryad played a significant role in capacity building and defence education.  
The UK also supported the emerging SSR agenda in international multilateral 
fora such as the OECD DAC. The work of the OECD DAC on security and 
development started in 1997 and continued in 2001 (OECD DAC, 1997, 2001). 
However, it was only in 2004 that the DAC members agreed on a policy statement and 
a successive paper on SSR and governance that defined SSR, articulated its objectives, 
and provided some guidelines for implementation (OECD DAC, 2004, 2005). The 
following years saw a progressive formalisation of thinking and expansion of the SSR 
policy agenda at the international level. The OECD DAC published in 2007 a Handbook 
on SSR (OECD DAC, 2007a), the main outcome of the Implementation Framework for 
SSR, a two-year process to gather lessons learned and good practice on SSR. In recent 
years, many international multilateral and bilateral actors have become more involved in 
SSR programmes. International organisations such as the EU and the UN, as well as 
Western donors and governments like the US, the Netherlands, or Canada have 
undertaken numerous SSR activities. The UN has included SSR mandates in its peace 
support missions; similarly, numerous bilateral donors have translated the OECD DAC 
statements and papers in domestic policy papers, doctrines, and approaches (UN, 2008; 
US Department of the Army, 2009; USAID, USDOD & USDOS, 2009). A number of 
donors have funded an International Security Sector Advisory Team, located at DCAF, 
to ensure a standing capacity for operational support to their SSR activities. Some 
governments such as the Netherlands have secured interdepartmental pooled resources 
for SSR and created ad hoc teams to work on stabilisation issues. At the same time, SSR 
programmes have been promoted as an integral part of the international state building 
efforts in several countries of the world including Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia, 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Sudan.  
The policy network of multilateral institutions and bilateral governments 
working on SSR has thus grown exponentially over the last decade. Researchers have 
been part of this expanding network and the academic work on SSR has supported 
these international policy developments over the years. However, whilst the literature 
on some SSR-related issues such as civil-military relations or justice and security has a 
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long academic tradition, SSR emerged out of the development policy world as a 
response to urgent problems on the ground and developed primarily as a policy agenda 
that was very normative in nature and hence, to some extent, lacked a strong theoretical 
and empirical basis. This was particularly the case when the SSR policy agenda was 
launched in the late 1990s. SSR originated from policy documents, experiences, and 
recommendations as a practical policy-oriented agenda, not rooted in any theory, apart 
from the idea of liberal state building. SSR thus developed as a prescriptive agenda that 
always suffered a “benign academic neglect” (Peake, Sheye & Hills, 2007 cited in 
Jackson, 2011, p. 1804). As SSR emerged from the policy world, academic studies on 
the subject “have been relatively few and have never been fully linked into the broader 
state building debate or to the dialogue on liberal peace building” (Jackson, 2011, p. 
1804). The SSR policy approach, one of the policy interventions promoted in the 
framework of the liberal state building agenda – and part of the related academic 
literature – has rarely questioned or challenged “the underlying assumptions of the 
model” (Jackson, 2011, p. 1812). Instead, it has conversely focused on the technocratic 
and prescriptive aspects of an SSR intervention.  
As a consequence, whilst SSR has been incredibly influential, SSR concepts and 
programmes have not been adequately grounded in a contextual understanding of the 
security institutions donors were trying to change. Early SSR research was sometimes 
not sufficiently micro-level or empirical, but conversely focused excessively on 
normative frameworks that sometimes proved incapable to capture the complex power 
relations and the institutional and political dynamics in a country (Ball & Hendrickson, 
2006, pp. 24-28).25 As a result, despite the fact that scholars working on SSR have often 
been aware of the challenges entailed in transforming the socio-political structures of a 
conflict-affected country (Ebo, 2007; Egnell & Haldén, 2009), SSR research has 
frequently been normative, technical, operational, strongly influenced by donors’ policy-
related concerns, and targeted to the needs of specific groups such as military, police, 
justice, or intelligence actors, or relevant groups in the civilian policy sectors.  
In spite of these ealry constraints, the SSR literature has grown, expanded, and 
diversified over the last two decades (Berdal, 2009; Chanaa, 2002; Cooper & Pugh, 
                                                          
25 This was linked to the fact that short, policy-oriented assessments written by international consultants 
who flew in a country for a few weeks could hardly capture the micro-level security intricacies of power 
between the different actors on the ground. This point was stressed to me by an experienced SSR 
researcher in a private conversation. 
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2002; Hendrikson, 1999; McCartney, Fischer & Wils, 2004; Sedra, 2010; Wulf, 2004). 
International donors and governments have increasingly relied on the activities of 
academic and research institutes for guidance and advice on their work. A growing 
range of international universities, NGOs, and research centres such as the Berghof 
Conflict Research Center in Berlin, the Bonn International Centre for Conversion 
(BICC), Clingendael in the Netherlands, and DCAF in Switzerland developed alongside 
British research institutions and today conduct research on SSR and collaborate with 
international policy actors. This burgeoning international SSR literature was 
progressively enriched by case studies, recommendations, and lessons learned (Ball & 
Fayemi, 2004; Bryden & Hänggi, 2004; Bryden & Keane, 2010; Call, 2007; Friesendorf, 
2011; Huxley, 2001; Jones S. G. et al., 2005). Likewise, scholars published general 
reflections on the SSR discipline and policy practices (Hutchful, 2009; Nathan, 2007), as 
well as analyses on the role and practices to reform specific security bodies such as the 
police (Bailey D. & Perito, 2010; Hills, 2000a, 2000b, 2009; Neild, 2001), the armed 
forces (Cawthra & Luckham, 2003), intelligence (Wilson, 2005), justice (Bastick,  2010), 
or governance institutions (Ball, 2004a; Born, Fluri & Johnsson, 2003; Bryden & 
Hänggi, 2005). Academic studies on SSR have thus flourished in recent years and the 
network of SSR researchers and practitioners has today reached international 
dimensions. 
3.4 The use of research in state building and SSR: a policy network model 
Parts 3.2 and 3.3 of this chapter have provided an account of the recent evolution of 
state building and SSR in policy and research. These two sections have underlined how 
the two practices have become two of the principal policy prescriptions through which 
international actors and bilateral donors today aim to (re)build post-conflict states and 
reform the security institutions of countries emerging from war. Likewise, the analysis 
has shown how the network of researchers, policy institutions, and practitioners 
working on state building and SSR has grown and expanded exponentially over the last 
two decades, reaching international dimensions from Western donor countries to 
conflict-affected, fragile states.  
Chapter 2 of the thesis introduced different theories and models that explored 
the policy process and the utilisation of research in policy. It portrayed a dynamic and 
complex policy process that is shaped by multiple intertwined and frequently competing 
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factors in which research rarely interacts and influences in a direct, straightforward way. 
Most of the theories, concepts, and notions introduced in Chapter 2 have been so far 
applied to domestic policy processes, seldom examining international foreign policies 
such as state building and SSR in conflict-affected countries. Investigating the influence 
of research on an externally-led international policy such as British-led SSR in Sierra 
Leone adds thus a further geographical dimension to the frameworks and theories of 
research utilisation introduced in Chapter 2. Internationally-led policies are often 
planned and envisaged at domestic level in donor countries and implemented by 
donors’ country offices, embassies, personnel, and advisers overseas. These street level 
bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980, 1997; Sutton, 1999, pp. 22-23) can re-adapt these policies to 
the particular needs of a conflict-affected environment, maintaining the long-term 
footprint emanated by the headquarters, but also changing or delaying its day-to-day 
operationalisation to respond to more contingent and pressing situations on the ground. 
Implementing state building or SSR policies in fragile, conflict-affected environments 
therefore adds a further layer of complexity to the policy process, as policies need to 
‘travel’ internationally from headquarters to conflict-affected states and can be impeded 
or delayed in these often challenging fragile contexts.  
Furthermore, the domestic policy processes and dynamics within fragile, 
conflict-affected countries can play an additional role in the implementation of 
externally-led policies. Local governments and institutions could be reluctant to accept 
and implement policies designed by international actors or bilateral donors which might 
impinge on their sovereignty and roles. Local policy-makers could find these policies at 
odds with local culture, social norms, history, or traditions, or perceive them as an 
external imposition of values and institutions that are not accepted by the local 
population. In addition, local politicians might have (as most of the world’s policy-
makers) the political need to conquer and maintain their electorate in order to remain in 
power. As a consequence of these internal political dynamics, they might thus refuse to 
accept short-term personal losses, electoral or otherwise, in order to pursue a country’s 
longer-term gains, particularly when, at the moment of their policy decisions, the gains 
eventually deriving from the implementation of externally-led policies are not certain.   
The network of policy actors and the dynamics behind the implementation of 
internationally-led policies such as SSR in conflict-affected countries are thus wide and 
varied. This convoluted policy process is further complicated when researchers are 
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added to this network. As shown in Chapter 2, researchers constitute one of the many 
groups that might contribute to the policy process. They can exert influence on primary 
policies at headquarters level, which are then implemented in international conflict-
affected environments such as Sierra Leone. Yet secondary British policies in fragile 
countries can be also designed and planned by British country offices, embassies, and 
street-level bureaucrats overseas, which can commission their own research before 
implementing a particular policy at local level. British policy in fragile, conflict-affected 
environments could therefore be influenced by research conducted at the international, 
British, or local levels. Moreover, the same research could enter the policy process at 
the headquarters level or directly at the local level.  
Differently from domestic policies, state building and SSR interventions have an 
international dimension that adds an additional layer to the policy process and to the 
network of policy and research actors involved in the design and implementation of 
these policies. Usually envisaged and written at domestic level, British policies are 
influenced by the international general policy discourse and re-tuned or implemented by 
street-level bureaucrats in fragile environments. Research can interact with policy at the 
international, British, and local levels. As policy prescriptions are often in line with the 
international agenda and move from the UK headquarters towards a conflict-affected 
state, additional research and specific constraints can influence the policy process, 
further complicating the process of research uptake into policy. The international 
dimension of the state building and SSR post-war recovery policies therefore adds an 
additional layer of complexity to the models and frameworks of research utilisation into 
policy presented in the precedent chapter of the thesis. As a consequence, the whole 
architecture of this PhD study – its originality as well as its complexity – arises from the 
combination of two main aspects: (i) the convoluted interaction between policy and 
research and (ii) the peculiar international dimension of the state building and SSR 
policy process in conflict-affected countries.  
The general theories and models of the policy process and research utilisation 
presented in Chapter 2 need therefore to be re-elaborated in light of the peculiar 
international dimension of developmental policies such as state building and SSR. For 
example, the interaction between research and policy in fragile states can be hardened 
by the particular and insecure environment in which street-level bureaucrats operate, as 
well as by the complex, fast-paced, cross-governmental, institution-oriented, and 
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internationalised policy process characterising the implementation of externally-led 
policy decisions in conflict-affected countries.  
 ODI and other international research centres such as the Canadian 
International Development Research Centre and the International Centre of Excellence 
for Conflict and Peace Studies (Church, 2005) have promoted studies, models, and 
analyses on the impact of research on development policies. For example, ODI 
investigated six different dimensions of the knowledge-development policy interface, 
studying how different types of knowledge, political contexts, sectoral dynamics, actors, 
innovative frameworks, and knowledge translation can have an influence on the use of 
research in policy (Jones N., Datta & Jones H., 2009). Furthermore, the research 
institute has developed an analytical and practical framework to describe and examine 
the interactions between research and policy in development (Court & Young, 2004). 
This RAPID framework identifies the political context, the quality of a research and 
how this is communicated, and the links between policy and research as three inter-
related factors interacting with external influences and eventually determining the use of 
evidence in developmental policy.  
 According to the framework, the highly political, fast-paced, widely insecure 
context is a first factor influencing the use and collection of research in fragile, conflict-
affected environments. The presence of numerous political actors implies a competition 
for funding and a convergence of different power relationships, institutional pressures, 
and interests which might eventually limit the uptake of research findings on policy. The 
urgency of a situation and the shortage of resources allocated to research require the 
production and availability of quick and sometimes simplified information and data. 
Likewise, the lack of access to dangerous, conflict-affected, or insecure zones can 
hinder the work of agencies and the accuracy of the information collected by 
researchers on the ground.  
 The quality of research and the way this is communicated is a second main 
factor influencing the use of evidence into policy. In particular, the RAPID framework 
underlines how the research sources, the format in which evidence is presented, the 
clarity of a message and the way this is packaged, conveyed, and communicated to 
street-level bureaucrats can affect or improve the use of evidence into policy. In this 
regard, the timeliness and relevance of a research product are fundamental factors 
determining its uptake into policy. Working in hectic and busy environments, 
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sometimes for only few months due to the rapid turnover of personnel on the ground, 
street-level bureaucrats in fragile, conflict-affected countries need timely and targeted 
evidence to guide their policy; therefore, researchers should be able to provide this clear 
evidence at short term notice.  
 The links between researchers and street-level bureaucrats are a third 
important factor determining the influence and use of evidence in policy in conflict-
affected environments. As street-level bureaucrats need to take quick decisions in a 
rapidly changing context, the legitimacy and the reliability of a researcher or a lobbying 
group can make a difference in shaping a policy decision. Issues of trust, credibility, and 
the experience of the messenger could thus play an important role in the uptake of 
evidence in policy. In particular, networks and relationships assume particular 
importance in fragile contexts characterised by numerous exchanges, informal linkages, 
and meetings between different research and policy actors operating on the ground. 
 Lastly, the RAPID framework emphasises how external influences can also 
impact upon the use and influence of evidence in policy. International politics and 
processes, donor policies, and specific research funding instruments and mechanisms 
can eventually influence the uptake of a study into policy. Likewise, the fact that most 
research is actually funded by international donors and is rarely undertaken by local 
consultants or research institutes could undermine the ownership, perception of 
legitimacy, and the acceptance of a research product in the eyes of a local government 
and population.  
 The use of evidence in development, state building, and SSR policy is therefore 
modelled by numerous factors and hindered by several barriers. Some of these barriers, 
such as the pressure to see quick results or the existence of several competing processes 
in the country, are inherent to the nature of the policy and programme implementation 
process in complex and dynamics conflict-affected environments. Others are more 
linked to organisational issues of both local government and country offices, such as 
problems of accessibility and availability of research, lack of institutional memory, 
resources, funding, and capacity to commission systematic research that is sustainable in 
the long term. 
 In the field of SSR, only a few studies have tried so far to narrow the gap 
between theory and practice (Schnabel & Born, 2011) and to explore the different 
interactions between research and SSR policy practices (Ball & Hendrickson, 2006; 
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CSDG, 2008; Sugden, 2006). For example, Ball and Hendrickson (2006) argued that the 
dominance of donor-driven research priorities, the strong focus on normative 
frameworks, and the weakness of research capacity in reforming countries are three 
particular factors that limited the impact of research on SSR policy and practice. 
Likewise, an HMG-funded study conducted by CSDG at King’s College, London, 
concluded that “various factors make it difficult for SSR policy and programme 
managers to acquire the political analysis they need” (CSDG, 2008, p. 10). These factors 
are:  
“The long-term nature of academic research; the sensitive nature of 
security issues, which make research difficult; limited capacity within 
the advisory cadre to conduct analysis or digest research produced by 
others; lack of ‘local knowledge’ about the contexts where HMG is 
working; and the political imperative to develop programmes before 
there is adequate understanding of these contexts” (CSDG, 2008, p. 10) 
Other scholars such as Sugden (2006) used Haas’ (1992) concept of epistemic 
communities to specifically examine the role played by British epistemic communities in 
promoting the growing SSR policy agenda in the UK. By noting an increasing 
engagement and influence of SSR experts in the UK policy circles, the author analysed 
the contribution as well as the limitation given by experts to the promotion of SSR in 
UK policy.   
 The literature on research utilisation has therefore devoted increasing attention 
to the different dynamics, factors, and barriers impinging on the use of research in 
policy and on the capacity of epistemic communities to influence decision-makers. At 
the same time, the network of policy and research actors working on state building and 
SSR has expanded progressively over the years, to include several institutions and 
academic and research institutes in donor states and conflict-affected countries. In line 
with some studies that tried to visualise the interactions of different actors within 
domestic policy networks (Pross, 1986, pp. 100-101; Richards D. & Smith M. J., 2002, 
p. 177), this thesis provides in Figure 9 a sketch of an ideal state building and SSR 
network of researchers, policy-makers, and street-level bureaucrats that stretches 




Figure 9   State building and SSR policy network  
 
Figure 9 visually reconnects the concepts and notions of policy networks and research 
utilisation introduced in Chapter 2 with the description of the recent evolution of state 
building and SSR policy and literature presented in the previous sections of this chapter. 
It represents an ideal policy network of SSR researchers, policy-makers, and street-level 
bureaucrats working in a conflict-affected country. The figure encompasses in one 
single visual model the policy-making process in the UK and the different headquarters 
of international organisations, as well as the policy-implementation process of HMG 
and international organisations’ street-level bureaucrats working in fragile countries. The 
white circles at the top of the figure symbolise the main policy actors at headquarters 
level. In the case of the UK, HMG and main governmental departments such as DFID, 
FCO, MOD, and the Treasury are all represented in the figure and interconnected 
among themselves through solid lines symbolising the increased cross-governmental 
collaboration and joined-up approaches to policy. HMG is also linked through a dotted 
line to the circle of the international organisations’ headquarters. This line symbolises 
how state building and SSR policy approaches of the UK, other international actors, 
and bilateral donors interacted with each other and evolved following similar policy 
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agendas, as exemplified by the convergence between the OECD DAC and UK agenda 
in the field of SSR.  
The white circles representing British and international policy actors are all 
interconnected with different blue circles through solid lines. These blue circles 
represent the different research actors working in the UK and in donor countries. In the 
case of the UK, the circles represent dedicated centres and networks such as the 
GSDRC and the GFN-SSR; DFID-funded research carried out in research consortia 
and in other funded research projects; and studies conducted by other British 
universities, research institutes, and NGOs. As previously mentioned, all these blue 
research circles are linked through solid lines to HMG and governmental departments. 
These connections represent the commissioning of some studies by HMG or DFID, 
and the direct influence of some of these centres, universities, and NGOs on British 
policy. The circles are also connected among themselves through dotted lines. This 
symbolises that research themes and studies from different universities and research 
centres influence and are influenced by the work of other British researchers or by the 
materials produced by the GSDRC or the GFN-SSR.  
Likewise, the white policy circle of the international organisations is directly 
linked to different blue policy actors, namely international universities and research 
institutes; international NGOs; internationally-funded research; and independent 
consultants. The solid connections between these blue circles and the circle of the 
international organisations symbolise the increasing direct influence exerted by research 
on international state building and SSR policy. Similar to the UK, the blue circles of 
international research actors are interconnected by dotted lines, symbolising the 
progressive convergence of research themes, analyses, and studies by different research 
actors at international level. The circle of the international universities and research 
institutes is also connected through a dotted line to British research actors such as the 
GFN-SSR and UK research institutes and universities, as well as to HMG. These 
connections with other British research actors symbolise how state building and SSR 
research produced both at British and international levels has often analysed similar 
themes and topics; furthermore, different academic studies and researchers have 
influenced and interacted with each other, and their work has been incorporated in the 
materials of centres such as the GFN-SSR. The dotted connection between HMG and 
international universities and research institutes symbolises how some international 
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studies and researchers have indirectly influenced HMG policy, and how HMG has also 
commissioned over the years some research to international universities or research 
institutes.  
The white circles in the lower half of the figure symbolise the main policy actors 
at country level, usually tasked to implement headquarters policy in fragile or conflict-
affected environments. The main British policy actors in the figure are DFID country 
offices, embassies and British High Commissions overseas, and MOD staff. All these 
UK actors are linked together and to their respective headquarters by solid lines. These 
connections symbolise how HMG and headquarters decisions are communicated to 
street-level bureaucrats in country offices, which re-elaborate and implement the main 
policies through increased joined-up collaboration on the ground. These British policy 
actors in fragile countries are also linked through a dotted line to a white circle 
representing the country offices of international organisations. This connection 
represents how UK programmes and activities in a fragile country develop in line and in 
collaboration with those of other international actors in the country, which are, in turn, 
dependent on their respective headquarters and linked to these through a solid line. 
Furthermore, dotted lines connect the white circles representing British and 
international country offices to the local government of a fragile country. These dotted 
connections show how the activities of international and bilateral donors are meant to 
support and indirectly influence the work of local governments and their ministries 
through an indirect and bi-directional interaction. 
The three gold circles in the figure represent the main research actors working 
in fragile countries, namely ad hoc local research commissioned by both British and 
international actors, as well as local universities and researchers. These three circles are 
linked among themselves through dotted lines that symbolise the interaction between 
British, international, and local researchers on the ground, with the participation 
sometimes of local researchers in the work of international and British academics and 
consultants. The circles of ad hoc British and international research are directly linked 
with their respective country offices. This symbolises how this type of policy-driven 
commissioned research is usually extremely influential on the activities of street-level 
bureaucrats on the ground. Furthermore, the circle of DFID Country Office is also 
linked to GSDRC through a solid line, as the Department’s advisers working in fragile 
countries have the possibility to directly contact GSDRC helpdesk and use the centre’s 
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research in their policy activities. Likewise, local research institutes and universities are 
directly linked to the circles representing British, international, and local policy actors. 
This solid link symbolises how the activities of local researchers, when local research 
institutes and universities are present, have the potential to strongly impact on the 
policy decisions of the local government and of international street-level bureaucrats, 
directly or indirectly influencing the policy process in fragile, conflict-affected countries. 
A fourth circle of research actors is also present in the figure and represents regional 
research hubs such as the ASSN. The particular colour of this circle symbolises how 
these centres rarely carry out operational, policy-driven, ad hoc research commissioned 
as part of a policy programme. Conversely, some works, studies, and academic outputs 
of researchers from the ASSN have been included in the databases of research centres 
such as the GFN-SSR. The blue fading colour of the circle thus symbolises the 
academic nature of some of the studies produced in these research hubs. The dotted 
connection of the circle with the GFN-SSR represents how some of the researchers of 
these centres have had interactions with international and British researchers. Likewise, 
the dotted link between the circle and local universities represents the local focus of 
some of the research hubs’ studies. The direct link with country offices – in particular 
DFID – symbolises how the work of such research hubs is meant to facilitate and 
influence the work of different DFID country offices at regional level.  
Finally, the colours in the background of the figure show how research can at 
times influence the activities of policy-makers and street-level bureaucrats in an indirect 
way, as underlined in the percolation model of research utilisation presented in Part 2.4 
of the thesis. At the top of the figure, the blue colour symbolising this indirect influence 
of British and international research in policy reaches the white circles of HMG and 
international actors at headquarters level to progressively fade toward the centre of the 
figure. Likewise, the yellow colour at the bottom of the figure reaches the circles of the 
policy actors in fragile countries, showing how themes and studies conducted at local 
level can indirectly influence the activities of street-level bureaucrats on the ground. 
Nonetheless, international and local researchers are not completely detached from each 
other: the green area in the background is created by the intersection of the blue 
international research and the yellow local research. It borders with both HMG 
departments in London and country offices in fragile countries, symbolising how 
concepts, ideas, and notions emerging from research carried out at both international 
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and local level complete and interact with each other and can potentially and indirectly 
influence policy decisions at headquarters level, and street-level bureaucrats’ activities at 
country level.  
Figure 9 therefore represents a simplified understanding of the policy network 
of British and international policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and researchers 
working in donor countries and in fragile, conflict-affected states. The figure combines 
the theoretical concept of the policy network with the international dimension of British 
SSR policy process, and has been derived from the description of the evolution of the 
international and British state building and SSR policy and research agendas presented 
in the course of this chapter. Figure 9 thus visually illustrates the different interactions 
between policy actors and researchers both in the UK and on the ground, sketching an 
ideal policy network of research use into policy. Chapters 5 and 6 of the thesis will 
provide similar figures of the SSR policy network in Sierra Leone, showing how the role 
of research in British-led SSR in the country evolved over time, and indirectly 
comparing the different SSR policy networks in Sierra Leone with this ideal typical 
model.  
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the recent evolution of the network of policy and research 
institutions and actors working on internationally-led state building and SSR in conflict-
affected environments. The analysis has canvassed history to show how the practice of 
(re)building states in the aftermath of a conflict has waxed and waned over the years, 
gaining particular prominence in the wake of 9/11 and contemporary events such as the 
current military intervention in Afghanistan. The chapter has also underlined how SSR 
emerged in the last few decades as part of the growing state building policy and research 
agenda, becoming in the present day the major policy prescription to reform the 
security institutions of a conflict-affected state and promote long-term security and 
stability in the aftermath of a war. The analysis has thus problematised the theories, 
notions, and concepts pertaining to the literature on policy networks and research 
utilisation introduced in Chapter 2 in light of the state building and SSR policy and 
research evolution presented in this chapter. It has firstly given an account of some 
studies that have examined the particular problems, dynamics, and challenges of 
research utilisation in developmental, state building, and SSR international policies. 
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Secondly, it has elaborated and visualised a sketch of an ideal policy network of state 
building and SSR policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and researchers working in a 
conflict-affected country. This network constitutes an important tool to understand the 
evolution of the SSR policy network in conflict-affected Sierra Leone, as the successive 
Chapters 5 and 6 will draw similar sketches of the network of SSR policy and research 
actors working in Sierra Leone, indirectly comparing these to the ideal typical model 
presented in Figure 9 of this chapter.  
 Chapters 2 and 3 constituted the theoretical chapters of this PhD thesis. The 
purposes of these two chapters vis-à-vis the overall argument of the thesis are three. 
First, the two chapters have introduced theoretical notions and concepts that shed light 
on the empirical context of the thesis. The chapters re-elaborated the literatures on 
policy networks and on research utilisation in view of the recent evolution of 
internationally-led state building and SSR policy practices. The analysis brought together 
these two fields of study, showing how the thesis lies at the interception between these 
different theoretical disciplines. Second, the two chapters provided a theoretical 
framework to interpret, further explore, and better understand the ways in which the 
influence and interaction of research with British-led SSR policy in Sierra Leone 
changed over time. With its presentation of the literature on the policy process, Chapter 
2 has shown how policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and researchers exist in policy 
networks. By describing the evolution of the British and international policy and 
research on state building and SSR, Chapter 3 has underlined how SSR decision-makers 
and researchers are part of an international policy network currently extending from the 
UK to conflict countries like Sierra Leone. The chapter has further visualised an ideal 
policy network of SSR researchers, policy-makers at headquarters level, and street-level 
bureaucrats working in a conflict-affected country to understand the interactions and 
influences between research and policy in internationally-led SSR policy practices. 
Chapters 5 and 6 of the thesis will indirectly compare this ideal model to similar policy 
networks of policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and researchers that worked on 
British-led SSR in Sierra Leone in a first phase of ‘fire-fighting’ solutions and in a 
second phase of post-conflict years. The implicit comparison between these figures will 
convey a visual understanding of the evolution of the SSR policy process in Sierra 
Leone over the years and the role and influence of research on this process. Third, 
Chapters 2 and 3 have provided some useful theoretical tools to explore the main 
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question and some of the sub-questions of the thesis. In particular, the literature on 
research utilisation with its emphasis on the different factors and barriers that facilitate 
or hinder the uptake of research into policy constitutes the main theoretical framework 
which is used to investigate the second sub-question of the thesis and explore the 
different contextual factors and exigencies that influenced British-led SSR policy in 
conflict-affected Sierra Leone. Likewise, Chapters 2 and 3 have introduced the 
theoretical bases to explore the third sub-question of the thesis and understand the 
applicability of the literature on the research-policy nexus to the international challenge 
of state building and SSR in conflict-affected countries.  
 The next chapter presents and discusses the different methods used in the 
course of this PhD research to investigate and deepen the understanding of the 
principal question and sub-questions of the thesis. Chapter 4 concludes the theoretical 
part of the thesis and links it to the successive, analytical part of this PhD work. In 
explaining and introducing the methods used in the course of the study, the chapter also 






The main aim – and research question – of this PhD thesis is to understand whether 
and how research has influenced and interacted with British governmental policies to 
reform the security sector of conflict-affected Sierra Leone. In order to explore this 
question and its related sub-questions in more depth, Chapters 2 and 3 have introduced 
concepts and notions pertaining to the literature on policy networks and on research 
utilisation in policy, and re-adapted them to the fast-paced and internationally-led nature 
of state building and SSR in fragile, conflict-affected countries. In particular, Chapter 3 
of the thesis has underlined the problems and challenges of using research in complex 
state building and SSR policies implemented in third countries, and it has drawn a 
sketch of an ideal network of policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and researchers 
stretching from the UK to conflict-affected countries such as Sierra Leone. 
This chapter presents the different methods used to deepen the understanding 
of the empirical question and sub-questions of the thesis and discusses the challenges 
and limitations of this PhD research. It sets the scene for the second and more 
empirical part of the thesis, concluding the theoretical exploration of these first chapters 
and linking it to the subsequent analytical chapters of this PhD research. It bridges 
theory with practice and shifts the focus of the thesis from the former to the latter, 
analysing how the theoretical concepts and notions introduced in Chapters 2 and 3 have 
been made operational in the course of this PhD research. In explaining and 
introducing the methods used to investigate the particular empirical context and 
question of the thesis, the chapter also underlines the main challenges, limitations, and 
ethical considerations of this study. 
Chapter 4 is divided in three main parts. Part 4.1 presents the methodology of 
the thesis and explains the main methods that have been used to explore the principal 
question of the research – a qualitative approach tested and triangulated through a 
quantitative analysis of the qualitative findings. Part 4.2 contextualises the methodology 
presented in Part 4.1 in the framework of this thesis. It analyses the practical limits and 
problems of investigating the research-policy nexus in international state building and 
SSR policies implemented in fragile, conflict-affected environments, underlining the 
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specific challenges and limitations of this PhD research. Finally, Part 4.3 of the chapter 
briefly outlines the main ethical considerations which have been taken into account in 
the course of the study. 
4.2 Methods26 
In social science research, a principal and broad division is usually made between 
qualitative and quantitative approaches to research. According to Bryman’s definition, 
“qualitative research usually emphasises words rather than quantification in the 
collection and analysis of data” (2008, p. 697). Examples of this approach to research 
are semi-structured interviews, ethnography, participant observation, focus groups, and 
discourse and conversation analysis. Conversely, quantitative research “usually 
emphasises quantification in the collection and analysis of data” (Bryman, 2008, p. 697). 
Examples of this approach are statistical analysis, computer simulations, questionnaires, 
and surveys. These two approaches are usually associated with different epistemological 
and ontological perspectives. The inductive approach of qualitative research is typically 
linked to an epistemological emphasis on interpretivism and the ways people offer 
casual explanations about the world, in line with an ontological constructivist position 
that sees social properties as “outcomes of the interactions between individuals, rather 
than phenomena ‘out there’ and separate from those involved in its construction” 
(Bryman, 2008, p. 366). On the other hand, the deductive approach of quantitative 
research is associated with a positive and natural scientific epistemological approach, 
deriving from an ontological orientation that views “social reality as an external, 
objective reality” (Bryman, 2008, p. 22).  
This apparently irreconcilable dichotomy between these two archetypal 
approaches has been indeed blurred over the years, as scholars highlighted the 
complementarity of the two approaches (Abbot & Guijt, 1997; Chung, 1998; Chung et 
al., 1997 cited in Maxwell, 1998, p. 1) and argued for mixed methods approaches able to 
                                                          
26 This PhD is a distinct and original piece of research linked to the overarching three-year ESRC/DFID-
funded Research Project ‘The Influence of DFID-Sponsored State Building-Oriented Research on British 
Policy in Fragile, Post-Conflict Environments’. It differs from the main project in four main aspects, 
namely: (i) the use of a backward tracking approach which starts from policy-makers to backward track 
the influence of research on their choices; (ii) a focus on research rather than only on DFID-sponsored 
research influence on British policy; (iii) a focus on one distinct policy – SSR – rather than on general 
state building policy; and (iv) a focus on only one country – Sierra Leone – rather than on three case 
study countries. See the Appendix at the end of the thesis for further information on the four differences 
between this PhD and the project. 
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combine qualitative and quantitative data in overall research projects (Mahoney & 
Goertz, 2006; Poortinga et al., 2004). Mixed method research emerged thus as a term to 
describe either research that uses a combination of only qualitative or only quantitative 
research methods, or, more often, research that combines the use of both quantitative 
and qualitative research methods (Bryman, 2008, p. 695). While still recognising the 
connection of qualitative and quantitative approaches with distinctive epistemological 
and ontological assumptions, mixed methods research embraces a more technical point 
of view in which the two approaches are compatible. Combining qualitative and 
quantitative methods is thus not only possible, but also desirable, as research results 
obtained through different approaches mutually reinforce each other assuming in this 
way a greater validity.  
At the same time, the concept of triangulation, namely “the use of more than 
one method or source of data in the study of a social phenomenon so that findings may 
be cross-checked” (Bryman, 2008, p. 700), assumed increasingly importance in the 
literature as a way to improve confidence in research findings. Initially introduced by 
Campbell and Fiske (1959) as an idea to validate quantitative findings, and subsequently 
proposed by Webb et al. (1966, p. 3) as an approach where more than one method 
would have been employed to collect data in social research, the term then became used 
to refer to an approach that “can operate within and across research strategies” 
(Bryman, 2008, p. 379) using “multiple observers, theoretical perspectives, sources of 
data and methodologies” (Denzin, 1970, p. 310 cited in Bryman, 2008, p. 379).  The 
importance of triangulating from a variety of methods is well established in the 
literature (Hanney et al., 2003; Wajcman and Martin, 2002), as triangulation from a 
number of sources pointing towards a similar finding increases the confidence in that 
conclusion. In the context of mixed methods research, triangulation “implies that the 
results of an investigation employing a method associated with one research strategy are 
cross-checked against the results of using a method associated with the other research 
strategy” (Bryman, 2008, p. 611).  
The task of conducting research in fragile, conflict-affected environments entails 
several different problems and challenges that can potentially hinder the entire 
architecture of a study. As detailed by Barakat et al. (2002, p. 992), the post-war 
recovery discipline is characterised and distinguished by problems of access, sampling, 
generalisation and bias, as well as ethical issues. As a consequence, while some similar 
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problematic conditions can be found in other research contexts, these conditions “are 
unlikely to occur with the same degree of intensity as in war-affected contexts” (Barakat 
et al., 2002, p. 992). Indeed, some of the challenges related to research in conflict-
affected environments have impacted this PhD study. While Part 4.3 of this chapter 
addresses specifically the ethical considerations of the study, one of the main problems 
faced during the course of this research includes the high rates of staff turnover of UK 
personnel overseas. Additionally, the task of tracking policies developed and 
implemented over the course of 15 years implied some problems of access and 
sampling. Access to relevant people was sometimes hindered by the fact that British 
street-level bureaucrats who had worked in Sierra Leone were at the time of this 
research employed in field missions in other countries, had moved to different 
occupations, or were otherwise impossible to reach. Memories of their experiences in 
Sierra Leone were not always completely accurate and it was sometimes difficult for 
some of them to recall names of colleagues or exact dates of events happened more 
than a decade ago.  
Keeping in mind these limitations, the sampling strategy firstly through a desk-
based review of British-led SSR policies in Sierra Leone identified the names of the 
most relevant policy-makers and street-level bureaucrats who had worked on those 
policies. Starting from contacting those people, the sample has been snowballed to 
include enough street-level bureaucrats to cover the specific time period examined by 
the study, as well as the different aspects and programmes of British-led SSR policy in 
conflict-affected Sierra Leone. A large sample of people covering the whole duration of 
the UK intervention in the country and the manifold policies falling under the remit of 
SSR has therefore been approached to minimise and overcome potential problems of 
access and sampling. 
The choice to start from British policies and UK street-level bureaucrats in 
Sierra Leone in order to sample the potential participants to this PhD research is a 
consequence of the methodological decision to adopt a particular and new backward 
tracking approach to the study. Already theorised in the academic literature in the late 
1970s (Elmore, 1979), the backward tracking approach is a new and promising 
approach used to evaluate the influence of research on policy that has also been recently 
tested in some other ESRC-funded studies (Clark & Simmonds, 2010; WM Enterprise, 
2010). A backward tracking approach tracks the influence of research on policy by 
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starting from policy-makers and their decisions. Instead of selecting some pieces of 
research and studying their influence on policy, the backward tracking approach starts 
conversely from policy-makers and asks them what sources, research, and studies have 
been influential for taking their policy decisions. In the case of this PhD thesis, adopting 
a backward tracking approach would firstly result in a selection of British SSR street-
level bureaucrats who worked in conflict-affected Sierra Leone. The analysis of their 
answers and narratives would then enable the researcher to understand the role and the 
influence of research in the Sierra Leone SSR process.  
The reasons for using a backward tracking approach in this study are threefold 
and stem from the specific nature of this PhD research, as well as from operational and 
practical considerations. With reference to the nature of the research, this approach was 
identified as the best way to grasp from street-level bureaucrats the different political, 
environmental, and social constraints that, together with research, influenced SSR policy 
in post-conflict Sierra Leone. These constraints could be particularly significant in fast-
paced and chaotic war-torn environments, thus starting the investigation from British 
street-level bureaucrats rather than from research would facilitate a better understanding 
of the policy process in such peculiar situations. Furthermore, in the late 1990s – the 
time of the first UK-led SSR policy activities in Sierra Leone – “SSR was a relatively 
new approach for development agencies” (Albrecht & Jackson, 2009, p. 8), and “the 
international community was only beginning to come to terms with what SSR actually 
entailed” (Albrecht & Jackson, 2009, p. 8). SSR-oriented research followed this 
evolutionary path, and, as SSR became in the 2000s the ‘mot du jour’ among defence, 
police, intelligence, and judiciary policy-makers and street-level bureaucrats, so academic 
studies and research flourished in the same period. The use of a backward tracking 
approach is aimed at capturing these research-policy interactions as they were 
developing and at better understanding the particular character of the research-policy 
nexus in fragile, conflict-affected environments, underlining the problems and factors 
limiting or fostering the use of this growing SSR research into policy. With its primary 
emphasis on the needs and opinions of policy-makers and street-level bureaucrats on 
the ground, rather than on pieces of research supposedly impacting policy, the 
backward tracking approach has proven to be the best way to interrogate the role of 
research in SSR policy and the policy process in the particular context of conflict-
affected Sierra Leone.  
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On an operational level, previous studies pioneering the use of a backward 
tracking approach have underlined that a sufficient amount of time must pass for the 
impact of a policy to be felt, “but the time lapse should not be so great that it is difficult 
or impossible to track down discussion partners that were in positions of some 
influence at the time and who may no longer be available to expand on that experience” 
(Clark & Simmonds, 2010, p. 27). As a consequence, these studies suggested the use of 
a backward tracking approach within a maximum timeframe of 10-15 years from the 
policies analysed (Clark & Simmonds, 2010, p. 27). The British-led SSR policies and 
activities in Sierra Leone started in the late 1990s and lasted for several years. This 
period of time is suitable for utilisation of backward tracking based on the suggested 
timeframe. Moreover, the initial target of numerous UK street-level bureaucrats helps 
minimising the impact of particular and potentially problematic peculiarities of this 
research such as the long-term interventions, and the high rates of staff turnover in UK 
personnel overseas.  
On a practical level, sub-questions 2 and 4 of the thesis respectively investigate 
the different contextual factors and exigencies that also impacted upon British-led SSR 
policy in Sierra Leone and the measures that could favour or increase the influence of 
research on policy in fragile, conflict-affected environments. The use of a backward 
tracking approach allows the researcher to start the enquiry on these sub-questions by 
directly asking them to street-level bureaucrats who worked on the ground. Findings, 
answers, and narratives obtained through interviews and conversations with street-level 
bureaucrats have been thus considered as the most effective starting point to capture 
the interactions and intricacies of using research on policy. In this way, backward 
tracking information on the use and influence of research in policy decisions could 
provide a more precise account of the practical constraints and factors impacting the 
policy process on the ground. It could also show how these constraints and factors 
changed and evolved over time. Likewise, as the aim of sub-question 4 is to understand 
the measures that could favour the influence of research on policy, analysing extensively 
street-level bureaucrats’ views on the subject ensures a more policy-oriented analysis to 
such sub-question.   
Following the selection of the sample of policy-makers and street-level 
bureaucrats, a ‘composite approach’ utilising and combining different methodological 
strengths (Barakat et al., 2002) has been then used to plan the methodology of the 
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study. Such approach, particularly designed to tackle the potential problems deriving 
from conducting research in post-conflict environments, combines a triangulation of 
sources and methods to overcome the omissions of a single approach. This 
triangulation of qualitative and quantitative approaches is therefore in line with the 
theorisation of mixed methods research, in which the strengths of different methods are 
combined to improve the validity of the research findings. A combination of qualitative 
and quantitative methods has thus been envisaged as the main methodology of this 
study. These methods have been used in the framework of the backward tracking 
approach previously discussed. Thus the analysis and assessment of the influence of 
research on policy started with the British street-level bureaucrats and their policy 
initiatives. Following a careful consideration and study of British involvement in the 
SSR process in conflict-affected Sierra Leone, the research looked at the policy 
decisions in the country to explore the use and influence of research in these policies 
through two main phases of investigation. 
The first, mainly qualitative part of the methodology examined how and to what 
extent state building-oriented research has contributed to British-led SSR policies in 
conflict-affected Sierra Leone. Particular activities in this phase included a desk-based 
review to identify major British policy-makers and street-level bureaucrats who were 
part of the policy network that designed and implemented British-led SSR policy in 
Sierra Leone; an analysis of their main policy decisions; and an assessment of general 
and DFID-sponsored research on state building and SSR. Starting from an initial list of 
UK policy-makers and street-level bureaucrats, and snowballing from that initial sample, 
a total of 30 decision-makers have been selected and contacted. The sample size and 
selection was aimed at covering the whole length and range of activities of the UK SSR 
intervention in Sierra Leone. The final sample included different British and 
international actors that played a role in the SSR network and policy process in conflict-
affected Sierra Leone: advisers working form the Security & Justice Group of the SU; 
officers and advisers working at DFID country office and at the British High 
Commission in Sierra Leone; relevant people and former street-level bureaucrats who 
worked in British-funded programmes in Sierra Leone such as CPDTF, CCSSP, 
SILSEP, IMATT, JSDP, ASJP; staff of international organisations currently working in 
the country; local and international NGO personnel based in Freetown; and Sierra 
Leone decision-makers working for the Justice Sector Coordination Office (JSCO), and 
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the ONS. Semi-structured interviews, consultations, and one focus group were 
conducted with all these actors in the UK, through Skype, and in the course of a two-
week research trip to Freetown in June 2012. 
The trip to Sierra Leone was an opportunity to meet in-person the actors who 
were part of the SSR policy network and were working in local institutions, national 
public agencies, DFID country office, the British High Commission, and other HMG-
funded programmes such as IMATT, as well as various representatives of the 
international community. It allowed qualitative data collection through semi-structured 
interviews and informal conversations, as well as observational data on the state 
building process and the current security status of the country. The choice of semi-
structured interviews as the main method of research allowed a dynamic interaction 
with the interviewees (Kvale 1996) which gave the opportunity to explore the topics in 
more detail, have a broad range of perspectives and points of view, and develop the 
narratives of research utilisation in policy. Likewise, the literature on research methods 
considers observation and informal conversations as equally important methods for 
researchers working in conflict-affected environments (Kawulich, 2005), as only 
through physical presence in a country it is possible to understand the local situation 
and the potential challenges to the effective implementation of a policy. Presence on the 
ground is thus an indispensable part of such a research methodology, as through 
observation and informal conversations with local people a researcher can have a better 
picture of a country’s reality. This understanding minimised the potential bias of such 
research, as experiencing life in the country – although for only a limited period and in 
better living conditions than the locals – entailed a daily interaction with the people, the 
political environment, the society, the economy and the culture of the place 
investigated, partially redressing the risk of interpreting the local policy process through 
an overly ‘western’ lens.  
The research trip was conducted mainly in Freetown for a total length of two 
weeks. The reason for the focus on the capital city was that the country offices of 
British institutions working in Sierra Leone (as well as the offices of international 
organisations, the main NGOs, and the offices of the Sierra Leone government) are 
based in Freetown. Likewise, the decision to spend only two weeks in the country was a 
consequence of the fact that most of the British street-level bureaucrats and researchers 
who had worked on SSR in Sierra Leone had been posted to other countries at the time 
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of the visit. The presence of British street-level bureaucrats in the country was therefore 
limited to the number of officers and advisers currently based in HMG offices in 
Freetown27 and most of the street-level bureaucrats who had had an important role in 
the first phases of the Sierra Leone SSR process have been interviewed in London or 
through Skype. 
In the course of the interviews, street-level bureaucrats have been also asked to 
identify people, researchers and research centres, papers, articles of books which have 
been influential for their work, in order to have an understanding of the main research 
actors in the SSR policy network and the ways through which research found its way 
into the policy process. Starting from the street-level bureaucrats’ indications, a second 
sample of nine key informants, researchers, academics, and evaluators who were part of 
the network of actors that influenced the British-led SSR process in conflict-affected 
Sierra Leone has been approached and interviewed. Maintaining the backward tracking 
approach of the study, only researchers considered extremely influential by the same 
street-level bureaucrats and policy-makers have been included in this second sample. 
This could have excluded some pieces of research or authors that are relevant in the 
literature, but that have had only a limited influence on policy activities on the ground.  
The final group of researchers comprised university professors and researchers 
working for British and international research institutes and academic institutions. The 
researchers have been interviewed in person in British cities or, in one case, through 
Skype. This round of interviews was aimed at confirming the preliminary findings of the 
research, better developing the narratives of research uptake into policy and confronting 
the decision-makers’ views with those of researchers. Furthermore, it allowed a different 
analysis of the dynamics characterising the research-policy nexus, as well as the 
gathering of practical recommendations from researchers to improve this inter-
relationship.  
The first, mainly qualitative part of the study entailed a desk-based review of 
British policy decisions in Sierra Leone, a research trip to the country to collect 
qualitative and observational data, interviews with a total number of 39 policy-makers, 
street-level bureaucrats, and researchers identified through a backward tracking process, 
and an analysis of research deemed influential by the same decision-makers. This phase 
of the study allowed the collection of some preliminary findings upon which to build 
                                                          
27 All these Freetown-based street-level bureaucrats have been interviewed in the course of the thesis. 
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the first narrative to explain the dynamics of interaction and influence of research into 
policy which characterised the British-led SSR process in Sierra Leone. 
Starting from this narrative, the second part of the study tested and triangulated 
the qualitative findings of the first part through a quantitative analysis aimed at 
estimating the contribution of research to British policies in post-conflict Sierra Leone. 
The choice to combine qualitative and quantitative methods did not only derive from 
the well-established importance of triangulation in the general literature, but it also 
stemmed from the findings of previous similar studies on research influence into policy. 
As specified in the ESRC-funded Pathways to Work study, “insights gained through 
qualitative understanding need to be integrated with quantitative analysis” (WM 
Enterprise, 2010, p. 15). At the same time, despite some positive attempts to 
quantitative measure the impact of research (ESRC, 2009), “any attempt to derive a 
simple quantitative estimate of the impact of social science research on policy outcomes 
needs to be placed in a much wider context that recognises the complexities involved in 
the processes through which research influences policy and practice” (WM Enterprise, 
2010, p. 15). 
Data collected in the second phase of the study thus implemented, completed, 
and enriched the qualitative analysis carried out in the first part of the study. The main 
activity to measure research influence at this stage was further bibliometric, 
documentary, quotation, and content analysis of policy or strategy papers to understand 
whether and to what extent authors, concepts, and pieces of research identified as 
influential by policy-makers and street-level bureaucrats interviewed effectively found 
their way into official UK policy documents. The extent of this analysis was 
nevertheless limited at confirming or implementing with more data and with the ‘wider 
context’ (WM Enterprise, 2010, p. 15) the precedent and principal findings of the 
interviews.  
Several different reasons lay behind the choice of not relying heavily on 
bibliometric, documentary, quotation, and content analysis. The first is that speeches, 
policy papers, guidelines, and white or strategy papers at governmental level do not 
always report extensive references or quotations to research. Whilst influential theories 
or concepts could percolate through the policy papers, the names of authors, articles, 
and books are not always referred to, and therefore this kind of quantitative analysis can 
capture the influence of research into policy only to a limited extent.  
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A second reason is that the particular backward tracking approach of this PhD 
used the major British policy-makers and street-level bureaucrats who worked on UK-
led SSR in Sierra Leone as starting point for the research. While recognising that the 
policy and strategy papers written at headquarters level could have been extremely 
influential and relevant in steering the long-term direction of British policy in the 
country, the study has nonetheless given more attention to those authors, researchers, 
and studies that had been identified as influential by street-level bureaucrats who 
worked on the ground and were not necessarily quoted in the strategies and primary 
documents published at headquarters level. Furthermore, most of these SSR strategy 
and policy papers appeared only while British street-level bureaucrats were already 
operating in Freetown. For example, Chapter 5 will show how the first UK SSR street-
level bureaucrats in Sierra Leone did not even have a strategy upon which to rely to 
implement their policies. In order to analyse the impact of research on these early 
policies, findings from the interviews have thus been considered more important than 
bibliometric indicators on policy and strategy papers that sometimes were not existent 
at the time of the first reforms implemented in the country.  
The third and final reason why this research did not rely excessively on 
quantitative measurements is that the particular country context and characteristics of 
conflict-affected environments have necessarily influenced the research-policy nexus. As 
a result, quantitative analysis per se would not have been sufficient to explain in depth 
the different conceptual and indirect forms of interaction and influence characterising 
the uptake of state building and SSR research into policy in fragile countries. An 
excessive focus on quantitative, bibliometric, and documentary data would not have 
captured completely the several factors, particularities, narratives, and dynamics of 
research utilisation characterising the research-policy interplay in conflict-affected 
countries. It has therefore been considered that the accounts of the experiences of 
people working on the ground would have better explained the dynamic interactions 
between policy and research at local level. Nonetheless, quantitative analysis of the 
policy papers was extremely important in order to sketch a whole picture of the use of 
research in policy and describe the influence of research on British-led SSR policy in 
Sierra Leone.  
As part of this second, quantitative phase of investigation, a survey involving 40 
British policy-makers and street-level bureaucrats working on state building- and SSR-
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related issues in headquarters and country offices was also envisaged and launched. The 
survey would have enabled the collection of longitudinal data through the answers of 
different decision-makers to the same set of questions. This data would have allowed a 
comparison between results which would have not only tested the qualitative findings 
of the first phase of research, but it would have also permitted an analysis of the uptake 
of research from decision-makers pertaining to different UK departments. As these 
departments constitute the key actors of the British state building and SSR policy 
network, such a survey would have investigated the utilisation of research across 
government and the impact of different forms of research on the work of the diverse 
institutional policy actors in the network. Furthermore, given the different level of 
experience and seniority of the policy-makers and street-level bureaucrats targeted, the 
survey would have also explored whether, how, and why the influence of research on 
HMG policy had changed and evolved over the years. The low rate of responses to the 
survey (equal to 10%) did not allow a thorough presentation and comparison of the 
data. However, the answers provided by some of the survey participants represented an 
interesting and additional point of view on the use of research in HMG policy. They 
highlight the different research attributes favouring the utilisation of research by 
decision-makers’, and the diverse measures which could be adopted at HMG level to 
increase the influence of research on policy.  
4.3 Practical limitations of the research   
Examining and understanding the ways in which research has influenced and interacted 
with British-led SSR policy in conflict-affected Sierra Leone requires a careful 
consideration of the peculiarities, problems, and limits characterising the empirical 
context of this research. Some of these peculiarities have been already introduced in 
Part 3.4 of the thesis. As already underlined, the task of evaluating research impact into 
SSR policy is enriched and further complicated by several different issues deriving from 
the specific fragile, conflict-affected environments in which street-level bureaucrats and 
researchers operate, as well as from the particularly technical research topic analysed. 
Investigating the use and influence of research in internationally-led SSR policies implies 
taking into account the distinctive features of the SSR policy process in fragile 
environments. These features characterise this PhD investigation and can be considered 
as additional challenges toward a deep understanding of the principal question and 
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related sub-questions of the thesis. The methodology presented in Part 4.2 minimises 
the impact of these issues on the findings of this PhD research. However, some 
peculiarities and potential practical problems still remain to characterise, challenge, and 
to some extent limit the investigation into the empirical question and sub-questions of 
this PhD.  
The unique peculiarities characterising fragile, conflict-affected environments, as 
well as the specific nature of state building and SSR knowledge thus complicate the 
uptake of research into policy. Conflict-ridden countries are indeed fluid and 
unpredictable environments – complex, hostile, and dangerous contexts characterised 
by violence, insecurity, and extreme living conditions. The potential local partners for 
international state builders are often in disarray, with governments and institutional 
structures frequently absent, collapsed, or, at best, under-funded, transitional, 
disorganised, undefined, contested, unstable, or new. Moreover, multiple actors and 
spoilers try to implement different and sometimes competing agendas, with private, 
international, and regional interests occasionally converging with the needs and 
expectations of the local population. As a consequence, the task of (re)building a state 
in the aftermath of a war might entail a complete overhaul of the security, economic, 
social, and judicial architecture of a conflict-affected country, and the implementation of 
timely and coherent interventions in a dangerous, fragile, and extremely politicised 
environment.  
At the same time, Part 1.2 and Chapter 3 of the thesis have already underlined 
how state building research is a new, cross-disciplinary, sometimes contradictory form 
of knowledge providing few solutions, benchmarks, or universal indications of ‘what 
works’ and is usually dominated by the liberal state building ideology (Duffield, 2001; 
Jackson, 2010, 2011). Such kind of research is often based on past experience, yet it 
rarely provides a definition of success or a recipe to be used in every scenario, as past 
experiences could have succeeded for a series of reasons hardly replicable in other 
contexts. Moreover, the impact of state building research on policy is hardened by the 
fact that such research may provide theoretical findings difficult to operationalise by 
policy-makers and street-level bureaucrats, or it might challenge business or 
development agencies and be in this way not always comfortably accepted.  
Likewise, SSR-oriented research is a form of knowledge that is extremely 
technical, operational, specific, and targeted to well defined groups such as military, 
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police, justice, and intelligence actors, or relevant groups in the civilian policy sectors. 
Implementing SSR policies requires a long timeframe and necessitates a gradual change 
in attitudes and behaviours. Such change usually takes a decade to manifest, and it is 
therefore extremely difficult – if not impossible – to replicate in a short-term policy the 
environmental conditions and the factors underpinning that attitudinal change. 
Moreover, the sensitive nature of SSR might further impinge upon the use of research 
in policy. The decision to provide – or not provide – SSR assistance to a fragile, 
conflict-affected country can entail several political and reputational risks for the 
international actors and donors involved. For example, a lack of accountability in the 
local security sector might result in violent actions by military or police forces, riots, 
coups, or disrespect of human rights, with these events heralded globally in the media. 
This highly sensitive dimension of SSR can thus complicate the use of research in SSR 
policy in two ways. First, the sensitivity of security issues can make conducting good 
empirical research more challenging. Second, high reputational risks mean that street-
level bureaucrats working on SSR may not be open to research findings for different 
reasons, political and otherwise. Conservative cultural mind-sets or a resistance to 
inputs coming from civilians and academics can at times hinder dialogue among the 
different components of the security sector and between such actors and the research 
world. Likewise, prescriptions against entrenched institutional mind-sets or previous 
patterns of operation might not be incorporated into policy. These distinct peculiarities 
of research add a further layer of complexity to the picture, and when combined with 
the unique issues, contexts and challenges of a conflict-ridden environment, shape and 
influence the research-policy nexus.  
Section 2.4 has already introduced the numerous factors that can impede, 
hinder, inhibit, or postpone the uptake of research into policy. The peculiarities of 
fragile, conflict-affected environments as well as of state building and SSR practices and 
research presented in the course of this section further impinge upon these factors, 
creating unique research-policy interplay. This particular interaction needs to be 
carefully taken into account when investigating the influence of research on state 
building and SSR post-war recovery policies, as this interaction necessarily shapes the 
policy process in fragile countries and indirectly limits the extent of the study. Exploring 
the role of research on British-led SSR policy in conflict-affected Sierra Leone thus 
entails taking into account the particular characteristics of the research-policy nexus in 
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fragile environments, as the peculiarities of the context may negatively impact the 
uptake of research into policy. The fast-paced and extremely politicised practices of 
externally-led state building and SSR entail that research influence, shrunk among 
several converging interests, actors, and policy agendas and limited by the surrounding 
environment as well as by its own peculiar nature, could be less direct than in other 
disciplines and fields. Moreover, practical problems such as the long-term interventions 
evaluated, the high rates of turnover in UK personnel overseas, their lack of time to 
approach research when facing several urgent and compelling issues, their 
organisational culture, bias, and personal relationships with other expatriates and local 
policy-makers add final and new challenges to research uptake and, consequently, to this 
PhD.  
4.4 Ethical considerations 
The task of researching in fragile, conflict-affected environments entails several unique 
ethical difficulties which have been extensively addressed by the specific literature on 
the topic (Barakat & Ellis, 1996; Barakat et al., 2002; Goodhand, 2000; Marriage, 2000; 
Olujic, 1995). As the main targets of this study are researchers and British policy-makers 
and street-level bureaucrats in the UK and Sierra Leone, the research does not face 
most of the ethical issues involved in dealing with traumatised or more vulnerable 
categories such as children or former combatants. Participants to the study were 
experienced policy actors or researchers used to deal with press and to talk in public. 
Nevertheless, ethical concerns, particularly related to access to the interviewees and to 
the use of the data generated in the interviews, needed to be taken into account in 
designing and carrying out the study.  
All the participants to the study gave their informed consent and were fully 
informed of the purpose of the research. In order to prevent personal or institutional 
risks, their names remained anonymous, particularly in case of quotations in the thesis 
or in related publications. Recordings and transcripts of interviews were anonymised 
using a coding system and kept secured. 
Personal and university reputational risks connected to the trip to Sierra Leone 
were minimised through the adherence to the FCO security advice and guidelines for 
the country. While in Sierra Leone, the researcher sought and received security updates 
from the British High Commission and had access to a security number for 
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internationals to be called in case of emergencies. During the visit to Freetown, the 
researcher was covered by the University’s travel insurance scheme, a scheme that 
applies to higher-risk environments such as Sierra Leone and provides evacuation and 
emergency transportation and medical treatment. Only airlines or other transportation 
providers approved by the EU were used to travel to the country. 
Finally, this PhD research (and its related ESRC/DFID project) was approved 
by the Ethics Committee of the University of York, as of personal communication from 
6 June 2012.  
4.5 Conclusion 
This methodological chapter has carefully introduced the methods used in the course of 
the study to deepen the understanding and explore the principal question and the sub-
questions of this PhD research. The analysis has presented the different methodological 
approaches of the thesis, explaining the reasons behind the choice of particular research 
methods, and the ways in which qualitative and quantitative data have been combined 
and triangulated in the course of the study. Such triangulation from a number of 
different methods and sources is aimed at improving the accuracy of the research 
findings of the thesis and the confidence in its conclusions. However, the chapter has 
also presented the particular characteristics of this PhD study, arguing that a careful 
exploration of the principal question and related sub-questions of the thesis requires a 
preliminary consideration of the practical and ethical challenges, problems, and intrinsic 
limitations potentially entailed in this research. Such preliminary analysis and 
clarification of the problems and potential difficulties of this study was particularly 
needed given the ground-breaking nature of this thesis, a study combining different 
disciplines such as research utilisation and SSR in conflict-affected countries. In this 
regard, the chapter presented and introduced a strong methodology through which the 
empirical analysis of the study has tried to minimise and mitigate these problems.  
Chapter 4 concludes the theoretical part of the thesis. This first part of the study 
presented the theoretical foundations underpinning the rest of the research. It 
introduced the main theoretical concepts and notions that will be used in the course of 
the study to deepen the understanding of the empirical question and sub-questions of 
the thesis. Moreover, it set the general context of the thesis while specifying the 
particular limitations and methodology of the work. The second part of the thesis 
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moves the analysis from a theoretical to a more empirical level. It examines in depth the 
processes and the ways in which research has influenced and interacted with British-led 
SSR policies in conflict-affected Sierra Leone. Chapters 5 and 6 will thus present and 
analyse the data collected in the course of the research, showing how the network of 
policy and research actors working on British-led SSR in Sierra Leone and the 





PART II – LINKING THEORY TO PRACTICE 
 
The first part of the PhD thesis introduced the main theoretical foundations of the 
research. It explored the literature on policy process and research utilisation to identify 
concepts and ideas that help examine the principal question and related sub-questions 
of the thesis. It re-elaborated these concepts in light of the recent evolution of state 
building and SSR in policy and research, showing the progressive expansion of the 
network of policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and researchers, while providing in 
Figure 9 an important tool to understand the evolution of the SSR policy network in 
conflict-affected Sierra Leone. This second part of the thesis moves the analysis from 
theory to practice, presenting the main findings of the data collected throughout the 
course of this study. These data will be used to examine how the network of SSR policy 
and research actors working on British-led SSR in Sierra Leone evolved from the 
conflict years to the post-civil war decade. Such analysis investigates the extent to which 
research has influenced and interacted with British governmental SSR policy in conflict-
affected Sierra Leone, and provides a deep exploration into the principal question and 
related sub-questions of this PhD.   
The second part of the thesis is divided in two main chapters that analyse the 
role played by research in British-led SSR policy in conflict-affected Sierra Leone. In 
particular, Chapter 5 focuses on the ‘fire-fighting’ solutions designed and implemented 
during the Civil War, while Chapter 6 investigates the ways in which research influenced 
and interacted with British-led SSR policy during the post-conflict years. The division 
into two periods differs from other accounts of UK SSR activities in the country 
(Albrecht & Jackson, 2009; Jackson & Albrecht, 2011), which conversely divide British-
led policy in three distinct phases. The reason for this choice was to distinguish the 
narrative of British activities only between a war and a post-war phase, maintaining 
more cohesion in the analysis and without further dividing it in smaller and more 
numerous parts. Indeed, most of the features and themes that characterised the use of 
research in British-led SSR policy in Sierra Leone evolved over the years without being 
associated to clear and watershed dates. In this regard, 2005 – the year that represents 
the beginning of the third phase in Albrecht and Jackson’s book, as well as the year in 
which DFID opened its country office and some of the first SSR programmes closed 
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and were replaced by the more comprehensive JSDP – will be still considered an 
extremely important year in the evolution of British-led SSR policy in Sierra Leone. 
Nevertheless, the date will not be taken as a starting year of a third phase of analysis, 
but it will be incorporated into the second phase of the narrative focusing on the use of 
research since the end of the conflict in 2002.  
Chapters 5 and 6 present the evolution of the network of SSR policy-makers, 
street-level bureaucrats, and researchers from the civil war period to the post-conflict 
years. The two chapters provide sketches of these different policy networks, describing 
and analysing them in a parallel structure composed of three main parts which 
respectively examine (i) the historical and security context in the country; (ii) the 
institutional pathways through which SSR entered into British policy and the related 
research agenda; and (iii) the role of knowledge in influencing British-led SSR policy in 
the country. This three-part division would help maintain coherence in the analysis, 
facilitating comparisons between the themes, barriers, problems, dynamics, and the 
main features characterising the use of research in the war and the post-conflict UK-led 
SSR activities in Sierra Leone. Furthermore, the policy network models provide a visual 
understanding and the basis for comparative analysis of the evolution of the interactions 
between research and policy during the war and post-conflict periods. The indirect 
comparison between the two figures and Figure 9 presented in Chapter 3 will show the 
distinctions and differences between the networks of SSR policy-makers, street-level 
bureaucrats, and researchers working in Sierra Leone and the ideal typical policy 
network portrayed in the theoretical part of the thesis.  
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5. The influence of research on British-led SSR policy in conflict-
affected Sierra Leone: first period (1996-2002), ‘fire-fighting’ 
solutions28 
5.1 Introduction 
As the main analysis of the Sierra Leone case study, Chapters 5 and 6 examine the 
extent to which research has influenced and interacted with British-led SSR policies 
promoted in conflict-affected Sierra Leone. The data presented in these chapters 
constitute the principal materials used by this PhD thesis to investigate its main 
question and inter-connected sub-questions. The two chapters analyse the narratives 
and dynamics of research utilisation in UK-led SSR policies designed and implemented 
in Sierra Leone, showing how the network of policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, 
and researchers – and the influence of research on British-led SSR policy – evolved over 
the years.  
In particular, Chapter 5 examines the conflict period and the influence of 
research on British-led SSR activities from 1996 to the end of the Civil War in 2002. 
Likewise, Chapter 6 focuses on the influence of research in SSR policy in the post-
conflict years. Together, the chapters show whether and how the use of research has 
evolved over time by moving away from the conflict toward the increasingly peaceful 
and stable post-war recovery period. As already underlined, both chapters have a 
parallel structure which facilitates comparison between the use of research during the 
conflict and the post-conflict years. The chapters present sketches of the different 
policy networks characterising the two periods. They build, describe, and analyse these 
networks through a three-part narrative that examines the Sierra Leone context and 
stability situation, the evolution of both SSR policy and research in the UK and in Sierra 
Leone, and the role played by knowledge in shaping the British-led SSR activities in the 
West African country. The presentation of the policy networks of SSR researchers and 
practitioners working in Sierra Leone helps to understand and visualise how the role of 
research in policy evolved and improved over time. Furthermore, the parallel structure 
of the chapters helps to compare the narratives of research utilisation in policy during 
the conflict and post-conflict years. 
                                                          
28 Some of the materials of this chapter have been used in Varisco (2014). 
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Figure 10 introduces the network of policy and research actors working on 
British-led SSR in Sierra Leone during a first period of ‘fire-fighting’ solutions from the 
late 1990s to the end of the civil conflict in 2002. The chapter will explore this policy 
network in depth, examining the relationships between the different actors in the 
network, and the ways in which research has influenced and interacted with SSR 
activities promoted and implemented by British street-level bureaucrats in Sierra Leone 
during the conflict years.  
Figure 10   First period, ‘fire-fighting’ solutions: the policy network  
 
Chapter 5 is divided in three main parts. Part 5.2 introduces the SSR policies 
implemented by British street-level bureaucrats and analyses the unstable security 
situation of Sierra Leone in the late 1990s. It argues that this lack of stability in the 
country is the first variable (external to the policy network proposed in Figure 10) that 
inevitably limited and impacted on the policy options and activities of British street-
level bureaucrats and, by extension, on their use of research. Part 5.3 examines the 
pathways through which SSR was institutionalised for the first time into the UK policy 
agenda at headquarters and country levels and developed as related research agenda. It 
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also discusses the ways in which this evolution shaped the activities of British street-
level bureaucrats working in Sierra Leone. Since the developments of SSR as a policy 
and research agenda occurred concurrently and alongside the events in Sierra Leone, the 
analysis argues that this evolution could be considered as a second, internal variable 
modelling the network of policy and research actors, interacting with both the policy 
process in Sierra Leone and the use of research in British-led policy decisions in the 
country. Part 5.4 explores the role played by knowledge and research in influencing the 
British-led SSR policy in Sierra Leone. The analysis shows how the two variables 
previously introduced in the chapter, namely the stability of the context and the SSR 
evolution in policy and research, also impacted – and sometimes limited – the influence 
of research on the policy process in the country. Despite the limited impact of research 
on policy during this period, the chapter nonetheless provides examples of studies 
directly feeding into policy and enriches the exploration of the SSR policy network in 
Sierra Leone by describing the dynamic relationship between policy and research on the 
ground. 
5.2 The context and stability situation 
The first UK-led SSR activities in Sierra Leone started in 1996 following a personal 
request from President Kabbah to DFID to reform the Sierra Leone Police (SLP). Prior 
to that date, Sierra Leone’s former colonial power had already provided a sort of 
sporadic, ad hoc, short-term training assistance to the SLP. Recent British security 
efforts in the country therefore developed after the initial request of President Kabbah 
and by the end of the war in 2002 encompassed reforms in the fields of intelligence, 
justice, military, governance, and police. The first policies implemented by SILSEP, 
CPDTF, CCSSP, IMATT, and British street-level bureaucrats in the country constituted 
the main foundations of Sierra Leone’s SSR programme. This set of reforms started in 
the late 1990s in the middle of the civil conflict and developed alongside other activities 
promoted by the international community in the country such as the DDR process and 
the UNAMSIL peacekeeping operation.  
Sierra Leone’s volatile security and stability situation and the events that 
occurred in the final conflict years inevitably influenced and impacted on the early 
activities and choices of British street-level bureaucrats in the country. At the first 
arrival of British police advisers in Freetown, the SLP was, according to a report of the 
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former Sierra Leone foreign minister Hastings Banya, “a demoralised force, lacking in 
basic equipment, logistics, accoutrement and resources, inadequate and often neglected 
accommodation, and a deplorable working environment” (Horn, Olonisakin & Peake, 
2006, p. 111). British project appraisal initiatives, which encompassed the legal sector 
and civil service reform (Gbla, 2007, pp. 17-19), began in 1997 but were soon disrupted 
by the AFRC/RUF coup in May. Kabbah’s return to Freetown in 1998 reinvigorated 
British engagement in the country (Thomson, 2007, pp. 5-8). The CPDTF, a group of 
seven senior police advisers from the UK, Canada, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe, flew to 
Freetown in the summer to conduct an initial assessment and begin to work on police 
reform. The results of this first visit were almost immediate: President Kabbah 
announced a new Policing Charter in August 1998; furthermore, the Police Mission 
Statement and the new doctrine of Local Needs Policing were defined in the same 
months. 
Likewise, in October 1998 DFID funded a preliminary diagnostic study of the 
civil service. Alongside these first UK activities, the international community also 
increased its involvement in the country. President Kabbah appointed the Nigerian 
Head of the ECOMOG Task Force as Sierra Leone’s Chief of Defence Staff. His main 
task was to assist the reorganisation and restructuring of the Armed Forces, as the 1997 
coup demonstrated in stark relief the lack of government control over the Army. 
Furthermore, the first phase of the DDR programme, implemented by the Sierra 
Leonean National Committee for DDR and supported by international partners such as 
the UN, the World Food Programme, the World Bank, and the UK (Tesfamichael, Ball 
& Nenon, 2004, pp. 25-31), began in July 1998 under the control of 70 UNOMSIL 
military observers. 
The security situation in Sierra Leone nonetheless remained fragile and the RUF 
attack on Freetown in January 1999 halted all reform activities and forced the British 
street-level bureaucrats in the country to leave. As soon as security was re-established, 
the UK sent Brigadier David Richards to Freetown. Brigadier Richards, the head of the 
Operation Basilica Operational Liaison Team, assessed the type of assistance the country 
required and established “relations with key players in the Government of Sierra Leone, 
including President Kabbah” (Jackson and Albrecht, 2011, p. 64). It was after this visit, 
and following the decision to abandon the idea of completely disbanding the Army to 
replace it with an expanded police force, that the UK boosted its support to Sierra 
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Leone and started to plan its direct involvement in reforming the military apparatus and 
the defence institutional structures of the country.  
The poor condition of the RSLMF was a consequence of several years of 
mismanagement. During the Siaka Stevens era and before the beginning of the war in 
1991, the Army was purposely maintained weak: a ceremonial, conservative, and 
politicised body with an official force of approximately 3,500 people. With IMF 
conditionalities preventing Momoh from expanding the Army, at the time of the RUF 
attack Sierra Leone’s Armed Forces were “ill-equipped, badly-led and had no real 
intelligence capability” (Jackson & Albrecht, 2011, p. 62). Although the NPRC military 
junta did not improve the status of the military, it did undertake a massive recruiting 
and training campaign that brought approximately 14,000 armed personnel to fight 
against the RUF (Keen, 2005, p. 97). Left with no control and discipline, these poorly 
recruited, badly trained, and inadequately armed soldiers soon became ‘sobels’, looting 
and attacking civilians, and coalescing with the RUF in the 1997 military coup. For 
British street-level bureaucrats and military advisers, the task of reconstructing the 
MOD and rebuilding the Army while fighting a war required then a complete overhaul 
of the military status quo. 
In Spring 1999, a British military training team of six men was deployed to 
provide some military training to the SLA. The UK also provided weapons, vehicles, 
and materiel to ECOMOG and the Army, and, in June 1999, deployed the first three 
SILSEP advisers. SILSEP aimed to reform and restructure the country’s security, 
intelligence, and military apparatus. Two of the three advisers, one military and one 
civilian, renamed themselves the MOD Advisory Team (MODAT) and worked on 
designing and implementing a plan to reorganise the Sierra Leone MOD. MODAT’s 
first fact-finding visits underlined the need for a complete review of the roles, functions, 
and organisation of the Armed Forces. The GoSL gave MODAT the responsibility to 
conduct a mini-Strategic Defence Review, which was completed by October 1999. 
Among the different recommendations, the Review proposed the establishment of a 
British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT) to support the planning and 
restructuring of the Armed Forces and the MOD, fill some staff and command 
appointments, and implement SILSEP reforms. The recommendations were accepted 
and the idea of BMATT was enlarged to include other countries – becoming IMATT. 
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The Commonwealth and Overseas Defence Attachés were briefed on these 
developments in London in January 2000.   
The third SILSEP adviser focused on the reform of the intelligence and security 
services of the country. At the time of SILSEP’s arrival in Freetown, the main counter-
terrorism, counter-espionage, and counter-subversion responsibilities were the 
responsibility of the Special Branch of the SLP, while intelligence was mainly gathered 
to monitor opposition parties, student organisations, and trade unions. SILSEP’s initial 
activities were aimed at supporting the Sierra Leone National Security Advisor and 
contributing to the creation of a National Security Council, the outline of a National 
Security Act, and the draft of a National Security Policy. A first draft of the Sierra 
Leone National Security Policy Paper was thus initiated and circulated by 2000. The aim 
of the paper was to consider the key security issues and threats of the country and to 
provide an overarching basic framework for the main security agencies. 
Meanwhile, the CPDTF team returned to Freetown to resume police reform 
activities. By the end of the year, Keith Biddle, a retired British police officer who was 
heading the team, was appointed by President Kabbah as Sierra Leone IGP. It was after 
the CPDTF return in 1999 that the team decided to maintain, rearm, and train the SSD 
as the country’s sole armed police forces. This decision was made given the permanence 
of unstable security circumstances and the role played by the SSD in defending the 
capital from the RUF attack in January 1999. Police ranks were reduced and streamlined 
and training was provided by British personnel in Sierra Leone. Police officers in more 
senior positions received training at the UK Police Staff College at Bramshill. By the 
end of 1999, British-funded street-level bureaucrats were thus fully engaged in helping 
the GoSL rebuild its Army, police, intelligence, and public sector. At the same time, the 
signature of the Lomé Peace Agreement in Summer 1999 reinvigorated the efforts of 
the international community. A second DDR phase was implemented from October 
1999 to May 2000, and UNAMSIL troops replaced UNOMSIL observers in October 
1999.  
 The hostage crisis in May 2000 and the UK military intervention in the same 
month bolstered British support to SSR. The UK committed additional funds to re-
equip the SLA and deployed an infantry battalion with Short Term Training Team 
(STTT) functions. IMATT was deployed in June 2000 to support the STTT and fill key 
and command appointments in the MOD and Armed Forces. It was then further 
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strengthened following the deterioration of the security situation in early October 2000. 
Security concerns also suggested a need for an increase in the size of the Army to 
approximately 15,000 personnel, followed by a proposed reduction to 10,600 by 2005 
(Albrecht & Jackson, 2009, p. 57; White, 2008). In order to ensure transparency and 
civilian oversight of the Armed Forces, plans to restructure the Sierra Leone MOD 
according to the UK MOD structure were considered and implemented. In January 
2002, the GoSL inaugurated the new MOD as a ‘joint Civilian/Military organisation’. 
To mark the new beginning, the Armed Forces were officially renamed Republic of 
Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF). 
On the police side, in October 2000 the CPDTF was transformed into the 
CCSSP, a project funded by DFID and by the ACPP which supported the longer-term 
SLP development (Albrecht, 2010). Police presence outside Freetown was nonetheless 
very limited, and DFID procured more vehicles and communications equipment to 
extend the SLP’s reach beyond the capital. At the same time, the team established the 
Family Support Units (FSU) to deal with issues of domestic violence, sexual offences, 
and crimes against women and children (Fakondo, 2008). 
At the end of 2000, there were three official intelligence agencies in the country: 
the Special Branch of the SLP, the Force and Intelligence Security Unit (FISU), and the 
Central Intelligence Security Unit (CISU), established in 1997 to provide secret 
intelligence services. British street-level bureaucrats and national counterparts started 
considering plans to restructure, integrate, and organise these three agencies. These 
plans resulted in the creation of the ONS, a new, apolitical government institution with 
central coordination and open source intelligence gathering functions (Conteh, 2008). 
At the head of the new-born ONS, the title of National Security Coordinator replaced 
that of National Security Advisor, marking the departure from a personality-driven 
relationship with the President to a more professional and institutionalised interaction 
with a governmental agency (Ashington-Pickett, 2008). Security coordination 
mechanisms were also decentralised with the progressive creation of the Provincial and 
District Security Committees (PROSEC and DISEC). Developing the security 
architecture outside Freetown was extremely important, as this resolved the problem of 
the lack of early warning mechanisms in the provinces and emphasised the importance 
of security as a community issue. 
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The peculiar security situation of the country in the late 1990s urged British 
street-level bureaucrats to prioritise the police, military, and intelligence reform 
processes over justice reforms. As a consequence, reforms of the justice sector started 
only in January 2001, with the launch of the LDP. The LDP was developed in parallel 
with the CCSSP and the partially UK-funded Sierra Leone Anti-Corruption 
Commission, a body established by an Act of the Parliament of Sierra Leone in 2000 
and supported by HMG until 2007. The first task of the LDP was to address the most 
urgent problems in the justice sector, such as the reconstruction of infrastructure. The 
programme refurbished the main Law Courts Building in Freetown and Magistrate’s 
Courts in Bo and Kenema, an activity that had “a major psychological effect” (Albrecht 
& Jackson, 2009, p. 41; Jackson & Albrecht, 2011, p. 60) on the population. The second 
part of the programme was then devoted to rebuild the capacity of the judiciary by 
training 20 registrars, administrators, under-sheriffs, and bailiffs.  
By early 2002, the main programmes and structures to reform the police, 
military, intelligence, and justice apparatus of the country were in place. Police reform 
activities were under the CCSSP, with a British officer as IGP of the SLP force. Military 
reforms of the Sierra Leone MOD and of the Armed Forces were under the 
responsibility of the military element of SILSEP and IMATT. Intelligence reform was 
ensured by a SILSEP element, and further reinforced by the presence of intelligence 
specialists from the UK to support the new-born ONS and CISU (Albrecht & Jackson, 
2009, p. 73). The LDP was addressing justice issues. Alongside these reforms and 
programmes, the international community remained committed to ensure and maintain 
security in the country. Seven British military officers served with the UN Force 
headquarters in Freetown (Le Grys, 2008, p. 2), while 17,500 UNAMSIL peacekeepers 
provided space for the UK to reconstruct local security forces and governance 
structures. The DDR process was restructured as the UK withdrew its support from the 
programme’s Emergency Response Team in 2000, and had its third and final phase 
from May 2001 to January 2002. As part of the DDR programme, approximately 2,500 
ex-combatants entered the Military Reintegration Programme and were absorbed into 
RSLAF in 2001/2002 (Nelson-Williams, 2008, pp. 7-8).  
During the first period of reforms, British street-level bureaucrats in Sierra 
Leone therefore designed and implemented a series of security programmes and policies 
targeting the whole security apparatus of the West African country. Nonetheless, the 
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unstable security situation on the ground severely restricted the possible policy options 
and activities of British street-level bureaucrats on the ground. HMG street-level 
bureaucrats not only had to leave Freetown in more than one circumstance, but they 
were also constrained in their mobility, decisions-making freedom, and policy 
implementation. For example, establishing a police and intelligence presence in the 
outskirts of Freetown was almost impossible until late 2000, and the provision of 
vehicles and communication equipment for the police force was indeed one of the 
priorities of the early police reform programmes. The instability in the provinces limited 
British and international presence to the capital city. Security was also lacking in some 
parts of Freetown, as recalled by one of the first advisers sent to the country in 1999:  
“On our arrival we found Freetown in complete disarray and still in a 
state of virtual war. The functions of state were practically collapsed, 
with ministries in confusion and officials lacking clear aims and 
direction. Most businesses and government offices had been looted and 
vandalized during the January 1999 RUF/AFRC attack and had not 
been repaired. Much of the city’s infrastructure had been destroyed or 
badly damaged. We were taken by car to the MOD in Freetown to 
meet the Deputy Minister of Defence. On the journey from our 
accommodation we passed through seven checkpoints manned by 
various groups of armed persons. From their dress it was difficult to 
ascertain if they were military, civilian or police. The rule of law and 
order appeared to have broken down completely” (Albrecht & Jackson, 
2009, p. 45; Jackson & Albrecht, 2011, p. 64). 
British street-level bureaucrats in the country could barely move from their hotels and 
some governance activities were managed from London, with sporadic visits to Sierra 
Leone. Freetown was a traumatised city after the 1999 attacks, as recalled by one of the 
first British advisers sent to the country: 
“I suppose over a million and a half people had come out of the 
country into Freetown. Freetown was just packed for the people, and it 
was a pretty destroyed city, nothing had been done, nothing had been 
rebuilt since the 1999, early 1999 attacks on Freetown by the AFRC. 
So, it was a devastated city, you had people living in the streets, it was 
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awful: no water, no electricity, very little food, very difficult place to 
live”.29 
Similarly, the Sierra Leonean institutions that were to be reformed were either destroyed 
or in complete disarray. The police forces were considered extremely corrupt by the 
population. They had no uniforms, only a dozen of working vehicles, and, according to 
one initial report from the CPDTF, the living accommodation of SLP officers was “the 
worse any member of the CPDTF has seen and all have travelled widely in the 
developing world” (CPDTF, 1998a). Military advisers found an equally bad situation: 
the 1997 coup had already demonstrated the unreliability of some factions of the Army. 
Similarly, still in 1999 the Sierra Leone’s MOD Deputy Minister’s office: 
“Was in a two-storey building, had no glass in the windows, there were 
whole bullet holes in the roof, there were papers in the courtyard 
outside. We found out later there were three members of staff, four 
members of staff […]. And that was it. And the Minister, the Deputy 
Minister”.30 
The status of the intelligence institutions was equally poor. CISU had been established 
in 1997 but, according to a British adviser working on the reform of the security and 
intelligence apparatus, existed only on paper:  
“I walked into an empty building and about three people in there, 
who hadn’t really an idea of what they were doing. Three or four 
people. No, actually, let me think […]. There must be about 5 people 
in there. Three of those I had to get out, because they were just 
political placements”.31  
The task was not easier for the governance advisers, who on their arrival in the country 
could not find any institutional memory regarding the activities of the government, 
except for “a box of floppy disks that had been brought away from Freetown during the 
war”.32 The situation was similar for those working with the justice system: the first 
reforms in this sector started only in 2001 and were aimed simply at refurbishing and 
                                                          
29 Interview n. 33, London, 20 March 2013. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Interview n. 31, London, 19 November 2012. 
32 Interview n. 1, Birmingham, 10 May 2012. 
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reconstructing the Law Courts buildings and the basic physical and institutional 
infrastructures. 
 Facing numerous security constraints and the extremely decrepit status of the 
main institutions in the country, British street-level bureaucrats worked to completely 
overhaul the entire Sierra Leonean security apparatus. They determined what was 
needed in their specific sectors, worked out what resources were required, designed and 
drafted project plans, and recruited and trained people accordingly. Most of the times, 
these reforms proceeded in combination with the refurbishment of the edifices hosting 
the main institutions or with the ad hoc construction of new buildings. In April 2000 
for example, an advance element of the IMATT Support Team was sent to Freetown to 
arrange for the provision of accommodation and administrative support for the IMATT 
personnel. They planned to refurbish a dilapidated block of ten flats that had been 
allocated to the IMATT by the GoSL. They also initiated a new project to build 20 
houses on government-owned land, and identified suitable property to rent in the 
interim period until the new accommodation was ready (Anon. 2002, p. 19). Likewise, 
MODAT had to restructure the derelict Paramount Hotel before opening the new 
Sierra Leonean MOD there. Similarly, one of the LDP’s main priorities was refurbishing 
the Law Courts Building in Freetown and magistrates Courts in Bo and Kenema.  
These first activities to completely overhaul the Sierra Leone security apparatus 
were supported by a progressive evolution of SSR policy in the UK and in Sierra Leone. 
This policy development of SSR progressed alongside increasing attention and 
evolution of the research on the sector, as DFID and other HMG departments funded 
research centres and studies aimed to support, back and complement the emerging SSR 
policy agenda during the same period. The next part of this chapter gives an account of 
the early policy and research evolution in the UK and in Sierra Leone, which not only 
shaped the policy process in Sierra Leone, but also influenced the role of knowledge 
and research in British-led SSR policy in the country.  
5.3 The policy and research evolution  
Chapter 3 has already described how the SSR policy agenda developed in the late 1990s 
in the UK and would be increasingly adopted at the international level by the OECD 
DAC and its donor members. As part of this evolution, Sierra Leone was the first 
engagement on SSR for the British government, as well as a new and learning 
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experience for several UK departments and their increasingly joined-up activities. The 
evolution of SSR policy at HMG level and its related research agenda proceeded 
concurrently with historical events and policies implemented by British street-level 
bureaucrats in Sierra Leone, sometimes interacting with these activities, more often 
remaining disjointed and disarticulated from developments on the ground.  
The early evolution of the SSR policy and research agenda happened during the 
same period in which British SSR street-level bureaucrats were already working in Sierra 
Leone. As a result, several lessons from Sierra Leone have been translated into British 
and international policy approaches to SSR. As it has been argued by some scholars, 
“while SSR came to shape Sierra Leone, the transformation process in Sierra Leone 
came to shape international approaches to SSR – as a concept, a set of policies and an 
integrated set of programmatic approaches” (Albrecht & Jackson, 2009, p. 8; Jackson & 
Albrecht, 2011, p. 25). UK-led SSR efforts in Sierra Leone were thus referred in several 
policy papers, speeches, and events (DFID, 1998, 2000a; Short, 1999) or analysed in 
early research studies and working papers (Ball, 1998; Ero, 2000). Sierra Leone was a 
real learning experience, as well as a test case study for HMG SSR policy in conflict-
affected countries. Lessons from Sierra Leone were feeding into headquarters policy 
and being extremely influential on the domestic and international policy agenda in 
London and elsewhere. Equally and conversely, HMG policy was meant to shape the 
SSR policy developments in the country. The following part of the chapter describes 
how this early policy and research evolution of SSR shaped the network of actors 
working in the UK and in conflict-affected Sierra Leone.  
5.3.1 The policy evolution in the UK 
Figure 11 is adapted from Figure 10 and presents a sketch of the network of policy 
actors supporting the early evolution of the SSR policy agenda and involved in policy 







Figure 11   First period, ‘fire-fighting’ solutions: the policy actors in the UK 
 
As already underlined, the SSR policy agenda developed in the late 1990s in the UK and 
was further adopted at international level in subsequent years. HMG and British 
departments and ministries such as DFID, FCO, the MOD, and the Treasury are thus 
the main policy actors represented in the white circles of the figure. At the same time, 
international organisations and bilateral donors were increasingly starting their policy 
reflection on SSR (Ball, 2001, 2002). International organisations thus represent another 
white circle of policy actors in Figure 11. However, this circle is not directly linked with 
the UK actors because in the early 2000s the international SSR agenda was only 
developing, and initiatives aiming to promote SSR at the multilateral level were not yet 
consolidated. 
 Dotted lines link the different UK policy actors in the figure. The reason for 
these dotted lines is that the evolution and institutionalisation of the SSR agenda 
required some sensitive organisational changes at central government level. In 
particular, it was sometimes difficult in the late 1990s to overcome deeply entrenched 
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cultural and institutional differences among and within governmental departments, as 
well as joining up the diverse approaches of personnel collaborating on the ground. For 
example, working with other SSR-related actors such as military, intelligence, or security 
personnel represented a real revolution for DFID. In this regard, SSR activities in Sierra 
Leone were a watershed operation and only a modification of the 1980 Overseas 
Development Act allowed DFID to participate to SSR programmes in the country, 
while setting the limits for the Department’s engagement with security-related activities. 
Working in the UK and Sierra Leone alongside street-level bureaucrats from other 
security-related departments hence represented “a quite significant shift in the whole 
ethos” (Albrecht & Jackson, 2009, p. 177; Jackson & Albrecht, 2011, p. 179) for DFID 
personnel, a change not devoid of challenges and misunderstandings.  
The dotted lines therefore symbolise the difficult process of joining-up 
institutions with diverse and sometimes antithetic culture such as the different HMG 
departments. The general perception of this revolutionary change is expressed in the 
words of a British adviser: “this emphasis on coordination and everything fitting 
together looks wonderful on paper, but when you are dealing with institutions that they 
have never even talked to each other, I would react with horror and incredulity”.33 
Nonetheless, efforts toward a more joined-up approach continued and reinvigorated in 
early 2000s, with DFID, FCO, and MOD officers and ministries participating to the 
2000 SSR Symposium in London, with the development of the SSDAT in 2001, and 
with the creation in the same year of the tri-departmental ACPP and GCPP. In 
particular, the ACPP – a joined-up funding mechanism explicitly used for UK policies 
in conflict-affected sub-Saharan countries – provided the main financial support for 
British SSR policy in Sierra Leone. In 2002, the ACPP funded British SSR programmes 
and activities to reintegrate ex-combatants for a total of £28.9 million (Ginifer & Oliver, 
2004, p. 11). It also strengthened Whitehall and in country tri-departmental 
collaboration through “regular formal and informal coordination and information 
sharing” (Ginifer & Oliver, 2004, p. 2).  
Two other white circles are linked to DFID. These represent DFID’s Conflict 
and Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD), and DFID’s Governance Department. 
The reason for these additional circles is that the new and uneasy task of coordinating 
tri-departmental activities and policies was further complicated by the fact that DFID 
                                                          
33 Interview n. 19, London, 12 July 2012. 
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maintained and developed a holistic SSR concept, but divided implementation of its 
SSR policy administratively into two different departments, with elements relating to 
“the military, paramilitary, and intelligence services, and the civilian structures 
responsible for their oversight and control” (DFID, 2002b, p. 7) under CHAD – today 
called Conflict Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE) –  and the police and 
justice elements under its Governance Department. This division of labour resulted in 
the publication of two different guidelines by the two departments in 2002, which 
addressed only the specific actors falling under the departments’ respective 
responsibilities (DFID, 2002a, 2002b). Moreover, the decision to split DFID SSR 
implementation into two different departments “not only established the basis for a turf 
war within DFID, but it also delayed meaningful dialogue within the British 
government […] on how to address insecurity most effectively through the UK’s 
foreign, defence and development policies” (Ball, 2010, p. 34). The dotted lines between 
the two departments and DFID therefore show how DFID divided implementation of 
its SSR agenda into two internal departments, and how communication between these 
was limited and often difficult. 
5.3.2 The research evolution in the UK 
Figure 12 expands upon Figure 11 by depicting the principal research actors that 
contributed to the development of the early SSR policy agenda in the UK and at the 











Figure 12   First period, ‘fire-fighting’ solutions: the research actors in the UK 
 
As already underlined in Part 3.3, researchers have been considered an integral and 
important part of the SSR policy evolution at HMG level since the launch of the SSR 
policy agenda by Clare Short in March 1999. For example, DFID established a three-
year collaboration with CSDG at King’s College, London to support the Department’s 
work on SSR. CSDG thus represents one of the circles in Figure 12, connected to 
DFID with a solid line to symbolise the direct collaboration between the Department 
and the research group.  
At the same time, DFID began to fund additional research on state building and 
SSR which indirectly fed into its policy, the work of CSDG, or other international 
consultants working on SSR. This other research is symbolised in the figure by the two 
circles named ‘NGOs and other research’ and ‘Governance Resource Centre’. NGOs 
such as Saferworld were indeed part of this emerging SSR research agenda; likewise, the 
activities of the Governance Resource Centre were funded by DFID and aimed to 
support its policy with evidence. However, the dotted lines between these two blue 
circles and DFID and between the NGO circle and the other research actors symbolise 
how these studies did not influence directly DFID SSR policy papers, but were 
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nonetheless part of an emerging discourse on state building and SSR that was 
progressively shaping the expanding research agenda. 
 Independent consultants form another blue circle in the policy network linked 
with a solid line both to DFID and international organisations. The reason for this 
additional circle is that in the late 1990s, DFID developed regular collaborations with a 
group of trusted researchers and consultants. Some of them, such as Dylan 
Hendrickson, Nicole Ball, ’Funmi Olonisakin, Paul Jackson, and Ann Fitz-Gerald 
started a long-term professional exchange with the Department and other international 
donors that enabled them to directly influence British SSR policy and participate as 
consultants, policy advisers, or experts in several SSR-related studies, meetings, and 
evaluations worldwide (Ball, 1998, 2001, 2002, 2004b, 2005; Ball & Hendrickson, 2002, 
2006; Ball & Holmes, 2002; Ball & van de Goor, 2008; Ball, Bouta & van de Goor, 
2003; Ball et al., 2007; Bryden, N’Diaye & Olonisakin, 2005; Fitz-Gerald, 2004; 
Hendrickson, 1999; Horn, Olonisakin & Peake, 2006).  
Dylan Hendrickson is one example of these influential researchers who had a 
direct role in shaping HMG policy. Hired as a Research Fellow for CSDG in King’s 
College, he reviewed in 1999 the thinking, approaches, and dilemmas characterising the 
emerging SSR agenda (Hendrickson, 1999). One of the first paragraphs of this early 
Working Paper is emblematically entitled Linking Research and Policy and bridging SSR 
research and policy was a main role for the author in the successive years. He 
collaborated on the organisation and preparation of the Discussion Papers for the 
HMG Symposium on SSR in 2000 (DFID, 2000a) and coordinated the production of 
DFID’s guidelines on SSR in 2002 (DFID, 2002b). Starting from these early 
engagements, he began a prolific collaboration with DFID, HMG, and other 
international donors. For example, he was involved in the preparation of the tri-
departmental SSR Strategy in 2004 (DFID, FCO & MOD, 2004) and today, he still 
participates as a consultant, policy adviser, and expert on a number of SSR-related 
activities. 
Nicole Ball is another researcher that influenced the SSR policy agenda at HMG 
and international level. Considered as the ‘mother of SSR’, she authored in 1998 the 
first DFID-sponsored report on SSR made by Saferworld (Ball, 1998) which de facto 
constituted one of the first engagements of the Department with SSR. Over the course 
of the following years, she maintained a strong professional collaboration with Dylan 
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Hendrickson (Ball & Hendrickson, 2002, 2006) and participated in several studies and 
initiatives funded by the UK government. For example, she worked on the organisation 
for the 2000 HMG SSR Symposium, drafting some of the Background Papers (DFID, 
2000a). She also led the evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools SSR Strategy in 
2004 (Ball, 2004b), and influenced the early approaches to security and defence 
expenditure of the World Bank and the IMF (Ball, 2001; Ball & Holmes, 2002). Over 
the years, she became one of the main personalities behind the evolution of the SSR 
agenda at the international level, collaborating extensively with the OECD, the UN, and 
the Dutch government, and working as consultant or researcher for international and 
bilateral donors worldwide (Ball, 2002, 2005; Ball et al., 2007; Ball, Bouta & van de 
Goor, 2003; Ball & van de Goor, 2008).  
The solid lines between independent consultants and the policy circles of DFID 
and the international organisations symbolise the direct link of these researchers with 
the institutional actors promoting SSR at policy level. Furthermore, the circle of 
independent consultants is also linked directly to CSDG. This symbolises how most of 
the time these influential and independent consultants collaborated with each other in 
promoting the emerging SSR agenda, as shown in the cases of Dylan Hendrickson and 
Nicole Ball.  
However, it is worth adding two additional comments in relation to these initial 
collaborations between policy and research. Firstly, some researchers from developing 
countries such as Rocklyn Williams, Eboe Hutchful, and Kayode Fayemi were also 
involved in this early evolution of the SSR agenda. This is symbolised in the figure by 
the blue circle of ‘African universities and NGOs’, linked through dotted lines with the 
activities of CSDG. The participation of African SSR experts in this process was usually 
the outcome of institutional relationships between British and Western universities and 
African non-governmental organisations or academic institutions. As recalled by an 
early SSR researcher: “we, in many ways, were enabling all these researchers from 
developing countries to feed into HMG policy”.34 For example, Rocklyn Williams 
became part of the SSR process at World Bank level because of his work with Nicole 
Ball. Professional relationships were thus the main channel through which local 
researchers could enter the British and international SSR networks. African SSR experts 
like Kayode Fayemi, Eboe Hutchful, and Rocklyn Williams participated in the 2000 
                                                          
34 Interview n. 25, London, 23 October 2012. 
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HMG SSR Symposium in London. The line between the CSDG circle and the circle of 
African universities and NGOs is nonetheless dotted because the work of these 
researchers fed into policy mainly through indirect means such as the collaboration with 
Western researchers in policy papers delineating the emerging SSR policy agenda. 
Furthermore, the circle is blue and not linked to policy actors in Sierra Leone, as 
academic studies conducted by these researchers mainly influenced the development of 
SSR policy at headquarters level, rather than the activities of SSR street-level 
bureaucrats in fragile countries such as Sierra Leone.    
The second important thing to note about these first SSR research 
developments is that the majority of the researchers and academics who were involved 
in the initial phase of the SSR evolution – even those sponsored by DFID – did not see 
and define their early work as ‘research’. Indeed, DFID had an existing SSR policy 
agenda, or at least a clear idea of what it wanted to do in the field of SSR in conflict-
affected countries like Sierra Leone. As a consequence, researchers during this early 
stage were not requested to carry out research, but conversely were asked to assist with 
the further development of HMG’s SSR policy and implement this policy on the 
ground. People working in the CSDG for example saw themselves as having a hybrid 
position as DFID policy advisers/staff. They became, in a tangential way, additional 
members of CHAD, helping British street-level bureaucrats implement the policies on 
the ground and spending a lot of their time overseas. Their research in the early 2000s 
consisted of collecting few lessons learned and producing some studies on various 
approaches to SSR used in different countries. One of the King’s College fellows 
further clarifies this important point:  
“I worked full time effectively for DFID for three years. So, not as an 
academic, but effectively as a… not a researcher in fact […].Basically, 
they hired us, they had a policy, they had an agenda which talked about 
Sierra Leone, Uganda and few other countries, but they were not 
interested in King’s doing research. We did very little research in the 
first few years which is interesting, what we did was to help them to 
develop the policy further, to develop a sort of cross governmental 
working, to help to implement the policy, Sierra Leone, Uganda, 
Indonesia the countries. So basic we became additional staff members 
of CHAD as it was called at the time […]. So, we were under that 
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contract for four years, and so I was not an academic or a researcher, I 
was based in King’s but effectively what I was… was a policy 
adviser/staff. So, we both advised and helped to implement the 
policies, we spent a lot of time overseas, so I think it was a very 
important point to make first of all in terms of my role and the role of 
my Unit because all we did was SSR for DFID the first four years”.35  
Figure 12 includes another blue circle of ‘other international research’ linked with 
dotted lines to both the research circle of the independent consultants and the policy 
circle of international organisations. Increasing reflection on security and development, 
as well as research on themes pertaining to state building and SSR, necessarily shaped 
the emerging SSR discourse and policy work at the international level. However, the 
dotted lines symbolise how this research had a cumulative impact on the whole SSR 
policy and academic discourse, influencing with themes and reflections this emerging 
agenda, but impacting the work of policy-makers and researchers only indirectly.  
 Finally, the blue area representing the indirect influence of research and research 
themes stops at the headquarters policy-making level, without expanding to fragile 
states. This point will be further investigated throughout the chapter and highlights how 
the academic research and themes linked to the emerging SSR agenda had a major 
influence on policy papers, strategies, and documents at the headquarters level. In 
contrast, academic research shaped to only a limited extent the activities of British 
street-level bureaucrats in conflict-affected countries like Sierra Leone, who conversely 
looked for short-term, policy-oriented studies to implement SSR programmes and 
activities on the ground. 
5.3.3 The policy evolution in Sierra Leone 
Figure 13 shows the different policy actors who contributed to the implementation of 
the first, ‘fire-fighting’ solutions in conflict-affected Sierra Leone. The figure derives 
from the precedent Figure 12 and shows the network of policy actors on the ground, as 
well as the connections of the different street-level bureaucrats with their respective 
headquarters. 
 




Figure 13   First period, ‘fire-fighting’ solutions: the policy actors in Sierra Leone 
 
The white circles in the figure represent the main policy actors implementing British-led 
SSR policy on the ground. The circles are linked with different lines, symbolising a 
variety of reciprocal relationships. The circle of the international organisations country 
offices symbolises the presence in the country of some international and bilateral actors 
alongside the British and the Sierra Leonean government. As previously described, 
international actors such as the UN supported the SSR, DDR, and peacekeeping 
operations in Sierra Leone. They maintained a high amount of freedom from their 
respective headquarters and are therefore linked to them by a dotted line. The impact of 
the activities of these international actors on the security situation on the ground was 
extremely positive and international and bilateral donor countries contributed to 
promote and maintain peace in the final years of the conflict. However, the lack of 
connection between these actors and the UK policy players, as well as the dotted line 
linking these actors to the local government show that these international policy actors 
were not the main implementers of the SSR policy in the country, as SSR programmes 
and activities were mainly designed and implemented by the UK. 
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Indeed, some scholars have pointed out how the driving role of the UK in the 
early SSR process and British bilateral linkages with the GoSL constituted two factors 
that contributed to the effectiveness of the first reforms in the West African state 
(Albrecht & Jackson, 2009; Jackson & Albrecht, 2011). The UK was the principal policy 
actor implementing the first security activities on the ground. The main British actors 
and street-level bureaucrats in Sierra Leone were intelligence, military, police, and justice 
advisers, the British High Commission, and the presence of the IMATT military 
contingent to help implement the first military reforms. These actors are all represented 
in the white circles of the network in Figure 13, and were, in this way, part of the SSR 
policy process in conflict-affected Sierra Leone.  
Two distinct circles symbolise (i) military and intelligence advisers and (ii) police 
and justice advisers. DFID’s decision to divide responsibility of SSR policy 
implementation between two different departments created a parallel chain of 
command for street-level bureaucrats in Sierra Leone, with police and justice advisers 
reporting to the Governance Department and the activities of the other SSR advisers 
overseen by CHAD. As recalled by an early SSR researcher, this division had practical 
consequences for policy design and implementation on the ground: 
“The police component was not designed at the same time as the 
military component and the work on the national security office and 
things like that, that was all designed somewhere separately and pieced 
together, so in that sense I don’t think it was fully integrated or 
comprehensive”.36 
Thus the different SSR elements were not coordinated under a unique command and 
therefore developed over time as separate entities responding to different departments 
and desks. Probably the most famous example of this lack of coordination was the 
December 1999 controversy between the police and the military elements of British 
street-level bureaucrats in the country over the use of the old Paramount Hotel in 
Freetown. The derelict building was hosting the police’s Criminal Investigation 
Department (CID) and the SSD and had been at the same time identified by MODAT 
as a good location for the new Sierra Leone MOD. Eventually, the building was 
assigned to MODAT and President Kabbah found an alternative accommodation for 




the CID, while the SSD was placed in temporary barracks outside Freetown (Albrecht 
& Jackson, 2009, pp. 49-50; Jackson & Albrecht, 2011, pp. 35-36). 
Most of the British street-level bureaucrats working in the country during the 
period of ‘fire-fighting’ solutions therefore agreed that the policy process in Sierra 
Leone was not necessarily joined-up among the different SSR components. British 
street-level bureaucrats in Freetown – included the High Commissioner – had regular, 
weekly formal and informal meetings. They always showed a high degree of 
professionalism and generally maintained good personal relationships with other 
practitioners working in the country; nonetheless, the various SSR components often 
functioned as separate and parallel entities. IMATT, one of the white circles in Figure 
13, had a third and different chain of command and reported to UK MOD in London, 
while the DFID-seconded Civilian Adviser to the Sierra Leone MOD reported to 
DFID. The various SSR elements thus evolved as separate entities, responding to 
different departments and desks while lacking an overarching strategic framework. Most 
of HMG cooperation thus developed directly on the ground, thanks to individuals 
operating with “the right background, mentality and personality, so a collaborative 
mind-set”.37  
Dotted lines link the white circles of the different UK policy actors working in 
Sierra Leone. The lines symbolise how coordination among the diverse SSR elements 
on the ground was at times difficult, with different entrenched departmental cultures 
and several distinct chains of command at times hindering coordination among the 
various programmes. Moreover, some logistical issues further worked to complicate the 
pursuit of a holistic SSR approach in the country. Staff continuity was one of the main 
problems for British street-level bureaucrats working in Freetown. In particular, 
IMATT personnel had a higher turnover rate than DFID advisers, while their 
commander usually changed on a yearly basis. This high rotation created obvious 
problems not only in relation to an internal lack of capacity, continuity, and corporate 
institutional memory, but also in relation to the work of the other street-level 
bureaucrats in the country, who always had to build new relationships with incoming 
IMATT commanders. A DFID adviser working in Sierra Leone during the conflict 
years for example reminds: “in my period there, three director generals of IMATT 
                                                          
37 Interview n. 31, London, 19 November 2012. 
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changed”.38 His colleague recalls the difficulties of re-building a professional 
relationship at every change of personnel: “if you send a new contingent every few 
months, it becomes a very, a ‘beginning again type’ process”.39 
Furthermore, IMATT personnel were located in Leicester Peak, a different 
location that was relatively isolated from the British High Commission and the other 
British and Sierra Leonean institutions in Freetown. This small but significant difference 
in geographic location added to the perception of the separation of IMATT personnel 
from other British street-level bureaucrats in the country. As a result, IMATT policies 
appeared to some to be more linked to the priorities of single commanders rather than 
to an overarching and joined-up strategy in collaboration with other British SSR street-
level bureaucrats. An early British adviser in the country recalls: “[IMATT] always 
changed its personnel. Every commander had his own ideas; they had their own 
mandate, but every commander had his way to implement it”.40 Likewise, his colleague 
comments more explicitly: “there was a lot of concern that basically the IMATT’s 
operations on an annual basis were very much determined by the interests and the 
priorities of the commanding at the time rather than each commander delivering against 
a strategic plan”.41  
British street-level bureaucrats in the country enjoyed a large amount of 
freedom and responsibility: their policy was usually reactive and shaped by the needs of 
the situation on the ground rather than by London headquarters. As remarked by one 
of the early street-level bureaucrats in the country: “there was in general no involvement 
from the headquarters, but when policy was done back in London this caused problems 
because they did not know about the situation on the ground”.42 Indeed, DFID only 
opened its country office in 2005. Before that date, it managed some of the 
programmes from London, occasionally flying out some of its advisers and maintaining 
only the seconded British advisers and two staff in Freetown (Poate et al., 2008). Figure 
13 thus links with dotted lines the British actors in Sierra Leone and their respective 
headquarters. This symbolises the large amount of freedom of personnel on the ground, 
                                                          
38 Interview n. 3, London, 6 June 2012. 
39 Interview n. 19, London, 12 July 2012. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Interview n. 24, London, 19 October 2012. 
42 Interview n. 3, London, 6 June 2012. 
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as underlined by the words of a DFID adviser working in Freetown during this early 
period: “basically, we had more or less a free hand”.43 
Coordination and cooperation among the various elements of the SSR 
programme developed directly on the ground, as recalled by one of the early street-level 
bureaucrats working in Sierra Leone: “we were not coordinated, we did it on the 
ground”.44 Interactions among British street-level bureaucrats assumed paramount 
importance and underpinned the development of the SSR programmes and activities in 
the country. Top UK advisers worked in close arrangement and used to have regular 
formal and informal meetings among themselves, with the British High Commissioner 
in Freetown, and with the President of Sierra Leone to monitor, update, and decide the 
developments of SSR policy on the ground. In spite of the differences of mandates and 
roles, the institutional divisions at headquarters level, and the small misunderstandings 
that can happen when working in a fragile, conflict-affected environment, 
professionalism, collaboration, and very good relationships underpinned the activities of 
British street-level bureaucrats. One of them recalls how relationships on the ground 
were “extremely good. Because there was only a small number of us, because we were 
in a war situation, we were all professionals, we knew we relied on each other, and 
absolutely no problem. But of course, with limited resources everybody is grabbing 
resources!”45 
Similarly, personal relationships between British street-level bureaucrats and 
local policy-makers were important, as top UK street-level bureaucrats had regular 
meetings with the President of Sierra Leone and with the main security actors in the 
country. In particular, the British High Commissioner, the IGP, and the IMATT 
Commander had direct access to President Kabbah,46 as remembered by one of the first 
IMATT commanders in the country: 
“I was also direct Adviser to the President. I was always taken very 
seriously by the President: together with the Chief of Defence Staff and 
the IGP we used to meet with the President two or three times per 
week in informal meetings. No one else, as far as I know, had such a 
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similar access. There were two reasons for it. First, the President was 
the Minister of Defence at that time. Actually the Deputy Ministry of 
Defence then ran the Department, but the President still had the 
position of Minister of Defence. Now it is no longer the case, as there 
is a Minister of Defence. Second, the fragility of the situation. Out of 
the Committee, we could have private discussions, exchange our ideas 
and discuss them privately, even saying things we could not say at the 
Committee. The President was immensely receptive. […] When I left, 
we reduced the number of informal meetings to two every week”.47 
President Kabbah was usually extremely receptive and willing to accept and take on 
board suggestions coming from British street-level bureaucrats, as recalled by two 
advisers working in the country: 
“- Was he receptive?   
- Oh, yes! Very sensible, he would listen. He would not always do 
what we wanted him to do.  
- No, but he solved few problems.  
- And he listened, he thinks about things”.48 
Other British street-level bureaucrats would regularly meet with the Sierra Leonean 
President, as well as local ministers and top security officers. SILSEP security and 
intelligence adviser used to regularly meet the President “in the presence of the head of 
CISU or the head of the ONS”.49 Likewise, the British Military Adviser to Sierra Leone 
MOD used to visit Sierra Leonean ministries and to accompany the Sierra Leonean 
Chief of Defence Staff in his regular meetings with the country’s President. 
 IMATT personnel at that time filled key positions in the Sierra Leone MOD 
and the Armed Forces, as explained by one of the early IMATT commanders in the 
country: 
“The reason for this was that there was a lack of capacity and 
experience, a lack of capability. The air wing was very tiny, actually they 
probably had only one M124, and was commanded by the British Air 
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Force. The maritime wing was commanded by a UK navy officer, who 
is the current Defence Attaché in the Sierra Leone High Commission. 
In the MOD, there were a number of officers running some sections of 
the MOD. I sat with the Chief of Defence staff, who was from Sierra 
Leone, and there were lots of Brits in support positions”.50 
Consequently, personal interactions between British and Sierra Leonean security actors 
developed and were built on a basis of mutual respect and trust, if not friendship. In the 
long term, these positive relationships, usually not considered or downplayed in the 
literature about state building, development, and SSR, “made an immense difference to 
the work”51 of British street-level bureaucrats in the country. As explained by one of the 
first DFID advisers in Sierra Leone:  
“Things usually work thanks for personal relationships, and the ability 
of a person to develop good and strong relationships. It’s only with 
confidence and patience that then they start collaborating with you, not 
because they see Britain behind you, but because of you”.52   
The importance of maintaining good personal relationships with local policy-makers 
was even higher considering the direct and extremely influential role played by British 
street-level bureaucrats in guiding and influencing the Sierra Leone SSR policy process. 
In the first period of UK-led reforms in the country, British street-level bureaucrats 
were not only mentoring and steering the domestic SSR process, but in some 
circumstances actively and directly led and participated in the development of the SSR 
country policy. This strong linkage and direct role played by British street-level 
bureaucrats in local security reforms is symbolised in Figure 13 by the solid lines 
connecting the UK actors on the ground to the Sierra Leone government. 
Some street-level bureaucrats wrote specific papers, charters, reports, and 
strategies constituting the early security policy of the GoSL. CPDTF advisers for 
example had a seminal role in the publication of the Sierra Leone Policing Charter in 
August 1998 (members of the CPDTF were equally influential in organising and 
facilitating a seminar where over 70 senior local police officers formulated the Police 
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Mission Statement). They drafted the text of the Charter according to ideas coming 
from the 1996 Banya Report and from consultations with over 100 people. CPDTF 
advisers prepared a draft of the Policing Charter, which was then signed by President 
Kabbah and read in a Presidential public statement on policing. Members of the 
CPDTF “were delighted that His Excellency used the full text of our draft without any 
alteration” (CPDTF, 1998b). However, they were equally conscious that “when he 
signed it, it was exactly what he wanted”,53 as, in the words of one of the top British 
police advisers working in Freetown, “President Kabbah would not have signed 
something because I gave it through”.54 
Likewise, from 1999 to early 2000, the MODAT team not only developed and 
proposed the structure of BMATT – then implemented and deployed as IMATT – but 
it also designed an Order of Battle (ORBAT) for the Armed Forces and drew numerous 
plans and organisational charts to reform the structure of the Armed Forces and of the 
Sierra Leone MOD. As explained by a military adviser involved in the process, while 
bearing in mind the necessity to “put together a structure that was achievable, that 
looked sensible”,55 the MODAT team prepared “a paper for restructuring the Armed 
Forces, reorganisation, and also the formation of a team to implement the restructuring, 
and that became the IMATT”.56 The same adviser recalls the process to reform the 
RSLAF:  
“We did our design work, we got a team of single service advisers, so 
we got somebody from the navy, somebody from the Army, somebody 
RAF, from the medical services, from the support services to come out 
to look at our structures. […] The navy was one gunboat. A hard-
sunken shiny gunboat, but, that was it. We put together this team of 
advisers, but the advisers had – which was the difference to a normal 
BMATT – we had command appointments, so we were all seconded, I 
ensured that we were all seconded to the RSLAF, as we called it, and 
we held ranks, we wore RSLAF badges and rank, and we had command 
appointments. […] So, what happened was all the key appointments 
were Brits. So, the head of navy, the head of RAF, we left Sierra 
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Leoneans as a Chief of Defence Staff and the Brigade Commanders, 
but the Senior Staff Officers were Brits”.57 
The same adviser also remembers how the MODAT team drafted, discussed, finalised, 
and presented to President Kabbah the structures for the reformed RSLAF and Sierra 
Leone MOD: “[My colleague] took on the MOD structure, I took on the Armed Forces 
structure, Navy, Army and Air Force, then we both looked at each other’s […], we 
decided this was a template we could run with, we then talked about to the President”.58 
 British street-level bureaucrats also had a direct role in restructuring the security 
and intelligence apparatus of Sierra Leone. As recalled by a local ONS officer: “we 
developed a consistent policy that was DFID led or supported/funded, thanks to 
DFID and UK taxpayers’ money”.59 British street-level bureaucrats in Freetown thus 
facilitated and led the reforms of the country’s security institutions and, in some 
circumstances, filled key positions and drafted Sierra Leone’s policy papers. The 
urgency of the situation, the limited capacity in the country, and the need for an external 
drive to avoid partial and politically biased policies were some of the reasons cited to 
explain the proactive role played by UK street-level bureaucrats. British help was also 
requested by Sierra Leonean ministries and institutions, thus local ownership was at 
times sacrificed for efficiency, effectiveness, and impartiality. One of the first IMATT 
commanders in the country further explains this point:  
“There was a heavy dependence on the UK in terms of driving, 
foreword, and policy. The legislation per se was there, but in terms of 
policy, plans, rules and regulations there were no capabilities, and they 
relied on the UK. Now, if a policy was developed by IMATT, you 
could ask how it was Sierra Leone owned. In fact this was a challenge, 
but we did it not because we wanted to divest their responsibilities”.60 
This active participation of British street-level bureaucrats in the Sierra Leonean policy 
process was not devoid of difficulties, as UK street-level bureaucrats in Freetown 
sometimes had to retune the British experience and way of working to the different 
capacity of the local institutions. For example, British street-level bureaucrats had to 
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face logistical and organisational problems, as “in a developing country, things move 
naturally slower, and there are always problems of logistic”.61 Lack of training was an 
additional problem, as explained by a military adviser in the country: 
“The only way it was going to work was to have British people 
commanding, to make decisions and mentor the Sierra Leoneans, to 
take them through it, to show them how it was done, because a lot of 
these people had no training at all”.62 
The UK thus developed and provided training programmes for future soldiers and 
police officers. Additionally, some local military officers participated in training courses 
in the UK. However, these courses were not always targeted to the Sierra Leonean 
reality which at times created a disjuncture between the concepts learned in the UK by 
future officers and the actual possibility of their implementation in Sierra Leone. The 
problem is recalled in the words of an early military adviser: 
“They were sending people again back on courses to UK, and of course 
the courses they were sending them on were much too high level for 
these guys. So they were coming back and say: ‘we should not be doing 
that! In UK, you are doing this one’. And I said: ‘Hang on, you are not 
in the UK’. ‘Oh, yes, but we got to emulate the UK’. […] And some of 
the people got really quite nasty”.63 
The specific context and stability situation of conflict-affected Sierra Leone, together 
with the evolution of SSR as policy and as a related research agenda in the UK and in 
Sierra Leone, thus created a particular policy process for British street-level bureaucrats 
working in the country. Unique factors, elements, and dynamics shaped and modelled 
the nexus between SSR research and policy in conflict-affected Sierra Leone. The next 
part of the chapter explores and describes this nexus, examining the extent to which 
research and knowledge played a role, influenced, and interacted with early British-led 
SSR policy in conflict-affected Sierra Leone.  
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5.4 The role of knowledge in British-led SSR policy in Sierra Leone 
The previous sections of the chapter have presented the peculiar country context and 
discussed the main features of the SSR policy process in conflict-affected Sierra Leone. 
Both the stability context and the evolution of SSR in policy and research represented 
two important variables shaping and limiting the role played by knowledge during the 
period of ‘fire-fighting’ solutions. This section of the chapter analyses the extent to 
which research has influenced and interacted with SSR programmes and activities 
implemented by British street-level bureaucrats in conflict-affected Sierra Leone. 
Narratives of research utilisation described in this section of the chapter will help design 
Figure 14 at the end of the section, a figure building upon Figure 13 that will visually 
incorporate research and researchers in Sierra Leone to the previous policy network of 
policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and researchers in the UK. 
The UK military intervention in May 2000 stabilised the Kabbah regime and 
transformed the first, primarily DFID-led, ‘fire-fighting’ solutions into a longer-term 
commitment to help rebuild the Army and reform the whole security sector apparatus 
of the West African state. The British intervention was prompted by a mixture of 
political demands, calculations, and personal commitments. Some of the main 
motivations identified by different scholars are: the long-term ties between the two 
countries and an historical sense of responsibility for the former colony, the presence of 
a relatively large Sierra Leonean diaspora community in the UK, the allegations about 
British involvement in the ‘arms to Africa’ affair64 while the UK government was 
promoting an ‘ethical foreign policy’, the legacy of the Rwandan genocide, the possible 
criticisms about the different engagement of the UK in the Balkans and in Sierra Leone, 
and the opportunity to assert the UK’s position in global power politics (Albrecht & 
Jackson, 2009; Jackson & Albrecht 2011; Schümer, 2008, pp. 26-53). 
Personal resoluteness was also important in shaping early policy decisions on 
the ground. A few extremely influential British policy-makers played a very important 
role in the decision to maintain British support to the Kabbah government. For 
example, then Prime Minister Tony Blair, whose father had been a school teacher in 
Sierra Leone, had a special interest in the country’s fate. Similarly, then Secretary of 
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State Clare Short played a seminal role in both DFID’s early engagements with SSR and 
in the decision to intervene in Sierra Leone. She believed that the UK, as the former 
colonial power of a country that was experiencing years of civil war, could not let the 
newly democratic elected government of Kabbah collapse and the situation in Sierra 
Leone deteriorate. Her personal commitment to the country was seen almost as “an 
elemental force” (Albrecht & Jackson, 2009, p. 170; Jackson & Albrecht, 2011, p. 173) 
behind British intervention in Sierra Leone. As recalled by one of the first British street-
level bureaucrats in the country: “most of the things started from a personal 
commitment, mainly of Clare Short […] She said that we could not let down the newly 
elected government of Kabbah, and from there everything started”.65 This personal 
commitment and belief of the then DFID Secretary of State thus drove and supported 
the early British engagement in Sierra Leone. Garth Glentworth, one of the first DFID 
advisers sent to Sierra Leone, clarified and made explicit this point in more than one 
circumstance: “Ms Short said: ‘We could not – we, being the British – could not let this 
fragile, but democratically-elected government collapse’. Now, I don’t think there was 
much theory behind that” (Albrecht & Jackson, 2009, p. 174).  
Likewise, then Brigadier Sir David Richards, the leader of Operation Basilica and 
commander of Operation Palliser, had a seminal role in the planning of SILSEP and in 
transforming an initial evacuation operation of British citizens into a small- to medium-
scale war-fighting operation against the rebels, from which UK longer-term SSR 
assistance originated.  
Up-to-date research on the situation in Sierra Leone did not play a big role in 
shaping the direction of policy in the first phase of British engagement. UK-led SSR 
policy in Sierra Leone started during the course of the conflict and was mainly 
conditioned by events and exigencies in the country. British street-level bureaucrats 
were mainly reacting to the situation on the ground and trying to avoid making 
mistakes, rather than following a pre-planned strategy based on previous research or 
assessments. The limited influence of research on these early activities could be well 
understood by the body language and by some of the answers of the most experienced 
interviewees, who did not hesitate to smirk or smile when I introduced the topic of this 
PhD research, or candidly pointed out: “I will try not to be too cynical; I would turn the 
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thing in the other way: the influence of events on research”.66 This perception was also 
made explicit by the words of one of the first British SSR advisers who flew to the 
country:  
“The fact is that Sierra Leone was a big learning experience, where we 
probably made also some mistakes. The thing was to getting the people 
there, and these were not necessarily the right ones. Research did not 
play a big role at that time, and never played a big part in my job, or at 
least in what I was doing”.67 
Re-establishing security and stability in the country was thus the most pressing issue for 
British street-level bureaucrats in Sierra Leone. Given the urgency of the situation, the 
first advisers sent to the country had enormous responsibilities, and basically a free 
hand to implement the policies they considered important for improving stability on the 
ground. As recalled by one of them:   
“I would argue that most of this was just a reaction to circumstances 
and I don’t apologise for that and I don’t think that it was misplaced. It 
was so overwhelmingly urgent to try and get things back to work out 
there. That was the first intention. [...] the overwhelming pressure was 
to try and to strengthen the government sufficient that it could take 
over when the RUF was finally defeated as it was declared in 2002. And 
trying to re-establishing government control in the whole country. That 
was the other intention”.68 
The UK lacked a pre-planned strategy to guide its first security policies in the country. 
Robert Ashington-Pickett, one of the first British Intelligence and Security Advisers to 
the ONS and CISU, remembers: “when I went to Sierra Leone at the end of 2000, what 
I was presented with was not a strategy, it was a vision. And, basically, I was told: ‘make 
it up when you get out there’. When I asked about a blueprint for SSR, I was told: ‘Well, 
you are going to write it’. Effectively, we did” (Albrecht & Jackson, 2009, p. 174; 
Jackson & Albrecht, 2011, p. 176-177). One of his colleagues adds: “in Sierra Leone, we 
made up everything. Things have been created as we went along. In the Terms of 
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Reference there was no sequencing, we created things and everyone involved there had 
the same problem”.69 These words are echoed by those of another colleague: “we just 
made it up as we have gone along, and I have to say, we did”.70  
Likewise, another interviewee highlights the fact that the UK military 
intervention in Sierra Leone started initially as an evacuation operation to admit that “in 
the first phase there was no entry, nor an exit strategy”.71 He then recollects the story of 
a colleague sent from London to Freetown with a list of priorities who, at his arrival in 
the country, called London to change these according to the situation on the ground, 
with the headquarters agreeing with his new set of priorities. Another adviser recalls the 
lack of a strategy in the first phase of intervention in the country:  
“Essentially we had to develop it, make it up, develop it as we went 
along. Again, we were not working within some strategic framework of 
what SSR was, what it was there to achieve, what the traps, pitfalls 
were. We did not have really any of that. We hadn’t. We worked within 
the sort of DFID developing log frame”.72 
The instability of the context and the consequent need to re-establish security were thus 
important factors shaping the initial SSR policy process in Sierra Leone. More than 
research, the volatile events on the ground influenced initial SSR policy in Sierra Leone, 
as policy decisions were often shaped by necessity or practical constraints and planned 
in ad hoc documents urgently written by British street-level bureaucrats. For example, 
the difficult decision to maintain, rearm, and train the paramilitary SSD police force was 
taken only after the return of the CPDTF team in Freetown in the spring of 1999, and 
was based on the positive role played by the SSD forces in defending the city from the 
January attack of the RUF. As recalled by two CPDTF advisers, at their first arrival in 
Freetown in July 1998, all politicians including the President wanted to disband the SSD 
“because they consider them to be the relic of the APC regime”.73 Back in London in 
winter, the CPDTF leader: 
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“Briefed England [Ray England, responsible for the SSD] just before 
new year, in late December 1998, in Victoria Street. And Ray England 
was briefed that ‘you have to come in, and find a way to dismantle 
them, and replace them with something more community police 
friendly’. And that was his initial brief”.74 
However, the dynamics changed during the RUF’s brutal attack on Freetown in January 
1999: “the SSD with limited weaponry held them in two places, they stopped the RUF 
getting into Freetown, they held them”,75 and played a major role in the defence of the 
city. When the heads of the CPDTF team returned to the capital in March-April 1999, 
“the dynamic had changed, and they have changed in this way that Kabbah, the vice-
president, all the politicians and ministers, people in the street who were saying: ‘get rid 
of the Siaka Stevens’ dogs’ before Christmas, were saying: ‘these men saved this 
country’”.76 The forces of the paramilitary police were “not the sharpest, best educated 
people. But as for what they did they were very well disciplined, very loyal, they could 
be relied upon”.77 As a result, the CPDTF team seconded the GoSL decision to turn the 
SSD “into a proper operational support group”.78 At the arrival of Ray England in 
Freetown in Summer 1999, “his Terms of References and briefing were changed in 
‘train and bring this Unit into becoming an operational support arm to the rest of the 
police’”,79 and British police advisers thus maintained, armed, and trained the SSD in 
defensive policing, non-lethal tactics and public border control.   
 Likewise, the unstable and volatile context of the country was one of the main 
factors influencing military advisers’ decisions on the size of Sierra Leone’s Armed 
Forces. On their first arrival in Sierra Leone, British advisers realised that the size of the 
Armed Forces – allegedly composed by more than 14,000 soldiers – was too big for an 
actual population of a country of less than 5 million people (to put this size in 
perspective, Ghana for example has “an armed force of 5,000” (White, 2008, p. 4), for a 
population more than four times bigger than the one of Sierra Leone). This size was 
even more threatening considering the unreliability of the Armed Forces, which had 
already staged several coups in the course of the civil conflict. Nevertheless, the first 









British military advisers and their successive colleagues did not downsize the Armed 
Forces in a radical, draconian way, but decided to maintain the large number of troops 
initially and downsize progressively.  
Practical security reasons lay behind this choice: facing an unstable situation, 
with several armed groups potentially deleterious for the security of the country, British 
military advisers preferred to contain and integrate the different groups within the 
institutionalised Armed Forces, rather than exclude them from the system and keep 
them fragmented and isolated. As a consequence, such a large number of soldiers did 
allow the numerous and potentially dangerous splinter armed groups that otherwise 
would have remained unchecked across the war-ravaged country to be integrated into 
the official forces. One of the early military advisers recalls: “we had to bring these three 
groups [the AFRC, the RUF, and the CDF] together somehow”,80 because “the 
collective view at the time was that it would be better to integrate all the different 
factions under one banner and contain the problem than to isolate various group at the 
outset and risk the development of fragmented militia forces” (White, 2008, p. 4). 
Maintaining such an excessive size was of course against every consideration about the 
long-term sustainability of the Army. However, practical security constraints and 
contingent necessity influenced this initial policy decision, and the reduction of the 
number of soldiers was postponed and implemented only in successive years. 
Given the insecure context and the lack of a strategic direction from London, 
most of the early successes of British-led SSR policies in Sierra Leone thus lay in the 
presence and activities of the first street-level bureaucrats on the ground. Many scholars 
agree that these were ‘the right people in the right place at the right time’. As the 
situation in the country “just really got to the state where the right person made the 
right decision”,81 the importance of having the right people and personalities on the 
ground in charge of these decisions was paramount. Most of the advisers sent to Sierra 
Leone in the first phase of British engagement were admittedly people with many years 
of combined professional experience in both their respective fields and developing 
countries. Their extensive expertise proved fundamental in addressing the most pressing 
problems the country was facing and in steering and guiding the SSR policy process in 
the right direction.  
                                                          




Furthermore, some street-level bureaucrats combined their experience with an 
academic background or with the participation in previous research, reports, and 
evaluations of SSR programmes and activities. As a result, street-level bureaucrats 
working in Sierra Leone were, in part, informed by research and knowledge gained in 
other contexts. They were therefore directly or indirectly aware of research themes, 
problems, and discussions that were emerging in the SSR policy agenda at the time. 
Facing an urgent situation on the ground characterised by the lack of security and time 
to sit down, read, and reflect before implementing policies, the different street-level 
bureaucrats’ experiences, academic studies, and backgrounds were extremely important 
in setting the priorities for British involvement in the country. As underlined by an SSR 
researcher: “the people there were experienced people with background, experience, 
and professional development. They learnt from other experiences, and their 
background and studies had a role in taking the right decisions”.82 A quick glance at the 
biographies of some of the first British street-level bureaucrats in Sierra Leone can 
explain how the majority of these constituted a group of experienced practitioners with 
practical and theoretical knowledge in their field of intervention.  
For example, Garth Glentworth was DFID’s Senior Governance Adviser at the 
beginning of the British engagement in Sierra Leone. At the time of British military 
intervention in the country, he was already a well-experienced adviser. He joined DFID 
in the late 1970s, and worked for the Department for 27 years. Before coming to 
DFID, he was lecturer with the Development Administration Group of the then 
Institute of Local Government Studies at the University of Birmingham. He worked at 
the Makerere University in Uganda, and at the University of Botswana, Lesotho, and 
Swaziland. He combined this vast academic and theoretical knowledge with a 
professional background in governance and civil service reform. In this way, he was 
engaged with the research debates in academia, as well as the practical difficulties and 
issues entailed in working in fragile, conflict-affected environments. He eventually 
retired in 2005 after 27 years of work with DFID and he still collaborates occasionally 
as part-time adviser for the Department. 
 Similarly, two well-experienced advisers led the police reform activities in the 
country. Keith Biddle was a retired UK police officer who was chosen by President 
Kabbah as Sierra Leone IGP because he was not politically linked to any of the 
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country’s parties or ethnic groups and was, for this reason, considered impartial. Before 
working in Sierra Leone, he gained extensive experience in the UK and had worked on 
police reform in South Africa. In 1998, he was contracted by DFID along with two 
academics at the University of Wales to conduct a synthesis study on the police 
programmes supported by the Department in several developing countries (Biddle, 
Clegg & Whetton, 1999). From the findings of that study, DFID derived in 2000 its 
Policy Guidance on Support to Policing in Developing Countries (Clegg, Hunt & Whetton, 2000). 
Biddle was not among the authors of the Policy Guidance, as at that time he was already 
acting as IGP in Sierra Leone. Nonetheless, the other two authors of the 1999 synthesis 
study wrote the Policy Guidance and it is plausible that Keith Biddle was well aware of the 
literature on policing in developing countries that was published in late 1990s/early 
2000s. After Sierra Leone, Keith Biddle worked on policing issues in DRC and in other 
developing countries. Today, he still works occasionally as police adviser for DFID.  
Biddle’s colleague Adrian Horn, one of the initial members of the CPDTF team 
and the manager of CSSP from 1999 to 2003, had a similar professional path. Before 
working in Sierra Leone, he had precedent experiences in Uganda and Ethiopia. After 
Sierra Leone, he worked with Keith Biddle in DRC and he now works occasionally as 
police adviser for DFID, with recent work experiences in South Sudan. Other British 
street-level bureaucrats working in Sierra Leone in the period of ‘fire-fighting’ solutions 
were equally experienced in their respective fields. At the time of his deployment to 
Sierra Leone, Colonel Mike Dent, the military adviser to the Sierra Leone MOD, had 
just returned from his role of Military Assistant to the Force Commander of the UN 
Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission, established on the wake of the First Gulf War. More 
importantly, he already knew his MODAT colleague Robert Foot, the civil adviser to 
the Sierra Leone MOD, as they both had been members of the Permanent Joint 
Headquarter Implementation Team in 1995-1996. This prior experience and working 
relationship was extremely important, since the two advisers had to work in concert on 
a daily basis in Sierra Leone, collaborating closely on the plans for the reform of the 
Sierra Leone MOD and the RSLAF. 
Nonetheless, the first urgent policy and programme decisions taken by British 
street-level bureaucrats in Sierra Leone were based on limited empirical analysis of the 
nature of the issues facing the local security sector, as British advisers urgently sent to 
Freetown had limited local contextual knowledge of the situation on the ground. Two 
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principal factors explain the limited empirical knowledge of the context in which HMG 
was operating, including the various security agencies and governance structures in 
Sierra Leone. The first is the urgency and instability of the situation, as British street-
level bureaucrats had to react to circumstances on the ground by taking compelling 
decisions often based upon necessity and practical considerations rather than on 
detailed research. A second and equally important factor was the novelty of the SSR 
concept. One of the first British street-level bureaucrats in the country reflects upon 
this point:  
“I guess that the reasons why [research did not have a prominent role] 
are manifold. SSR was a relative new area: for example, the things we 
always write about, the idea of developing the link between 
development and security, was at the time a new one; there was not 
much research at that time, as it was mainly written later; there was 
some consultancy work, but not what I see as academic research”.83 
Furthermore, as recalled by one of the first IMATT commanders in the country, the 
research capacity on the ground “was limited, in terms of people and technology”.84 As 
a consequence, in the late 1990s, empirical research on relevant contextual issues that 
would affect the SSR programme in Sierra Leone was either limited, non-existent 
(because of the novelty of the SSR concept and the unstable security conditions limiting 
research on the ground), or of restricted availability due to technological deficiencies 
(limited office equipment, computers, or internet access) in the country.  
The instability of the context, the particular policy process in the country, and 
the limited availability of research therefore impacted on the use of research and 
knowledge by British street-level bureaucrats in Sierra Leone. In spite of these 
limitations, research did however play a role in shaping some of the first UK-led SSR 
activities in Sierra Leone. As previously underlined, most of the British street-level 
bureaucrats had experiences from other conflict-affected or developing countries, and 
some of them had an academic background and a good understanding of the main 
debates shaping the SSR research agenda at the time of their presence in Sierra Leone. 
As a result, British advisers sent to Freetown on short notice were not necessarily 
                                                          
83 Interview n. 3, London, 6 June 2012. 
84 Interview n. 18, London, 4 July 2012. 
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looking for general academic SSR research coming from Western universities or 
research institutes, but they were hungry for knowledge to improve their understanding 
of the culture and history of the country.  
Anthropologic and historical books and reports written by the few people who 
had the opportunity to spend time in war-affected Sierra Leone assumed paramount 
importance for British street-level bureaucrats, who often conducted their personal 
reading and research independently. The knowledge and expertise of those who studied 
and understood the local history and culture became an invaluable source of 
information for British advisers who were sent to the country on short notice and 
needed to understand as much as possible about their new context. The bibliography of 
recommended readings included in an unpublished Background Brief prepared by a 
British adviser is elucidatory in this sense (Anon., 2002). The adviser lists 46 different 
recommended books and reports which have been influential for him to better 
understand the history and culture of Sierra Leone. Among these texts, most are 
historical studies focusing on the pre-colonial and colonial years, on the wider West 
Africa region, or on the military history of the country, others such as Paul Richards’ 
Fighting for the Rain Forest (1996) are anthropological books explaining the causes and 
dynamics of the war.  
At the same time, pressing security needs determined street-level bureaucrats’ 
urgency to act quickly to restore peace, security, and a minimum degree of rule of law in 
the country. British street-level bureaucrats therefore looked for specific, ad hoc, 
targeted, operational pieces of research and studies that could provide them with rough 
data and information. Locally produced reports such as the Banya report, surveys, and 
pieces of research commissioned by the same street-level bureaucrats and focusing, for 
example, on formal and informal systems of justice in the communities or on the state 
of the police, as well as personal visits on the ground, were of extreme importance for 
the early SSR activities. Rough data collected in the country were extremely valuable 
sources of knowledge for British street-level bureaucrats and were therefore highly 
influential. 
Contextual information gathered through such types of ad hoc, ‘on the ground’ 
activities was critical for establishing some of the UK-led SSR programmes and for 
steering the implementation of some policies. Examples of uptake into policy of these 
types of studies are numerous. For instance, CPDTF and SILSEP were activated 
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following project appraisal initiatives and previous visits of British advisers to the 
country. Likewise, in late 1999 the MODAT team of SILSEP conducted a mini-
Strategic Defence Review of the national security and national defence requirements of 
the country. The review listed the roles and responsibilities of the Armed Forces and 
constituted the starting point for the reform of the RSLAF and the Sierra Leone MOD. 
Following the review, the MODAT team designed a new ORBAT and determined 
“what the role of the maritime wing was, what the role of the air wing was, what the 
role of the land forces with the Army”85 in the reformed RSLAF.  
Another problem for British street-level bureaucrats working on the reform of 
the Army was establishing the exact number of soldiers in the SLA. This was important 
because the soldiers were not only paid, but they also received bags of rice, and the 
GoSL was paying salaries and distributing rice to an alleged number of approximately 
14,500 soldiers. In Autumn and Winter 2000, an IMATT-led Personnel Verification 
Team of four people visited all the SLA locations countrywide to effectively check the 
exact number of soldiers against existing documentation, create a computer database in 
the newly established Armed Forces Personnel Centre, and issue new temporary ID 
cards to all the individuals. According to an unpublished Background Brief of a military 
adviser, the research led by the Verification Team:  
“Highlighted a large number of inconsistencies in unit nominal rolls 
and identified several hundred impostors, civilians drawing military 
salaries, many previously discharged service personnel and ‘ghost’ 
soldiers. All these were discharged and several individuals involved in 
frauds were handed over to the police. By the end of the process the 
strength and payroll of the SLA had been reduced by over 2000 […] 
and the strength of the SLA was confirmed to be under 12,000” 
(Anon., 2002, p. 22).  
Likewise, when police advisers arrived in the country, the only available information on 
the status of the SLP they had was the Banya report, a government report produced in 
1996 and commissioned by President Kabbah that “looked at policing and the future 
policing in Sierra Leone”86 and had “already identified all the issues and problems that 
                                                          
85 Interview n. 33, London, 20 March 2013. 
86 Interview n. 22, London, 29 August 2012. 
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needed to be addressed”.87 CPDTF personnel therefore carried out additional research 
and commissioned some ad hoc studies and surveys that could provide them with a 
clear picture of the status of the police. For example, in February 1998, a team led by 
Christopher John carried out a review of the policing in Freetown and undertook some 
surveys on public perception of the SLP. The results of these surveys were emblematic 
for the CPDTF team: 100% of the interviewees considered the SLP corrupt, arguing 
that police officers “ask for money in police stations” and “should be more polite to 
civilians” (CPDTF, 1998c, p. 3). Similarly, 100% of police officers stated that there were 
“no possible channels to forward new ideas for improvement of the police” (CPDTF, 
1998c, p. 3), 97.4% bemoaned “a great fall in discipline” (CPDTF, 1998c, p. 3), 95.7% 
agreed that police stations or formations were “not functioning as they should be” 
(CPDTF, 1998c, p. 3), and 87% of the personnel had “never seen the Police Force 
Standing Order” (CPDTF, 1998c, p. 3).  
 As part of these surveys, CPDTF personnel (who could barely leave their hotel 
because of security constraints) sent several A4 white sheets to the different police 
officers in the country. On these sheets, signed on one side by the then Sierra Leone 
IGP, police personnel could write their thoughts and views on the police situation and 
problems. The returned papers, sent in majority by junior SLP officers, proved 
extremely useful not only in understanding the main problems faced by police officers 
in Sierra Leone, but they also made British police advisers aware of the presence of a 
vibrant critical mass of officers at junior levels that they could rely on for the 
implementation of delicate reforms. The survey was thus extremely important in 
supporting early police reforms in the country. In the words of a CPDTF member: 
“basically, it gave us confidence that there was a critical mass […], and I think that 
sustained some pretty difficult times, because the senior officers at that stage were very 
very difficult to change with people where the change would mean they had less 
resources”.88  
Similarly, in 2001 CCSSP members wanted to understand the effects of their 
reforms on the local community. They thus commissioned Richard Fanthorpe, a British 
anthropologist who was in the country at that time, to investigate the factors potentially 
affecting the interface between formal and informal systems of justice, and the contrasts 





in policing and systems of justice between urban and rural areas, as well as between 
secure and recently secured areas. Fanthorpe’s report constituted:  
“A preliminary analysis of the social, political and cultural environment 
in which Local Needs Policing must operate in Sierra Leone. It assesses 
the present operational effectiveness and deployment of the SLP and 
chiefdom police, the working relationship between the SLP and the 
chiefdom police and chiefdom courts, the interface between informal 
and formal systems of justice, and the expectations and attitudes of 
different stakeholders towards the SLP and chiefdom police” 
(Fanthorpe, 2001, p. 2)  
The findings of the report were given serious consideration by British street-level 
bureaucrats working on police and justice reforms at a community level, and 
represented the initial HMG and DFID effort toward improved engagement with local 
and informal police and justice actors.  
Finally, the extensive experience of the British advisers deployed in Sierra Leone 
allowed them to look at examples, ideas, models, experiences, lessons learned, and best 
practice from other countries and, where possible, re-apply or model these to the local 
context.89 For instance, the CPDTF team could rely on the expertise of people who had 
worked extensively on police-related issues in numerous developing countries such as 
Bangladesh, Uganda, and Haiti. These different experiences constituted a valuable asset 
for the early police reforms in Sierra Leone, as remembered by the head of the team 
Keith Biddle:  
“In Sierra Leone we were lucky. I’d done a project, Adrian [Horn] had 
done a project. The training adviser was David [Tingle], who is now 
Sudan I think. David had done training projects in Bangladesh and in 
Uganda. So we had people with some Africa experience who had an 
                                                          
89 Policy transfer has been defined as “the process by which actors borrow policies developed in one 
setting to develop programmes and policies within another” (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996, p. 357). Policy 
transfer is thus “a generic concept that refers to a process in which knowledge about institutions, policies 
or delivery systems at one sector or level of governance is used in the development of institutions, 
policies or delivery systems at another sector or level of governance” (Evans M., 2006, p. 1). For a 
reflection on policy transfer and lesson-drawing, see Evans M. (2006); for an analysis of policy transfer in 
global perspective, see Evans M. (2004); for a study on the role of the World Bank as an agent of 




appreciation. The rest of them came from Commonwealth countries. 
The girl from Zimbabwe I had worked with in South Africa, so she was 
good. The Canadian had been in Haiti and had been up in the Arctic 
working on community policing with the Inuit. It was a fantastic story. 
The Sri Lankan had been involved in police reform outside of Sri 
Lanka. So we were lucky that we had a fairly good mix and a good team 
to start with” (Innovation for Successful Societies Oral History 
Program, 2007, p. 23). 
Advice and models coming from other states were useful sources of knowledge and 
were often used as templates to reform the local security apparatus. For example, a local 
ONS officer remembers: 
“We needed a country specific scenario, not based only on the UK. We 
looked at South Africa, Ghana, UK and US to have comparative 
analysis. From the UK, we took the idea of the assessment team, this 
Whitehall approach not based on presidency. We stole the idea from it, 
and the fact the there was no presidential role. From Ghana, we got the 
idea of decentralised security architecture. From South Africa, the 
defence; from Uganda, the police. From Canada, and also from the US, 
we took the National Security Strategy policy and strategy”.90 
Models and best practices coming from other African states were easier to replicate in a 
country emerging from years of conflict like Sierra Leone. These models were followed 
and readapted in some of the local SSR policies, as recalled by an ONS officer: “in 2002 
there was a need for a review of the Security Sector since the past. We reviewed the 
entire security architecture, comparing with South Africa and Uganda”.91 Likewise, the 
Joint Intelligence Committee was established following a UK model: “we have the 
FISU for the military, the CISU for the ONS, and the Special Branch of the Police: 
together they constitute the Joint Intelligence Committee, a model imported from the 
UK”.92  
                                                          





Models, ideas, and examples from the UK also influenced the early SSR 
reforms. For example, the new motto of the SLP, ‘A force for good’, was taken from 
the slogan of the British police in Kent, where Keith Biddle had previously worked. 
Similarly, the concept of community policing was distilled from different community 
policing experiences to its lowest common denominator in order to simplify it. The 
reason behind it was to have a useful, simple, and definite concept of community 
policing to be agreed, understood, and used in a country where people “have had no 
police force for the last ten years” (Innovation for Successful Societies Oral History 
Program, 2007, p. 35). Adrian Horn prepared a short paper of one, one and a half page, 
on community policing and modern policing since the establishment of the 
Metropolitan Police Service in the UK in 1829. He presented the note to Keith Biddle, 
who approved the paper and started implementing for the first time the concept of 
community policing in Waterloo, a small village outside Freetown.  
Nonetheless, not all the models and examples coming from other countries 
were transferrable to the Sierra Leone context. The Sierra Leone MOD and Armed 
Forces, for example, were initially restructured following the British blueprint. One of 
the military advisers who drew the initial reform plan highlighted how, in order to have 
a structure that “was transparent, particularly to the civil population”,93 the MODAT 
“followed a very outlined template of the British system, cutting out areas that we did 
not need, focusing on areas where we needed more civilians so we had civilian 
oversight, and that was the big driver”.94 The MODAT team decided to maintain a 
major distinction between the organisational structure of the RSLAF and the UK 
model. At commander level, they created a twin structure composed by the Joint Force 
Command and the Joint Support Command, both of which were subordinated to the 
Sierra Leone MOD and initially under the IMATT command. The reason behind the 
establishment of a twin structure was the prevention of possible military coups, because 
with only “one head, you could have another coup”,95 whereas “by splitting the Armed 
Forces in two there had to be collusion to have a coup”.96  
However, applying the UK model to conflict-ridden Sierra Leone proved too 
complicated and unsustainable in the long term. Furthermore, the sudden death of one 
                                                          






of the British advisers tasked with reforming the Sierra Leone MOD and RSLAF 
structures created some continuity gaps. Following the publication of the Defence 
White Paper in 2003, a Sierra Leone-led Command Structure Review Committee began 
to review the initial structures of the Sierra Leone MOD and RSLAF according to the 
needs and requirements of the country. 
Following the description in this section of the chapter, Figure 14 adds local 
research and researchers to the network of policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and 
international researchers presented in the previous sections of the chapter and in Figure 
13. Figure 14 provides a visual account of the influence of research on policy decisions 
implemented by British street-level bureaucrats in Sierra Leone, illustrating the network 
and interconnections between the different policy and research actors that worked on 
UK-led SSR in Sierra Leone during the conflict years. 
Figure 14   First period, ‘fire-fighting’ solutions: the research actors in Sierra Leone 
 
The figure indicates how ad hoc ‘local’ research (comprised of surveys, visits in the 
country, and commissioned reports) was the main form of research that shaped the 
activities of street-level bureaucrats in conflict-affected Sierra Leone. The importance of 
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this form of knowledge is underscored by the direct lines connecting local research with 
the circles of the main British policy actors in the country. As extensively shown in the 
analysis of the chapter, contextual information gathered through such types of ad hoc 
research was directly up-taken in policy, and was critical for establishing, designing, and 
implementing some of the early UK-led SSR programmes. The figure also has a yellow 
area which extends to the circles of British policy actors in Sierra Leone. This 
symbolises how other forms of ‘local’ research and knowledge, such as anthropologic 
studies on the culture of the country, or similar models and experiences from other 
developing countries, also contributed to the knowledge base of British street-level 
bureaucrats on the ground. The extent of this area indicates that this form of knowledge 
also interacted with the activities of SSR street-level bureaucrats. Nonetheless, its 
influence was less direct than that of ad hoc, policy-driven research. For example, 
models coming from different developing countries needed to be readapted to the 
Sierra Leone reality. For this reason, the figure does not include a direct link between 
this more general form of research and the circles of British policy actors on the 
ground. The lack of overlap between the blue and yellow areas of international and local 
research visually shows how concepts emerging from research at British and 
international level were barely utilised by policy actors in Sierra Leone. Similarly, local 
and action-oriented research used by street-level bureaucrats on the ground rarely fed 
into policy at headquarters level or more general SSR studies produced in the UK or in 
other Western countries. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The chapter has used the theoretical model of the policy network to explore the extent 
to which research and researchers have influenced and interacted with British-led SSR 
policy in Sierra Leone during the first phase of UK reforms in the country. The 
different figures have progressively built a network of policy-makers, street-level 
bureaucrats, and researchers that stretched from the UK to Sierra Leone. The analysis 
has shown how several research centres and studies from independent consultants 
supported the emerging SSR policy agenda at HMG and international level. At the same 
time, HMG created different institutional structures to promote the SSR agenda in 
fragile, conflict-affected countries. Nonetheless, the lack of a clear strategy and direction 
from headquarters and the particular division of roles and responsibilities between 
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different departments resulted in a high degree of freedom from street-level bureaucrats 
working in Sierra Leone.  
British street-level bureaucrats in Sierra Leone thus started collaborating directly 
on the ground, and looked for ad hoc studies and reports to gather contextual 
information to guide and steer their early policy decisions. These operational pieces of 
research were extremely important for understanding the context of the country and for 
implementing some of the first ‘fire-fighting’ solutions. Furthermore, experienced 
British advisers based in Freetown relied on lessons learned from previous 
deployments, implementing and readapting – not always successfully – to the Sierra 
Leonean reality policy models, ideas, and blueprints from other countries. They 
consulted historical and anthropological studies on Sierra Leone and maintained up-to-
date knowledge base of the academic debates surrounding their respective fields. 
Previous personal studies and professional activities thus influenced directly or 
indirectly the early policy decisions of British street-level bureaucrats on the ground. 
Two main factors account for the limited extent to which research influenced 
and interacted with SSR policy decisions in the country. These two factors are the high 
level of insecurity in the country and the novelty of the SSR concept in the policy and 
research agenda. The urgency and instability of the situation required immediate 
reactions from British street-level bureaucrats on the ground, who lacked the necessary 
time and security to carry out detailed studies or research before taking compelling 
decisions. Most of the time, necessity, urgency, and political acumen shaped SSR policy-
decisions more than research. Rapid and effective policy implementation was ensured 
by the direct role of British street-level bureaucrats in local policy-making. Furthermore, 
the relative novelty of the SSR concept in the late 1990s implied that British street-level 
bureaucrats in Sierra Leone could rely on a limited number of available studies and 
research. The SSR policy and research agenda developed incrementally since British 
intervention in Sierra Leone: in the period of ‘fire-fighting’ solutions, most of the 
current SSR-oriented research was thus non-existent or of restricted availability. 
Knowledge and research therefore did not play a prominent role in the early 
policy decisions of British street-level bureaucrats in Sierra Leone. Research influence 
on policy was limited by the country’s instability and by the evolution of SSR in policy 
and research, the main variables restricting the role played by knowledge and research in 
early British-led SSR programmes in the West African state. These two variables also 
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represent the two principal external and internal factors that impacted upon the 
network of SSR policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and researchers working in the 
country. These external and internal factors interacted with one another, eventually 
influencing and limiting the role played by research in British-led SSR policy in Sierra 
Leone and creating the particular policy network presented in Figure 10.   
Chapter 5 provided a narrative of the early British-led SSR policy activities in 
conflict-affected Sierra Leone and the role played by research in shaping these policies. 
It presented a dynamic interaction between policy and research, an interaction rich of 
anecdotes and particulars, but eventually limited by the peculiar, unstable, and insecure 
context of the country and by the evolution of the SSR policy and research agendas in 
the UK and in Sierra Leone. These two variables influenced the first policy decisions of 
British street-level bureaucrats working in Sierra Leone during the conflict period and 
the particular policy network of SSR policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and 
researchers working on SSR in the country. Chapter 6 examines whether and how the 
role of research into British-led SSR policy in Sierra Leone changed and evolved since 
the end of the civil war in 2002. It examines how changes in the two previous variables, 
resulting in an increased stability and security in the country and in a progressive 
evolution of SSR policy and research, impacted on the use and influence of research on 
British-led SSR programmes and activities implemented in post-conflict Sierra Leone. 
Furthermore, it analyses how changes in the two previous variables shaped and 
modelled the network of SSR policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and researchers 




6. The influence of research on British-led SSR policy in conflict-
affected Sierra Leone: post-war period (2002-2013)97 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 provided an account of the extent to which research has influenced and 
interacted with British-led SSR policy implemented in Sierra Leone during the period of 
‘fire-fighting’ solutions. The analysis has shown how two main variables, namely the 
context and stability situation, and the early SSR evolution in policy and research, 
contributed to create a particular policy process for British street-level bureaucrats who 
were working in the country. These two variables have been considered external (the 
country context) and internal (the policy and research evolution) factors that modelled 
the policy network of SSR policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and researchers. 
Severely limited by these two variables, research and knowledge interacted dynamically 
with this policy process, influencing some of the early policy decisions taken by British 
street-level bureaucrats in the country.  
Building upon that analysis, Chapter 6 examines how research has influenced 
and interacted with British policy to reform the security sector in post-conflict Sierra 
Leone. It focuses on the role played by knowledge in British-led SSR activities 
implemented in the country since 2002, the final year of the Sierra Leonean civil 
conflict. The chapter explores the ways in which the influence of research on policy 
evolved over time, and the dynamics between policy and research transformed and 
developed over the post-war recovery period. It analyses whether and how the role of 
knowledge in policy changed following similar shifts in the stability context of the 
country and in the evolution of the SSR policy and research agendas, indirectly 
comparing the narratives of the conflict period described in Chapter 5 with those of the 
post-war recovery years. As some of the findings are derived from interviews with 
British street-level bureaucrats currently working in Sierra Leone, the chapter also gives 
an account of the distinctive features which mark the contemporary interaction between 
research and policy in the country and, more generally, the utilisation of research in 
fragile, conflict-affected environments.  
                                                          
97 Some of the materials of this chapter have been used in Varisco (2014). 
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Similarly, Chapter 6 provides a visual representation of the network of policy 
actors and researchers working on SSR in Sierra Leone during the post-conflict years. 
This network is presented in Figure 15, and will be explored and described in the 
different sections of the chapter. Narratives of research utilisation and the analysis of 
the dynamic interactions between policy and research will contribute to unravel this 
policy network and to better examine the extent to which research influenced and 
interacted with British-led policy activities and programmes in the post-conflict years.  
Figure 15   Second period, post-conflict years: the policy network 
 
In order to facilitate comparisons between the period of ‘fire-fighting’ solutions and the 
post-conflict years, the structure of Chapter 6 mirrors Chapter 5 and is organised into 
three main parts. Part 6.2 analyses the Sierra Leone context, describing how security in 
the country progressively improved to allow better reach of SSR programmes to the 
different provinces. Part 6.3 focuses on the evolution of SSR in policy and research and 
on the ways in which both SSR policy and research have been progressively 
institutionalised in the HMG domestic policy agenda and in the work of British street-
level bureaucrats in Sierra Leone. This part of the chapter does not only show how SSR 
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has incrementally become part of the British and international state building policy 
agenda, but it also underlines how the role of research in the policy-making process at 
the headquarters level has evolved over the last decade in line with a ‘quiet revolution’ 
which brought research to the forefront of DFID’s and HMG’s current policy practices. 
Part 6.4 investigates the extent to which knowledge and research shaped and influenced 
UK-led SSR activities and programmes in Sierra Leone in the post-conflict years. The 
analysis provides some examples of research directly feeding into policy and explores 
the dynamic ways trough which research is accounted into policy by street-level 
bureaucrats on the ground, indirectly describing the different narratives that qualify the 
research-policy interaction in conflict-affected environments in contemporary days 
6.2 The context and stability situation  
President Kabbah’s lift of the state of emergency in the spring of 2002 brought peace to 
Sierra Leone after 11 years of civil conflict. In spite of the war’s end and increased 
stability in the country, the security situation on the ground remained fragile during the 
initial post-conflict period. The third and most effective phase of the DDR process 
ended in January 2002, bringing the total number of disarmed ex-combatants to more 
than 72,000. Peaceful Presidential elections were held in May 2002, thanks to the 
presence of 17,500 UNAMSIL troops, at that time “the largest and most expensive UN 
peacekeeping operation ever” (Olonisakin, 2008, p. 139).   
The end of the war and the new Presidential elections marked the beginning of 
a period of institutionalisation and consolidation of the security reforms started in the 
period of ‘fire-fighting’ solutions. The early UK-led SSR policies were thus 
reinvigorated and consolidated in the new-born Sierra Leonean security institutions: the 
UK and the GoSL signed in November 2002 a Memorandum of Understanding that 
committed the UK to offer support to the West African country for ten years. At the 
same time, the capacity of the local security institutions improved. In 2002, the GoSL 
produced the National Security and Central Intelligence Act (GoSL, 2002), a policy 
document resulting from a process of almost two years of consultations and reviews 
between Sierra Leone’s institutions and security actors, with inputs and support from 
international advisers. The Act delineated the relationship, role, and responsibilities of 
ONS and CISU, and fully established the National Security Council, PROSECs, and 
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DISECs, institutionalising in this way the main security and intelligence architecture of 
the country.  
The RSLAF re-equipment programme ended, and in 2003 the GoSL published 
a Defence White Paper that specified the roles of the RSLAF, MOD, and Joint Force 
Command (Kondeh, 2008b). A Command Structure Review Committee was also 
established to revise the MOD structure, as the British template was found to be 
unsuitable for Sierra Leone’s institutions. In the same years, local policy-makers started 
working on longer-term policy documents such as the Sierra Leone’s National Vision 
2025 (National Long Term Perspectives Studies, 2003), the country’s Security Sector 
Review, and the PRSP. On the British side, IMATT produced in 2004 the ‘Plan 2010’, a 
document that planned the future developments of the team, secured more ACPP 
funding until 2010, and established the goals to be achieved in restructuring the RSLAF. 
Training of senior RSLAF officers continued at the IMATT-sponsored Horton 
Academy. IMATT approached DFID to ask for financial assistance to provide new 
accommodation to RSLAF through Operation Pebu. The programme started in March 
2003 and ended in 2008, achieving only 30% of the initial planned project (Gaeta, 
2008). 
With regards to police reform, the SSD changed its name to OSD and was ready 
to take over responsibility for internal security after UNAMSIL’s withdrawal from the 
country. Vehicles, communications, and infrastructure support favoured the SLP 
presence in the internal provinces. Yet the force remained under-numbered, so in 
response, recruitment and training programmes to increase the size of police from 6,000 
to 9,500 were launched in collaboration with the UN Civil Police Force team in the 
country. In June 2003, Sierra Leonean Brima Acha Kamara replaced Keith Biddle as 
country IGP. Police reforms lost some impetus following the slow replacement of 
Adrian Horn with a new CCSSP leader in 2003. The replacement of the two key UK 
figures in the police sector weakened the links between the SLP and British police 
advisers; furthermore, uncertainty on the future of the programme also contributed to 
create a management vacuum.  
In addition to the reforms in the security fields, the Sierra Leone TRC, 
established in the Lomé Peace Accord in 1999 and tasked with investigating human 
rights violations committed during the war, was constituted and operated from 
November 2002 to October 2004. It presented its final report to the GoSL and to the 
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UNSC in November 2004. Likewise, the GoSL and the UN established the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone in January 2002. The Special Court for Sierra Leone’s mandate 
was “to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of 
Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996” (Special Court for Sierra Leone, 2000). Prompt 
economic development was not forthcoming despite these improvements in the 
security and justice sectors and an increased stability. As a result, the country remained 
at the bottom of the UN Development Programme Human Development Index (HDI) 
for several years. 
2005 was a very important year for British SSR intervention in Sierra Leone, as 
it marked the opening of DFID’s Sierra Leone office in Freetown and the closure and 
re-organisation of some SSR programmes in the country. The opening of the country 
office and the relocation of part of DFID staff to Freetown allowed a better interaction 
between HMG street-level bureaucrats and local and international partners based in the 
capital city. The LPD and the CCSSP ended, and police and justice reforms were 
incorporated into the new JSDP, a comprehensive programme involving local partners 
and targeting broader elements of the justice sector which had been previously 
neglected such as prisons, probation, legal reform, legal advice, the MIA, and non-state 
and traditional justice (Howlett-Bolton, 2008). The police element of SSR was split, with 
JSDP overseeing broader justice aspects of police reform such as the FSUs, while 
SILSEP absorbed the security aspects of police reform such as the OSD. JSDP, 
SILSEP, and IMATT remained, for a number of years, the main UK-sponsored 
programmes targeting SSR in Sierra Leone.  
In particular, the fact that the JSDP initially focused on the pilot area of 
Moyamba District and that, in the words of a British manager of the programme, “more 
than 90% of the programme was staffed by locals”,98 denotes a progressive stability and 
security in the provinces as well as British willingness to enhance the professional 
capacity of Sierra Leoneans. Improvements in security are confirmed by the words of a 
researcher working in the country during the same time period, who noted how, 
differently from other post-conflict environments, in Sierra Leone “you can move 
around freely, and you never, you never sense a danger”.99 Likewise, the increased 
                                                          
98 Interview n. 20, Skype, 28 August 2012. 
99 Interview n. 32, Skype, 14 March 2013. 
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capacity of the local population was underlined by the process that brought about the 
publication of the PRSP and the Security Sector Review in 2005. The production of the 
two documents followed consultation processes owned and driven by Sierra Leoneans, 
with the Poverty Alleviation Strategy Coordinating Office and the ONS collaborating 
and coordinating the PRSP and the Security Sector Review, while British street-level 
bureaucrats supported the domestic policy process by maintaining an advisory role and 
editing parts of the documents (Albrecht & Jackson, 2009, pp. 118-124; Conteh, 2007; 
Jackson & Albrecht, 2011, pp. 125-131; Kondeh, 2008b). In particular, the Security 
Sector Review was published after a consultation process that defined security in the 
context of Sierra Leone, gave clarity about the institutions comprising the country’s 
security system, addressed the actual national threats, and developed an overarching 
national security framework. The links between security and development were officially 
formalised by the inclusion of peace and security in the first pillar of Sierra Leone’s 
PRSP (Denney, 2011; White, 2008). Furthermore, at the end of 2005 the Sierra Leone 
MOD undertook a Core Review focusing on the sufficiency, efficiency, sustainability, 
and quality of the Defence Forces. 
UNAMSIL completed its mandate in December 2005 and was replaced by the 
United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) until September 2008 and 
by the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) since 
the end of UNIOSIL. The departure of the UN peacekeeping troops shifted the 
responsibility for the country’s internal security onto the shoulders of the new security 
institutions. In particular, the police assumed a primary role in internal security, while 
the reformed Army had to deal with external threats and occasionally assist the SLP in 
the provision of internal security during emergencies or for specific support operations 
through the Military Aid to Civil Power (MACP) framework. As part of this framework, 
the Army supported the activities of the SLP during the 2007 Presidential elections – a 
peaceful vote that replaced President Kabbah with his opponent Ernest Bai Koroma 
(International Crisis Group, 2008). This non-violent transition of leadership between 
the two principal political parties of Sierra Leone, together with the leadership of the 
ONS and the role played by the SLP and the RSLAF in maintaining stability during the 
elections, provided further proof of the re-establishment of security in Freetown and 
the provinces. At the same time, the ‘peace dividend’ of economic development slowly 
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materialised, and Sierra Leone’s HDI progressively increased, particularly in recent years 
(UNDP, 2013).100 
Following the 2007 elections, stability continued to improve: with the country’s 
priorities rapidly moving from security to development, the GoSL channelled 
progressively less attention and resources to the SSR process. On the British side, 
SILSEP was not extended after 2007, but received funding to sustain the ONS and 
CISU for another year, eventually ending this financial support in March 2008. The UK 
government supported the first year of the exit strategy with £1.3 million provided 
through the ACPP from April 2008 to March 2009 (Albrecht, 2009, p. 12). The JSDP 
ended in 2011 and was replaced with the ASJP, a new, four-year programme funded by 
DFID and implemented by Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI). The ASJP focused 
on improving local ownership of the security and justice provision at community level. 
IMATT was progressively downsized to become a small contingent of a few dozen staff 
who remained in the country through the peaceful 2012 Presidential elections which 
saw confirmation of the APC and President Ernest Bai Koroma’s leadership. IMATT 
was eventually replaced by ISAT in April 2013. This new multilateral team continues to 
advise and support the RSLAF, providing additional support to other elements of the 
security sector such as the police force, the ONS, the National Fire Force, the Prisons 
Department, the Immigration Office, and the Joint Maritime Committee. ISAT also 
works alongside DFID and the UNDP on operations dedicated to the justice sector. 
The conditions of democracy, basic security, and stability in the country 
radically improved over the last 15 years, together with an increased capacity and 
reliability of the security forces in the country. For example, soldiers from the RSLAF 
have been successfully deployed in international peacekeeping operations, such the joint 
African Union/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur in 2009 and the African Union Mission 
in Somalia in 2013. Oversight and sustainability of the reforms nonetheless remain a 
challenge, as these issues were partially neglected in the early stages of SSR in the face of 
more pressing demands. Additionally, the oversight capacity of the MOD, MIA, and the 
Parliamentary over the security system continues to be limited (Albrecht & Jackson, 
2009, pp. 165-167; Gbla, 2008). In particular, the MOD was restructured to ensure 
civilian oversight over the country’s Armed Forces, but the same process did not occur 
                                                          




with the MIA in relation to the SLP, in part because of the unreliable and corrupt 
reputation of some of the Ministers of Internal Affairs (Jackson & Albrecht, 2011, pp. 
162-163; Osho Coker, 2008). Likewise, the issue of sustainability of the Armed Forces 
was not considered in the early stages of SSR, as the unstable security situation forced 
British street-level bureaucrats to maintain all the different armed groups in the formal 
system. For a number of years, the Armed Forces have thus remained excessively large 
in number and mainly internationally-funded. Because such a large military force was 
difficult for the GoSL to sustain in the long term, the RSLAF progressively downsized 
in recent years. 
6.3 The policy and research evolution 
A progressive growth and institutionalisation of SSR in the British and international 
research and policy agendas occurred while British street-level bureaucrats were already 
operating in Sierra Leone and the UK was supporting SSR programmes or initiatives in 
a number of other countries like Ethiopia, Uganda, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka. The 
impact of these engagements on SSR thinking thus prompted the UK to invest more in 
SSR research. As a result, most of the interviewees agreed that the evolution of the SSR 
research and policy agendas were a ‘post-hoc rationalisation’ of events that happened on 
the ground, and concurred with this assertion from Albrecht & Jackson (2009, pp. 7-8) 
and Jackson & Albrecht (2011, p. 24):   
“One of the core questions for security system transformation – or SSR 
– in light of the Sierra Leone experience – is whether or not SSR can be 
referred to as a coherent cluster of activities. As the experience in Sierra 
Leone attests, there is an element of SSR as a post-hoc rationalisation 
of events that happen on the ground. It can be argued that initial SSR 
efforts, particularly those that occur in an immediate post-conflict 
environment, are, by definition, fragmented and incoherent. Only after 
experience on the ground can enough specific context and information 
be gathered and analysed in order to begin the construction of a 
coherent and appropriate set of SSR strategies”. 
Comprehensive SSR policies and strategies of intervention, as well as deeper research 
investigating, analysing, and reflecting upon these policies, were thus developed and 
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rationalised during and after the UK interventions in Sierra Leone and in other conflict-
affected countries. A British adviser recalls how the SSR policy and research structure 
“appeared after we started, while we were involved in Sierra Leone”,101 following “some 
sort of rationalisation: there was an element of rationalisation, as well as forward 
looking”.102 Referring in particular to research, he further explains:  
“The research effort sort of gradually grew up through this process, 
and I would argue that Sierra Leone was the major catalyst to the 
research efforts. Maybe others will disagree, but I mean basically it was 
a reaction to the fact that we were drowned deeper and deeper into 
involvement in Sierra Leone”.103  
One of his colleagues also concurs that a comprehensive SSR agenda developed as a 
post-hoc rationalisation of events happening on the ground. In pointing out how SSR 
policy was shaped by the events in the country as much as the intervention in Sierra 
Leone was shaped by the policy and research framework developing in the UK, he 
warns against “a danger to make sure that people don’t retrospectively apply 
frameworks that exist now to a tiny, rich experienced-framed framework”.104   
 The next sections of the chapter give an account of this post-hoc rationalisation 
and the evolution of SSR policy and research from the end of the war in Sierra Leone to 
the current time. 
6.3.1 The policy evolution in the UK 
Figure 16 presents the network of the main policy actors that supported the evolution 
of the SSR policy agenda in the post-conflict years and formulated British HMG SSR 
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Figure 16   Second period, post-conflict years: the policy actors in the UK 
 
The white circles in the figure identify the main policy actors responsible for SSR at 
British and international levels. These actors include HMG and British departments and 
ministries such as DFID, FCO, MOD, and the Treasury, as well as international 
organisations like the OECD. As underlined over the course of the thesis, throughout 
the last decade the British and international SSR policy agendas rapidly evolved 
alongside Sierra Leone’s post-war development, informed also by UK SSR engagements 
in a range of other countries, including Uganda and Indonesia. The activities of 
multilateral organisations such as the OECD DAC and bilateral donors like the Dutch 
government contributed to the expansion and promotion of the SSR policy agenda at 
international level: thus international organisations are also one of the main policy 
actors in Figure 16. Differently from the first period of ‘fire-fighting’ solutions, the 
figure connects the international actors’ circle to British HMG with a dotted line. This 
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interconnection symbolises how the British and international SSR policy agenda 
developed in concert over the last decade, with DFID promoting SSR at the OECD 
level and piloting some OECD DAC programmes, and the OECD supporting donors’ 
efforts to develop a joint approach to SSR. 
 In Britain, efforts toward a more joined-up approach were progressively 
reinforced. In June 2002, ministers from DFID, FCO, and the MOD approved a tri-
departmental SSR strategy. £2.8 million were allocated to SSR for the year 2002/03 
through the GCPP (DFID, FCO & MOD, 2003b, p. 40), whereas the 2003/04 GCPP 
allocation for the SSR Strategy increased to over £5 million (Ball, 2004b, pp. 46-47). 
Furthermore, in November 2003, the three departments published an SSR policy brief 
that set out the UK government’s policy approach to SSR (DFID, FCO & MOD, 
2003a) and the SSDAT continued to support HMG SSR initiatives and activities. 
The tri-departmental publication of the SSR Strategy in 2004 (DFID, FCO & 
MOD, 2004) further formalised the UK’s SSR policy agenda. Two different bodies were 
created to manage this new strategy: the SSR Steering Group, which met monthly to 
discuss priorities and approve projects supported by the SSR programme, and the 
Policy Committee, which gave wider policy input through quarterly meetings. In order 
to foster a better coordination among SSR activities, the two managing bodies were 
constituted by HMG officers and representatives of the ACPP, GCPP, DAT, and the 
GFN-SSR.  
Increased efforts toward a more coordinated approach to dealing with countries 
affected by conflict resulted in the creation of the PCRU in 2004, renamed the SU in 
2007. The Unit was conceived as a tri-departmental entity working with government 
departments and the military to facilitate joint military-civilian assessments and 
planning, share lessons to improve the effectiveness of UK stabilisation activities, and 
enhance government capability to deploy civilians in conflict-affected countries to 
develop and oversee the implementation of these joint plans. 
HMG SSR policy activities and the related joined-up institutional structure to 
support these efforts were progressively consolidated over the last decade. As a 
consequence, Figure 16 connects the different governmental departments and HMG 
with solid lines. These solid connections symbolise how institutional collaboration 
among different HMG departments progressively improved, in line with a promotion of 
tri-departmental strategies and approaches to SSR.  
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6.3.2 The research evolution in the UK 
The policy evolution of SSR at headquarters level was accompanied by a progressive use 
and account of research in HMG policy practices. Figure 17 develops from Figure 16 
and shows the different research actors that contributed to the evolution and 
promotion of the British and international SSR policy agenda over the last decade. 
Figure 17   Second period, post-conflict years: the research actors in the UK 
 
The number of actors involved in state building and SSR research and supporting SSR 
policy developments at international and bilateral levels increased exponentially over the 
last 10 years, extending from Western donor countries to fragile and conflict-affected 
states. 
 In particular, the British SSR policy network progressively expanded as a 
consequence of the early conceptualisation and institutionalisation of SSR at HMG 
level. This evolution was also fostered by an initial difficulty for British street-level 
bureaucrats on the ground in reforming the security sector of conflict-affected 
countries. As recalled by one of the early SSR researchers:  
198 
 
“After year two, three, lessons were starting to emerge about some of 
these experiences on the ground such as Sierra Leone. Of course the 
key lesson was: ‘this is much more difficult than we realised, and we 
haven’t, we don’t understand the situation well enough, we don’t 
understand the context, we don’t understand the actors, etcetera’. Not 
surprisingly, so, as you are very well aware, DFID got involved in Sierra 
Leone quite quickly because of the security situation there, and they 
had to be seen to be doing something quickly, and the situation was 
deteriorating”.105 
DFID consequently enhanced its mechanisms to support its SSR programmes with 
more research. Bradford University inherited the CSDG contract in 2002. At the same 
time, DFID established the GFN-SSR, a hub for SSR resources and practitioners to 
provide “the intellectual engine to support forward thinking, and networking and 
capacity building” (DFID, FCO & MOD, 2004, p. 7). The GFN-SSR – symbolised in 
one of the blue circles of research actors in Figure 17 – was based for four years at 
Cranfield University: Ann Fitz-Gerald became Director of the Network until 2006, and 
published in 2004 a report on SSR in Sierra Leone (Fitz-Gerald, 2004).  
 Mechanisms to include local researchers in the process were also envisaged. For 
instance, in 2003 DFID started sponsoring the ASSN through the GFN-SSR, which 
became a hub for African researchers, policy analysts, practitioners, and serving and ex-
members of the security forces working on SSR. Figure 17 identifies the ASSN as one 
of the research actors in the policy network. However, ASSN’s circle has a particular 
colour that incorporates the blue of international research with the yellow of local 
research. This choice of colour symbolises how the network is comprised of both 
African researchers such as Eboe Hutchful, who participated to the early policy 
developments of SSR at headquarters level, but also local researchers who studied in 
depth the local security dynamics. The dotted connection of the ASSN circle with 
GFN-SSR shows how the studies carried out by the ASSN were sponsored by the 
GFN-SSR and contributed to the wide research activities of the centre.  
The Governance Resource Centre in Brimignham was expanded in 2005 to 
become the GSDRC, a centre providing DFID and other international clients such as 
                                                          
105 Interview n. 25, London, 23 October 2012. 
199 
 
the EC with applied knowledge services on broader state building-related issues such as 
governance, social development, humanitarian response, and conflict. The Centre 
provides DFID with applied knowledge on demand and produces Topic Guides that 
are requested and agreed by a Steering Committee in DFID. Recently, the centre has 
been expanded and has started working in close collaboration with Coffey International 
Development and a large group of consultancy partners to provide expanded and 
integrated governance, social development, conflict, and humanitarian Professional 
Evidence and Applied Knowledge Services for DFID. Figure 17 therefore connects the 
circles of GSDRC and DFID with a solid line that symbolises the strong link and 
collaboration of the centre with the Department.  
Birmingham University was awarded the contract of the GFN-SSR in 2006. 
Directed by Paul Jackson, the Network started organising quarterly Security and Justice 
training courses for HMG and international SSR officers and practitioners. The courses 
aim to give a practical, case study-orientated introduction to security and justice by 
mimicking the real-life experience of designing, implementing, and reviewing a security 
and justice intervention in a developing country. The organisation of these courses, 
together with the recognition in the HMG’s SSR 2004 Strategy of GFN-SSR as one of 
the essential, central bases “for resources, policy advice and information” (DFID, FCO 
& MOD, 2004, p. 6), denote the importance of the Network for HMG work on SSR. 
This strong policy role of the GFN-SSR is symbolised in Figure 17 by the solid 
connection between the Network and its main funder, DFID. Furthermore, the circle 
of GFN-SSR is also linked through a dotted line with the GSDRC. This connection 
symbolises how the co-location of the centres ensured an indirect collaboration 
between the two centres, to the point that even though GFN-SSR is no longer active 
today, its website remains and the materials have been incorporated into the GSDRC’s 
document library. 
DFID-sponsored SSR research has also grown exponentially over the years, 
with the Department funding, for instance, a guide for donors to operationalise their 
policy commitment to local ownership of SSR, a comparative study on the politics of 
security decision-making, a research project on SSR provisions in peace agreements, and 
a six-year research programme investigating the provision of security and justice in 
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fragile, conflict-affected situations (CSDG, 2008; Hutchful, 2009; Nathan, 2007).106 
Alongside this HMG-sponsored research, studies produced by British universities, 
research centres such as CSDG, and NGOs such as Saferworld have contributed to the 
expansion of the SSR knowledge-base at British level. ‘Research Consortia and funded-
research’ and ‘CSDG and other UK universities’ are thus two additional circles of 
research actors in Figure 17. These circles are connected to the other research actors, as 
well as with DFID and HMG, with a series of dotted lines. These particular 
connections symbolise how concepts, ideas, and reflections on SSR from different 
research institutions interacted with each other and contributed to the increasing 
evolution of SSR as a policy practice and as a related research agenda.  
This increasing interaction between SSR policy and research has been reinforced 
by the progressive creation of policy mechanisms and intermediary roles aimed at 
ensuring the use and translation of research in policy. Today, intermediary figures such 
as FCO analysts or DFID’s evidence brokers facilitate the use of research in 
government departments. Furthermore, DFID’s RED invests every year just under 10 
per cent of its total research expenditure on state-building, governance, conflict, and 
social development research (NAO, 2011). The production of SSR research and the 
channels through which this research is accounted for in HMG policy have evolved 
over the last decade. Some of the mechanisms that DFID supported to enhance the 
interaction between the research and policy world include institutional collaborations 
with research institutes and universities and increased funding of research programmes. 
Collaborations were fostered with increased consultations with reference groups, expert 
panels, academic specialists, and Senior Research Fellows. The Department also 
promoted context-appropriate policies through the use of evidence-based business 
cases. 
The role played by research in SSR and state building policies at HMG level 
thus improved progressively over the last decade, with the development of different 
institutional mechanisms and intermediary roles to facilitate the use of research into 
policy and increased government funding of studies and research. Policy-makers and 
practitioners on the ground witnessed a distinct increase of SSR and state building-
oriented research in the last decade, as recalled by a British adviser in Sierra Leone: “we 
                                                          




saw that growing, if you like the research industry, academic research industry growing 
in parallel to our exploratory efforts in Sierra Leone”.107 Likewise, another colleague 
recalled how “the architecture began to grow, and then there is the king, the major thing 
of commissioning research”,108  further adding that “even the MOD has all sorts, or had 
its own sort of research establishments”.109   
This engagement of HMG with research resulted in an increased involvement of 
SSR and state building researchers in the policy process. An SSR researcher witnessed 
“a closer and closer relationship between some of the policy-makers and researchers 
working in these areas”.110 A colleague confirms how among policy-makers and street-
level bureaucrats “there is more awareness of what academics can offer them”.111 
Likewise, another researcher reflects on the increased use of research in HMG policy:  
“What I think it’s very important is that HMG supported a lot of 
research. So HMG understands the importance of research and they 
put their money where the mouth is, they commissioned a lot of 
research over the years, increasingly in the area of SSR so I think that 
that is a very, very positive thing”.112 
This increased interaction between policy and research in the UK was mirrored at the 
international level by a growth in the number of researchers working on SSR. The work 
of independent consultants remained extremely influential for HMG and international 
organisations and multilateral donors working on SSR. Figure 17 therefore connects the 
circle symbolising international consultants and these policy actors with solid lines. 
Furthermore, the activities and studies of independent consultants were part of a wider 
and international network of SSR researchers, whose creation was facilitated by the 
existence of centres such as the GFN-SSR. For this reason, Figure 17 connects the 
independent consultants and the GFN-SSR with a dotted line symbolising these 
increasing exchanges and collaborations between international SSR researchers. 
Alongside the activities of independent consultants, a growing range of centres and 
institutes contributed to the expansion of the SSR research agenda at the international 
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level. Universities, NGOs, and research centres such as the Berghof Conflict Research 
Center and BICC in Germany, Clingendael in the Netherlands, DCAF in Switzerland, 
and the Security Governance Group in Canada were all part of this growing network. 
Their work and publications on security and development shaped the SSR policy agenda 
of international organisations and bilateral donors directly and indirectly. Furthermore, 
their reflections and analyses contributed to a growing knowledge of SSR, indirectly 
feeding in the work and research of SSR researchers and practitioners. Figure 17 
connects these different research actors (the blue circles named ‘Clingendael’, ‘DCAF’, 
and ‘other research institutes’) with dotted lines and links these centres to the circles of 
independent consultants and international organisations with similar dotted lines. This 
symbolises how the contribution of these research activities shaped both SSR policy at 
the international level and the increasing academic reflection on SSR.  
Finally, the blue area in Figure 17 extends to fragile, conflict-affected countries 
and progressively changes to green. This colour transition symbolises how concepts, 
ideas, and themes emerging from international research have merged progressively with 
studies and reflections conducted in fragile environments. The next sections of the 
chapter will clarify this point by analysing the extent to which international and local 
research interacted with each other and influenced SSR policy and programmes 
implementation in conflict-affected Sierra Leone. 
6.3.3 The policy evolution in Sierra Leone 
The preceding sections of the chapter have illustrated the progressive evolution of the 
network of British and international SSR policy-makers and researchers working at 
headquarters level. Over the last decade, new research centres and policy initiatives were 
promoted in the UK and internationally, contributing to the recent development of SSR 
as a policy practice and as a related field of research. Figure 18 expands on Figure 17 
and introduces the network of British and international policy-makers and researchers 
described in the previous parts of the chapter along with the different policy actors 
tasked to implement British-led SSR programmes and activities in post-conflict Sierra 





Figure 18   Second period, post-conflict years: the policy actors in Sierra Leone 
 
The intensified efforts toward a more coordinated approach at headquarters level and 
the years of collaboration among DFID, FCO, and MOD improved the relationship 
between the three departments and their officers and advisers in Sierra Leone. 
However, the late decision to include justice among British-led SSR programmes and 
activities in Sierra Leone with the start of the comprehensive JSDP programme only in 
2005 (as recalled by an interviewee, “there was not really strong engagement with the 
justice sector until JSDP started”),113 created some consequences for the different SSR 
elements in the country. In particular, the beginning of the new programme resulted in 
the split of the different police elements between SILSEP and JSDP, with the security 
aspects of police reform such as the paramilitary force being absorbed under the first 
programme while elements of policing more linked to justice fell under JSDP purview. 
This decision created some uncertainties within DFID as to whether policing projects 
were undertaken as part and parcel of SSR projects, which were often under the lead of 
CHAD, or whether they were separate and linked to justice projects under the lead of 
the Governance Department. An SSR researcher recalls: “even in late 2007 there were 
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serious disagreements within DFID about whether, to what extent police was part of 
SSR or was part of governance or was part of justice”.114 This lack of co-ordination 
between different DFID departments has been redressed in recent years with the 
consolidation of all security and justice work under the CHASE policy lead. 
The progressive promotion of a holistic approach, together with the opening of 
DFID country office in Freetown, facilitated improved relationships between British 
HMG departments operating on the ground. DFID, FCO, and MOD street-level 
bureaucrats collaborated in close arrangement, as a DFID adviser working in the 
country in the early post-conflict years reminisced:  
“The UK policy process there was driven by three main UK 
people/positions: IMATT, the head of DFID, and the High 
Commissioner. These three met together every two weeks to see the 
Sierra Leone President, then they reported back to us as we had regular 
meetings with them. I would say that there was a good consultation 
among us”.115 
This collaboration further improved in the course of the years. A Programme Manager 
of the JSDP remembers his “excellent relations”116 with the other UK street-level 
bureaucrats in the country: 
“I used to meet with the UK country team once a week or once every 
two weeks to discuss all issues. It was a routine meeting where I would 
meet with the head of the Army, the Head of the Foreign Office, the 
Head of the Governance section of DFID. So, that was the sort of way 
we worked, it was a very much joined-up approach. No problematic 
issues related to coordination”.117  
In recent years, the success of tri-departmental collaboration has eventually boiled down 
to personal relationships. As underlined by an FCO officer in Freetown, “personal 
relations are very important in terms of how HMG works as a whole in the country”,118 
particularly among the top British street-level bureaucrats in Sierra Leone. The High 
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Commissioner, the DFID Head of Office, and the IMATT Commander (until 2013), 
worked in close agreement while maintaining their autonomous agendas, priorities, and 
programmes, with the High Commissioner ultimately representing the UK in the 
country.  
British street-level bureaucrats in Sierra Leone established very good HMG 
relations during the post-conflict years, and today follow a cross-governmental country 
strategy. In particular, the British High Commission and DFID country office are 
located within walking distance from each other. Over the years, they developed a good 
collaboration which helped create a stronger understanding of each other’s cultures, 
mind-sets, objectives, and priorities. While maintaining their differences, FCO and 
DFID personnel currently working in Freetown try, for example, to maximise and share 
their resources: they often travel together to different provinces, they push and support 
each other’s agendas in multilateral arenas, and they share information within the limits 
of their reciprocal mandates and autonomous agendas.119 Figure 18 connects the DFID 
country office, the British High Commission, and IMATT with solid lines to symbolise 
the high degree of collaboration between personnel from different HMG departments 
currently working in the country. 
In spite of the current positive cross-governmental cooperation, some 
differences in the mind-sets, mandates, and objectives of the three departments still 
remain, as each HMG actor “seems to have its own culture”.120 Whilst these differences 
are never related to ideological issues, nonetheless they can create at times small 
underlying tensions between street-level bureaucrats on the ground. For example, some 
military personnel noted how development actors still view them with “institutional 
mistrust”.121 This perception, which can be linked to the burgeoning academic debate 
on civil-military relationships in conflict and post-conflict situations, was confirmed in 
some of the interviews with both military and development actors.  
In order to overcome this problem, improve collaboration with the civilian 
element of British presence in Sierra Leone, plan the long-term activities of the military 
contingent in the country, and address the consequences of the high turnover of its 
personnel, IMATT produced in 2003 its ‘Plan 2010’. The Plan was, in the words of a 
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DFID adviser, “primarily a plan for HMG rather than a plan for the RSLAF”.122 
Nonetheless, the Plan did not completely bridge the distance between civil and military 
personnel on the ground. As explained by an IMATT member, the contingent remained 
a sui generis structure until its drawdown in 2013, quite “unique as an international 
organisation led, financed and policy driven by one nation”.123 Furthermore, the fact 
that it was located in Leicester Peak and remained physically detached from DFID 
country office and the British High Commission reinforced the perception of an 
‘IMATT bubble’124 and did not help overcome this feeling of separation. 
DFID’s activities and understanding of the country greatly improved following 
the opening of its country office. Its presence on the ground fostered better interactions 
with local, British, and international policy actors based in Freetown, as well as with 
NGOs working in the capital city and in the provinces. As agreed by several 
interviewees, the opening of the country office ensured “a much deeper understanding 
of the issues, by people being on the ground on a regular basis”;125 it “made relations 
with the other departments, and with the Force Commander, so different”126 and 
improved HMG linkages on the ground and, by extension, the British policy process in 
the country.  
However, several practical difficulties and a lack of planning characterised the 
opening of the office. A DFID adviser recalls:  
“If there should be a major lesson from it, it’s the one on transition, 
that such transition processes should be thought and planned in a 
better way, because we had to start recruiting people. Plus, the people 
who were in charge in London were not those who moved to 
Freetown. The transition was instead a difficult process, not thought 
through”.127 
This difficult transition phase caused a gap in the programmes, as DFID was at the 
same time opening its country office and replacing the CCSSP and the LDP with JSDP. 
The result was a hiatus in the programmes, with some reforms being paused for a while 
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and restarting only once the office effectively opened. The same adviser remembers this 
complicated transition:  
“I think that actually the transition process was not very good […]. 
CCSSP to JSDP was a microcosm of a wider problem and that 
happened with the devolution of DFID Sierra Leone, so the office for 
the first few months was quite chaotic in the fact that there was not an 
office”.128 
Problems in the transition between programmes remained a common feature for 
British-led activities in Sierra Leone, as poor information sharing and continuity gaps 
also characterised the transition between successive programmes, such as the recent 
shift from JSDP to ASJP. An SSR subcontractor working for ASJP recollects “a very 
long gap between the British Council leaving and us taking over”,129 and further explains 
that “when we got in the country, there was a huge problem in getting any information 
at all for the whole programme”.130 An SSR researcher reflects more widely about the 
problems entailed in the transition between programmes: “there was something about 
that transition, problems of transitions, because it was also JSDP. CCSSP from JSDP 
was a huge internal battle for that programme and they reproduced that to a certain 
degree between JSDP and ASJP”.131  
Several street-level bureaucrats bemoaned the lack of a clear structure and 
routine governing the transition or the drawdown of a programme. An SSR 
subcontractor commented “that is often the experience with DFID programmes, one 
just ends, and another one starts”.132 Likewise, an IMATT officer in the country noted 
how, in view of the contingent’s drawdown in 2013, few examples guided that transition 
process. He underlined how they tried to learn from the negative experience of Ghana, 
where BMATT withdrew in 2009 with only 28 days of notice and, according to his 
point of view after visiting the country, “it still rankles”.133 
Whilst people on the ground maintained a high degree of autonomy in their 
decisions, their relationship with their respective headquarters became more structured 
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in the course of the post-conflict years. Nonetheless, different street-level bureaucrats 
who worked in Sierra Leone noted a division between country and headquarters levels, 
underlining how working on the ground entails dealing “with the specific country level 
and an ever changing environment”.134 British street-level bureaucrats observed an 
“immense difference between the work on the ground in country and back home”135 in 
terms of priorities and needs and a higher devolution of responsibilities to people on 
the ground. A DFID adviser for example explains: “actually almost all of the decisions 
are done by DFID on the ground, I mean, it’s probably the most devolved organisation 
I think that I say I have ever worked with”.136 Figure 18 therefore links the circles 
representing HMG policy actors on the ground and their respective headquarters in 
London through dotted lines. These lines symbolise the high degree of autonomy and 
responsibilities of people in the country.  
Nonetheless, collaboration between headquarters and street-level bureaucrats on 
the ground improved over the years. Chapter 5 has underlined how British street-level 
bureaucrats implementing the first ‘fire-fighting’ solutions did not have a pre-planned 
strategy to guide their early SSR activities, and how this SSR strategy “came 
afterwards”.137 In contrast, today the HMG country strategy is developed both in 
London and in Sierra Leone; it is usually derived and filtered down from high-level 
policy documents such as the Building Stability Overseas Strategy or the Building Peaceful 
States and Societies Practice Paper. It is agreed, reshaped, reverse-engineered through 
discussions on the ground, and driven in-country following an integrated approach.138 
Street-level bureaucrats in Freetown admit to be “constrained from the beginning”139 by 
“a chosen set of priorities from the headquarters and by the minister”.140 They always 
remain accountable to London, reporting to the headquarters regularly and maintaining 
frequent contacts, phone and video conferences, and exchange of views. However, they 
all remarked how their work in the country maintains a high degree of discretion and 
autonomy from London and in their day to day activities act as “intelligent customers, 
not a franchise that is repeated everywhere”.141  
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Furthermore, the growing tendency of DFID to outsource the implementation 
of its SSR assistance programmes to private contractors has added a third layer to the 
policy process.142 These contractors sometimes further subcontract particular tasks to 
other private companies or partners through a delegated model composed of numerous 
layers of partners and responsibilities. In some circumstances, this sort of delegate 
model has created a vertical disjuncture between DFID headquarters and street-level 
bureaucrats on the ground. An SSR subcontractor reflects: 
“I think there is a structural issue for DFID, I think you got various 
disjoints. You got the disjoint between Palace Street and DFID country 
offices; you got the disjoint between DFID country offices and 
contractors; you then got a disjoint between contractors’ intellectual 
knowledge and the team in the field.  So you got a team leader, you got 
advisers out there who know a lot about security and justice. But I 
think it’s an issue”.143 
Moreover, this tendency to outsource the implementation of some SSR assistance 
programmes or parts of them to private contractors sometimes resulted in poor 
information sharing and continuity gaps between successive programmes. Figure 18 
visualises the relationship between DFID country office and contractors by connecting 
the circles of the two policy actors with a dotted line. This dotted connection 
symbolises the different dynamics and problems hindering at times continuity between 
successive programmes and exchange of information between private contractors and 
the DFID country office.  
In the post-conflict years, the UK has remained the most important bilateral 
donor in Sierra Leone and maintained its influence on the country’s policy process. 
Nonetheless, the British role in local policy-making became less prominent over the 
years, moving away from the direct production of policy papers toward a more advisory 
and mentoring role. Starting from the end of the Civil War, revived local institutions 
took increasingly ownership of SSR policy in the country. The production of domestic 
policy papers such as the Defence White Paper (GoSL, 2003), the Security Sector 
Review, or the PRSP (GoSL, 2005) usually followed consultation processes owned and 
                                                          
142 The JSDP was for example funded by DFID but managed by the British Council; likewise, the current 
ASJP is funded by DFID and managed by DAI. 
143 Interview n. 29, London, 19 November 2012. 
210 
 
driven by Sierra Leoneans. British street-level bureaucrats in the country sustained this 
domestic policy process by maintaining an advisory role, consulting their local 
counterparts and editing parts of the documents.  
  For example, British street-level bureaucrats played an advisory role in the 
formulation of the Sierra Leone’s Defence WP. As recalled by Al-Hassan Kondeh 
(2008b), the Deputy Secretary in the Sierra Leone MOD who was in charge of 
producing the WP, despite some tensions that “arose between Freetown and London 
on the nature and scope of the Paper” (p. 4), “contributions from the UK SILSEP were 
tremendously helpful in terms of contents, style, and presentation of the final Paper” 
(Kondeh, 2008b, p. 4). DFID provided “opportunities for overseas study tours for 
comparative country case studies in South Africa and the UK” (Kondeh, 2008b, p. 5), 
and British advisers had a fundamental role in “editing the final version of the 
publication” (Kondeh, 2008b, p. 5). Likewise, IMATT and the MOD’s Civil Adviser 
provided technical advice to the Command Structure Review Committee, which was 
exclusively composed of Sierra Leoneans and tasked to review the structure of the local 
MOD and RSLAF.  
Similarly, from 2003 to 2005 British street-level bureaucrats supported the 
ONS-led preparation of the Security Sector Review. They set up a complementary 
advisory committee that provided “advice and support, bringing experience of other 
similar Security Sector Reviews”144 and of initiatives that were developing at the same 
time in other countries such as Kosovo and Uganda. Moreover, since at the same time 
the Sierra Leone Ministry of Development and Economic Planning was producing the 
PRSP with the support of the World Bank, British street-level bureaucrats in the 
country ensured “that the analysis that was undertaken through the Security Sector 
Review was utilised by the PRSP secretariat that was drafting the first pillar of the 
PRSP, which is about governance and security”.145  
At the same time, British support was of paramount importance for the new 
Sierra Leonean institutions. DFID regularly and continuously assisted the ONS “in 
terms of resources and finances”.146 Likewise, in 2007 the Department’s financial 
support through the JSDP was fundamental for the creation of the JSCO, a unit within 
the Sierra Leone Ministry of Justice tasked to co-ordinate, plan, budget, and 
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operationalise the 2007 Justice Sector Reform Strategy. A Sierra Leonean working for 
the JSDP recalls: “JSCO was in fact receiving resources from the government [of Sierra 
Leone] main budget. But it was not sufficient, as you could expect”.147 The JSDP 
supported the work of the government office: “we were kind of paying the salaries of 
some of the staff and providing the basic working equipment”.148 A British manager of 
the programme further expands: “we established that office. […] We developed the 
JSCO, we funded some of the posts within government, so to ensure the government 
were, essentially, the drivers”.149 At the end of the JSDP in 2011, JSCO was maintained 
as a unit within the Ministry of Justice. Today, its main responsibility is supporting the 
GoSL to drive forward the justice sector reform.  
In this way, the policy process in Sierra Leone evolved over the post-conflict 
years. As security and stability were increasingly re-established in the country, the 
urgency characterising the period of ‘fire-fighting solutions’ was replaced by a more 
institutionalised policy process. DFID opened its office in Freetown, the policy agenda 
progressively moved from security to development, and British street-level bureaucrats 
in the country actively collaborated with local, international, and private partners in the 
implementation of post-war SSR and development programmes and policies on the 
ground. The UK’s role in the Sierra Leone policy process was nonetheless less direct 
and prominent than it had been throughout the years of conflict, and Figure 18 depicts 
this different interaction between British actors and the local government by connecting 
them through dotted lines. 
During this period, personal meetings between British personnel and the 
President of Sierra Leone became less frequent; however, the policy process still 
remained centralised and personal. Several interviewees confirmed the importance of 
personal politics and relationships in the country.150 A JSDP Programme Manager 
recalls:  
“We were particularly fortunate inasmuch as the vice president himself 
met with us every quarter, so the vice president and all the top people 
such as the chief of justice, the ombudsman, the head of the police, the 
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head of the prisons, all these people, we all met around the table every 
quarter to ensure there was a proper ownership for programmes”.151 
As the former colonial power and the major bilateral donor in the country, today the 
UK maintains a special role in the local policy process: the President of Sierra Leone 
still has regular meetings with the British High Commissioner; similarly, as part of his 
prerogatives as Military Adviser to the GoSL, the IMATT Commander had access to 
the President and to the National Security Council Coordination Group until the 
drawdown of IMATT.  
  Today, in addition to the UK and the local institutions, several multilateral and 
bilateral actors are present in Sierra Leone. The activities of other donors in the country 
have increased over time, and British street-level bureaucrats in Freetown have often 
collaborated with other multilateral institutions and bilateral donors working on the 
ground. For example, the JSDP was developed alongside other activities funded by 
different donors in the country: the Programme Manager of the British Council-led 
programme held regular meetings with other donors to enhance opportunities for 
possible synergies and avoid programme overlap and duplication of efforts. A local 
World Bank officer recalled how its institution partnered and “had a small joint work 
with JSDP in local court and justice”.152 Similarly, a JSDP Programme Manager 
remembers how one of the JSCO’s goals was “to coordinate all the efforts, not just the 
JSDP, but those that involved the other donors as the Germans, the UN, the World 
Bank and so forth”.153  
British street-level bureaucrats in Freetown currently engage on a regular basis 
with local ministries, hold joint co-ordination meetings, and share policies with 
multilateral institutions such as the UN or the EU. In 2007, DFID for example agreed 
with the EC a multi-year Country Strategy Paper for Sierra Leone (GoSL, EC & DFID, 
2007). The paper represents a strategic framework of co-operation between DFID and 
the EC, covering the period 2008-2012 for DFID and the period 2008-2013 for the EC. 
Likewise, UNIPSIL today has a role in police reform and supports the work of the 
Local Policing Partnership Boards, which were originally established within the 
framework of the early police reforms in 2002-2003. As of 2013, the UK had a 
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seconded Senior Police Adviser to UNIPSIL. Finally, British activities in the country are 
today developed in line with the international policy agenda of multilateral organisations 
like the OECD DAC, the UN, and the World Bank. Some of these international donors 
collaborate with HMG activities in the fields of security and justice, governance, and 
development. International organisations’ country offices thus represent the last circle 
of policy actors in Figure 18, connected to the headquarters through a dotted line 
symbolising the relative amount of freedom for street-level bureaucrats on the ground. 
Dotted lines, which represent an improved collaboration among these different policy 
actors over the post-conflict years, link these international actors to the circles of British 
street-level bureaucrats and to the Sierra Leonean government. 
As demonstrated throughout this section, the UK has maintained a deep 
engagement in the reconstruction and development process of conflict-affected Sierra 
Leone over the last decade. Strong historical ties and reputational interests still link the 
two countries, as more than 15 years of direct British involvement in the West African 
state have produced extensive gains in terms of peace, security, and development. These 
gains have been obtained and are today supported by an active collaboration between 
British street-level bureaucrats in the country, local government and institutions, and 
international partners. A recent example of this collaboration was the extensive process 
of consultation with different domestic and international stakeholders – the Secretary 
General of the Mano River Union, numerous Ministries of Sierra Leone, the World 
Bank and several NGOs – to review IMATT’s role and establish the future of the 
contingent after the 2012 elections. Over the last 15 years, the UK has thus developed a 
firm and respected presence in Sierra Leone. However, this ‘UK brand’ could also 
prove to be problematic in some circumstances, as, according to some interviewees 
currently working in the country, local people sometimes ask British street-level 
bureaucrats for services and implementation of policies that are outside the UK 
mandate and are part of the GoSL’s responsibilities.  
This part of the chapter has described the recent evolution and 
institutionalisation of the SSR policy and research agenda in the UK and at the 
international level. It has shown how the network of policy-makers and researchers 
working on SSR at headquarters level has evolved and expanded over the last decade. 
The chapter has also introduced the main British and international policy actors 
working in Sierra Leone tasked to implement SSR policies and activities on the ground. 
214 
 
The next part of the chapter analyses the extent to which research has influenced and 
interacted with British-led SSR programmes and activities implemented by street-level 
bureaucrats working in Sierra Leone during the post-conflict period. In exploring the 
network of local researchers that influenced British SSR policy in the country, the 
chapter underlines some unique features that currently characterise the research-policy 
nexus in conflict-affected environments, deriving wider insights on the role research can 
play in internationally-led SSR policy from the Sierra Leone case study.   
6.4 The role of knowledge in British-led SSR policy in Sierra Leone 
The following Figure 19 incorporates Figure 18 and visualises the different research 
actors that interacted with the SSR programmes and activities implemented by British 
street-level bureaucrats, international actors, and local government and ministries in 
post-conflict Sierra Leone. In analysing the extent to which knowledge and research 
influenced British-led SSR activities in the country, this section of the chapter explores 
the following policy network, describing in depth the different relationships between 
research and policy actors on the ground.  




As this section will show, the use of research in British-led SSR programmes and 
activities in Sierra Leone increased progressively over the post-conflict years. Several 
reasons can explain this improved influence and interaction of research and policy. 
Firstly, re-established security and a more institutionalised British presence in the 
country augmented the opportunities for research in the provinces. Secondly, more 
governmental funding for research at the UK and local levels resulted in a more 
systematic and structured use of knowledge in HMG policy, with research embedded in 
institutional policy approaches to state building and SSR. The uptake of research in 
policy was also strengthened by regular professional relationships between policy-
makers, street-level bureaucrats, and international or local researchers. Thirdly, an 
increased availability of research, materials, case studies, examples, and lessons learned 
from different countries of the world constituted an important repository of knowledge 
that could be used and accessed by British street-level bureaucrats in the country, 
eventually feeding into the Sierra Leone’s policy process.  
Positive changes in the two main variables determining the use of research in 
policy, namely the stability of the context and the evolution of the SSR policy and 
research agenda, resulted in the progressive incorporation of research into policy 
programmes and activities on the ground. In particular, the return of peace and the 
increased stability and security gave street-level bureaucrats more time to read and 
commission research, as well as reflect on their policy. In the words of an SSR 
researcher, “the further you get away from conflict, the more time you have to look into 
this stuff”,154 as the first street-level bureaucrats who were operating in a war zone “did 
not have time to be reading reports, they were just making decisions sort of, on the 
flight”.155  
 The opening of DFID’s country office also corresponded to an increased use of 
research in policy programmes and activities. The Department itself was transforming 
into an “organisation more research-led”156 and the permanent presence of DFID 
personnel in the country gave the opportunity to access numerous research and 
researchers in a more informal way. It also allowed them to have more relationships 
with civil society’s organisations and to gather more insights and a better understanding 
of the situation on the ground. A DFID adviser recalls: 
                                                          
154 Interview n. 26, London, 26 October 2012. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Interview n. 1, Birmingham, 10 May 2012. 
216 
 
“[It] was an access to a much wider group of, one of the better term, it 
was not just the research community. I think it was a wider sort of civil 
society, wider advocacy community etcetera. And, because I think all of 
a sudden what you were getting was that people within the DFID office 
could go along to, I don’t know, Action Aid that organised a seminar, 
or something rather, or Fourah Bay College, a couple of students may 
get attached to the DFID office and say: ‘we are doing research on this, 
can we come and talk to you?’. So all of a sudden we had a much better 
idea of what was being done around of the country, what people were 
discussing, what people were thinking about etcetera. And DFID 
actually at that time, and I know it because I was involved in it, we had 
to do this slightly under the radar from here, we actually started 
sponsoring quite a lot of different people research, people, master’s 
courses and all of the other stuff. Partly because it was putting us in 
touch with people”.157  
Research was thus progressively used in HMG, particularly in DFID’s programmes and 
activities in the country. As explained by an SSR researcher, “more research has 
influenced the ASJP than the JSDP, and more research has influenced the JSDP than 
the CCSSP”.158 Figure 19 shows the increased role of ad hoc, local, HMG-funded 
research by connecting through a solid line commissioned reports, surveys, and visits on 
the ground to DFID country office, the UK policy actor that funded the majority of 
HMG research in Sierra Leone. Furthermore, as some of the British-led programmes in 
the country developed alongside the activities of other international actors on the 
ground – especially in the field of justice reform – Figure 19 connects HMG-
commissioned research with similar ad hoc research funded by international actors in 
Sierra Leone. The circle of international research is linked to HMG-funded research 
through a dotted line, and to the circle of the international country offices through a 
solid connection. The solid line symbolises how concepts and notions emerging from 
studies funded by international actors directly shaped the activities of these international 
and bilateral donors working on the ground alongside UK institutions. Likewise, British 
street-level bureaucrats did not necessarily prioritise government-funded research over 
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other studies funded by different donors, despite the former having a more direct 
influence on their activities and the potential to be disseminated more widely through 
different avenues such as websites, video conferences, or the DFID intranet. Thus the 
two circles of UK-funded and international research are linked through a dotted line to 
symbolise this indirect connection between research themes and studies funded through 
different channels. Nonetheless, at the same time DFID’s country office is connected 
through a solid line to GSDRC, as DFID street level bureaucrats have the capacity to 
directly contact the centre and request desk-based research on questions related to 
governance, social development, conflict, and humanitarian topics.  
 Research interacted at different stages with the design and implementation of 
JSDP. As stated by a DFID adviser, “when the JSDP was developed, the process of 
putting together the Project Memorandum, there was a quite extensive amount of research 
undertaken”.159 Before the publication of the Project Memorandum in 2004, DFID 
conducted an early mission in the country in June 2002, held stakeholder workshops in 
December 2002 and August 2003, and created a Justice Sector Task Force to carry out 
“individual institution/organisational appraisals, public consultation and research” 
(JSDP, 2004, p. 7). The Task Force commissioned the Voices of the Poor survey and 
report that were received in November 2003, and produced its own report in January 
2004. During the initial phase of the programme, from 2005 to 2007, research and 
analysis were undertaken “to identify and plan the activities and outcomes of the main 
phase of the programme” (JSDP, 2004, p. 4) and to “target, prioritise and strengthen 
programme interventions and monitoring” (JSDP, 2004, p. 11). £420,000 was budgeted 
under the heading ‘Research and Policy Implementation Facility’ (JSDP, 2004, p. 17) to 
conduct a baseline survey and other research on the justice sector of Sierra Leone. A 
local participant in the JSDP explains:  
“We had two years of inception phase. We did a lot of research and 
work in the community which has been more useful for the 
implementation. The important thing is that it was from the people 
who said: ‘these are the issues’. We also had input from other countries, 
consultants with experience, showing best practices and adapting to 
context; bringing people from outside, plus understanding from the 
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bottom. […] We had this professor from South Africa to develop a 
legal aid act based on extensive experience in that country”.160  
Research remained an important element of JSDP for the whole length of the 
programme: as explained by a Programme Manager of the programme, “we did not do 
anything without researching at first”.161 A local participant in the programme further 
expands:   
“All the projects of JSDP would involve a desk review/literature review 
as a standard start point. We focused largely on academic work, looking 
at research across the board in this process. We commissioned to hire a 
person to go to the internet and download research documents on the 
Sierra Leone justice sector”.162 
This research was not necessarily linked to general academic studies that were published 
in the same years, but it was conversely policy-oriented research focusing on ad hoc 
issues that were meant to directly influence the programme. A Programme Manager of 
the JSDP reflects: 
“I don’t think academic research helped influence what I was doing, it 
was a question really of what I called focused research. Practical based, 
PRA and this sort of research where you are sort of looking at issues, 
you have a focus and you drive that research, you drive that reports to 
ensure that you are covering the areas you are particularly interested in, 
as opposed to a general research”.163 
Research, Information, and Monitoring and Evaluation was one of the four main 
components the programme and was led by a Research Adviser supported by a local 
Research & Information coordinator. The programme conducted several studies, such 
as a baseline survey and two scoping studies in Moyamba district, two SLP perception 
surveys, two reports mapping the Justice Sector and two Justice Sector surveys (JSDP, 
2006, p. 7). These studies were usually carried out by local researchers or external 
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consultants. Finally, the JSDP regularly commissioned “tailor-made research”,164 and 
funded the creation of a library of resources which was then transferred to the JSCO. 
The resource library informed JSDP work and it is still accessible in person and online. 
It is a useful and important repository of materials, an institutional memory, and a 
library for researchers working on Sierra Leone and for local policy-makers interested in 
governance, justice, human rights, SSR, police, anti-corruption documents produced 
over the years by local and international bodies as well as by civil society organisations. 
 The JSDP’s successor, the ASJP, was equally informed and shaped by research, 
at least in its preliminary and inception phase. DAI, the company that won the contract 
from DFID, consulted researchers and commissioned studies to develop its proposal. 
Studies, articles, and reports written by international researchers such as Dylan 
Hendrickson, Richard Fanthorpe, Lisa Denney, and Peter Albrecht were taken into 
consideration and informed the early phases of the programme. An SSR researcher 
comments:  
“I was a little bit involved when they were drafting, when all these 
companies were developing their proposals… DAI who has won the 
proposal… and I had been to help them write their bid, and one of 
the interesting things I think, […] they really did try and seek to 
engage few academics, so both Dylan [Hendrickson] and I were 
consulted”.165  
Another researcher reminds how “Fanthorpe also did a report for ASJP […] on the 
influence of chiefs in the justice system. I am not sure how they have used that […] but 
it definitively was good, it was a good report. I think it was well received in general”.166 
Likewise, Peter Albrecht co-authored an ASJP-commissioned report on community 
policing that was used to develop the programme in Sierra Leone and has directly 
informed the ASJP strategy (Albrecht, Garber & Gibson, 2013). Once the report was 
completed, he also worked for one year as a technical adviser to the programme, 
implementing many of the recommendations of the report. Research also influenced the 
work of DAI’s subcontractors. One of them for example reminds:  
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 “During the inception phase we did a lot of investigatory works, we 
went out [...] we did have a different focus, so we were going out to 
new districts where the British Council hadn’t been working, so for 
example we did a district assessment study and that was going out to 
different districts, so working out which one we should working and 
which ones we should working first”.167 
The examples of research that shaped, interacted with, and influenced policy during the 
post-war recovery phase are numerous. They range from DFID-commissioned studies 
such as the Drivers of Change report and CSDG’s study on the politics of security 
decision-making to academic outputs such as Clare Castillejo’s Working Paper Building 
Accountable Justice in Sierra Leone (Brown et al., 2005; Castillejo, 2009; CSDG, 2008). Most 
of these examples could be inferred from conversations with street-level bureaucrats, 
who did not hesitate to indicate studies, articles, or reports that directly or indirectly 
influenced their work in the country. For example, in the post-conflict years the UK 
MOD conducted an internal study of IMATT, which was extremely influential in so far 
as it gave British street-level bureaucrats a sense of the so-called ‘IMATT effect’. Local 
people consulted as part of the study perceived the IMATT presence as larger than it 
actually was, and assumed that the military would have rapidly intervened to re-establish 
peace in the case of security problems. British personnel benefitted from this 
perception, and IMATT maintained a small contingent in the country until 2013. A 
British adviser recalls: 
“I remember sponsoring a piece of research on IMATT and 
perceptions of IMATT, which actually was incredibly useful for 
IMATT, and incredibly useful for DFID, because it actually gave us 
access to what people were thinking about IMATT what it was doing 
[…] The perception was positive, but the thing that was worrying about 
it was that people did not really have any understanding of what 
IMATT was doing, so the perception it was positive was the fact that if 
the country… if the RUF appeared again, all of these people on the hill 
will come down and deal with them basically; and the message about 
what IMATT was doing with the RSLAF, the role it was playing in 
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terms of helping Sierra Leone own institutions wasn’t understood, they 
were… no one really was worried about that. There was also quite 
interestingly, it is much talked about the IMATT effect, one of the 
research questions was […] to ask how many people were in IMATT, 
and the answers were quite interesting, I mean the multiplier effect… 
[…] There were people that did were under the impression that were 
thousands of people that was still in the country, which from an 
IMATT perspective they were also quite keen not to necessarily leave it 
because it was also quite good for a security perspective”.168  
Another example of the direct influence of research on policy was the use made by 
IMATT personnel of the book by Peter Albrecht and Paul Jackson, Security System 
Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997-2007 (2009). The book, a comprehensive account of 
UK-led SSR policy in the country since the conflict, was on the desks of some IMATT 
senior officers. Interviews with IMATT members confirmed how they considered the 
book to be a good source of information, extremely useful as a means to understand 
what happened in the past in Sierra Leone, and easy to consult as it is structured in 
different short parts that can be read according to different needs. An IMATT member 
explains: “the book is pretty good and laid down in a way I can read the bit of interest, 
otherwise I need an executive summary and if there is something in it that catches my 
attention I may use it. Of course, these things will inform my general understanding”.169 
The same member pointed out how, in view of the contingent’s drawdown, he had read 
the part of the book about exit strategy to understand previous plans for an exit strategy 
that could influence future developments of the contingent. Furthermore, he recalled 
how he referred to the book in conversations with his colleagues to enhance the 
credibility of his arguments, denoting in this way a political use of research. 
Likewise, personnel in the ONS recognised how research played – and still plays 
– an important role in their daily work. For example, a local officer declared that they 
developed over the years “links with academic institutions, even in the UK”.170 He 
further recalled how the ONS regularly engaged in security-related issues with 
“Cranfield University, King’s College London (‘Funmi Olonisakin), University of 
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Bradford (David Francis), DCAF in Geneva”171 and with country experts such as Paul 
Jackson. However, ONS’s research capacity is sometimes thwarted by economic 
constraints, which also hinder the long-term sustainability of the office’s activities. For 
example, personnel in the ONS underlined the office’s limited capacity to conduct 
research on natural disasters and disaster management, one of the ONS tasks. They 
bemoaned the lack of adequate resources for research, as the group that deals with 
natural resources is composed of only four people and lacks “library or resource centre 
for reference point”.172 
 Research therefore played an increasing role in British-led and local SSR policy 
in post-conflict Sierra Leone. Nonetheless, not all the UK SSR activities in the country 
were planned and implemented following systematic analysis and research. One negative 
example is Operation Pebu, a GoSL-owned project, funded by DFID and the same 
government and supervised by IMATT, aimed to build accommodations for RSLAF 
soldiers and their families. The project started in April 2003 and, according to the then 
Civil Adviser to the Sierra Leone MOD (Gaeta, 2008), experienced problems since its 
inception, with changes in the initial design of the accommodation, requests for 
additional funding, and lack of investment appraisal. Difficulties continued in the 
successive phases of the project, which were characterised by bad or no project 
management, skyrocketing of costs, unrealistic timeframe, as well as conceptually flawed 
and over-ambitious goals. These goals were nonetheless pushed forward, as the Army 
wanted to have the same accommodation standards of the SLP, who were rebuilding 
their accommodations in the framework of another DFID-funded programme at the 
same time. Problems worsened in the construction phase, following the decision to 
change the construction method from mud blocks to Hydraform blocks, without doing 
a preliminary study on the feasibility and the advantages of this new material. In the 
words of Gaeta (2008):  
“To the best of anyone’s knowledge, Hydrafrom blocks had never been 
used on a major construction project in Sierra Leone. The decision to 
purchase Hydraform machines was based on an advertisement in the 
back of a local magazine. No trials of the machines ever took place, nor 





did anyone visit South Africa (where they are produced) to carry out a 
proper appraisal of Hydraform’s applicability to Op. Pebu” (p. 4). 
In 2004, DFID funded an independent review of Operation Pebu by an international 
housing consulting firm, who produced a critical report on the project. The project was 
thus scaled down in 2005: “70% of the project was cancelled and focus was on the 
remaining 30%” (Albrecht & Jackson, 2009, p. 146; Jackson & Albrecht, 2011, p. 149) 
and on completing the accommodations in the two sites of Kailahun and Pujehun. 
These goals were achieved in 2008, when the project ended. The final balance of 
Operation Pebu was thus extremely negative; the project failed in many aspects, 
achieved only a minimal part of the planned objectives, and, in the words of a DFID 
adviser, “was a good lesson learned on how not to implement and do a policy, as 
everything went wrong since the beginning and things kept snowballing to the worst”.173 
 As happened in the first period of ‘fire-fighting’ solutions, experiences from 
other countries also informed SSR policies and programmes. For example, Brima Acha 
Kamara, Keith Biddle’s successor as Sierra Leone IGP, studied in Northern Ireland and 
took from there the idea of policing boards, which were then introduced and 
established as Local Policing Partnership Boards in each police division of the country 
(Jackson & Albrecht, 2011, pp. 107-109). Likewise, ONS personnel used, imported, and 
followed British practices and examples in some of their policy decisions, such as the 
definition of the limits and responsibilities of the military in internal security. An ONS 
local officer recalls: 
“One of the things we had to do was to circumscribe the role of the 
military only to external aggression. After a comprehensive review and 
research we created the MACP, getting the idea from the Military Aid 
to the Civil Authorities in the UK, where it was developed. Military can 
therefore intervene only when the police cannot deal with internal 
security”.174 
As in the earlier conflict phase, British street-level bureaucrats working on SSR policy 
and implementation had extensive professional experience in developing countries. For 
example, Peter Viner, the JSDP Programme Manager from 2007 to 2011, was a senior 
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UK police officer who had worked in international development programmes in sub-
Saharan Africa for 16 years. Before moving to Sierra Leone, he participated in a police 
programme in Botswana and managed a justice programme in Lesotho. Likewise, senior 
British street-level bureaucrats currently working in Sierra Leone combine professional 
experience in different countries with a good understanding of the research agenda, as 
they are well aware of the main ideas and themes that have emerged from state building 
and SSR research in recent years. 
 As the research-policy nexus evolved over time, British street-level bureaucrats 
built formal and informal professional relationships with a group of trusted researchers 
and academics over the years. Several interviewees stressed how these relationships, 
usually born and maintained through professional collaborations, are extremely 
important to ensure a better interaction between research and policy. A DFID adviser 
for example remarks:  
“A lot of cases, is being around for a lot of time and build up networks 
[…] Doing things together, yes. Being in a team writing up strategic 
conflict analyses, or government analyses, or something like that or, for 
that matter, just planning a programme somewhere, things like that”.175 
His colleague adds: “a lot of people in DFID are just out of university and writing 
policy. They think they can change the world, whereas in the field you have lots of 
interaction with individuals and personal connections that these people don’t 
understand, as they have no experience of this”.176 Likewise, a British officer based in 
Freetown describes his interactions with researchers on the ground: 
“Between researchers and policy-makers, we have interaction. 
Researchers in country act as a sort of memory. When we come in to 
the country, we don’t know anything so we will go to them first. These 
researchers have knowledge, biographies of key people; they are the 
academic repository to rely on. We develop strategy at a regional level 
and such academic repositories can help in this respect”.177 
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His colleague points out how in a fragile country there is a continuous flux and 
exchange of information: “in London you can switch off, but here you are constantly 
talking to people about the issues. You work 24/7, you have meetings at dinners, etc. So 
you learn a lot informal”.178 His words are echoed by a DFID adviser, who stresses the 
importance of informal relationships for his work: “the best search function is to have 
other people in your network to find out research. We are overwhelmed by the mass of 
information; this is a good way, have people two phone calls away. It gives us easy, 
quick access – networks”.179  
 On the other hand, several researchers are equally well aware of the importance 
of building long-lasting good formal and informal relationships with practitioners to 
increase the chances of uptake of their work into policy in the long run. Researchers 
recognise that street-level bureaucrats and policy-makers “have their preferred 
suppliers”180 of research, and are aware that “personal relationships do make quite a 
difference, particularly when you actually met people for long time”.181 An SSR 
researcher recalled how interactions with street-level bureaucrats on the ground had 
always been an important aspect of his professional career: “I started as a 
decentralisation adviser. […] There I met Garth [Glenworth] […]. Soon I started 
working in areas such as Kono […]. I guess that what I have done has been read in 
DFID, because after some years they asked us to reassess it again”.182 His colleague 
working for a DFID-sponsored research centre further explains how they: “developed a 
relationship with advisers. Usually they use the helpdesk question form, some policy-
makers call or write personal emails”.183 
 Paul Jackson and Peter Albrecht are two examples of researchers who built 
long-term professional relationships with British policy-makers and street-level 
bureaucrats. Their book on British-led SSR in Sierra Leone (Albrecht & Jackson, 2009) 
was quoted in a report by the UK Parliament’s House of Commons International 
Development Committee (2012). They also maintained over the years a close 
collaboration with the Sierra Leone programmes, based on their expertise on the 
country. Paul Jackson has become a major expert of SSR at global level (for example, he 
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sits on the advisory board of DCAF). He acted as Director of the GFN-SSR until 2011 
and has worked with several international policy actors such as European governments, 
the EU, the UN, and the World Bank. He has collaborated extensively with the UK 
government in the production of some security-related British policy papers and as a 
Senior Security and Justice Adviser to the SU. Likewise, Peter Albrecht has become one 
of the major experts on SSR in Sierra Leone over the years. He participated in a HMG-
sponsored review of the SLP capabilities (Horn, Gordon & Albrecht, 2011), wrote a 
report for the ASJP, and worked as technical adviser to the same programme (Albrecht, 
Garber & Gibson, 2013). His PhD dissertation focuses on SSR in Sierra Leone 
(Albrecht, 2012) and he has collaborated on SSR issues and publications with 
international donors such as the OECD and research centres such as Saferworld 
(Albrecht, 2009), DCAF (Jackson & Albrecht, 2010), and the Danish Institute of 
International Studies (Albrecht, 2010).  
 Richard Fanthorpe is another researcher who participated in numerous DFID-
funded studies on conflict-affected Sierra Leone and influenced several policy 
programmes in the country. During the period of ‘fire-fighting’ solutions, he was 
contacted by British police advisers in the country to conduct a study on formal and 
informal police and justice systems at community level (Fanthorpe, 2001). The 
importance of his report was acknowledged in one of the CCSSP’s Output to Purpose 
Reviews (Bredemear et al., 2002). Since then, he occasionally collaborated with the 
activities of DFID in Sierra Leone. He led a two-year DFID-sponsored research project 
that monitored Sierra Leone’s chiefdom system and looked at the viable political 
structures for post-war reconstruction in the country (Fanthorpe, 2004). Furthermore, 
he was one of the authors of the influential Drivers for Change study sponsored by DFID 
in 2005 (Brown et al., 2005). Finally, in 2011 his consultancy company led an eight-
month, DFID-funded project focusing on the impact, constraints and prospects of 
decentralisation in Sierra Leone (Fanthorpe, Lavali & Gibril Sesay, 2011). 
 Ad hoc studies and reports prepared by British researchers were thus influential 
in the design and implementation of several SSR policies and activities in the country. 
The expertise of some of these academics and researchers was also requested at 
headquarters level and helped shape SSR policy documents and strategies at the British 
and international levels. This increased interaction between research themes, activities, 
and studies produced both at local and international levels is symbolised in Figure 19 by 
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the green area created by the overlap between the blue of international research and the 
yellow of local research. Themes and reflections that emerged from international and 
local research were progressively harmonised throughout the post-conflict years. More 
numerous research centres and activities at the international and local levels ensured a 
growing exchange of ideas and notions between research produced in donors’ and 
fragile countries. SSR themes and concepts therefore percolated from the international 
to the local level and vice versa, eventually interacting and indirectly influencing policy 
papers and doctrine at headquarters, as well as the design and implementation of SSR 
programmes and activities on the ground. The activities of experienced researchers were 
seminal in creating and reinforcing this exchange, as most of the top experts and 
academics contributed to both policy at headquarters level and programme activities on 
the ground.  
 Local researchers hardly entered into this well-established network of 
researchers. Instead, they remained under-utilised to some extent in the course of the 
entire SSR process. Their limited exposure and access to international street-level 
bureaucrats, together with the fact that international or bilateral donors tend to rely on 
the work of well-known international researchers without investing adequate effort in 
harnessing local knowledge, are two of the main reasons for the limited reliance on local 
researchers.  
 However, British street-level bureaucrats’ reliance on local research improved 
slightly over the course of the years. A DFID adviser who worked on the early SSR 
reforms in the country admits a limited interaction with local researchers: “to be honest, 
I would say not existent. I don’t ever recall any. I mean there were local consultants, but 
not in the military, nothing to do with security. You could get a local social 
development consultant with tribal background or traditional authorities, things like 
that”.184 The creation of the ASSN in 2003 did not necessarily improve the exchange of 
information between local researches and British street-level bureaucrats on the ground. 
The Network harmonised the various Western African organisations carrying out 
activities in the general area of SSR, transformation, and governance. However, its work 
hardly influenced the SSR programmes and activities in Sierra Leone, as the ASSN was 
rarely quoted by the street-level bureaucrats interviewed in the course of the study. This 
limited influence of the ASSN on country policy is visually shown in Figure 19 by the 
                                                          
184 Interview n. 19, London, 12 July 2012. 
228 
 
lack of connection between the ASSN and the circles of British and local policy actors 
in the country. Likewise, the participation of street-level bureaucrats and researchers in 
seminars, such as the one on post-conflict challenges in Sierra Leone organised at the 
Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in 2005 (Albrecht & Malan, 
2006), facilitated an increased interaction between street-level bureaucrats and local and 
African researchers in the region. However, the seminar was not seen as an opportunity 
for research to feed into policy, as explained by one of its participants: “we all attended, 
but I would say that it was a kind of ‘food for thought’ rather than research”.185  
 Informal relationships between international and local or African researchers 
were nonetheless stressed by some interviewees, and the work of these researchers 
increasingly fed into programmes sponsored by DFID and other donors. The use of 
local expertise improved thus over time, particularly with a progressive reliance on the 
work of the Fourah Bay College, a College in the University of Sierra Leone where the 
Centre for Development and Security Analysis was set up. The founder and leader of 
the Centre, Osman Gbla, became for example a trusted figure for British street-level 
bureaucrats in Freetown, and participated in the preparation of the PRSP, the Sierra 
Leone Vision 2025, and the DFID Review Team of the Sierra Leone Governance and 
Civil Service Reform Programme II in 2007. Policy inputs from local researchers thus 
improved over time, as recalled by a DFID adviser: “there were some good ones, 
particularly at the Fourah Bay College. We used to talk with them, with locals, as well as 
with senior people. A name that comes to my mind is Osman Gbla, who had a very 
clear idea of the history of the country and of policy. We used to talk with them”.186 
Fourah Bay College is thus one of the circles of research actors in Figure 19. It is linked 
to DFID country office and to the GoSL through a dotted line symbolising the 
increased interaction between the research activities of the college and British as well as 
local policy. 
 Likewise, several local researchers worked in the JSDP or in other SSR 
programmes or participated in studies as part of the staff or as consultants and 
researchers. For instance, Momo Turay worked as Research and Information co-
ordinator in the JSDP and produced an early situational analysis and report on the 
district of Moyamba. Likewise, James Vincent collaborated with Peter Albrecht and 
                                                          




Paul Jackson in the preparation of their book. The work of local researchers was thus 
extremely important in data collection at the district level. It improved especially with 
the recent funding of programmes in the field of justice, as local people could better 
understand local dynamics and informal justice mechanisms in the country.  
 British street-level bureaucrats’ accounts of the work of local researchers were 
mixed and mainly dependent on personal experiences. Some street-level bureaucrats 
and international researchers praised the capacity of local researchers; conversely, others 
noted poor organisation, problematic access, and lower standards of work. An SSR 
researcher reflects on the issue of access: 
“There is more of local researchers who I think they are excellent […] 
But again, I think that the challenge for them is the platform to access 
DFID, so, unless you become a consultant, who somehow gets an 
international project, if you are a researcher at the University of Sierra 
Leone, how do you get your research to DFID?”.187 
Likewise, another SSR researcher expands: “the raw material can be superb; what they 
do, they don’t make the most of it. They don’t have the access, they don’t have the 
money, a lot of them don’t do the travels, some do, but most don’t”.188 Conversely, 
other accounts are more negative. For example, a DFID adviser commented: “we 
worked with someone in the University of Sierra Leone who was a private consultant, 
but generally, the quality is poor. Fourah Bay College is a mess”.189 As a result, British 
street-level bureaucrats have not always relied on local knowledge: most of the time, 
local researchers have participated in some British-sponsored programmes and, 
sporadically, some of them have been used as private consultants. Nonetheless, some 
issues preventing the greater use of local researchers, such as the HMG tendency to 
commission research by international researchers “particularly for work over certain 
amounts”190 remain, and British street-level bureaucrats did not necessarily use local 
researchers as much as they could. 
 The colours on the background of Figure 19 visually show the limited influence 
of local researchers at headquarters level. While the indirect interaction between 
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international (blue) and local (yellow) research is symbolised by the overlap of the 
colours in the green area, the blue of international research remains predominant in the 
background if compared to the ideal policy network presented in Figure 9 in Chapter 3. 
The amount of blue on the background visually captures how ad hoc, policy-driven 
research commissioned in country had a limited reach at the international level, mainly 
exerting a direct influence only on implementation activities on the ground. 
Furthermore, it symbolises how the limited participation and access of local researchers 
to the international debate make hard for them influencing policy papers and strategies 
at headquarters levels.  
6.5 Conclusion 
The chapter has analysed the extent to which research has influenced and interacted 
with British-led SSR policy in Sierra Leone during the post-war recovery period. It has 
provided examples of research and researchers that proved influential for the activities 
of British street-level bureaucrats working on the ground. Furthermore, the chapter 
visually depicted how the network of policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and 
international and local researchers evolved and expanded from an early period of ‘fire-
fighting’ solutions to the post-conflict years. It argued that developments outside (an 
increased stability and security) and inside (a progressive evolution of SSR policy and 
research) this network shaped the policy process in the country and the interaction 
between policy and research. External and internal factors and variables interacted with 
one another and supported the expansion of the network of policy and research actors, 
ultimately contributing to an increased influence of research on British-led SSR policy. 
Positive changes in the stability of the country and a progressive evolution and 
institutionalisation of SSR policy and research at headquarters and country levels thus 
constituted the two main variables favouring an increased use of research by people 
implementing British SSR policy in Sierra Leone during the post-conflict years. 
 The empirical Chapters 5 and 6 have described the narratives and dynamics of 
research utilisation in British-led SSR policy during the conflict and post-conflict years. 
The chapters illustrated how the influence of research in policy increased from a period 
of ‘fire-fighting’ solutions to the present time. Furthermore, the chapters visually 
showed the changes and expansion of the network of SSR policy-makers, street-level 
bureaucrats, and international and local researchers throughout these two periods. The 
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analysis noted how developments outside and inside this network resulted in an 
increased interaction between policy and research in the post-conflict years. The third 
part of the thesis concludes the PhD by synthesising and reconnecting the theoretical 








PART III – SYNTHESIS 
 
The first and second parts of the thesis introduced the theoretical foundations of the 
PhD research and presented the main empirical data collected in the course of the 
study. The analysis of the Sierra Leone case underlined how research has increasingly 
influenced and interacted with British-led SSR policy in conflict-affected Sierra Leone. 
Policy-makers at headquarters level, street-level bureaucrats in Freetown, and 
researchers built over the years a policy network which progressively consolidated in the 
post-conflict phase. This network grew as the stability on the country improved and 
SSR evolved as a policy and related research agenda, supporting an increased use and 
uptake in research in policy over time. 
 The third part of the thesis is divided in two chapters that synthesise the main 
findings from the Sierra Leone case study and conclude this PhD research, respectively. 
Chapter 7 assesses the main empirical findings of the thesis. It analyses when, why, and 
how different types of research have different kinds of policy impacts – or not. The 
chapter builds a typology to explain how various types of research interacted differently 
with policy over the conflict and post-conflict years. It presents the main ingredients 
and indicators of high impact research and explores the various ways in which research 
has been used in British-led SSR policy, programmes, and activities at headquarters level 
and in conflict-affected Sierra Leone.  
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by presenting the main explanatory and 
normative conclusions of this PhD research. The chapter explains the ways in which the 
thesis has addressed and explored its main question and related sub-questions. It 
provides some practical recommendations to increase the influence of research on SSR 




7. Research influence on policy: when, why, and how? 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapters 5 and 6 showed how the use and influence of research in British-led SSR 
policy in Sierra Leone increased over the years from a period of ‘fire-fighting’ solutions 
to the more stable post-conflict years. The chapters showed how the network of policy-
makers, street-level bureaucrats, and researchers working at headquarters and country 
levels evolved over the course of British intervention in the country. They identified in 
the stability of the country context and the progressive evolution and institutionalisation 
of SSR in policy and research two main variables that contributed to the increased use 
and uptake of research by HMG policy-makers and street-level bureaucrats.  
 Chapter 7 synthetises, analyses, and assesses the main findings of the case study 
and links them to the main theories on policy networks and research utilisation 
presented in Chapter 2 of the thesis. The chapter derives from the Sierra Leone case a 
thorough reflection on when, why, and how research – and different types of research – 
have or do not have different kinds of policy impacts. It is divided in three main parts, 
respectively addressing and analysing the three questions above. Part 7.2 systematically 
compares and contrasts the first conflict phase of the UK intervention with the 
successive post-conflict period. In arguing that research had an increasing influence on 
the work of policy-makers in the UK and street-level bureaucrats in Sierra Leone, it 
develops a typology explaining how different types of research have different types of 
impact on policy. Part 7.3 examines the reasons why research is or is not used in policy. 
It argues that networks matter for a positive uptake of research in policy and analyses 
some main ingredients and indicators that favoured the use of research in the Sierra 
Leone case and, more generally, in fragile, conflict-affected countries. Finally, Part 7.4 
links the case study to the literature on research utilisation and, in particular, to the 
different models in which research is used and influences policy. It recapitulates some 
examples of direct utilisation of research in policy and provides cases in which research 
has been used politically as ‘ammunition’ in policy negotiations or to justify 





7.2 When research influences policy: a typology 
The narratives from Sierra Leone demonstrated how research has increasingly 
influenced and interacted with SSR policy designed and implemented by the UK in the 
West African state. In this respect, the first main finding of the case study is that 
research was important for British-led SSR policy in conflict-affected Sierra Leone. 
During the conflict, British street-level bureaucrats in Freetown eagerly looked for 
research, rough data, and information that could help the design and planning of their 
first ‘fire-fighting’ solutions. Likewise, the work and expertise of Sierra Leone experts 
contributed to and fed into several security and justice programmes funded by the UK 
in the post-conflict years, while policy-makers at headquarters level progressively 
funded research institutes and university studies to conduct research on SSR and state 
building-related issues. 
Figure 20 is derived from the data presented in Chapters 5 and 6. It presents a 
typology which summarises how different types of research had various policy impacts 
and influence in the conflict and post-conflict periods analysed. In line with the 
distinction between different types of research provided in Part 1.1 of the thesis, the 
figure analyses the policy impact of academic and ad hoc, policy-driven research. The 
table also adds a third type of research – Southern research – intended as the work of 
local researchers from Sierra Leone and from the wider West African region. Figure 20 
also lists four different kinds of policy impact. These types of impact are derived by 
Waldman, Barakat and Varisco (2014), and represent four main ways in which research 
directly, indirectly, and widely influences and interacts with policy. Headquarters policy 
impact is “the uptake of research on formal government policy documents” (Waldman, 
Barakat & Varisco, 2014, p. 89) such as cross-governmental SSR strategies. Country 
level policy impact is the use of research in “specialised, programme-oriented policy 
documents” (Waldman, Barakat & Varisco, 2014, p. 89), programmes and activities. 
Conceptual impact indicates “less direct and widely adopted conceptualisations” 
(Waldman, Barakat & Varisco, 2014, p. 89) that shaped the SSR and state building 
debate in the course of the years such as the concept of fragility, the necessity to 
integrate security and justice within the SSR agenda, or the recent debate on the future 
of SSR and its second generation (Sedra, 2010). Lastly, a fourth type of impact is policy 
relevant research influence, defined by Waldman, Barakat, and Varisco (2014) as “the 
capacity of a piece of research to give rise to further policy relevant research and to 
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have a multiplier effect on research and policy environment” (p. 89). The scores and 
values in the table are derived from the interpretation of the data collected in the course 
of the study191 and provide an indication of how various types of research impacted 
policy differently in the case of Sierra Leone and might influence similar SSR and state 
building programmes in fragile countries. 
Figure 20   The impact of research by type 
Types of Impact Academic Research Ad hoc Research Southern Research 
Period Conflict Post-confl. Conflict Post-confl. Conflict Post-confl. 
Headquarters High High Low Medium Low Low 
Country level Low Medium Very high Very high Low Medium 
Conceptual Med.-high High Med.-low Medium Very low Low 
Policy Relevant High High Low  Medium Very low Low 
 
In the conflict period, academic research had a high influence at headquarters level, a 
low impact at country level, medium-high conceptual influence and high policy 
relevance. New research centres such as the CSDG at King’s College London were 
funded by DFID to support the emerging SSR policy agenda and collect lessons learned 
from the field. As explained in Chapter 5, some of the researchers of these centres 
worked as additional members or staff of CHAD and contributed to policy initiatives 
such as the writing of the DFID guidelines on SSR in 2002. Their influence at 
headquarters level was therefore high; their capacity to shape conceptually the emerging 
policy agenda was medium-high – HMG already had its own agenda when it launched 
SSR in 1999 – and their capacity to generate further research and policy debate in the 
long term was high. Conversely, these kinds of academic studies had low impact at 
country level: in the first phase of the intervention, street-level bureaucrats in Sierra 
Leone rarely consulted international academic studies, but looked at ad hoc pieces of 
research to guide their programmes in the country.  
 Ad hoc, policy-driven research consists in those studies commissioned by street-
level bureaucrats in Sierra Leone to better understand the local context and collect 
rough data to guide their policy solutions. Its influence at country level was very high 
during the conflict years and Chapter 5 provided several examples of studies, surveys, 
and reports which were used instrumentally in the design and implementation of some 
of the ‘fire-fighting’ solutions. Conversely, this type of research had a low impact on 
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SSR policy at headquarters level and a low capacity to generate new research, as most of 
the times these studies were commissioned to respond to specific policy problems on 
the ground. Nonetheless, this type of research had a medium-low impact at conceptual 
level because the direct uptake of some of these studies in country policy eventually 
contributed to change policy practices in the long run. For instance, the report on 
formal and informal systems of justice commissioned by DFID to Richard Fanthorpe in 
2001 represented an initial engagement of the Department with those issues. 
 Southern research had a minimal role in the conflict years. Street-level 
bureaucrats’ limited knowledge of the local researchers in the country, their lack of time 
to seek out local advice while facing a highly unstable and insecure situation, as well as 
the lack of access of local researchers to HMG policy actors are some of the reasons 
explaining the limited influence of this type of research on policy. As a result, Southern 
research had a very low conceptual and policy relevant impact, and a low influence at 
headquarters and country levels. The scores related to the headquarters and country 
levels are due to the fact that, as shown in Chapter 5, institutional relationships between 
Western and African universities facilitated the participation of researchers from 
developing countries in the early evolution of the HMG SSR agenda. Likewise, facing 
an unstable situation on the ground, street-level bureaucrats looked for and – when 
these were available – consulted studies or books written by local researchers to have a 
better understanding of the Sierra Leone context and culture. For instance, the list of 
recommended readings included in the Background Brief of one of the first British 
military advisers also contains a few studies and reports on the history of the country 
written by local or African researchers (Anon., 2002). 
 In the post-conflict years, academic research maintained a high impact at 
headquarters level, high conceptual influence, and high policy relevance. Numerous 
centres and research institutes working on SSR such as the GFN-SSR or DCAF 
emerged in the last decade. The work of academic researchers resulted influential in the 
publication of SSR strategies and papers at HMG and OECD levels. SSR and state 
building themes and topics progressively shaped the development policy discourse and 
had a cumulative influence that gave rise to further policy-oriented research. Academic 
studies on SSR had a medium influence on policy at country level. Street-level 
bureaucrats in Sierra Leone mainly relied on ad hoc, policy-driven studies to implement 
their programmes in the country. Nonetheless, Chapter 6 showed how the work of 
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some Western researchers and academics such as Paul Jackson was read and quoted by 
British personnel in the country.  
Policy-driven research maintained a very high impact on the work of street-level 
bureaucrats on the ground. Chapter 6 has demonstrated how, in the post-conflict years, 
HMG personnel and advisers in Sierra Leone commissioned numerous ad hoc pieces of 
research that directly influenced their SSR programmes and activities in the country. 
This type of research also had a medium impact at headquarters level and a medium 
conceptual influence and policy relevance. Lessons learned and examples coming from 
developing countries fed more systematically in HMG and other donors’ headquarters 
policy approaches. They contributed to shape conceptually the SSR policy discourse and 
to foster new research and studies commissioned by other international and bilateral 
actors in the country. This increased impact is also a consequence of a better interaction 
between policy and research in the post-conflict years. Enhanced HMG mechanisms 
favoured the use of research in policy and enabled the direct contribution of some 
researchers such as Peter Albrecht to policy papers and programmes both at 
headquarters and country levels. 
Southern research maintained a limited influence on policy also in the post-
conflict years. Studies and research conducted by African researchers had a low impact 
at headquarters level, as well as a low conceptual influence and capacity to give rise to 
further policy research. However, some positive developments such as the creation of 
the ASSN or the inclusion of Southern centres and academic institutions in some 
Research Programme Consortia justify an increase from the very low score of the 
conflict years to the low values of the post-conflict period. African researchers had an 
increased influence on policy at country level and medium impact on street-level 
bureaucrats’ policy programmes and activities. As shown in Chapter 6, professors and 
students from the Fourah Bay College or local researchers such as Momo Turay or 
James Vincent collaborated with HMG-funded SSR programmes in Sierra Leone. 
Nonetheless, their access to British street-level bureaucrats and influence on UK-led 
policy in the country remained limited if compared to their Western and British 
colleagues.  
 The typology presented in Figure 20 also indicates how all the three different 
types of research analysed in the table increased their impact and influence on policy 
from the conflict to the post-conflict period. As demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6, two 
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main variables accounted for the improved influence of research on policy: the 
increased stability of the country context, and the progressive evolution of SSR as a 
policy and related research agenda. As a result, positive shifts in these two variables 
contributed to a more consolidated policy network of policy-makers, street-level 
bureaucrats, and researchers, which in turn facilitated an increased use and policy uptake 
of research in the post-conflict years.192 
Some of the narratives and accounts of the Sierra Leone case study are in line 
with Hall’s work on first, second, and third order change, and his suggestion that 
paradigm shifts in policy-making emerge in times of crisis. Hall states that paradigm 
changes “can rarely be made on scientific grounds alone” (Hall, 1993, p. 280), and 
“politicians rather than experts” (Hall, 1993, p. 288) play a dominant role at the 
beginning of such processes. The process of change rapidly spills “well beyond the 
boundaries of the state” (Hall, 1993, p. 288) to involve other actors such as the media, 
researchers, as well as outside interests. In his account of third order changes, Hall 
asserts that “the play of ideas was as important to the outcome as was the contest for 
power” (Hall, 1993, p. 289). In particular, the author underlines that “new research 
institutes sprang up, […] something similar to a ‘policy network’ or ‘issue network’ 
sprang up to provide outsiders with influence over a formerly closed policy process” 
(Hall, 1993, p. 289).  
The case of Sierra Leone presents some of the features of Hall’s account of 
third order changes. As explained in part 1.1 of the thesis, the launch of the SSR policy 
agenda in the late 1990s and the decision to intervene in the country followed a 
moment of crisis, as previous solutions in Sierra Leone were not working and HMG 
required a longer-term and more integrated approach to reform the security sector of 
                                                          
192 The fact that the improved stability of the country context was one of the main variables favouring an 
increased use and uptake of research in policy in the post-conflict years does not preclude the possibility 
that research itself could contribute in a variety of ways to the nurturing, structuring, and creation of 
these improved conditions of stability. The main aim of the thesis – and of its related ESRC/DFID 
project – is to investigate the ways in which research has influenced and interacted with British policy in 
fragile, conflict-affected countries. This PhD thesis and the related project therefore explore the different 
dynamics of research utilisation in policy and the interactions between policy and research, without 
looking at policy outcomes and at the ways in which the use of research in policy actually contributed to 
change the conditions of stability in conflict-affected environments. As a result, in the case of Sierra 
Leone analysed in this PhD, research conducted in the conflict phase was surely instrumental in 
improving the stability of the country (for instance, through the direct uptake in policy programmes that 
contributed to an increased stability). However, the thesis – in line with the overarching ESRC/DFID 
research project – only investigates the ways in which research has interacted and influenced with British 
HMG SSR policy in Sierra Leone, without looking at the ways in which the policy use and uptake of such 
research has actually changed the conditions of stability in the country. 
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the West African state. Furthermore, Chapter 5 demonstrated that the intervention in 
Sierra Leone represented an important policy shift for different HMG departments that 
had never collaborated before. The chapter showed how, in line with Hall’s account of 
third order changes, politicians such as Tony Blair and Clare Short, developments on 
the ground, political calculations, as well as ideas and the media193 all contributed to the 
decision to intervene in Sierra Leone. Likewise, Chapters 5 and 6 underlined how, in 
accordance with Hall’s account of third order changes, new research institutes and a 
policy network sprang up over the years, providing important guidance and direction to 
HMG policy-makers and British street-level bureaucrats working in conflict-affected 
Sierra Leone.  
7.3 Why? The role of policy networks and the ingredients of high impact 
The Sierra Leone case study also shed light on the different reasons why research 
influences policy. Chapters 5 and 6 of the thesis underlined how the progressive 
consolidation and institutionalisation of the network of policy-makers, street-level 
bureaucrats, and researchers was an important factor determining an increased use of 
research in British-led SSR policy in the country. Policy networks thus matter and play 
an important role in the take-up of research. Narratives of research utilisation from the 
post-conflict phase highlighted how networks can foster formal and informal 
relationships between policy-makers and researchers; they give street-level bureaucrats 
the possibility to consult experts and knowledgeable people on a regular basis; they 
define insiders and outsiders; and they help build long-term trust and collaborations 
with a defined group of researchers. 
Marsh and Rhodes’s theoretical understanding of policy networks differentiated 
networks from their various degrees of membership, integration, resources, and power. 
Likewise, the dialectical approach to policy networks focused on conceptual, 
environmental, contextual, political, ideological, institutional, cultural, and ethical 
variability within and across networks. In line with these theoretical approaches, the 
analysis in Chapters 5 and 6 and the descriptions of the policy networks in the conflict 
                                                          
193 Part 5.4 of the thesis reported that allegations about British involvement in the ‘arms to Africa’ affair, 
the legacy of Rwanda genocide, and the possible criticisms about the different UK engagement in the 
Balkans and in Sierra Leone also contributed to the decision to intervene in the country. In line with 
Hall’s account, it is also important not to neglect the importance of media in policy change. In 1994, the 
very influential article ‘The Coming Anarchy’, written by Robert Kaplan and circulated to every US 
embassy around the world, indicated conflict-ridden Sierra Leone as the epitome of a future world “in 
which criminal anarchy emerges as the real ‘strategic’ danger” (Kaplan, 1994). 
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and post-conflict years have demonstrated how the characteristics and nature of policy 
networks are important factors explaining the differential impact and uptake of research 
in policy. In this respect, the connections and linkages in the figures of the policy 
networks in Chapters 5 and 6 symbolised different levels of interactions between 
research and policy actors. The descriptions of the networks in Chapters 5 and 6 and 
the presence (or lack) of solid and dotted lines connecting the different actors can help 
explain the reasons why only some researchers and studies have influenced and 
interacted with British-led SSR policy in Sierra Leone. 
 The different connections and the background colour of the policy networks in 
Chapters 5 and 6 visually symbolised politics/power relationships underpinning the 
linkages between research and policy actors. These different relationships imply that, in 
line with the dialectical approach to policy networks and with Marsh and Rhodes’ 
model, conceptual, environmental, contextual, political, ideological, institutional, 
cultural, and ethical variability exists within and across networks and networks differ for 
levels of membership, integration, resources, and power. Ultimately, these 
politics/power relationships determine the reasons why specific pieces of research 
influence policy or not. For instance, narratives from the Sierra Leone case study 
showed how HMG-funded research centres like the GFN-SSR and GSDRC or 
intermediary figures working for HMG such as Senior Research Fellows, DFID 
knowledge brokers, or FCO research analysts have a high level of membership, 
integration, and resources and, ultimately, more chance that their research products can 
feed into policy papers and programmes at both headquarters and country levels. 
Likewise, cash-transaction research and studies commissioned ad hoc had a high level 
of uptake at country level. Conversely, the absence or low influence of Southern 
research is a consequence of the limited level of membership, integration, resources, 
and power of Southern researchers and academic institutions. In practical terms, this 
entails a limited access to donors’ funding, a low level of interaction with street-level 
bureaucrats and policy-makers, and, ultimately, a very low influence of such research on 
policy.  
The Sierra Leone case study highlighted some main factors facilitating the use 
and uptake of research in policy. These factors can be considered as the principal 
ingredients needed for research to have high impact on policy. Some of these factors 
have been already analysed in the literature on research utilisation (Edwards & Evans 
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M., 2011) and indicate those cognitive, institutional, and environmental ingredients, as 
well as those supply and demand dimensions that underpin the research-policy 
relationship and ultimately favour the utilisation of research in policy. Waldman, 
Barakat and Varisco (2014) divided these factors in four main structural, policy, 
research, and translation sub-sets, which encompass the various ingredients needed for 
research to have high policy uptake. Chapters 5 and 6 showed how these ingredients 
also underpinned the use and uptake of research in policy in the Sierra Leone case. 
At structural level, Waldman, Barakat, and Varisco (2014) underlined that some 
underlying factors such as a country’s context and stability, institutional dynamics, as 
well as politics and ideology can all impact on research use in policy. Indeed, Chapters 5 
and 6 repeatedly indicated how an increased security in Sierra Leone and the progressive 
creation of institutional mechanisms to account for research in policy were instrumental 
in improving the use and uptake of research in policy in the post-conflict phase. 
Likewise, the political circumstances or ideological preferences can contribute to the 
emergence of research on state building or SSR topics. In particular, the politicisation of 
particular issues can “serve to catalyse research use” (Waldman, Barakat & Varisco, 
2014, p. 194), as policy-makers might seek research to justify or support their policy 
agenda. In this respect, the role of media can contribute to explain why policy-driven 
research tends to cluster around certain cases and issues. As already underlined, 
allegations about British involvement in the ‘arms to Africa’ affair increased media 
attention on the UK role in the Sierra Leone conflict and contributed to the decision to 
intervene in the country.  
At policy level – the demand dimension of the policy-research interaction – 
Waldman, Barakat, and Varisco (2014) underlined how improvements in research 
management, organisation dynamics, and processes of research utilisation are important 
ingredients that favour the impact of research on policy. These same ingredients 
contributed to an increased use of research in the case of Sierra Leone. A growing 
interest for research at HMG and DFID level fostered over the years the creation of 
numerous mechanisms to promote evidence-based policy as part of the UK state 
building and SSR policy process. This progressive push toward a more rigorous 
utilisation of research in policy “was manifested in clear commitments to improving 
research uptake in various high level policy documents […]; increased funding for 
research and research activities; new research funding frameworks; innovative roles and 
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positions devoted to improving uptake in government; and organisational restructuring” 
(Waldman, Barakat & Varisco, 2014, p. 194). This appetite for research fostered 
increasing funding for researchers, fellows, Research Programme Consortia, centres, 
and teams producing research on state building and SSR topics. Eventually, it 
contributed to a progressive evolution of state building and SSR in policy and research, 
a second important variable explaining the increased utilisation of research in HMG 
policy in the Sierra Leone case. 
At research level – the supply dimension of the policy-research nexus – 
Waldman, Barakat and Varisco (2014) noted how important ingredients determining the 
high impact of research are the quality of its format and presentation, its dissemination 
and communication, its focus, content, and quality. The particular attributes of a 
research can therefore affect its potential influence on policy. Findings from Sierra 
Leone confirmed this general point, as in hectic, unstable fragile countries research 
needs to be timely, usable, accessible, and relevant. In particular, the way a research is 
presented, disseminated, and communicated can make a considerable difference in its 
ultimate uptake in policy. Clear and well-written studies that avoid dense and technical 
language, or reports with a concise executive summary and actionable recommendations 
have more chances to be read by busy policy-makers and street-level bureaucrats. 
Likewise, the presentation of a research product to policy-makers in seminars or 
workshops accrues their engagement with the study and might foster trust and personal 
interactions between researchers and policy actors.   
Waldman, Barakat, and Varisco (2014) further indicated that translation factors 
at the research-policy interface such as the presence and role of intermediaries and 
formal and informal networks are additional important ingredients that favour the high 
impact of a research on policy. This section has already underlined how networks 
matter in the ultimate use and uptake of research in policy. Likewise, the case of Sierra 
Leone has demonstrated how the creation of intermediary roles such as DFID 
knowledge brokers or the FCO research analysts, as well as the increasing collaboration 
of senior academics with HMG improved the linkages between research and policy and 
fostered a better uptake of research findings in policy. 
Finally, different indicators can suggest a high uptake of research in policy. The 
particular backward-tracking approach of the thesis entailed that Chapters 5 and 6 
mostly focused on those pieces and studies that were deemed influential by the policy-
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makers and street-level bureaucrats interviewed. As a result, many of the research 
studies presented in the thesis have been directly used in policy. Their authors 
established regular formal and informal connections with HMG personnel at 
headquarters level or in Sierra Leone, sometimes contributing to the writing of policy 
papers or SSR country programmes. The direct quotation of articles, books, and studies 
in policy papers – as in the case of Albrecht and Jackson’s book – is an obvious 
indicator of the use of research. Likewise, the authorship of a policy paper or a report, 
or the collaboration of a researcher in country programmes usually signal a long-term 
interaction between such researcher and his/her funders. Other indicators of high level 
uptake are less explicit and can be ascertained only following a thorough investigation. 
Content analysis of speeches, policy and country papers clearly demonstrated how main 
concepts emerged in the state building and SSR literature incrementally shaped the SSR 
policy discourse. Likewise, interviews with policy-makers and street-level bureaucrats 
often indicated policy actors’ wide knowledge of the main researchers and debates in 
the field of state building and SSR. 
7.4 How? The different use of research in policy  
The literature on research utilisation explored the different ways in which research is 
used as part of the policy process. Research is a heterogeneous product which is sought 
and used by policy-makers and street-level bureaucrats for the most disparate reasons. 
Research can drive the design and implementation of different policy programmes; it 
can indicate alternative policy solutions; it can question, legitimise, or justify current 
policy practices; it can elicit or satisfy the curiosity of single policy-makers and street-
level bureaucrats, it can provide sociological or anthropological information on a 
country, region, or culture; it can be commissioned as part of the policy process to 
evaluate the effectiveness of particular projects or programmes. 
 The empirical analysis of Chapters 5 and 6 highlighted the different ways in 
which research has interacted with British-led SSR policy in conflict-affected Sierra 
Leone. These different types of interactions encompassed several models described by 
the theoretical literature on research utilisation. In the majority of the cases presented in 
Chapters 5 and 6 of the thesis, research findings fed directly in SSR policy or 
programming. In line with Weiss’ problem-solving model, street-level bureaucrats in 
Sierra Leone commissioned studies and analyses to respond to specific policy 
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exigencies, find specific information and data on the situation on the ground, and guide 
or evaluate their policy programmes and activities. Sometimes, the authors of this 
research directly worked alongside policy-makers and street-level bureaucrats, such in 
the cases of Dylan Hendrickson’s coordination of DFID’s guidelines on SSR and Peter 
Albrecht’s work as technical adviser for the ASJP. 
 Research has been utilised politically as ‘ammunition’ in policy negotiations, as 
happened in the case of the IMATT member quoting the book of Peter Albrecht and 
Paul Jackson to enhance the credibility of his arguments in conversations with peers. 
Research concepts and themes such as state fragility or the necessity to integrate 
security and justice in SSR progressively percolated and shaped the policy discourse, 
finding their way in speeches of policy-makers at headquarters level as well as in country 
papers and programming decisions of street-level bureaucrats on the ground. In line 
with Weiss’ percolation model, this kind of influence has been more indirect. Policy 
actors got acquainted with concepts through a cumulative process of osmosis; over 
time, these concepts enlightened and shaped their policy practices and discourses. 
Finally, interviews in Sierra Leone underlined how the recent organisational 
pressure to demonstrate the evidence-base of policy programmes has moved 
practitioners to use research in a justificatory way with the aim to support 
predetermined courses of actions or to abide by organisational requirements at 
headquarters level. A number of respondents acknowledged that research is often used 
or selected to cynically justify or support predetermined policy choices. Street-level 
bureaucrats tend to refer to the main research papers that set the tone of the 
conversation at headquarters level and look for evidence to back their decisions in 
country. The use of policy-based research evidence – the tendency of street-level 
bureaucrats to retrofit the evidence to fit decisions already taken – is a form of research 
utilisation different from the use of evidence-based research in policy. This particular 
form of research utilisation is rarely analysed by the literature on the subject. 
Nonetheless, interviews in Sierra Leone underlined how this justificatory use of research 
appears to be a common practice in HMG in current days, and it might be interpreted 
as a sort of defence mechanism against the recent increasing organisational pressure that 





The chapter has synthesised the main findings of the thesis into a single analysis and 
assessment. It linked the empirical findings presented in Chapters 5 and 6 to the 
theoretical literature on research utilisation and policy networks introduced in Chapter 
2. It analysed and assessed the Sierra Leone case study and clarified when, why, and 
how different types of research have different kinds of policy impacts – or not.  
 The chapter built a typology to demonstrate how various types of research – 
academic, ad hoc, and Southern – had different policy impacts during and after the 
Sierra Leone conflict. It explored the role played by policy networks in the take-up of 
research: it argued that the characteristics and nature of policy networks, their internal 
variability and different level of membership, integration, resources, and power, as well 
as the politics/power relations among the actors in the networks are important factors 
explaining the differential impact and uptake of research on policy. It described the 
cognitive, institutional, and environmental ingredients – presented in the form of 
structural, policy, research, and translation factors – that determine a high impact of 
research on policy. Furthermore, it gave an account of different indicators through 
which research uptake in policy can be ascertained. Finally, the chapter analysed the 
ways in which research is used in policy and reconnected the findings from the Sierra 
Leone case study to the theories and paradigms of research utilisation introduced in 
Part 2.4 of the thesis. It showed how the utilisation of research in British-led SSR in 
Sierra Leone followed most of the models presented by Weiss in 1979. It added that 
street-level bureaucrats in the country do not hesitate to use of research in a justificatory 
way in order to justify predetermined or ongoing policy choices.  
 The following Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by presenting the main 
conclusions of this PhD. It emphasises the relevance of the case study to contemporary 
SSR interventions, and derives some general reflections on the role of research in SSR 
policy from the Sierra Leone experience. Furthermore, the chapter abandons the 
descriptive, explanatory approach of the thesis to shift toward a more normative and 
prescriptive approach and provide a series of recommendations aimed to improve the 
use and uptake of research in SSR policies implemented by international organisation 





8. Conclusions and recommendations 
8.1 Introduction 
This PhD has examined the extent to which research has influenced and interacted with 
British-led SSR policy in conflict-affected Sierra Leone. Chapter 1 introduced the 
empirical context underpinning the research and the main question and sub-questions 
addressed by this study. The theoretical portion of the thesis then presented 
frameworks, ideas, and concepts that facilitated a deeper understanding and exploration 
of the principal question and sub-questions of the research. Chapter 2 outlined notions 
and ideas pertaining to the literature on the policy process and research utilisation. 
Chapter 3 then re-elaborated these concepts in light of the recent policy and research 
evolution of state building and SSR, presenting an ideal policy network of practitioners 
and researchers stretching from headquarters to fragile, conflict-affected countries. 
Following an overview of the methodology in Chapter 4, the empirical part of this 
research employed and operationalised these theoretical concepts in the context of 
conflict-affected Sierra Leone. Chapters 5 and 6 provided a visual conceptualisation of 
the evolution of the network of SSR researchers and practitioners from the UK to 
Sierra Leone to explain how the use and influence of research in British-led SSR policy 
improved from a period of ‘fire-fighting’ solutions to the more stable post-conflict 
years. The two chapters linked the theory on policy networks presented in the first part 
of the thesis to the empirical reality of conflict-affected Sierra Leone, showing how two 
main variables – the stability of the country context and the evolution of the SSR policy 
and research agenda – impacted on the use of research and knowledge by street-level 
bureaucrats on the ground. Finally, chapter 7 synthesised the main findings of the case 
study into a single analysis and assessment. 
 Chapter 8 completes this PhD research by revisiting the conclusions of the 
thesis and by deriving from the Sierra Leone case study a series of general 
recommendations aimed to improve the utilisation of research in SSR and state building 
policies. The chapter will also underline the importance of this PhD for the literature on 
post-war recovery and research utilisation. In particular, the recommendations section 
of the chapter shifts from the descriptive, explanatory analysis of the precedent chapters 
to a normative, prescriptive approach. The distinction between these two main 
categories is common in several academic disciplines, from linguistic to philosophy and 
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ethics. Generally speaking, explanatory approaches are fact-based accounts that describe 
a phenomenon as it is, and not as it should be. By contrast, normative approaches 
“posit some set of values and recommend action on the basis of those values” 
(Vanderheiden, 2010, p. 313), they relate to an ideal standard or model of how things 
ought to be, and prescribe the best means, rules, and recommendations “of achieving a 
desired condition” (Evans M., 2007, p. 141). In the context of this PhD, the precedent 
chapters of the thesis have used an explanatory approach to describe the ways in which 
research interacted and was used as part of the British-led SSR policy process in Sierra 
Leone. Conversely, the recommendations section of this chapter uses a normative, 
prescriptive approach to provide a set of general measures that could favour and 
increase the influence of research on state building and SSR policies in fragile, conflict-
affected environments. 
 Chapter 8 is divided into three main parts. Part 8.2 provides the main 
explanatory conclusions of the thesis. It starts by recapitulating the gap in the literature 
identified in Section 1.2 and explains the ways in which this PhD research has originally 
addressed, analysed, and filled this gap. It summarises the main argument of the thesis 
to illustrate how the empirical analysis of the study has explored, investigated, and shed 
light on the main question and the different sub-questions of this study. From the main 
explanatory conclusions of the thesis and the empirical analysis presented in Chapters 5 
and 6, Part 8.3 derives a series of practical recommendations to improve the use and 
uptake of research in state building and SSR policy in fragile, conflict-affected countries. 
These recommendations constitute the main normative conclusions of the thesis and 
reinforce the methodological, theoretical, and empirical contribution of the study to the 
literature on research utilisation, as well as state building and SSR policy practices. They 
strengthen “researchers’ and policy-makers’ ability to interact in a manner conducive to 
evidence-based policies” (Anon., 2010, p. 6), helping them maximise the influence and 
impact of research on their programmes and policies. Finally, Part 8.4 concludes the 
thesis by underlining the importance of this PhD research for the general literature on 
research utilisation and post-war recovery. The analysis acknowledges the ground-
breaking nature of this study and sets the thesis in a bigger context, highlighting the 
positive features and the limitations and potential weaknesses of this research, and 
pointing to future research directions that could stem from this work. 
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8.2 The influence of research on SSR policy: explanatory conclusions from the 
Sierra Leone case study 
Section 1.2 in the introductory chapter of this thesis identified a gap in the literature on 
research utilisation and post-conflict recovery. It stressed how, despite a growing 
importance of state building and SSR in post-war recovery policy practices and an 
increase of research on these topics, the literature on research utilisation has rarely 
explored the interactions between policy and research in such fields of enquiry. In 
underlining this gap in the literature, it argued that a careful analysis of the dynamics 
and key factors underpinning the use of state building and SSR-oriented research in 
policy was needed from both a theoretical and an empirical point of view.  
From a theoretical point of view, such a study would test the applicability of the 
literature on the research-policy nexus in an international domain and under-studied and 
problematic fields of research like state building and SSR in fragile, conflict-affected 
environments. Whilst several studies investigated the numerous factors impeding, 
hindering, or postponing the uptake of research into policy (Caplan, 1979; Carden, 
2004; Coleman, 1991; Edwards, 2005; Garrett & Islam, 1998; Majone, 1989; Mulgan, 
2005; Nutley, Davies & Walter, 2002; Perri 6, 2002; Porter & Prysor-Jones, 1997; Sen, 
2010; Shaxson, 2005; Stone, 2002), the literature exploring the use of research in state 
building and SSR has thus far remained limited (Ball & Hendrickson, 2006; Barakat, 
Waldman & Varisco, 2011a; CSDG, 2008; Sugden, 2006). Because of its direct 
engagement with the relationship between research and policy in the SSR and state 
building sectors, such research would represent an important and ground-breaking 
reflection on the policy process and the utilisation of research in internationally-led state 
building and SSR policies implemented in insecure fragile, conflict-affected 
environments. 
Likewise, from an empirical point of view, analysis that addresses the gaps 
identified in the literature would include significant advice for British and international 
policy-makers and street-level bureaucrats working in current and future conflict-
affected environments, as well as important recommendations to guide their activities in 
war-torn societies. It would assess the extent to which street-level bureaucrats in fragile 
countries have the capacity to absorb and assimilate research findings. Additionally, it 
would devote particular attention to the cultural compatibility of research users within 
DFID and other UK governmental departments and research providers, as well as to 
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personnel processes and incentive structures, including staff continuity and mobility, 
which are likely to affect research use and influence within British street-level 
bureaucrats on the ground. It would examine the extent to which the increasing HMG 
investments in research are actually generating a ‘return’ in policy, providing useful 
recommendations to improve the use and influence of research in state building and 
SSR policy.  
This PhD research has addressed and filled the gap introduced in Section 1.2 of 
the thesis in an original and systematic way. Drawing upon the literature on policy 
process and research utilisation in policy, this study re-adapted it to the post-conflict 
state building and SSR fields. The analysis started from the literature on policy networks 
to examine the extent to which research has influenced and interacted with policy in a 
particular case study – namely the British-led SSR assistance in conflict-affected Sierra 
Leone. The empirical chapters of the thesis progressively constructed and explored the 
network of policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and researchers who worked on SSR 
in Sierra Leone during the conflict and post-conflict years. In presenting these 
networks, the chapters explained that the utilisation of SSR research in policy has 
progressively increased from an initial period of ‘fire-fighting’ solutions to the more 
stable post-conflict years. Furthermore, Chapters 5 and 6 introduced and analysed the 
main external and internal variables that determined the extension of the network of 
policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and researchers over time.  
 In addressing and filling the gap in the literature presented in Section 1.2, the 
different chapters of the thesis have also addressed the main question of this PhD 
research: to what extent has research influenced and interacted with British 
governmental SSR policy in conflict-affected Sierra Leone? The theoretical framework 
presented in Chapters 2 and 3, the solid methodology outlined in Chapter 4, and the 
narratives of research utilisation described in Chapters 5 and 6 clarified and deepened 
the understanding of the principal question of this study. The analysis of the Sierra 
Leone case study illustrated and proved the main argument of the thesis: two main 
variables – the country’s increased stability and a progressive evolution of SSR as a 
policy practice and related research agenda – accounted for the increased influence and 
use of research in British-led SSR policy activities over time. Positive shifts in these two 
variables combined to improve the uptake of research into British HMG policy-making 
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and activities of British street-level bureaucrats in Sierra Leone from a period of ‘fire-
fighting’ solutions to the post-conflict years. 
 In particular, an improved stability in the country following the end of the Civil 
War in 2002 resulted in a better access to the different war-ridden provinces and regions 
which allowed street-level bureaucrats and researchers on the ground to collect an 
increasing amount of information. British street-level bureaucrats’ local and contextual 
knowledge improved progressively throughout this period, fostered by more regular 
visits to the different provinces of the country and by an improved understanding of the 
local culture. Furthermore, the re-establishment of security in the post-conflict period 
meant that British street-level bureaucrats faced less compelling policy decisions and 
therefore had more time to reflect on their policies and digest different studies and 
reports produced at local and international levels. The urgent policy and programme 
decisions taken in the conflict period were thus progressively replaced by a more 
articulated and structured policy process during the post-war years. As a result, British-
led SSR programmes and activities were increasingly shaped and modelled by ad hoc, 
policy-driven research, studies, and surveys conducted by international and local 
researchers, but also by concepts and notions that emerged from the burgeoning SSR 
international research agenda during the same period.  
  Likewise, the evolution of the SSR policy and research agenda over the last 15 
years also contributed to the improved utilisation of research in policy documents at 
headquarters level and in SSR programmes and activities in conflict-affected Sierra 
Leone. As the SSR policy agenda developed in the UK in the late 1990s was increasingly 
adopted at international level, SSR research also expanded. It progressively interacted 
with the policies and programme activities of international actors and bilateral donors. 
This evolution of the SSR agenda at British and international levels, combined with an 
improved level of organisation and technology in Sierra Leone country offices, 
increased the number of channels through which street-level bureaucrats on the ground 
could become acquainted with research. Today, research products have the potential to 
reach street-level bureaucrats in fragile countries through a variety of both 
institutionalised and more informal avenues. Findings based on the information 
provided in the interviews undertaken throughout the course of this study confirmed 
that street-level bureaucrats usually get acquainted with the latest developments in SSR 
research through the academic work of institutions like Birmingham University and 
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CSDG or through reports prepared by research institutes and organisations such as 
DCAF, Saferworld, ODI, and Chatham House.  
The creation of institutional mechanisms and intermediary roles also facilitated 
the use of research at HMG level, increasing and strengthening the channels of research 
utilisation. Today, British street-level bureaucrats in fragile, conflict-affected countries 
can consult the work of intermediaries: resource centres such as the GSDRC; network 
hubs such as the GFN-SSR; colleagues specifically working on research such as FCO 
analysts or people in DFID’s RED. They find most materials online, on the website of 
the SU, in emails with research summaries circulating among the advisory network, or 
in presentations and copies of reports, newsletters, workshops, video conferences, and 
annual retreats. Incentives from the Head of Office are an additional and equally 
important way through which research shapes the daily work of street-level bureaucrats 
in fragile countries, as some of the main concepts in the academic literature are usually 
filtered through policy guidance from headquarters or staff in higher positions. Some 
interviewees mentioned the role of DFID evidence brokers; however, few practitioners 
considered and relied on them as a first port of call for research, because their role in 
the Department is still quite new and not completely clear to street-level bureaucrats. 
Additionally, most practitioners prefer to rely on evidence coming from people based 
in-country. Likewise, most street-level bureaucrats had no clear idea about the possible 
future role of the DFID-sponsored PEAKS, centres providing knowledge services in 
the areas of climate, environment, infrastructure; livelihoods economics and private 
sector governance; social development, conflict and humanitarian health; and education. 
The empirical analysis of the Sierra Leone case study has also investigated the 
different sub-questions of this PhD research. The first sub-question of the PhD 
inquired about the ways in which the network of researchers and policy actors working 
on SSR in conflict-affected Sierra Leone has evolved during the conflict and post-
conflict years. The thesis explored this sub-question by providing a visual 
conceptualisation of the evolution of the network over the years. Chapters 5 and 6 
graphically depicted how this network – and the relationships and connections of the 
actors within it – expanded and improved from the conflict period to the post-war 
years. The analysis argued that the two main variables that accounted for an increased 
use of research in policy acted as external (the stability and security of the country) and 
internal (the evolution of the SSR policy and research agenda) factors that determined 
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the shape and extension of the network of policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and 
researchers working on SSR in Sierra Leone. Policy-makers in London, street-level 
bureaucrats in Sierra Leone, and researchers informing HMG policy at the headquarters 
and country levels established a growing and consolidated network over the years. The 
number of actors in this network expanded over time, and their interconnections and 
links were progressively institutionalised and reinforced. Developments outside and 
within the research-policy network thus interacted with one another, eventually 
contributing to a more structured and articulated network of policy and research actors, 
and, by extension, to an increased use, influence, and interaction of research with 
British-led SSR policy in Sierra Leone. 
The second sub-question of this PhD sought to identify the main contextual 
factors and exigencies that hindered or promoted the uptake of research into British-led 
SSR policy in Sierra Leone. The empirical chapters of the thesis examined and 
presented these factors and exigencies. During the conflict years, the compelling 
situation on the ground, the need for urgent solutions, and political considerations, 
limited the policy options of British street-level bureaucrats working in the country. 
Contextual factors, political necessities, and historical circumstances sometimes shaped 
the early SSR policies more than research, as the unstable situation on the ground 
necessitated urgent interventions and rapid decisions. For example, the decision to 
postpone the downsizing of the Army was dictated by the necessity to reintegrate the 
different rebel groups within the state system, as opposed to leave them unchecked and 
potentially dangerous outside the government’s Armed Forces. Likewise, the decision to 
maintain the OSD was taken only as a result of the fundamental role played by the 
paramilitary forces in defending Freetown from the RUF attack in 1999. Similarly, the 
corrupt reputation of the Ministers of Internal Affairs resulted in the decision to limit 
the MIA oversight over the SLP. As a result, knowledge and research did not constitute 
the main drivers of some SSR policy decisions taken by British street-level bureaucrats 
in Sierra Leone during the conflict period.  
Conversely, the thesis has shown how enhanced stability on the ground, an 
increased access to both the provinces and to research, and improved technology in the 
country were the main contextual factors that coalesced to facilitate the better use of 
research in the post-conflict years. Nonetheless, interviews with British street-level 
bureaucrats and researchers have identified several issues and barriers that still hinder 
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the uptake of research into policy. The first and most common issue is time, which 
influences the research-policy nexus in at least three ways. Firstly, researchers usually do 
not have a great deal of time to conduct research, particularly when it is commissioned 
as part of the policy process. This short time frame puts pressure on researchers and 
might compromise the quality of their work, particularly when research requires long-
term understanding of a particular situation in context. Secondly, street-level 
bureaucrats working in fragile countries are continuously under pressure and extremely 
busy with the day-to-day demands of running projects; as a consequence, they usually 
lack time to wade through long documents or to carefully read and digest research 
findings. This lack of time is also a consequence of an increasing pressure on staff in 
recent time: for example, DFID’s commitment to ‘doing more with less’ has decreased 
the ratio of staff to funds, consequently squeezing out certain analytical and intellectual 
tasks. Thirdly, the long time needed for some research projects does not necessarily fit 
with the reality on the ground which is characterised by the necessity of taking quick 
decisions and by a high turnover of personnel. This rapid turnover of personnel can 
also impact upon the use of research, as the uptake of a commissioned study usually 
depends on the priorities of the next person arriving in a country. 
Street-level bureaucrats in the country indicated several other barriers hindering 
the uptake of research into their programmes. Some of these barriers, such as the 
pressure to see quick results or the existence of several competing processes in the 
country, are inherent to the nature of the programme implementation process in 
complex and dynamic conflict-affected environments. Others are more linked to 
organisational issues of both local government and country offices, such as problems of 
accessibility and availability, lack of institutional memory, resources, funding, and 
capacity to commission systematic research which is sustainable in the long term. 
Likewise, DFID personnel noted how problems of dissemination and communication 
sometimes make it impossible for people on the ground to know about all the research 
being funded and conducted in the country, particularly when some of these studies are 
outsourced to the private sector.  
The thesis has also investigated the third sub-question of this PhD research: 
what is the applicability of the literature on the research-policy nexus to the fast-paced, 
cross-governmental, institution-oriented, and internationalised challenge of state 
building and SSR in fragile, conflict-affected environments? The empirical analysis of 
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Chapters 5 and 6 has re-elaborated concepts, ideas, and theories pertaining to the 
literature on policy networks and research utilisation in light of the findings from the 
Sierra Leone case study. The chapters used the theoretical approach of the policy 
networks to show how the network of policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and 
researchers working on British-led SSR in Sierra Leone has evolved and expanded over 
the years. The figures in Chapters 5 and 6 proposed a new, original, and unique policy 
network model that stretched from the UK to Sierra Leone and visually illustrated the 
particular international SSR policy process and the different interactions between 
research and policy at headquarters and country levels.  
Likewise, narratives from the case study have confirmed how some theoretical 
models and barriers to research utilisation that typically characterise the research-policy 
nexus in domestic policy processes have equally qualified the use of research in an 
internationally-led policy such as British-led SSR in conflict-affected Sierra Leone. 
However, the thesis has shown how the international dimension of state building and 
SSR policies adds a further layer of complexity to the use of research into policy. It also 
identified the stability and security of a country context as a main variable impacting on 
the use of research by actors on the ground. Peculiar challenges and barriers such as the 
lack of access to provinces, the presence of competing agendas from numerous 
international and local actors, or the need to take sensitive policy decisions in a limited 
amount of time characterise the policy process and might limit the uptake of research in 
policy in fragile, conflict-affected countries. As a result, narratives of research utilisation 
from the Sierra Leone case study have illustrated how street-level bureaucrats on the 
ground often rely on policy-driven, action-oriented research commissioned ad hoc in-
country, whereas academic or theoretical studies produced in universities are most likely 
to influence policy papers and strategies at headquarters levels.  
Staff involved in implementing programmes considered some research of no 
utility for the particular context in which they operate. They noted how some academic 
studies, despite their influence at headquarters level, are sometimes unable to fully 
describe a complex country situation like the one in Sierra Leone, as they usually lack an 
element of political economy, history, or anthropology. Some influential research at 
headquarters level thus is not necessarily useful for people working in fragile countries, 
as it appears not sufficiently plugged into the realities of what people are facing on the 
ground. As shown by the Sierra Leonean example, conditions on the ground often 
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require street-level bureaucrats to get empirically sound and focused outputs, conducted 
rapidly enough to feed into and influence policy. Conversely, academic research requires 
a long time to be generated and feed into the policy process. As a consequence, 
academic research maintained a limited or indirect influence on the activities of British 
street-level bureaucrats in the country. In contrast, short-term, policy-driven research 
focusing on specific country issues was often extremely influential for the 
implementation of programmes. This created, and still creates, a ‘research-policy’ gap 
that is difficult for donors to narrow. Striking the right balance between long-term, 
innovative academic research and short-term, operationally-driven, policy-oriented 
research remains thus a challenge for international and bilateral donors working on SSR.  
Through its engagement in each of the issues presented in the sub-questions, 
this PhD thesis is a unique and original study on the use of research in a specific 
internationally-led policy (SSR) designed and implemented by the UK in a conflict-
affected country (Sierra Leone). This ground-breaking study explored an under-studied 
field of enquiry in a systematic way, highlighting the various dynamic interactions 
between policy and research in state building and SSR. The thesis identified, analysed, 
and addressed a gap in the research utilisation literature, employing theoretical notions 
and concepts pertaining to the literature on policy networks to examine the extent to 
which research influenced and interacted with British-led SSR policy in Sierra Leone. 
The empirical analysis of the case study built and explored the unique network of 
policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and researchers working on SSR in Sierra Leone 
during the conflict and post-conflict years. Furthermore, the narratives of research 
utilisation presented in the course of the thesis shed light on the principal question and 
the different sub-questions of this PhD research.  
The fourth and final sub-question of this PhD asked what measures could 
favour and increase the influence of research upon state building and SSR policies in 
fragile, conflict-affected environments. Part 8.3 examines this sub-question in depth. It 
builds upon the empirical analysis of Chapters 5 and 6 and the explanatory conclusions 
presented in this section of the thesis to provide some recommendations that could 






The Sierra Leone case study investigated the complicated and multifaceted subject of 
research utilisation, improving the theoretical and practical understanding of the 
interaction between SSR and state building-oriented research and policy. Lessons from 
the Sierra Leone case study – an intervention considered successful by some SSR 
scholars and practitioners – can improve the understanding of the research-policy nexus 
in similar SSR and state building engagements in fragile, conflict-affected countries.  
 As repeatedly analysed in the course of the thesis, two main variables – the 
stability of the context and a progressive evolution of SSR in policy and research – 
impacted upon the use and uptake of research in British-led SSR policy in Sierra Leone 
over time. In this regard, contemporary SSR and state building interventions in fragile, 
conflict-affected environments also benefitted from this progressive evolution of SSR in 
policy and research. Today, SSR is one of the main externally-led security policies 
promoted by the international community in the aftermath of a conflict. It has been 
adopted as a policy prescription by several bilateral donors and international actors as 
part of a burgeoning state building agenda that rapidly evolved over the last decade. 
Institutional structures such as cross-governmental units or advisory teams have 
supported SSR policy programmes and activities of numerous bilateral donors. 
Likewise, international networks and bodies such as the OECD International Network 
on Conflict and Fragility have promoted the SSR agenda at international level. At the 
same time, the theoretical literature and the amount of SSR and state building-oriented 
research has rapidly grown over time, and international, British, and local research 
centres today constitute invaluable sources of information for policy-makers at 
headquarters level and street-level bureaucrats in fragile, conflict-affected countries.  
 If the evolution of SSR in policy and research has therefore had a positive 
impact on the use and uptake of research in contemporary SSR and state building 
engagements in fragile countries, the instability of the context, the second variable 
identified by the thesis, has remained nonetheless one of the main factors hindering 
research utilisation in contemporary post-war recovery policies. The use of research in 
internationally-led SSR and state building policies in fragile, conflict-affected countries is 
therefore influenced by the same issues, themes, barriers, and limitations analysed by the 
general literature on research utilisation in policy. In addition to these factors, fragile 
contexts add particular security challenges that further complicate the collection and use 
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of information on the ground. Problems of access, capacity, lack of information, and 
instability characterise contemporary fragile, conflict-affected environments, and 
constitute unique challenges to the use and influence of research on SSR and state 
building policy processes. 
 In order to partially redress and tackle these unique challenges that limit the 
utilisation of research on SSR and state building policy in fragile, conflict-affected 
countries, the fourth and final sub-question of the thesis asked for measures that could 
favour the influence of research upon such policies. In this regard, interviews with 
policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and researchers have underlined some of the 
problems characterising the SSR research-policy nexus in fragile states. Some 
researchers and street-level bureaucrats bemoaned a disjunction between headquarters, 
country offices, and contractors in fragile states, noting how it created at times a 
‘research-policy gap’ and a difficult balance between academic concepts influencing 
policy practices at headquarters level and the policy-driven, ad hoc materials needed for 
policy implementation. Others pointed to organisational and structural deficiencies that 
hinder the use of research on policy programmes and activities.  
 Findings presented in Chapters 5 and 6 of this study and derived from 
interviews with policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and researchers, as well as the 
explanatory conclusions in the preceding section have suggested some 
recommendations to redress these problems and some of these suggestions have been 
incorporated in Section 8.2 of the thesis. The following section abandons the 
descriptive, explanatory approach of the precedent chapters to shift toward a more 
normative and prescriptive analysis. Drawing from the network of policy-makers, street-
level bureaucrats, and researchers working on British-led SSR in Sierra Leone presented 
in Figure 15 of Chapter 6, as well as the interviews with the main actors of this network, 
it sets forth a series of recommendations to improve the commission, management, 
dissemination, and utilisation of research in SSR programmes and policy. Some of these 
recommendations are aimed to improve the interactions, relationships, and exchange 
between policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and researchers. Others are more 
closely linked to structural issues characterising the activities of international actors and 
donors in fragile countries, such as the high rate of personnel turnover or the recent 




 Mainly rooted in the analysis of British-led SSR policy activities in Sierra Leone, 
the following set of recommendations can nonetheless be adopted by other 
international, bilateral, private, and non-governmental organisations and donors 
working in fragile contexts. Bilateral agencies like USAID, governments, or 
intergovernmental bodies such as the UN or the EU, international financial institutions 
like the World Bank, non-governmental or philanthropic entities such as the Gates 
Foundation, research sponsors like the ESRC or the Leverhulme Trust, and private 
sector actors could thus adopt the following recommendations derived from the main 
findings of this thesis. Recommendations derived from the Sierra Leone case study can 
thus carry international importance and improve the commissioning, management, 
dissemination, and utilisation of research by several policy actors working in post-
conflict state building and development. 
As previously underlined, the fragile stability and insecurity of a country context 
constitutes a major variable that hindered research utilisation in the Sierra Leone case 
study and in contemporary state building and SSR policies. As a consequence, 
interviews and conversations with street-level bureaucrats and researchers underlined 
how practitioners on the ground need, look for, and commission ad hoc operational, 
short-term pieces of research such as surveys and reports to improve their local 
knowledge and guide their activities in country. This policy-driven research is different 
from the academic research that is commissioned and tends to influence the activities of 
policy-makers at headquarters. The thesis has called this difference a ‘research-policy 
gap’ and has visually symbolised it by the predominant blue colour of international 
research in the background of the policy network of Figure 15 in Chapter 6. Ultimately, 
this gap entails the lack of a system within DFID and many bilateral donors that allows 
or adequately disaggregates between the long-term, innovative research needed at 
headquarters levels and the short-term, policy-driven research sought by street-level 
bureaucrats in fragile countries. Researchers also bear some of the responsibilities for 
this gap, as, according to some street-level bureaucrats interviewed, they sometimes 
tend to produce studies that are relevant only for the academic community rather than 
for practitioners in fragile countries, remaining in this way disjointed from the political 
realities faced by personnel on the ground.  
 Two different recommendations have been formulated with the aim to 
overcome this ‘research-policy’ gap and the apparent divide that sometimes emerges 
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between research and policy. The first of this recommendation for international 
organisations and donors is: promote a better exchange between the policy and the research 
communities. This recommendation aims at making research and policy actors aware of 
the different needs, requirements, and culture of their counterparts. This improved 
awareness could be obtained not only with better communication and more numerous 
initiatives to account for research in policy, but also with an increased flexibility and 
exchanges between the policy and the research world. For example, policy-makers and 
street-level bureaucrats working for international organisations and donors should be 
given the opportunity to take full or part-time paid leaves to attend Masters and 
academic courses (particularly with the recent offers of numerous online academic 
courses). On the other hand, academics and researchers should be afforded more 
opportunities to work alongside policy-makers at headquarters level or street-level 
bureaucrats in fragile countries to experience for some months the hectic dynamics 
characterising their daily policy work. Likewise, academia should be more open to 
outputs coming from the policy world, for example allowing policy-makers or street-
level bureaucrats to teach short courses or lecture at the Masters level. In this way, 
students and academics would be exposed to the practical problems characterising the 
design and implementation of state building, security, and development policy measures 
in fragile countries. This exchange would enrich the academic debate with the 
experiences of practitioners, improving the reciprocal understanding between the policy 
and research world. Researchers working on governance issues related to SSR or state 
building in fragile countries should explicitly target some of their research outputs, such 
as briefings and reports, to policy-makers and street-level bureaucrats. International 
organisations’ or governmental funding mechanisms for researchers should always 
include the preparation of a final report or policy briefing and its presentation in front 
of a policy audience. At the same time, academia should give more value to these 
policy-oriented activities, for example by linking career progression in universities not 
only to the publication of books or peer reviewed articles on academic journals, but also 
to the production and presentation of these policy-oriented research outputs to a policy 
audience. 
 Linked to this first recommendation, a second recommendation for donors to 
improve the use and influence of research on state building and SSR policy is: increase the 
role and contribution of international and local researchers at every stage of the policy-making and policy 
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implementation process. Steps in this direction would entail an increased collaboration 
between country offices in fragile countries and international or local country experts 
with expertise on particular countries or regional contexts. In the case of Sierra Leone, 
international researchers such as David Keen, Paul Jackson, Paul Richards, Richard 
Fanthorpe, Peter Albrecht, or Lisa Denney are examples of prominent names whose 
work has analysed in depth the causes and evolution of the war and the recent post-war 
recovery trajectory of the country. Besides them, local researchers such as Osman Gbla 
or regional experts working for the ASSN also have a greater expertise on the social, 
political, and economic history of the country and of the West African region.  
In some circumstances, international organisations and bilateral donors working 
in fragile countries are already making good use of these researchers and experts, who, 
as seen in the case of Sierra Leone, have been sometimes influential in the design and 
implementation of some policy programmes. However, few practical activities could 
further promote collaboration between these experts and practitioners at headquarters 
level and in country offices. If hiring and embedding one or more of these researchers 
within the country offices would prove prohibitively expensive, international and local 
experts nonetheless could be called upon to brief and collaborate with street-level 
bureaucrats in the country on a regular basis. In the British case, international experts 
on Sierra Leone who are based in the UK could brief British street-level bureaucrats 
before their posting to Freetown, for example. Likewise, local researchers could hold 
regular seminars for HMG street-level bureaucrats in Sierra Leone. This would provide 
personnel on the ground first-hand information and understanding of the country. 
Furthermore, it would build and improve local researchers’ capacity and access to 
international donors, two issues that, in the case of Sierra Leone, preclude a better use 
of local research by British street-level bureaucrats. In this regard, none of the policy 
actors interviewed – including those who worked in the country recently – mentioned 
the ASSN as a possible resource for their work. Considering the fact that DFID is one 
of the sponsors of the network, the role of the ASSN should be reinforced and the 
centre should be used more regularly as an important regional research hub. These 
kinds of efforts to foster regular collaboration between regional and local experts and 
HMG or international donors’ country offices could be easily replicated in other regions 
or countries of the world where British or international presence and involvement is 
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high and relevant. DFID’s creation of the South Asia Research Hub is an example of a 
positive step in this direction.  
The recent evolution of SSR in policy and research has been identified as a 
second variable that positively influenced the use of research in British-led policy in 
Sierra Leone. The findings presented in Chapters 5 and 6, and the numerous interviews 
with street-level bureaucrats, have underlined how the increased production of research 
on state building and SSR-related topics has facilitated the utilisation of research in 
policy. However, the recent and positive outgrowth of research has consequently 
resulted in a large amount of available research for policy-makers and street-level 
bureaucrats, who sometimes confessed the difficulties they experienced when searching 
for new research products, which eventually lead them to rely on a limited number of 
research suppliers. For example, HMG street-level bureaucrats in Freetown admitted 
that most of the times they do not have sufficient awareness of the work carried out by 
the different researchers in the country, even when this research is directly sponsored by 
DFID or HMG. Two additional recommendations have been thus formulated in order 
to overcome this problem and better align the burgeoning production and supply of 
research on state building and SSR with the increasing demand for research of street-
level bureaucrats in conflict-affected countries. 
The third recommendation addresses donors working in fragile countries: create 
a virtual space where researchers can communicate to street-level bureaucrats the work they are doing on 
a country. In particular, in the case of HMG the website R4D is an already existent hub 
for DFID-sponsored research. However, some interviewees judged it too dispersive, 
since the high amount of research in that website is difficult to manage for busy street-
level bureaucrats lacking time to consult research products on a regular basis. The 
creation of country webpages – in the case of HMG, this would ideally be a page or a 
space in the website of DFID country offices – where researchers working on a fragile 
country can communicate the title and a short abstract of their research would help 
overcome this problem. Researchers might also register their names with DFID country 
offices and be given direct access to this page so that they can directly add new research 
outputs or update their studies themselves, without relying on help from DFID 
personnel, which may require street-level bureaucrats’ extra time and delay the addition 
of new material on the webpage. Ideally, research carried out in the country should be 
organised by topic and themes and researchers interested in promoting their research to 
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street-level bureaucrats could communicate to DFID their contact details, together with 
a short summary or web-links to their work. In this way, street-level bureaucrats 
interested in a particular topic could easily find the names of the main researchers 
working in and on the same country, as well as the direct links to their research outputs. 
Street-level bureaucrats could regularly check new research carried out on a specific 
country, as the website would be regularly updated with new outputs and studies. This 
virtual library would grow over time to become an important hub of research to be 
consulted by different street-level bureaucrats working on a country over the years. 
Creating this page would cost HMG or international organisations and donors a limited 
amount in financial and human resources and the model could be also replicated in 
different country offices worldwide.  
 Linked to the previous recommendation, a fourth recommendation mainly 
targets HMG and proposes to: further improve the mechanisms to account for research in HMG 
programmes. As repeatedly underlined in the thesis, commissioned research in HMG has 
rapidly increased over the last decade. This growth was found to be one of the main 
variables that positively influenced the extent to which research was used in SSR policy 
programmes in Sierra Leone. This recommendation could be thus adopted by following 
a series of small changes and improvements aimed at smoothing the current use of 
research in HMG policy. Since some street-level bureaucrats found it difficult to know 
the different ways and mechanisms through which they can commission research, 
HMG should provide more communication on the available funding for research in-
country. Ideally, each member of HMG or adviser arriving in a fragile, conflict-affected 
country should be provided with a small amount of money to be used exclusively to 
commission short-term research that could help his or her work. If this approach would 
prove to be impossible or too expensive, HMG should at least improve the mechanisms 
through which research can become an integral part of British policy in fragile countries 
by ensuring more linkages between the research activities of the different departments. 
In this regard, DFID is at the vanguard of HMG efforts to use more research in policy 
programmes. Some of DFID’s mechanisms to account for research in policy could be 
replicated or used by other HMG departments. For example, researchers or staff from 
the GSDRC could be invited more often to DFID advisers or government retreats. 
Similarly, cross-governmental retreats and meetings could be organised more often, and 
the programmes and outputs of DFID’s retreats could be circulated to other HMG 
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street-level bureaucrats interested in the topic discussed. HMG departments should also 
be allowed to use helpdesks such as the GSDRC, since at the moment only DFID has 
access to the service. Likewise, exchange of information between FCO advisers, DFID 
knowledge brokers, and research staff from the Development, Concepts and Doctrine 
Centre of the Defence Academy should be improved. 
 These four recommendations were made following an analysis of the current 
practices, mechanisms, and organisational aspects which characterise the utilisation of 
research in HMG policy at headquarters and country level. The following set of 
recommendations is linked to structural issues that characterise the activities of 
international actors and donors in fragile countries and ultimately impact on the use of 
research on policy programmes.  
One of the main findings of this PhD thesis is that the volatile context of 
fragile, conflict-affected environments represents a key variable that impacts on the 
uptake and use of research in policy programmes and activities on the ground. The first 
British street-level bureaucrats in Sierra Leone needed and were able to adapt their 
policy decisions and activities to this changing environment, making urgent decisions 
and modelling their programmes according to the country context and needs. Such 
flexibility and capacity to rapidly adapt a policy to a volatile environment was one of the 
main factors ensuring the positive outcome of several early SSR reforms in Sierra 
Leone. However, the same flexibility and capacity to change a policy course is more 
difficult to maintain in contemporary times, as international organisations and bilateral 
donors often implement more structured and institutionalised large, multi-year 
programmes through private contractors, and such programmes do not always have the 
capacity to adapt themselves to a country context that rapidly evolves and changes. As a 
result, some street-level bureaucrats and researchers bemoaned the inability to use the 
research that has been developed in real time within a programme to inform its 
directions at strategic level. The fifth recommendation for international and bilateral 
donors and policy actors working in hostile environments is thus to regularly monitor 
and analyse, with the help of local researchers, a country’s context situation to: ensure 
flexibility in the policy programmes and adapt them to the changing situation on the ground. 
In the case of the UK, such analysis could take the form of regular, cross-
governmental political economy or conflict analyses before and during the 
implementation of British programmes and activities in a fragile country. DFID’s 
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Practice Paper Building Peaceful States and Societies already stresses the importance of such 
analyses, underlining how the Department “has developed a range of analytical tools to 
help understand state-building and peace-building dynamics” (DFID, 2010b, p. 39) and 
the implications of these analyses for its programmes. Preparing regular political 
economic analyses or conflict analyses in collaboration with other HMG departments 
working in a fragile country would help British street-level bureaucrats better 
understand and monitor the countries in which HMG operates, as well as the long-term 
direction of the cross-governmental state building efforts. This type of analysis should 
be conducted on a regular basis, in order to understand the different conflict dynamics 
and their evolution at local and regional level, map the various actors and their interests 
and capacities, and evaluate the effectiveness and the results of HMG state building 
efforts in a fragile environment. Such analyses should involve all the departments that 
have a presence in a country, as this cross-governmental approach would help them 
develop a shared view on the post-war trajectory of a state, align the different 
departments’ priorities to long-term HMG objectives, and allow them to adapt their 
programmes to the changes of a dynamic fragile context. Ideally, local researchers or 
international experts should be able to contribute to these analyses with their expertise. 
HMG street-level bureaucrats should be aware of the names of the most influential and 
trusted local researchers in their country of assignment. Their expertise and knowledge 
of the local context should be systematically sought and used for the production of such 
regular analyses, and for examining the main solutions that would solve a programme’s 
implementation problems. Likewise, HMG country programmes should have more 
flexibility and adaptability to new issues emerged from research. In order to obtain it, 
HMG street-level bureaucrats in country could organise yearly or quarterly meetings to 
discuss the potential impact on HMG programmes of new issues and findings arisen 
from research. Ideally, these meetings should be also attended (in video conference, if 
not in person) by the researchers who conducted these studies, in order to explore 
shared approaches for a programme to accommodate and tackle new issues and 
findings emerged from research. 
 Another problematic issue that emerged from this study and characterises 
international and bilateral state building and SSR engagements in fragile, conflict-
affected countries is the rapid turnover of donors’ personnel on the ground. As shown 
in the case of Sierra Leone, this rapid turnover also affects the utilisation of research in 
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policy, as street-level bureaucrats have limited time to read research products in 
preparation for the next posting, and sometimes do not have enough time to spend in 
the country to ensure that the research they commission is used in policy. Thus, the 
sixth recommendation of this study for international organisations and bilateral donors 
is to: improve street-level bureaucrats’ pre-deployment and induction. The rapid turnover of 
personnel on the ground sometimes means that street-level bureaucrats receive a limited 
informational briefing before they are posted to a new country. In these pre-departure 
meetings, they are usually briefed on the organisation’s or donor’s programmes and 
activities in the country, receiving only a small amount of information on the culture or 
history of the country. The handover of responsibilities between outgoing and incoming 
street-level bureaucrats should be improved and take place over a longer period of time. 
Ideally, the departing and arriving street-level bureaucrats should work alongside each 
other in the country office for a period of a week or at least three days to facilitate the 
transfer of knowledge and responsibilities to the newcomer. If such long handover 
would be too expensive, different and shorter briefings (i.e.: a three-day briefing at 
headquarters level, with video calls from the country offices) should be envisaged and 
instituted. Research should be part of these pre-deployment and induction practices: 
new street-level bureaucrats moving to a fragile country should be provided with a 
reading pack with information and research, in order to acquaint themselves with the 
main historical, political, and economic information of their new posting. They should 
be briefed by experts on the region before or at the beginning of their new placement, 
or at least receive a list of names of influential researchers who worked on a particular 
country, copies of their main studies, and their contact details.  
  Finally, findings from the analysis of the Sierra Leone case study and interviews 
with street-level bureaucrats and researchers presented in Chapter 6 have pointed to 
problems in the transition between successive programmes in fragile countries. These 
problems worsened with the growing HMG tendency to outsource the implementation 
of SSR assistance programmes to private contractors. In the case of Sierra Leone, some 
interviewees noted how the addition of a third layer of policy actors created a 
disjunction between headquarters, country offices, and sub-contractors working on the 
ground as part of some governmental-funded programmes. Figure 15 of the policy 
network in Chapter 6 has visually depicted this disconnect by linking DFID 
headquarters, DFID country office, and private contractors with dotted lines. 
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Furthermore, the findings drawn from the analysis of the information provided in the 
interviews presented in Chapter 6 have underlined how this lack of cohesion between 
the various actors appears to be particularly marked during transition phases and has 
negative consequences on the use of research in policy programmes and activities. Since 
continuity gaps have often characterised the transition between successive programmes 
on the ground, several street-level bureaucrats bemoaned poor information sharing (or 
loss of information) when different private partners or sub-contractors are asked to 
implement successive programmes in a country.  
 The seventh and final recommendation of this thesis for international 
organisations and bilateral donors working in fragile countries thus suggests to: improve 
coordination between headquarters, country offices, and the work of sub-contractors. Exchanges 
between country offices and private sub-contractors on the ground should be 
improved. In particular, the passage of information between different programmes 
needs to be ameliorated and managed at country office level. This would prevent losses 
of information and data and it would avoid turf wars between different private 
contractors who do not want to share their data with the incoming competitors. It 
would also spare time and resources for new contractors starting or implementing new 
programmes. Country offices should always maintain ownership and oversight of the 
different activities and programmes they fund, as these are often implemented by 
private commercial actors that focus on specific tasks without necessarily having a grasp 
of the donor’s broader cross-governmental strategy. Ownership over their different 
programmes within the country offices would give donors the capacity to maintain their 
programmes’ focus on the long-term political and governance dimension of state 
building and SSR policies rather than on sub-contractors’ short-term inputs and 
outcomes. International organisations’ and donors’ country offices should thus 
implement mechanisms such as electronic databases to own the information and data 
collected by private contractors in the course of the programmes. In this way, these data 
could be easily shared and accessed by street-level bureaucrats in the country, by 
researchers in need of information, and by different private actors implementing 
programmes in a fragile, conflict-affected country.  
 This normative section of the chapter drew from the analysis of the Sierra 
Leone case study a series of recommendations to improve the use and uptake of 
research in state building and SSR policy programmes and activities designed and 
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implemented by international organisations and bilateral donors working in fragile, 
conflict-affected countries. Together, Parts 8.2 and 8.3 presented the main explanatory 
and normative conclusions of this PhD research. The following and final Part 8.4 
concludes the thesis by underlining the importance of this PhD within the broader 
literature on post-war recovery and research utilisation. It analyses some positive aspects 
of this research, as well as its limits and potential weaknesses. Furthermore, it points to 
promising future research that could stem from this ground-breaking PhD work. 
8.4 The bigger picture: the importance and limits of this PhD and possible 
future research directions 
This study represents a ground-breaking investigation on an under-studied field of 
enquiry: the utilisation of research in internationally-led state building and SSR policy in 
fragile, conflict-affected countries. By directly engaging with this little-examined area, 
this PhD research could assume great importance for the general literature on research 
utilisation and post-war recovery. The thesis – and the three-year project to which this 
work is linked – constitutes one of the first attempts to scrutinise and understand the 
unexplored dynamics of research utilisation in two prominent post-war recovery policy 
practices, state building and SSR. The analysis also sought to address and fill a gap in 
the current literature on research utilisation: it deconstructed and examined the ways in 
which research has influenced and interacted with a fast-paced, cross-governmental, 
institution-oriented, and internationalised policy such as British-led SSR in conflict-
affected Sierra Leone.  
The thesis also addressed the principal question and related sub-questions of the 
PhD in an original and systematic way. It introduced concepts and notions from the 
literature on the policy process and research utilisation and adapted them to the context 
of post-conflict state building and SSR. It built the unique policy network of research 
and policy actors who worked on SSR in Sierra Leone and traced and analysed its 
expansion across countries (from the UK to Sierra Leone), and over time (from a first 
period of ‘fire-fighting’ solutions to the more stable post-conflict years). The utilisation 
of the policy network analysis to visually describe the different interactions between 
policy and research in the case study of the thesis constituted a new and promising 
approach to the analysis of complex and international policy processes like British-led 
SSR in conflict-affected Sierra Leone. The originality of the policy network model, and 
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the possibility to use and replicate this analytical tool in studies focusing on different 
countries, historical periods, and policies, is thus one of the strongest features of this 
research.  
A second hallmark of this PhD study is the utilisation of the backward tracking 
methodological approach to investigate the influence and role of research in British-led 
SSR policy. This approach proved to be extremely valuable in examining long-term and 
extremely technical policy programmes and activities such as those designed and 
implemented by the UK in conflict-affected Sierra Leone. Furthermore, it allowed a 
strong focus on those studies and research that actually influenced the activities of 
British street-level bureaucrats in the country, unravelling features of the policy process 
that would have been more difficult to discover using a forward tracking approach. The 
backward tracking approach is therefore a positive and promising aspect of this study 
which can be replicated in similar studies and evaluations. 
The explanatory conclusions in Section 8.2 of this chapter already emphasised 
the theoretical and empirical importance of this research. In addition, the normative 
conclusions in the precedent Section 8.3 provided some actionable recommendations 
that can be adopted by international organisations and bilateral donors to improve their 
use of research in externally-led state building and SSR policies. The ground-breaking 
analysis of this PhD research could thus have a great theoretical value for the literature 
on the policy process and research utilisation. Furthermore, it can provide important 
insights that can guide the activities of international and bilateral donors in conflict-
affected countries, as well as practical recommendations to maximise their use of 
research in state building and SSR programmes. Nonetheless, this final section of the 
thesis aims to situate this PhD study in a bigger theoretical and empirical context. It 
emphasises the great value of this research, but also underlines the possible limitations 
of the thesis. Acknowledging the potential weaknesses of this study is extremely 
important to rightly set and define the role of this PhD vis-à-vis the general literature on 
the subject. Furthermore, the analysis of the potential weaknesses of this study would 
enable new researchers to derive from this PhD some possible future research 
directions that, if pursued, could improve the theoretical and empirical value of this 
work and advance the research utilisation and post-war recovery disciplines.  
A first potential weakness of this PhD thesis is the fact that it focuses on a 
specific and allegedly successful case study. British-led SSR programmes and activities in 
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Sierra Leone constituted a set of policies which was mainly designed and implemented 
(particularly during the conflict years) by a principal bilateral donor, the UK. 
Furthermore, this donor has emerged in the recent years at the forefront of the post-
war recovery and development agenda as one of the actors that mostly looked at and 
promoted the use of research in policy. A thesis analysing such case study therefore has 
most likely focused on a ‘best case scenario’ of use and policy influence of research in 
state building and SSR policy practices. It examined a mainly bilateral set of policies, 
designed and implemented by a donor that, over the last decade, increasingly promoted 
the SSR agenda at international level while at the same time championing the use of 
research in policy. As a consequence, it would be worth exploring whether and how the 
utilisation of SSR research in internationally-driven policy followed similar dynamics 
and patterns in different case studies. Multilateral interventions comprising numerous 
and different policy actors, SSR initiatives of donors that promote the use of research in 
their practices in a less systematic way, less successful or more contemporary 
engagements such as Afghanistan or Iraq could constitute interesting case studies to be 
investigated and compared to the Sierra Leone case.  
A second potential limitation of this PhD research is linked to the fact that its 
quantitative survey had a very low rate of response, equal only to 10% of the people 
approached. Such a low rate of response should be considered more as a missed 
opportunity for policy-makers and street-level bureaucrats, rather than as an actual 
weakness of the study. The potential survey participants were contacted and reminded 
about it on several occasions; therefore the researcher put in place all the possible 
measures to assure policy actors’ participation in the study. Nonetheless, this was not 
sufficient to prevent a low rate of response from HMG policy-makers and street-level 
bureaucrats. This circumstance – per se a potential finding indicating practitioners’ lack 
of time to answer the questions of the survey or their limited interest on the subject – is 
particularly unfortunate and a missed opportunity, as collecting a larger amount of 
responses would have provided a valuable quantitative, cross-HMG measurement of 
the practices of research utilisation across British government over time. Furthermore, 
the questions of the survey would have constituted a useful methodological tool to be 
potentially re-utilised in similar research on the same issue. The survey could have been 
replicated in different contexts and policy programmes designed and implemented by 
the same HMG or by other international organisations or bilateral donors. The 
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comparison between findings and results from similar surveys targeting other HMG 
programmes, international organisations, and donors would have allowed a thorough 
investigation of the different international organisations’ and donors’ practices of 
research utilisation in state building and SSR policy, and of the evolution of these 
practices over time. 
Future research could potentially stem from this study, partially redressing the 
limits of this ground-breaking PhD research. As previously underlined, a highly 
promising and important avenue of enquiry could explore the utilisation of research in 
different or more contemporary SSR case studies. It could compare the findings from 
Sierra Leone to other SSR programmes of different bilateral donors, or to SSR policy 
programmes and activities promoted in the framework of current multilateral 
engagements. Such a study would investigate different dynamics of research utilisation 
in policy, examining the ways in which various international organisations and bilateral 
donors account for research in their policy and potentially streamlining at international 
level current best practices of research utilisation. 
A second promising avenue of research emerging from this study could look 
more systematically at one of the main themes emerged from this PhD research – 
namely the different research uses and needs of headquarters level policy-makers and 
street-level bureaucrats in fragile countries. This type of study could focus on the high 
level of autonomy and agency of SSR street-level bureaucrats vis-à-vis their respective 
headquarters. It could investigate the different interactions between headquarters, 
country offices, and private contractors and sub-contractors in different case studies 
and in contemporary SSR interventions. Starting from this enquiry, it could look how 
these different policy actors use research and envisage some mechanisms or solutions to 
address and narrow what the thesis has called the ‘research-policy’ gap. Such a study 
would be of extreme importance for the donors’ policy-making processes, as it would 
investigate the headquarters-country divide and would potentially streamline 
organisational policy practices and delicate passages between successive SSR 
programmes implemented by different private contractors.  
Thirdly, another possible avenue of enquiry arising from this thesis could 
examine the potential of the new technologies in promoting improved influence of 
research on policy. This type of research would consider the role and potential of new 
media and technologies in research utilisation, looking at the ways in which they could 
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foster better uptake of research into state building and SSR policy. The world today is 
increasingly connected by powerful social media platforms and communication 
technologies which allow real-time interactions at a global level. As a consequence, 
knowledge and research have the potential to be disseminated more widely and quickly, 
shaping the actions and policy decisions of policy-makers and street-level bureaucrats in 
real time. Conducting research on the ways in which new technologies and media can 
promote a better use of research in policy would help researchers disseminate their 
work and reach wider policy audiences. Furthermore, it would assist international 
organisations and donors maximise the impact of their commissioned studies on 
bilateral and multilateral policy. For example, new technologies could support the 
creation of global networks and online research repositories which could be accessed 
and consulted by international organisations, bilateral donors, and national 
governments. Likewise, mechanisms to account for a better use of research in policy 
such as the GSDRC could be promoted at the international level with the aim to 
provide knowledge on demand for a variety of international and bilateral policy actors. 
New technologies and media thus have the potential to favour a better interaction, 
communication, knowledge-sharing, and exchange of information between international 
research and policy actors. A future study could explore this immense potential and aim 
to improve and harmonise the use of research in policy at global level.  
Finally, a fourth avenue of enquiry could link this research to the recent growth 
of the ‘government-to-government’ (G2G) trade (Fuller & Romer, 2014; The 
Economist, 2014). G2G trade aims to allow national governments or cities to join 
forces with or delegate to other governments the provision of part of their public 
services. This trend was presented in a recent, thought-provoking article of The 
Economist (2014), and development practitioners have analysed the possible threats and 
opportunities entailed in the growth of the G2G trade (Green D., 2014). Future 
research could start from the analysis of this PhD to look at the interactions between 
research and the emerging G2G trade, focusing on the role that international experts 
and local researchers could play in this growing phenomenon. This PhD thesis has 
demonstrated how, in the case of Sierra Leone, the use and imposition of external 
blueprints in different contexts necessarily required a re-adaptation to the local tradition 
and culture. A future study could thus examine the ways in which local and international 
researchers could shape and interact with the G2G trade. Such increased interaction 
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between policy and research would avoid a repetition of blueprint models of 
government in different countries and assure a fine-tuning and adaptation of foreign 
experiences to local realities. Studying the ways in which international and local 
researchers could integrate the technocratic G2G trade would thus constitute a 
promising future research avenue with the potential to shape international policies and 






Appendix: distinctions between the PhD and its overarching project 
This PhD research is linked to the three-year ESRC/DFID funded Research Project 
‘The Influence of DFID-Sponsored State Building-Oriented Research on British Policy 
in Fragile, Post-Conflict Environments’ (Grant Reference: RES-167-25-0596). 
Nonetheless, as a distinct and original piece of research, the thesis has re-elaborated, 
changed, and adapted the general goals, objectives, framework, and methodology of the 
project. Whilst being part of an overarching research project, this PhD study differs 
from it in four main aspects: (i) the use of a backward tracking approach to deconstruct 
the influence of research on policy-makers’ and street-level bureaucrats’ choices; (ii) a 
focus on the influence of research, rather than DFID-sponsored research, on British 
policy; (iii) a focus on one distinct policy, SSR, rather than general state building policy; 
and (iv) a focus on only one country, Sierra Leone, rather than on the three case study 
countries of the overarching project.  
 The backward tracking methodology, an approach introduced and analysed in 
the methodological Chapter 4, aimed to complete and incorporate the general forward 
tracking methodology of the main project. The project methodology began with a 
mapping of DFID-funded research to identify relevant state building-oriented studies 
since the end of the Cold War. From this first selection of research, the project 
identified three research clusters, defined as time-bound concentrations of research with 
similar findings and themes pertaining to DFID-sponsored state building-oriented 
research. DFID-funded state building research was then assigned to these three 
different clusters and the project looked at the influence of research studies and themes 
pertaining to the different clusters on British HMG policy at headquarters level as well 
as three conflict-affected countries: Afghanistan, Nepal, and Sierra Leone.194 Conversely, 
this PhD research employed the backward tracking approach, which started from 
British policy and street-level bureaucrats in Sierra Leone to understand the role and 
influence played by research in the SSR process of that war-affected country. As 
explained in Part 4.2, the decision to adopt this approach was based on three reasons 
arising from the specific nature of the research, as well as operational and practical 
                                                          
194 The different steps of this preparatory phase have been summarised in the Project Progress Paper 
(Barakat, Waldman & Varisco, 2011b), presented to DFID in December 2011. 
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considerations. The backward approach thus complemented and enriched the forward 
tracking methodology of the main research project.  
The second difference between the PhD research and its overarching 
ESRC/DFID project is that the latter focuses on DFID-sponsored state building-
oriented research, whereas the former investigates the influence of general research into 
policy. The main reason behind this choice was linked to the previous decision to use a 
backward tracking approach. If a forward tracking approach starts from the 
identification of the specific research that needs to be tracked into policy, a backward 
tracking approach conversely starts from UK policy and street-level bureaucrats in a 
country. Given this different starting point and focus, a study evaluating the influence 
of research on such policies could not limit itself to a particular and specific set of 
research – in this case DFID-sponsored, state building-oriented. Instead, such a study 
needed to understand and capture all the possible research influences identified by 
policy-makers and street-level bureaucrats, not only those deriving from UK sponsored 
studies. A further reason for a wider focus on research was that, as shown in Chapter 3, 
in the last decade the UK state building policy agenda has developed in line with the 
international agenda. These policy agendas have interacted and evolved together with 
research and historical events, sometimes anticipating some research themes, more 
often adapting to them in a dynamic and evolving relationship. Focusing only on 
DFID-sponsored research would not have presented a comprehensive account of this 
general framework, capturing only a limited part of the several studies, reports, case 
studies, evaluations, articles, books and informal relations that could have shaped the 
thinking and the activities of UK street-level bureaucrats working in conflict-affected 
Sierra Leone. In order to prevent such a partial analysis, the thesis has thus chosen to 
focus on general rather than DFID-sponsored research and on its influence on UK SSR 
policy.        
The third difference between this PhD thesis and its overarching research 
project is the choice to focus only on one distinct policy, SSR, rather than on general 
state building policy. A focus on state building would have been a too wide and general 
subject, difficult to be managed and tackled within the framework of a PhD thesis, 
given its excessive breadth and lack of specificity. Furthermore, such a general focus on 
state building would have somehow replicated the research in the overarching project, 
whose aim is to understand the influence of state building-oriented research on British 
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policy in three different conflict-affected countries. A more specific focus was therefore 
needed. Such a policy-specific attention is aimed at incorporating and implementing the 
more general analysis of state building of the overarching research project. In this sense, 
the PhD complemented the main ESRC/DFID research with a more in-depth 
investigation that shed light on the processes influencing the uptake of research into a 
peculiar British policy in a specific conflict-affected country. As explained in the 
introductory chapter of the thesis, the choice to focus on SSR followed an academic as 
well as a personal and professional interest, as I thought that my academic and 
professional background on security and disarmament studies would have enabled me 
to better evaluate such policies, compared to other state building activities promoted 
and implemented by the UK in conflict-affected countries. 
The fourth and final difference between this PhD thesis and its parent 
ESRC/DFID project lies in the choice to focus only on one country, Sierra Leone, 
rather than on three case study countries: Afghanistan, Nepal, and Sierra Leone. The 
selection of the three case studies for the main project followed a multistage process 
based on several different criteria and explained in depth by Barakat, Waldman, and 
Varisco (2011b).195 The criteria taken into account in the selection were: (i) the past and 
future commitment of DFID in the countries; (ii) the fragility and post-conflict 
situation of the states according to the DFID proxy list of fragile states (DFID, 2005) 
and the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA); (iii) a 
judgement based on an evaluation of country-related documents, historical 
considerations, security problems, and stability; and (iv) the geographical spread of the 
countries. 
The selection process started from the identification of the countries where 
DFID has worked since the end of the Cold War and will concentrate its efforts until 
2015. The rationale behind this first criterion was to focus only on those countries of 
policy relevance for DFID, in order to be up to date with the Department’s activities 
and improve the relevance of the project’s findings. The research team relied on public 
data and documents available from the DFID website such as the aid reviews on 
bilateral and multilateral aid announced in March 2011 by International Development 
Secretary Andrew Mitchell (DFID, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d), as well as two documents 
produced by DFID to take forward the findings of the aid reviews at both multilateral 
                                                          
195 Part of the following description has been used in Barakat, Waldman & Varisco (2011b). 
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and bilateral level (2011e, 2011f) to derive an initial list of 27 countries. As a second 
criterion of selection, the research team considered among those 27 countries only the 
countries that were listed as fragile by the DFID ‘proxy list’ of fragile states (DFID, 
2005), narrowing the number of states to 14. Since DFID’s list of fragile states was 
from 2005, the research team cross-checked the 14 countries with the 2010 World 
Bank’s CPIA index. The CPIA is the most prominent and widely used index to measure 
state fragility. It assesses each country’s policy and institutional framework and consists 
of 16 criteria grouped into four equally weighted clusters: (i) economic management; (ii) 
structural policies; (iii) policies for social inclusion and equity; and (iv) public sector 
management and institutions. CPIA scores are used by the World Bank and the OECD 
DAC to determine the World Bank’s Country Performance Rating, a score which is 
used to allocate aid and to categorise states as fragile or LICUS. Countries with a CPIA 
score below 3.2 are considered fragile states. The analysis of the 2010 CPIA scores – the 
most recent scores at the time of the selection process – excluded from the list of 
potential case studies every country with a CPIA above 3.2, restricting in this way the 
number of countries in the list to 11. The third criterion of selection was a judgement 
based on an evaluation of country-related documents, historical considerations, the 
presence of a clear peacebuilding and state building process, security problems, and 
stability. This process of selection resulted in a list of four potential case studies: 
Afghanistan, Liberia, Nepal, and Sierra Leone. Lastly, as a fourth selection criterion the 
research team considered the geographical spread of the countries selected and the 
future commitment of DFID and the British government to these states. This allowed 
the research team to exclude Liberia from the list of potential case studies, as Sierra 
Leone would have received a larger amount of aid compared to Liberia until 2015. 
Despite the same regional location, the research team decided to include both Nepal 
and Afghanistan, as the different historical experiences and conflicts characterising the 
two countries justified a deep study of both states. 
Once the selection of the project’s three country case studies was complete, the 
choice of Sierra Leone as the case study for this PhD came almost as a natural 
consequence of the decision to focus on SSR. As already underlined in the introductory 
chapter of the thesis, although the UK supported and participated in SSR policies and 
activities in Afghanistan and Nepal, British involvement in Sierra Leone SSR was the 
first and one of the most important examples of SSR in conflict-affected environments. 
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The choice of Sierra Leone as a case study for this PhD thesis was therefore dictated by 
the need to understand whether and how research and knowledge influenced and 
interacted with this early and allegedly successful SSR intervention. 
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Glossary: list of abbreviations 
ACPP   Africa Conflict Prevention Pool 
AFRC    Armed Forces Revolutionary Council  
APC    All People’s Congress   
ASJP    Access to Security and Justice Programme  
ASSN   African Security Sector Network 
BICC    Bonn International Centre for Conversion  
BMATT   British Military Advisory Training Team  
CCSSP   Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project  
CDF   Civil Defence Forces 
CHAD   Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department  
CHASE  Conflict Humanitarian and Security Department 
CID    Criminal Investigation Department 
CISU    Central Intelligence Security Unit   
CPDTF   Commonwealth Police Development Task Force   
CPIA   Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 
CRISE Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and 
Ethnicity 
CSDG   Conflict, Security & Development Group 
DAI   Development Alternatives Inc. 
DAT   Defence Advisory Team 
DCAF    Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 
DDR   Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 
DFID   Department for International Development 
DISEC   District Security Committee  
DRC   Democratic Republic of Congo 
EC   European Commission 
ECOMOG Economic Community Of West African States Monitoring 
Group 
ECOWAS  Economic Community Of West African States 
ESRC   Economic and Social Research Council 
EU   European Union 
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FCO   Foreign & Commonwealth Office 
FISU   Force and Intelligence Security Unit 
FSU   Family Support Units 
G2G    Government-to-government 
GCPP   Global Conflict Prevention Pool 
GFN-SSR   Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform   
GoSL   Government of Sierra Leone 
GSDRC   Governance and Social Development Resource Centre   
HDI   Human Development Index 
HMG    Her Majesty’s Government   
IDS   Institute of Development Studies 
IGP    Inspector-General of Police  
IMATT   International Military Advisory Training Team  
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
ISAT   International Security Advisory Team  
ISU   Internal Security Unit 
JSCO   Justice Sector Coordination Office  
JSDP    Justice Sector Development Programme  
LDP   Law Development Programme 
LICUS   Low-Income Countries Under Stress 
LSE   London School of Economic and Political Science  
MACP   Military Aid to Civil Power   
MIA    Ministry of Internal Affairs  
MOD   Ministry of Defence 
MODAT  Ministry of Defence Advisory Team 
NAO   National Audit Office  
NPFL    National Patriotic Front of Liberia  
NPRC   National Provisional Ruling Council  
NGO   Non-governmental Organisation 
ODA    Official Development Assistance   
ODI   Overseas Development Institute 
OECD   Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
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OECD DAC Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
Development Assistance Committee 
ONS    Office of National Security   
ORBAT   Order of Battle  
OSD   Operational Support Division 
PCRU   Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit 
PEAKS   Professional Evidence and Applied Knowledge Services   
PRDE   Poverty Reduction in Difficult Environments   
PRDU   Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit  
PROSEC  Provincial Security Committee  
PRSP   Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
R4D   Research for Development 
RAPID  Research and Policy in Development  
RED    Research and Evidence Division  
RSLAF   Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces   
RSLMF   Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces  
RUF   Revolutionary United Front 
SILSEP   Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Programme   
SLA   Sierra Leone Army 
SLP   Sierra Leone Police 
SLPP   Sierra Leone People’s Party  
SSD   Special Security Division 
SSDAT  Security Sector Defence Advisory Team 
SSR   Security Sector Reform 
STTT    Short Term Training Team  
SU   Stabilisation Unit 
TRC   Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
UCDP   Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
UK   United Kingdom 
UN   United Nations 
UNAMSIL   United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone  
UNDP   United Nations Development Programme  
UNIOSIL   United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone  
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UNIPSIL  United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone 
UNOMSIL   United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone  
UNSC   United Nations Security Council 
US   United States 
USAID  United States Agency for International Development 
USDOD   United States Department of Defense 
USDOS   United States Department of State  
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